The three North American countries have traditionally been an economic region with active supply chain linkages. If the three countries of North America were considered a single nation, by 2020, for every dollar of exports generated within North America, $0.94 of the added value would by added within the region itself, demonstrating a high degree of self-sufficiency. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free trade agreement among the three nations that came into effect in 1994, has evolved into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) with the aim of strengthening regional supply chain contributions. The Biden administration, through the Inflation Reduction Act, introduced requirements such as conducting final assembly of electric vehicles in North America and sourcing battery components and critical minerals from North America or specific countries to qualify for green vehicle subsidies. In addition, the revivedNorth American Leaders’ Summit under the Biden administration has sought to advance cooperation by focusing on key issues such as a trilateral semiconductor forum, identifying investment opportunities through supply chain mapping, and critical minerals exploration.

Although a potential second Trump administration is expected to pursue policies with a degree of international isolationism under the banner of “America First,” a significant reduction in North American cooperation seems unlikely. Ironically, the unilateral trade policies of Trump’s first administration, particularly with China, have increased the US dependence on Canada and Mexico. This is because it remains difficult to establish fully self-contained supply chains within the US, especially in key industries like semiconductors and batteries, remains challenging. If the U.S. were to raise trade barriers against China, it would be difficult to quickly replace Chinese imports with domestic production.

In this context, this paper examines the supply chain policies and collaborative efforts of the three North American countries and seeks to identify implications for South Korea.

In Chapter 2, various policies of the three North American countries are reviewed. Beyond the trilateral leaders’ summits, there are numerous bilateral consultative bodies in place to promote trade and investment. The USMCA, as previously mentioned, enhances regional trade and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the USMCA improves rules of origin for automobiles and other products, increasing the proportion of value added within North America to reinforce trade and supply chains centered on the region. However, the agreement also includes new provisions, such as labor-related requirements, that are not present in NAFTA and that align the USMCA more closely with U.S. interests.

As noted earlier, the U.S. pursues a supply chain strengthening strategy centered on North America through policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act. In addition, industrial policies like the CHIPS and Science Act include large investments to strengthen manufacturing capacity, which also influence organic policy shifts in Canada and Mexico. The newly inaugurated Sheinbaum administration in October 2024 is expected to continue most of the policies pursued by the Obrador government, suggesting little change in the overall framework. Mexico is likely to maintain policies aimed at promoting nearshoring and strengthening domestic control over critical minerals. A key example is the “Tax Credit Decree for Promoting Nearshoring,” announced in October 2023, which applies to investments made between the date of enforcement and December 31, 2024. Items eligible for tax credits include agricultural products like food, feed, and pesticides, as well as pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, batteries, and various automobile and transportation components. Two criteria must be met for the tax credits: investment must be made in the production, processing, or manufacturing phase of the eligible items, and over 50% of the revenues generated by the investing enterprise’s Mexican operations must come from exports.

As the U.S. promotes tax incentives and subsidies to secure raw materials and advanced industries domestically, Canada and Mexico are wellpositioned to become major beneficiaries of supply chain restructuring. For example, electric vehicles manufactured in Canada that meet a 75% regional value content (RVC) threshold qualify for USMCA preferential tariffs. Canada also serves as an option for meeting the North American final assembly requirement under the Inflation Reduction Act’s electric vehicle subsidy criteria. Amid these changes, the Canadian government unveiled a comprehensive plan in March 2023 to accelerate supply chain restructuring under the “Made in Canada” initiative. This initiative aims to maintain Canada’s competitive edge in the global market and address two fundamental challenges: the need for significant long-term investment to create a sustainable framework for supply chain restructuring and a net-zero future, and the mitigation of competitive disadvantages resulting from the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. To address these issues, the Canadian government is focusing on sectors such as green energy, electric vehicles, batteries, and critical minerals, supported by various strategies and policies.

Chapter 3 examines the current state of the supply chain for semiconductors, batteries, and critical minerals in North America is examined. In semiconductors, as of 2022, the U.S. held a 48% share of the global semiconductor market, with particular strengths in upstream supply chain areas like design, design tools, materials, and equipment. Leveraging these strengths, the U.S.-centric North American semiconductor supply chain is well-established. Canada is a leader in AI research, notably through institutions like the University of Toronto, Alberta, and Waterloo, whose graduates fuelresearch in U.S. AI companies and drive downstream semiconductor demand. Additionally, Canadian strengths in design and AI research have attracted companies like Synopsys and NVIDIA to establish R&D centers there. On the midstream side of semiconductor manufacturing, Canada hosts companies like Teledyne DALSA and facilities for U.S. firms such as ON Semiconductor. Mexico, meanwhile, has attracted investments in mid-to-downstream semiconductor production, with companies like Vishay, Skyworks, Infineon, Texas Instruments, and NXP setting up production facilities.

In the battery sector, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico are competitively attracting leading global companies. This has boosted intra-regional trade, with notable exports of cathode materials from the U.S. to Canada and Mexico and significant reliance on Canadian imports of natural graphite for anode production.

Regarding critical minerals, the U.S. remains highly dependent on imports, with a notable concentration on a few countries. In 2023, the U.S. was 100% dependent on imports for 12 critical minerals and had over 50% dependency for 29 minerals. Mexico’s mineral exports to the U.S. exceeded 50% of its total mineral trade in 2023, reflecting its strong U.S.-centric orientation. Canada updated its critical minerals list in June 2024 to include 34 minerals, largely imported from the U.S., with iron and copper imports predominantly sourced from Mexico. However, policies in North American countries aim to enhance domestic value-added for critical minerals, with greater national control as a key strategy. Mexico revised its mining law in April 2022 to strengthen national control over lithium, a critical mineral for EV batteries and energy storage, creating a state-owned company, Litio para México (LitioMX), under the Ministry of Energy to oversee exploration, mining, use, and value chain management. Similarly, under the Biden administration, the U.S. has sought to boost domestic value-added for critical minerals, using mechanisms like Title III of the Defense Production Act (DPA). For instance, in March 2022, President Biden designated sustainable domestic mining, beneficiation, and processing of strategic materials for large-capacity batteries in the automotive and stationary storage sectors as critical to national defense, supporting domestic activities through various measures. Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy, announced in December 2022, emphasizes locating critical mineral value chains within the country in partnership with allies. To achieve this, Canada implements tax credits such as the Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit (CMETC) and Clean Technology Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit.

In Chapter 4, the economic impacts of strengthened North American supply chain integration are analyzed from three perspectives. Section 4.1 examines the impact of North American supply chain integration on Korea’s forward and backward industries. To this end, the study devised a North American supply chain integration index using the international input-output table. Usingthe international input-output table, the value added contributed within North America for every unit of export within the region was measured, subtracting the added value contributed by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico to their respective exports. This approach aimed to assess the value added purely generated within North America through the activation of trade among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.

Using this supply chain integration index, various trends have been observed. Notably, the index has shown a gradual upward trend since 2016. Given that the Trump administration began in 2017, it is noteworthy that North American supply chain integration has strengthened overall despite the “America First” policies of the Trump administration. This phenomenon remains consistent even when limited to the manufacturing sector and is particularly pronounced in industries such as automobiles, coke and petroleum refining, electrical equipment, and computers, electronics, and optical products. The supply chain integration index also shows a statistically significant positive (+) correlation with Korea’s total exports and value-added exports. A one-unit increase in the North American supply chain integration index (a $1 increase in the value-added contribution from North American trade) increases Korea’s value-added exports by about 10.5–12.7% ($0.105–$0.127). Furthermore, when North American supply chain integration occurs in one industry, it significantly contributes to Korea’s value-added exports in other industries as well. A closer examination by individual industries reveals that Korea’s retail trade, electrical equipment (batteries), and chemical industries benefit from North American supply chain integration within the same industries. In contrast, Korea’s value-added exports in coke and petroleum refining and computers, electronics, and optical products, increase more significantly when North American supply chain integration occurs in other industries. Section 4.2 analyzes the impact of policies aimed at strengthening North American trade and supply chains, such as the USMCA and the IRA, on Korea’s exports to the U.S. The quantitative analysis shows that these policies are associated with an increase in Korea’s exports to the U.S. Notably, after the IRA went into effect, monthly U.S. imports of Korean EV batteries more than doubled, driven by increased U.S.-directed investment by Korean battery manufacturers and the corresponding surge in exports of these items to the U.S.

Section 4.3 uses an event study approach to analyze the impact of the U.S.’s Section 301 tariffs on China on U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico. Tracking the long-term effects over 36 months revealed that the U.S. tariffs on China significantly and statistically increased imports from both Canada and Mexico in the long run. By industry, the effect was particularly pronounced in intermediate goods for Canada and capital goods for Mexico during the mid-term. With the expectation that the Trump administration’s second term will continue to increase U.S. efforts to contain China, these policies are likely to have positive effects on trade between the U.S. and its North American partners, Canada and Mexico.

Considering the preceding analysis, the Trump administration’s second term is expected to bring both obstacles and opportunities for North American supply chain cooperation. Potential obstacles include the possible suspension of government-led channels such as trilateral summits among the three North American countries. If the USMCA is amended again in favor of U.S. interests, tariff benefits may decrease, leading to a potential decline in North American trade. Additionally, Trump has expressed his intention to impose additional tariffs on Canada and Mexico, citing issues such as immigration and fentanyl, which could reduce U.S. imports from these countries. On the other hand, strengthened measures to contain China are likely to increase U.S. dependence on Canada and Mexico. Moreover, if universal tariffs are imposed globally rather than specifically targeting Canada and Mexico, the relative impact on these two countries could be mitigated. Overall, considering the already advanced level of integration among the three North American countries, significant disruptions to supply chain cooperation are unlikely.

Based on this outlook, the following implications are presented:
Given the high likelihood of USMCA revisions, it is necessary to review the current state of North American supply chain integration in major export sectors such as automobiles, which are central to Korea’s exports to the U.S., and prepare for a possible tightening of regional rules of origin. Since Korean automobiles enjoy stable exports driven by strong U.S. demand, it is worth considering a gradual expansion of local production volumes not only in the U.S. but also in Mexican production facilities. Additionally, in the semiconductor sector, Korea should actively pursue supply chain integration with USMCA member countries, including the U.S.

Although the three North American countries form a large economic bloc, they cannot achieve supply chain completeness on their own. Therefore, Korea should consistently develop cooperative strategies leveraging its complementarity with the North American countries. The findings from Chapter 4 suggest that industries such as retailing, electrical equipment (batteries), and chemicals, as well as semiconductors included in computers, electronics, and optical products, are closely related to Korea’s value-added exports when North American integration strengthens. Therefore, cooperative strategies can be developed, focusing on forward and backward linkages in these sectors.

Furthermore, to continuously identify agendas, it is essential to activate regular diplomatic channels such as summits between Korea and the three North American countries. By leveraging Korea’s manufacturing strengths in sectors such as semiconductors, critical minerals, and batteries—key areas of focus for the North American countries—Korea can create sustained demand for cooperation. While organizing trilateral North American summits may not be a priority for the Trump administration’s second term, if pursued, efforts should be made to align these summits with Korea-North America meetings. Even if such trilateral summits do not occur, Korea should upgrade its U.S.-focused cooperation strategy to a broader North America-focused approach through various government communication channels.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 필요성
2. 선행연구 검토

제2장 북미 공급망 관련 주요 정책
1. 북미 간 협력 정책
2. 미국
3. 멕시코
4. 캐나다

제3장 북미 산업별 공급망 및 기술협력 현황
1. 반도체
2. 배터리
3. 핵심광물

제4장 북미 공급망 연계 강화에 따른 경제적 영향 분석
1. 공급망 연계 강화가 한국의 전후방 산업에 미치는 영향
2. 북미 역내 교역 및 공급망 강화 정책이 한국의 대미 수출에 미치는 영향
3. 미국의 301조 관세 부과 후 대캐나다 및 멕시코 수입 변화 분석

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary