The World Bank estimates that US $1.5 trillion, or 2 percent of global GDP, is paid each year in bribery. Moreover, as globalization advances and economic integration deepens, this corruption undermines and distorts fair competition in international transactions as it induces misallocation of resources. The OECD (Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997) and the UN (Anti-Corruption Convention of 2003) have established legally binding standards to fight against corruption. Korea is a party to the OECD (United Nations) Anti-Bribery (Corruption) Convention, and is actively engaged in anti-corruption activities in the international community, including the G20 and APEC. However, over the years Korea has been ceaselessly embroiled in bribery scandals, which has damaged its global image and reputation. According to the 2016 survey of CPI (Corruption Perception Index) conducted by Transparency International, Korea ranked 52nd place out of 176 countries, a rank plunge by 15 steps compared to the previous year.
  From this point of view, this study aims to empirically examine how corruption affects trade, economic growth and welfare. Based on these empirical findings, policy implications and suggestions for the successful implementation of anti-corruption policy will be drawn. These evidence-based analyses and policy suggestions can then be used to form a public consensus on the benefits of successfully implementing anti-corruption policy.
  Chapter 2 explores anti-corruption efforts taking place in the international community. The members of the OECD concluded the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and 2009 Recommendation. In addition to these measures, the OECD published the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to combat bribery in international business transactions. In 2003 the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was concluded at the UN, making it the most comprehensive and universal of international anti-corruption instruments, and currently state members are undergoing Implementation Review. The G20 is biannually publishing the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan and has been releasing its High-Level Principles series on several anti-corruption issues. The APEC, OAS, EU have also been contributing to the enhancement of anti-corruption policies and capacities in the region. The WTO failed to conclude anti-corruption norms but some regulations in the Government Procurement Agreement and Trade Facilitation Agreement have been designed to improve transparency and tackle corruption. Free trade agreements initiated by the U.S. such as the KORUS FTA and TPPA include anti-corruption provisions and the contents of those provisions have evolved over time.
  In Chapter 3, we attempted to examine the inefficient and ineffective elements embedded in Korean anti-corruption policy and its implementation. We also utilize the outcome of surveys produced by the Transparency International (TI), the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), World Economic Forum (WEF) and Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. The results of the analyses are as follows: ① Inefficiency of government anti-corruption policy, ② Low public awareness of anti-corruption participation, and ③ Lack of ethical awareness of corporations are identified as the key factors that hinder the efficiency of anti-corruption systems.
  In Chapter 4, we use the Novy (2013) model to empirically measure the effect of corruption on trade costs. The correlation between corruption control and trade costs was estimated using the corruption perception index of the Transparency International as a proxy variable and the corruption control index of the World Bank as an alternative index. According to the estimation outcome, the trade cost decreased by 0.406% when the corruption perception index increased by 1%. On the other hand, when we apply the World Bank’s Corruption Control Index as an alternative index, a one-point increase in the control index is expected to yield a 21.7% reduction in trade costs.
  In Chapter 5, we attempted to measure the economic effects of corruption on trade and welfare by using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. In the first scenario, in which we assume an improvement in Korea’s level of anti-corruption to the average level of APEC economies, exports are expected to increase by 3.84% over the medium to long term. Meanwhile, when Korea’s anti-corruption level rises to the OECD average, in which scenario trade cost is assumed to be reduced by 11.973%, real GDP increased by 8.36% and the welfare increase amounted to about $158.3 billion. Also, taking into account the additional effects of capital accumulation, real GDP gain could reach up to 23%.
  In Chapter 6, based on the previous analysis, we propose the following policy suggestions. First, Korean businesses should establish ethical management principles to correct illicit business behavior. In addition, as addressed by the OECD Policy Framework for Investment, Korean companies should be more actively responsive to societal expectations communicated for instance by inter-governmental organizations, within the workplace, by local communities and trade unions, or via the press. Second, the Korean government should take concrete steps to fight corruption, and take the UK Anti-Corruption Plan and US FCPA and Criminal Code as reference points for establishing “zero tolerance” practices. Third, the Korean government may consider delegating a powerful level of authority to corruption prevention organizations in the manner of Singapore and Hong Kong, and building an effective anti-corruption system by reinforcing education on the harmful effects of corruption. Finally, there is a need for policy consideration to provide stronger protection for so-called “whistleblowers” to facilitate the process of reporting cases of public and private corruption and foreign bribery.
  This study contributes to the academia in that it is the first attempt to estimate the correlation between levels of corruption, trade costs and trade. However, despite the many advantages of the CGE model, it is inevitably subject to interpretation of the estimates, which in turn cannot be technically captured by the structure and characteristics of variables used in the quantitative analysis. In order to conduct an empirical analysis which is more realistic in its approach, we will continue to develop a GVC corruption index that takes an in-depth approach to new areas of ​​corruption occurrence and value added factors.
  In addition, while this study analyzed the effects of corruption on trade and trade costs using the corruption perception index and corruption control index, we cannot rule out the possibility that corruption levels in a country bear a close relationship with the stage of development or institutions of the country. The challenge of analyzing the effect that interactions between the system and level of corruption have on trade costs remains a task for future study. 

서언

국문요약

제1장 서론

1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적과 방법
3. 연구의 차별성과 보고서의 구성

제2장 국제사회의 부패 방지 논의 동향

1. 국제기구에서의 부패 방지 활동
    가. OECD
    나. UN
    다. G20
    라. 지역기구
    마. 소결
2. 무역협정에서의 논의 현황
    가. WTO
    나. FTA
    다. 소결

제3장 한국의 부패 수준에 대한 국제적 평가와 과제

1. 한국의 부패 수준에 대한 국제사회의 평가
    가. 한국의 부패 방지 제도
    나. 한국의 부패 인식 수준에 대한 국제사회의 평가
2. 부패 방지 제도의 효율성 저해요인
    가. 정부 부패 방지 정책 추진의 비효율성
    나. 일반 국민의 낮은 부패 방지 참여 의식
    다. 기업의 윤리의식 결여
3. 소결

제4장 부패와 무역 및 무역비용

1. 부패와 무역 및 무역비용의 관계에 대한 이론적 배경
2. 무역비용의 도출
    가. 무역비용의 도출
    나. 무역비용 현황
3. 부패가 무역에 미치는 영향
    가. 실증분석모형과 데이터
    나. 분석 결과
4. 부패가 무역비용에 미치는 영향
    가. 실증분석모형과 데이터
    나. 기본 분석 결과
    다. 강건성 검증(robustness check)

제5장 부패 방지의 경제적 효과 분석

1. 실증분석을 위한 시나리오 구상
    가. 시나리오 구상을 위한 고려사항
    나. 시나리오 설정
2. 부패 방지의 경제적 효과 분석
    가. 시나리오의 설정의 경제적 함의
    나. 분석모형 및 데이터
3. 분석 결과

제6장 결론 및 정책제언

1. 부패 방지 정책의 경제적 효과 및 정책 함의
2. 부패 문제 해결을 위한 개선과제
3. 부패 방지 정책의 효율성 제고를 위한 정책제언
    가. 부패 방지 제도 개선을 위한 외국의 모범사례 활용
    나. 국제공조 확대
4. 맺음말

참고문헌

Executive Summary