U.S.-China trade friction is one of the major variables causing external economic uncertainty in Korea. The competition for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China has been pointed out as lying at the essence of the trade friction between the U.S. and China, prompted by China’s rise in technological prowess. As the most representative industrial development policy by the Chinese government to respond to this rise in the nation’s technological prowess, the Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) plan deserves detailed analysis and evaluation, based on which we can debate proper response measures. In this regard, this study analyzed and evaluated the progress of measures to establish a manufacturing innovation network currently ongoing within China, one of the key policy tasks of MIC 2025.
   We perform a comparative analysis of policy operations in China and the U.S., the latter being the benchmark for China, in order to analyze in depth the manufacturing innovation centers that form the core of China’s manufacturing innovation network. We also studied specific cases at manufacturing innovation centers in the sectors of electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays ? core areas in which China has succeeded in localization and is competing with Korea ? to understand the specific characteristics, achievements and limitations of these innovation centers. To allow a comprehensive examination of the demand for development in participating entities and industries, we analyzed the rise of local businesses in related areas, incubation policies promoted by the Chinese government, and the trend of localization, together with a review of operations at the innovation centers.
   This study has drawn the following conclusions and suggestions. China may benchmark U.S. policy, but is fine-tuning its own policies, which is having the effect of limiting its progress toward the goals initially set.
   First, China’s manufacturing innovation centers are operating upon a dual scheme of dividing national- and provincial-level centers. China’s provincial manufacturing innovation centers are established by local governments, after which they compete to be selected as national manufacturing innovation centers. This dual system incurs leads to the possibility of overlapping areas and investments in similar R&D projects.
   Second, manufacturing innovation centers in China feature a self-sustaining profit structure like private businesses. Some in China point out that it is contradictory to apply a corporate management system to manufacturing innovation centers established to play a role for the common interest of the industry. In addition, given the level of development of Chinese companies, it may not be sustainable to continue operations based on profit gained from commissioned research, technology transfer, technology certification testing, and the establishment and utilization of patent pools.
   Third, as seen in some cases of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries and displays, cooperation and networking between companies can be difficult in sectors where a competitive structure already exists, neither do these seem to have a significant impact on related industries. The United States requires in principle the establishment of manufacturing innovation centers in areas remaining in a pre-competitive state for industrial technology. China, on the other hand, has prepared a list of areas to establish manufacturing innovation centers, based on areas specified within the MIC 2025, but does not make considerations for industrial technology features, such as is required in the U.S.
   Fourth, according to our case analysis, innovation centers for semiconductors and displays are significantly linked to the industrial development strategies of the local government, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center lack in connectivity with local industries. This indicates it is likely that semiconductor and display innovation centers will be able to create synergistic effects in conjunction with intra-regional industrial clusters, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center will have less impact on related industries within Beijing.
   Although some operational results have been achieved in the case of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays, the limitations described above have led to internal criticism and a call for policy coordination as doubt is cast on whether China’s innovation centers can eventually lead to the establishment of a nationwide network of manufacturing innovation centers, the original goal of this plan. Our expert interviews indicate a consensus for the need of policy coordination is emerging among China’s government agencies, academia and industries.
   Our case studies identify the following opportunities and threats created by the operation of manufacturing innovation centers in China, and industry policies in this area. China originally intended to establish manufacturing innovation centers for the core industrial sectors specified within the MIC 2025 plan, aiming to form a network of innovative players in each industrial sector. But so far, as suggested above, it appears that China’s manufacturing innovation center project will be insufficient to carry out this role in the actual application of policies, both in institutional and system terms. This trial and error in China’s policy operations serves as a positive factor for Korea to maintain the current technological gap with China. However, internal criticism of these policies and the discussion of alternatives in China can be seen as a threat in their potential for improvement, reflecting trial and error.
   In addition, since China holds a comparative advantage over Korea in certain areas within the value chain of the semiconductor industry, it will be necessary to remain cautious of the semiconductor innovation center establishing innovative networks and the current technology gap shrinking in foundry sectors. There is also the concern that Korea’s research and development know-how will be exposed during the process of collaboration between Chinese companies and multinational businesses, such as seen in the case of the display innovation center.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와 본 연구의 차별성
3. 연구구성

제2장 중국의 제조업 혁신 네트워크 구축
1. 「중국제조 2025」 추진과 제조업 혁신센터 사업
2. 중국과 미국의 정책사업 비교
3. 소결

제3장 전기차 배터리 사례
1. 중국의 전기차 배터리 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 전기차 배터리 혁신센터: 베이징(北京)시
3. 소결

제4장 반도체 사례
1. 중국의 반도체 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 반도체 혁신센터: 상하이(上海)시
3. 소결

제5장 디스플레이 사례
1. 중국의 디스플레이 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 디스플레이 혁신센터: 광둥성
3. 소결

제6장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary