This study examines the necessity and possibility of an inter-Korean FTA to expand inter-Korean economic cooperation and prepare for economic integration between the two Koreas. First, in Chapter 1, we conceptualize an FTA between South and North Korea as a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), an FTA between two independent tariff zones in one country, reflecting the special relationship between the two Koreas. This CEPA between South and North Korea would aim at gradually liberalizing trade in goods and services, and facilitating trade and investment. Considering the current system and economic realities of North Korea, it will be necessary to approach the FTA by starting with a low or provisional FTA and gradually increasing this level according to North Korea's regime change and economic development. Therefore, a CEPA between the two Koreas represents an initial stage of economic integration between the two.
  In Chapter 2 we analyze the cases of the China-Hong Kong CEPA and China-Taiwan ECFA in terms of their respective backgrounds, process, legal status, major contents, and economic effects realized by the FTA. The China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan FTAs ??are similar in that both specified the direction of opening and cooperating in each sector during the first round of negotiations, and then further defined the necessary regulations through follow-up negotiations. However, while the China-Hong Kong CEPA systematically opened the market through supplementary agreements once a year, the China-Taiwan ECFA has not led to specific negotiations for goods and services trade besides the EHP (Early Harvest Program). As a result, the performance of the two FTAs ??shows a marked difference. These differences are mainly attributed to differences in China’s political relations  with Hong Kong and Taiwan.
  Chapter 3 reviews the main contents of the CEPA. Already, the two Koreas have much better economic cooperation agreements than any between China and Hong Kong or Taiwan before their FTAs. Therefore, the CEPA of South and North Korea should be promoted in a way to accommodate and develop the existing economic cooperation agreements rather than starting from nothing. In this regard, Chapter 3 discusses the existing inter-Korean economic cooperation agreements and discusses the principles to be considered in the conclusion of the CEPA, such as principles of commodity trading (tariff, non-tariff barriers, and rules of origin), service trade and investment, trade and investment facilitation and dispute settlement. As a result, it becomes evident that non-tariff barriers need to be utilized appropriately in order to cope with any potential damage caused to each industry and class in the two Koreas. In addition, in the area of ??rules of origin and trade and investment facilitation measures, it is clear that there is still much need for detailed agreements between the two Koreas.
  Chapter 4 examines the problems of current inter-Korean economic cooperation from the perspective of international trade law, and suggests the necessity for an FTA between the two Koreas as a countermeasure to this problem and other related issues. Currently, the trade between the two Koreas proceeds as a “domestic transaction” based on the principle of zero tariffs. However, non-tariff transactions between the two Koreas can cause various international trade legal issues. In particular, there is the risk of violating the MFN, which is one of the basic obligations of South Korea as a member of the WTO under the GATT/WTO Agreement. Also, any preferential treatment for North Korea provided in line with the South-North Economic Cooperation Policy could also be objected to as a violation of WTO treaties. As a result, it was shown that the conclusion of an FTA or regional trade agreement between the two Koreas would be the best way to be recognized as an exception to obligations under the GATT/WTO Agreement. In addition, we also examined international trade legal issues such as those relating to North Korea's non-WTO status, meeting the requirements of Article 24 of the GATT, and the status of North Korea's non-market economy (NME) when concluding an FTA (CEPA) between the two Koreas. In conclusion, we could find no serious international trade legal issues in proceeding with such an agreement within the present situation. However, considering the scale of exchanges between North and South Korea, and the level of economic development in North Korea, the most practical way to conclude an FTA would be ??in the form of “tentative agreements” allowed by the WTO prior to concluding a formal FTA.
  Chapter 5 analyzes the economic effects of the CEPA between the two Koreas in terms of GDP change and production inducement effect. First, the GDP of North and South Korea was analyzed through the Growth Accounting Model. If a CEPA is concluded, South Korea's GDP will increase from 1,822.8 trillion won in 2020 to 3,067.5 trillion won in 2039, and North Korea's GDP will increase from 38.0 trillion won in 2020 to 308.3 trillion won in 2039. As a result, the income gap between North and South Korea will decrease from 21.4 times in 2020 to 5.2 times in 2039. The trade between South and North Korea will also rise to 2.32 billion dollars in 2020 (0.15% of South Korea's GDP, 7.2% of North Korea's GDP) to 4.93 billion dollars in 2039 (0.18% of South Korea’s GDP, 11.0% of North Korea's GDP).
  Next, we analyzed the changes in the vertical integration structure of the two Koreas and the changes in the final demand ripple effect using the production inducement coefficient of the inter-industry table. The degree of vertical integration between the two Koreas after conclusion of a CEPA shows that the proportion of intermediate goods input to South Korea in the light and heavy industries increases in the case of North Korea whereas the proportion of intermediate goods input to North Korea increases in mining and light industries in the case of South Korea. In addition, the intra-regional and inter-regional effects both increased after the CEPA according to an input-output analysis between the two Koreas. The effect within the North Korean region was 14.8 at the stage of general exchange and cooperation, but after the signing of the CEPA this increased to 16.4. In South Korea, the level of increase was from 18.77 to 19.86. As for inter-regional effects, the effect of North Korean final demand (export) on the Southern region increased from 0.2289 to 0.6394, and the effect of South Korean final demand (import) on the Northern region increased from 0.0243 to 0.0585. Meanwhile, we estimated the production inducement effect by final demand item by applying an estimation result of GDP and trade size increase before and after the signing of the CEPA between South and North Korea. The results showed the effect of the increase in South Korea's final demand (imports) to North Korea rising from 2.44 to 2.90 after the signing of the CEPA, while North Korea's dependency on South Korean production inducement increased from 2.9% to 7.4%.
  Finally, Chapter 6 explains the results and limitations of this study and suggests policy implications. Given the dynamics of inter-Korean relations, it seems important for the two Koreas to secure the “irreversibility” of agreements reached by defining as much detail as possible during the initial negotiations. In addition, the CEPA needs to be designed to minimize negative effects and ensure positive effects for economically weak sectors for a certain period of time after the conclusion of the CEPA. Lastly, it will be necessary to focus on the long-term economic integration effect rather than the short-term economic effect when proceeding with the CEPA. 

서언

국문요약

제1장 연구의 배경과 목적

제2장 CEPA 관련 해외사례 분석

1. 중국-홍콩 CEPA
가. CEPA 체결 배경과 진행 현황
나. CEPA의 법적 지위
다. CEPA의 주요 내용
라. 경제적 효과 
마. 한계와 문제점
2. 중국-대만 ECFA
가. ECFA 체결 배경과 진행 현황
나. ECFA의 개념과 법적 지위
다. ECFA의 주요 내용
라. 경제적 효과
마. 한계와 문제점

제3장 남북한 CEPA의 주요 내용 검토

1. 원칙
2. 상품교역
가. 관세
나. 비관세장벽
다. 원산지 규정
3. 서비스교역 및 투자
4. 무역ㆍ투자 편리화 및 분쟁해결

제4장 남북한 CEPA 체결의 국제통상법적 쟁점

1. 남북경협 관련 WTO 체제상 쟁점
가. 남북경협 법체제 현황
나. 남북경협 관련 국제통상법적 쟁점
다. 남북경협의 국제통상법적 정당성 확보 방안
2. 남북한 CEPA 체결에 따른 쟁점 
가. WTO 비회원국과의 FTA 체결
나. GATT 24조의 요건 충족
다. 북한의 비시장경제(NME) 지위 문제
라. 기체결 FTA의 역외가공지역 규정 인정 문제
3. 잠정협정을 활용한 우회 방안

제5장 남북한 CEPA 체결의 경제적 효과 분석

1. CEPA 체결에 따른 남북한 GDP 성장모형
가. CEPA 미체결 시 남북한 GDP 모형
나. CEPA 체결 시 남북한 GDP 모형
다. CEPA 단계별 교류 쿼터
2. 남북한 GDP 성장효과
가. 기본 시나리오에 따른 추정 결과
나. 추가적 시나리오 검토
3. 남북한 무역 증가효과
4. 남북한 생산유발효과
가. 다지역 산업연관표(MRIO)의 구조
나. 일반적 교류협력 단계의 생산유발계수 추정
다. 남북한 CEPA 체결 단계의 생산유발계수 추정
라. 남북한 CEPA 체결의 파급효과 분석

제6장 결론

1. 성과와 한계
2. 정책적 고려사항

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary