Russian Arctic Development Strategy and New Possibility for Korea-Russia Cooperation

Sung Hoon Jeh and Jiyoung Min

The Arctic is changing due to global warming. While this poses potential environmental risks, the region is also emerging as a new shipping route and an alternative source of energy supply. Recognizing the enormous potential of the region, both Arctic and non-Arctic countries are devoting increased attention to the use and development of the area. Korea, a non-littoral nation, also is moving quickly to involve itself in Arctic issues. Namely, it received permanent observer status at the Arctic Council in May 2013 and adopted the “Comprehensive Arctic Plan” in July.

In fact, participation in activities in the Arctic is an arduous task for a non-Arctic country under the current Arctic governance regime. However, Korea, an energy-and-trade-dependent economy, is seeing new opportunities, because the opening of the Arctic provides an irresistible attraction. In order to actively participate in the Arctic, Korea needs to take part in tackling relevant global issues, such as environmental protection and preservation, development of technology applicable to the Arctic, etc. as a member of the global community. Building and maintaining close relationships with relevant countries should be sought as well.

In this context, cooperation with Russia, in particular regarding the Arctic, has significant meaning to Korea for the following reasons. First, the majority of hydrocarbon resources in the region lay in the Russian Arctic region. Since Russia is developing fields for exploitation of energy resources through international cooperation, Korea needs to consider ways to participate in such projects. Second, when using the Northern Sea Route, it is inevitable that shipping pass through waters under the authority of the Russian Federation and employ Russian facilities, such as ports and ice-breakers. In addition, the Russian government’s plans to establish infrastructure for the development of the region including an integrated transport system and ICT network may provide chances to Korean investors. Third, Russia is an influential participant in Arctic governance such as the Arctic Council, BEAC, etc. Thus, closer cooperation with Russia can make Korea‘s participation in Arctic governance much easier.

In this report, the following measures are suggested in order to strengthen cooperation with Russia. First, apart from the “Comprehensive Arctic Plan,” an “Extensive Cooperation Strategy toward Russia” should be devised. The document needs to encompass all possible forms of collaboration and opinions of experts regarding Arctic issues. Second, establishment of an “Arctic Cooperation Committee” under the Korea-Russia Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation and “Korea-Russia Joint Arctic Research Center” will be helpful in developing constructive bilateral cooperation. All Arctic-related topics between the two nations can be discussed within the Committee and the Center will take a role as a think-tank on Arctic issues. Third, creation of Asia-Pacific-Arctic Council modeled on the Barents Euro-Arctic Council jointly with Russia will help intensify regional cooperation. Through this system, Korea may have more chances to engage in the Arctic issues earnestly as an active member. Fourth, the opening of the Arctic provides investment opportunities for Korean companies. Participating in consortium or joint investment projects, and technological cooperation with Russian organizations can be viable ways to become involved in the Arctic. Since Russia’s dilapidated ports require new construction or maintenance, investing in relevant projects could also be considered. Fifth, various civil and academic exchange programs will contribute to nurturing Arctic specialists, extending cooperation with indigenous peoples, and raising Korea’s image as a trustworthy partner in the Arctic for the long term.