This study comprehensively analyzes North Korea’s tariff and non-tariff regimes and suggests the direction of North Korea’s tariff and non-tariff regimes in the process of reform and opening up. The purpose of the study is to analyze North Korea’s tariff and non-tariff systems to reveal the direction of the North Korean authorities’ trade policy, the structure and characteristics of the legal and institutional framework, and to identify priority reforms for the country’s future integration into the international economy. This study differs from previous studies in that it is the first to quantitatively analyze North Korea’s tariff rates system. 

Chapter 2 examines the role of the legal system in North Korea and the history and purpose of the trade regime. North Korean authorities regulate tariff and non-tariff regimes through trade laws, customs laws, and tariff rate schedules. In North Korea, the guidance and policies of the Workers’Party take precedence over the law, but for the most part, the law governs the economy as a whole. North Korea’s customs law is similar to ours in that it aims to protect domestic industries, but it does not mention raising revenue through tariffs. In practice, however, North Korea’s tariff system appears to be used to raise revenue by absorbing foreign exchange held by private owners. One of the unique aspects of North Korea’s trade laws is that they are designed to ensure national security. This stems from the closed nature of the North Korean economy, which is designed to preventpolitical and economic influence from neighboring countries through trade, as well as the transmission of foreign cultures through imports and exports that could agitate the North Korean population and threaten the socialist system.

Chapter 3 analyzes North Korea’s tariff rate structure and assesses its industrial protection and fiscal revenue effects. A key feature of North Korea’s tariffs is the low overall level of tariffs. The average nominal tariff rate was 5.5% and the average real tariff rate was only 4.6% based on the foreign exchange rate. Structurally, the tariffs have a sloping tariff structure with higher tariff rates depending on the level of processing, but the overall tariff level is still low enough to achieve the purpose of industrial protection. By product, the relatively high sloping rates on processed food and beverages and leather textile and haberdashery products in particular suggest an intent to protect light industrial consumer goods, but the tariff rate on these final products are not very high. While North Korea states that the purpose of its tariffs is to protect industry, there are many aspects of the tariffs that are inconsistent with North Korea’s 2005 industrial policy , known as the Military-first(Songun) Economic Policies. In terms of fiscal contribution, North Korea’s tariff revenue accounted for less than 2% of total fiscal revenue, suggesting that tariffs do not contribute much to the economy.

Chapter 4 identifies policy and institutional factors that can be considered non-tariff barriers to the integration of North Korean trade into the international trade regime. The non-tariff barriers in the North Korean trading system can be broadly categorized into policy and institutional factors. Policy factors include the centralized governance system, the goal of building a self-reliant national economy, the qualitative strengthening of the national defense force, and the strengthening of the party-state system. To achieve, non-tariff measures arbitrarily restricted trade rights, items, and volumes. In terms of institutional elements, North Korea’s centralized trade system has identified a number of measures that can be perceived as non-tariff barriers in the entire process of trade, from planning, contracting, pricing, transportation, customs clearance, and payment. The role of North Korea’s non-tariff regime was to maintain the regime and implement state plans.

Chapter 5 examines the historical changes in the tariff regimes of Vietnam and South Korea during their economic opening and development. Although South Korea and Vietnam had different economic systems before the reform and opening up policy, they experienced a similar increase in tariff rates in the early years of reform. The first increase in tariff rates occurred as a result of ‘tariffication’, where non-tariff barriers were converted into tariff policies, and the second increase in tariff rates for protected industries occurred as a result of the policy of differentiating tariff rates by industry sector for the purpose of industrial protection. In the early stages of North Korea’s trade system reform, tariff rates are naturally expected to increase as the country moves from a non-tariff to a tariff system, and tariff hikes to protect its industries are inevitable as it integrates into the international economy.

Currently, North Korea’s tariff and non-tariff regimes are typical of Southeast Asian transition economies in the 1980s. Tariffs are low and fail to protect industries and raise government revenue, but the non-tariff barriers are high and serve to protect the economy. North Korea’s reform of its tariff and non-tariff regimes should consist of phasing out non-tariff barriers while raising tariff barriers to fill the gaps in trade regulations left by the removal of non-tariff barriers. To eliminate non-tariff barriers, the centralized trade administration system of trade should be abolished, the trade qualification approval system should be relaxed to limit trade to its own citizens, legal entities, and organizations, and the principle of building a self-reliant national economy should be revised to allow for integration into international value chains. In addition, North Korea’s unique logistics (transportation and ship-to-ship inspection) standards and inspection regimes, as well as trade payment methods should be harmonized with international standards. North Korea’s tariff rates should be systematically increased , with lower tariffs on raw materials and equipment in the early stages of reform, and higher tariffs on consumer and final goods.

국문요약

차 례

제1장 서론

1. 연구의 배경 및 필요성

2. 연구의 목적 및 구성

3. 연구의 방법

제2장 북한의 법치주의와 무역의 제도화

1. 사회주의 법치국가론의 부상

2. 무역 법ㆍ제도의 강화

3. 소결

제3장 북한 관세율의 구조와 역할

1. 북한 관세율의 구조

2. 북한 관세의 산업보호 효과

3. 북한 관세의 재정수입 효과

4. 소결

제4장 북한 무역제도의 비관세장벽

1. 비관세장벽의 정의와 국제분류

2. 북한 무역제도의 비관세장벽 요소

3. 소결

제5장 한국과 체제전환국의 국제사회 편입과 관세 개편

1. WTO의 국제무역 원칙과 관세제도

2. 베트남의 체제전환과 관세 및 비관세제도 개편

3. 한국의 경제성장과 관세 및 비관세제도 개편

4. 소결

제6장 북한의 국제사회 편입에 대한 방향

1. 북한의 관세 및 비관세제도에 대한 평가

2. 북한 무역 질서 개편의 방향성

참고문헌

Executive Summary