This research rigorously analyzes structural changes in Central Asia’s global value chains following the Russia-Ukraine war and proposes new directions for economic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. Given the high likelihood of prolonged Western economic sanctions against Russia, which have been sustained at unprecedented levels since the war, it is essential to examine the structural impact of these sanctions on Central Asia’s global value chains. In particular, as Central Asian countries have exerted national efforts to enhance export competitiveness to achieve stable economic growth, this study identifies the effects of the sanctions on Central Asia’s trade structure, primarily from the perspective of exports. Moreover, amid the deepening fragmentation of the global trade environment, it is necessary to explore new directions for economic cooperation that reflect the impact of the sanctions on Central Asia’s global value chains to enhance the quality of Korea-Central Asia economic cooperation. Based on the analysis of Central Asia’s global value chains, this research presents future directions for economic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. In Chapter 2, we analyze the foreign value-added in the exports of Central Asian countries. Specifically, using Eora’s MRIO data, we decompose the value-added of Central Asian exports from 2014 to 2022 to quantitatively identify which countries’ value-added was utilized and in which industries. There are commonalities and differences among the five Central Asian countries in terms of the share of foreign value-added in total exports, the industry-specific share of foreign value-added in exports, and changes in foreign value-added in total exports over time. Since the 2014 Crimea crisis, the share of foreign value-added in exports increased in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while it declined in all other Central Asian countries. In terms of industry-specific trends, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan primarily utilized foreign value-added in manufacturing exports, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan relied more on foreign value-added in service exports. Notably, the share of foreign value-added in manufacturing exports for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also declined after the Crimea crisis, similar to the trends observed in the other three Central Asian countries. The relative importance of Russia as a major supplier of export value-added for all five Central Asian countries weakened after 2016. These findings suggest that the 2014 Crimea crisis has served as an external shock, triggering structural changes in the export trend of Central Asia. If the 2014 Crimea crisis has acted as an external shock that caused structural changes in Central Asia’s exports, the Western sanctions against Russia introduced after 2014 could represent those economic effects. Based on this intuition, Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of Western sanctions on Russia on the export structure of Central Asia. To this end, this research uses bilateral trade data for 190 trading partners in 26 industry categories from 2011 to 2022. Total export volumes are divided into intermediate goods and final goods exports to separately identify effects of sanctions against Russia on Central Asia’s exports of intermediate and final goods, respectively. Additionally, exports to 35 sanction-participating countries and 155 non-participating countries are distinguished to examine how sanctions against Russia influence Central Asia’s integration into global value chains. The sanctions imposed after the 2014 Crimea crisis led to a decline in intermediate goods exports from Central Asia until 2016. However, a sharp increase followed until 2018, after which the growth slowed. In contrast, final goods exports did not experience significant declines around 2014 but steadily increased after 2015, with growth moderating slightly after 2019. These findings suggest that the sanctions have heterogeneous effects on intermediate and final goods exports from Central Asia. Also, significant differences were observed in intermediate goods exports to sanction-participating and non-participating countries. After 2015, exports to sanction-participating countries continued to decline, while exports to non-participating countries recovered rapidly. This indicates a possible shift in Central Asia’s global value chain participation after the 2014 Crimea crisis, suggesting that intermediate goods exports initially directed to sanction-participating countries were redirected to non-participating countries. Notably, in the manufacturing sector, exports to non-participating countries began to concentrate more rapidly after 2014, indicating a deepening of export concentration patterns in manufacturing intermediate goods. Finally, the sanctions significantly reduced Central Asia’s intermediate goods exports, excluding those to Russia and Ukraine. Additional sanctions against Russia are estimated to have decreased manufacturing intermediate goods exports from the five Central Asian countries by 10–20%. This raises concerns that economic sanctions against Russia could limit the participation of Central Asia’s manufacturing sector in global value chains.

Based on the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, it seems that the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war serves as an external shock that delays the integration of Central Asian exports into global value chains, both upstream and downstream, as long as economic sanctions against Russia persist. In particular, similar to the structural changes following the 2014 Crimea crisis, the 2022 war is likely to have a significant adverse impact on Central Asia’s manufacturing exports. In this backdrop, Chapter 4 explores policies to expand economic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia, focusing on the manufacturing sector. The findings in Chapter 2 reveal that, despite substantial progress in trade volume between Korea and Central Asia, Korea’s relative contribution to the value-added of Central Asian exports remains minimal. Therefore, to effectively enhance bilateral economic cooperation, it is essential to identify new cooperation strategies that reflect the structural changes in Central Asia’s trade environment caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. In particular, to respond to Central Asia’s increasing demand for cooperation aimed at export expansion(enhancing export competitiveness) and manufacturing development after the war, emphasis should be placed on strategies that enhance the value-added of Central Asia’s manufacturing exports. Additionally, with the growing importance of stabilizing supply chains for strategic resources, Central Asian countries are aiming to add higher value and expand exports of their abundant mineral resources. Central Asia is rich in key minerals critical to Korea, such as uranium, copper, anthracite, and nickel, which are also designated as strategic minerals in Korea. Furthermore, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are actively pursuing lithium development, making it necessary to explore cooperative directions for critical mineral resources as well.

In Chapter 4, an extensive review of the literature examines the development strategies and industrial status of the manufacturing and mining sectors in Central Asia. It identifies opportunities and risks for cooperation in each sector. Based on this analysis, specific directions for collaboration in these areas are proposed. For the manufacturing sector, differentiated cooperation strategies tailored to each country’s economic development stage and industrial structure are necessary. For instance, high-value-added manufacturing sectors, such as automobiles and automobile parts, are promising areas for collaboration with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the more industrially advanced countries in Central Asia, given their established industrial infrastructure, financial industries, institutional frameworks, and manufacturing bases. It is important to note that the impact of sanctions against Russia varies across sectors in Central Asia’s exports. While these sanctions have significantly hindered the region’s exports of intermediate goods, their effect on final goods exports has been relatively small. Thus, cooperation between Korea and Central Asia in the manufacturing of intermediate goods should focus on supporting local production of final goods. Specifically, Korean intermediate goods manufacturers should establish a presence in the region to facilitate the local production and export of final products. Notably, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), utilize tariff benefits when exporting within the union. Additionally, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan benefit from the European Union’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), which allows duty-free exports of over 6,000 items to the EU. Local production of manufactured goods can thus offer advantages in terms of tariff reductions for exports, and the overall trade environment is expected to improve gradually.

In mineral resource cooperation, the key priority is creating high value-added through mineral processing. The five Central Asian countries, all landlocked and facing challenging international logistics conditions, have relatively underdeveloped transportation and logistics infrastructure, rendering value creation an urgent necessity. Local mineral processing not only helps overcome high logistics costs but also aligns with Central Asia’s goals of advancing its mineral processing industries to add value to its resources. In the long term, improving transportation and logistics infrastructure must include efforts such as building roads, railways, and airport facilities, as well as enhancing traffic network management through digital technologies. Since the physical expansion of logistics infrastructure requires active private sector participation, appropriate government measures are essential to encourage such involvement. Many infrastructure projects in Central Asia are currently carried out as public-private partnerships(PPPs), necessitating accurate information sharing and sufficient guarantees to mitigate risks. Additionally, initiatives such as logistics network digitalization can be pursued as part of development assistance (ODA) programs. Meanwhile, corruption poses a critical barrier, especially in the exploration, extraction, and development of natural resources, underscoring the importance of government actions. Similarly to logistics infrastructure, mineral resource cooperation generally involves large-scale, long-term investments. Thus, it is vital to establish and maintain regular intergovernmental communication channels to ensure robust enforcement of contract against corruption and rent-seeking behaviors. Given the significant power wielded by political elites in Central Asia, intergovernmental mediation and resolution efforts are even more critical when issues arise. Furthermore, as with the expansion of transportation and logistics infrastructure, it is necessary to develop policies that induce private companies to participate in mineral resource exploration, extraction, and development with a certain level of government guarantees to help distribute risks effectively.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 연구 방법 및 범위

제2장 우크라이나 전쟁 이후 중앙아시아의 글로벌 가치사슬 변화
1. 중앙아시아의 글로벌 가치사슬 변화 추이
2. 글로벌 가치사슬 변화에 대한 해석
3. 소결 및 시사점

제3장 외부충격이 중앙아시아 국가의 글로벌 가치사슬에 미치는 영향 분석
1. 서론
2. 데이터 및 계량방법론
3. 추정결과
4. 소결 및 시사점

제4장 한-중앙아시아 주요 산업별 부가가치 증대를 위한 협력 방안
1. 한-중앙아시아 경제 협력 기회 요인과 위험 요인
2. 한-중앙아시아 주요 산업별 부가가치 증대를 위한 정책 방향

제5장 결론
1. 요약
2. 정책 시사점

참고문헌

부록
1. 1차산업 3개 세부산업의 중간재 수출액 추이
2. 제조업 9개 세부산업의 중간재 수출액 추이
3. 서비스산업 13개 세부산업의 중간재 수출액 추이
4. 1차산업 3개 세부산업의 최종재 수출액 추이
5. 제조업 9개 세부산업의 최종재 수출액 추이
6. 서비스산업 13개 세부산업의 최종재 수출액 추이

Executive Summary