The purpose of this research is to analyze the achievements and the limits of MERCOSUR as we near the 20th anniversary of its establishment. This research outlines the direction of the organization’s progress in the future, in light of conflicting arguments respectively favoring internal depth and greater expansion, in addition to asymmetries, and the recent global financial crisis. Also it presents implications as references in the establishment of Korea’s economic cooperation policies with MERCOSUR member states and possible FTA strategies, by looking at external/internal integration processes and prospects for MERCOSUR.
The implications of MERCOSUR intra-regional cooperation are as follows. First, MERCOSUR started off with an unstable base due to negative political and economic developments internationally, such as the dependence on foreign direct investment, recurring economic crises, appearance of neo-liberalism, and so on. Moreover, civil society and the state that must support the integration were also vulnerable. In other words, MERCOSUR has been established under the unfavorable circumstances including fragile political institutions; an immature, patron-client relationship between the state and civil society; and a high level of dependence on foreign capital. MERCOSUR set limits on the trade liberalization, which made it unable to achieve integration goals for a common market, and its member states had no intention of sacrificing part of their sovereignty to supranational organizations that spearhead integration. International economy often subjected MERCOSUR to shocks, and the leaders of MERCOSUR were not easily held to promises they have made in order to achieve integration. Moreover, all the efforts to intensify integration including social agendas simply turned out to be failures. Therefore, the implication of MERCOSUR integration is that the control of intra-regional differences is very important although uncontrollable factors such as changes in the international political/economic environment are excluded. In order to achieve a focused but stable integration, further policy adjustment including resolution of various conflicts and exchange rate regime divergent from trade liberalization is in order. Also, new policies for membership expansion, adjustments for common foreign policies, and social issues should be initiated. Lastly, the establishment of supranational institutions and partial transfer of sovereignty should be finalized.
It is expected that MERCOSUR will remain in its current state without rapid progress or regression, as competing models of integrated models based on neo-liberalism and revisionism will assume priority in turns. Industry associations of MERCOSUR member countries agree on this recognition and acknowledge this state of affairs. Available facts show that member countries have overcome the difficulties through their geographical solidarity and continuous efforts to get over the internal asymmetry and contradictions that appeared in the integration process, in spite of several instances where the possibility of MERCOSUR collapsing loomed prominently.
Analysis on economic effects of MERCOSUR integration draws out the following implications. It indicates that MERCOSUR integration shows characteristics of integration among developing countries, which are different from the economic achievements generally expected in cases of economic integration between developed-developing countries or developed-developed countries. In the case of integration among developed-developing countries, what shows up is macroeconomic synchronization with developed countries as centers, and they also enjoy complementary effect of trade in accordance with economic development stages. However, the integration among developing countries like MERCOSUR cannot be expected to achieve the effects mentioned above.
Firstly, according to the result of analysis on changes in macroeconomic indices before and after the establishment of MERCOSUR, macroeconomic synchronization between member countries are progressing differently in accordance with each variable such as GDP growth rate, consumption price level, exchange rate, trade openness and so on. The result can be explained by sensitive reaction of small economies on the demand changes of trade partners, and little possibility of synchronization for countries like Brazil where the share of trade share in its economy is small, as well as different economic structures between member countries. In conclusion, it can be reasonably estimated that macroeconomic synchronization of MERCOSUR’s member countries, impacted by conflicts between member countries during the process of overcoming macroeconomic shocks and crisis three times after MERCOSUR establishment, is relatively weak in comparison with EU and NAFTA. Therefore, it is necessary to promote jointly macroeconomic synchronization and the coordination of macroeconomic policies in MERCOSUR in order to deepen the integration process and make it stable.
Secondly, it shows that the share of intra-regional trade of MERCOSUR is lower than that of EU and NAFTA during the analysis period. Frequent economic crises within the region and trade conflicts by unadjusted countermeasures contributed to weakened intra-regional export. This highlights the importance of adjustment of closely-related trade policies between member countries. Meanwhile, it shows also that Brazil’s share of extra-regional trade has been rising for two decades, whereas other countries saw more increases in their shares of intra-regional trade. Therefore, the asymmetric character of trade structure, where a small economy is subordinate to a large economy, is also shown in this research. In addition, intra-industry trade in the non-traditional manufacturing sector has increased noticeably in intra-regional trade among member countries except Paraguay. It means that integration in intra-regional production is accelerated directly or indirectly by production specialization created during the integration process.
Third, an analysis of the scale of trade diversion and trade creation effects shown after the establishment of MERCOSUR through the use of the gravity model indicates that the trade creation effect is bigger than the trade diversion effect. Also, trade creation effects for non-member countries are also identified as a result of the analysis, whereas trade diversion effects do not appear. In a nutshell, it represents that there are positive effects on integration of both intra-regional and offshore trade.
Meanwhile, the implications of MERCOSUR extra-regional integration upon efforts for Korea-MERCOSUR FTA are as follows. First, MERCOSUR was passive about entering into FTA with extra-territorial countries except Uruguay. This means there is limited possibilities for the actual promotion of Korea- MERCOSUR FTA. Lukewarm attitudes concerning FTA with Korea can be confirmed from a survey targeting industry associations of MERCOSUR member countries. Second, extra-territorial integration in MERCOSUR is being undertaken for international politics purposes, namely for the sake of south- south co-operation, finding the export market for agricultural products and so on; and MERCOSUR’s target countries/regions for FTA negotiation was actually limited to the Middle East, Latin America, etc. This implies that it will be difficult for Korea to be regarded as a country of major concern with respect to a MERCOSUR FTA. Third, various trade agreements that MERCOSUR concluded are limited to preferential trade agreements, which are restricted to partial market opening of certain specified industrial products. The assumption here is that Korea-MERCOSUR FTA will only be regarded as a preferential trade agreement, qualified within narrow scope, and results that Korea can actually obtain from negotiations are also limited. Lastly, as shown in the case of MERCOSUR’s negotiations with the EU, the process proceeded very cautiously and excruciatingly, and sometimes even interrupted by negotiation strategies that cleaved to damage minimization for intra-regional industries and expansion of agricultural products export. This shows that Korea-MERCOSUR FTA negotiation might take a longer than any other FTAs Korea concluded or is negotiating. Also, the process of negotiation including adjustment of opinions among internal interest groups of both sides seems to be difficult.
According to a survey concerning the awareness among Korean businesses about the Korea-MERCOSUR FTA, there seemed to be great deal of interest among exporters. The survey showed 80.4% of the respondents gave affirmative answers to Korea-MERCOSUR FTA. Even though the respondents surveyed were not sensitive to discrimination from non-conclusion of the FTA, they exhibited the most interest toward measures related to lowering or elimination of customs duties and simplification of customs clearance during FTA negotiations. And Korean companies that invested in the MERCOSUR region stressed the need for conclusion, insisting that they are being discriminated against or suffer losses because Korea did not concluded FTA with MERCOSUR yet. Also Korean companies expect the damages on the local business of them if MERCOSURㆍEU FTA is concluded so that countermeasures for it are required to be established. Most companies that made inroads into the region answered in the affirmative on FTA with MERCOSUR and expected preemptive cooperation with Brazil when needed. 
There are several conditions to be considered in promoting the Korea- MERCOSUR FTA. Firstly, as suggested with respect to extra-territorial integration of MERCOSUR, sensitive products of MERCOSUR will need to be considered as exceptional items or excluded from concession categories in the initial stages and a strategy for facilitating a comprehensive FTA should be considered thereafter. Second, the FTA should include contents related to industrial and technological cooperation that MERCOSUR is expecting from Korea, as it had done with Israel. Lastly, there are efforts that Korea needs to undertake in advance in order to create favorable atmosphere for negotiations with MERCOSUR: adoption of national currency trade settlement system in trade between Korea and MERCOSUR, conclusion of Korea-MERCOSUR trade facilitation negotiations with focus on removal of non-tariff barriers in the long-term, promotion of their relations to a mutual strategic cooperative relationship, and reinforcing the cooperation with Brazil, the lead country in MERCOSUR.
In the meantime, plans to provide a ‘push’ for domestic companies into MERCOSUR markets are preferentially required in the light of actual limitation on Korea-MERCOSUR FTA promotion. To resolve the difficulties of Korea’s exporters and investment companies, the survey suggests the following. First, “Export Financing Fund for Small and Medium Sized Companies in Latin America” is suggested in response to the need for financial support. Therefore, a diverse array of export financing categorized in accordance with country, region, and industry, should be operated by merging them into a single source and its funding be increased in proportion to Korea’s export share to Latin America. Also, establishment of integrated database for exporters to Latin America is necessary for continuous management of companies and their activities. Second, is the establishment of a “Business Consulting Fund” for invest companies in Latin America. This fund would be operated jointly by public institutions with much knowhow in entering markets around the globe, such as an Export-Import Bank, Korea Trade Insurance Cooperation, and the Korea Development Bank; and also some commercial banks. Third, emphasis must be placed on roles of educational institutions, government, and enterprises to train local experts as part of a long-term policy. Fourth, to encourage exposition participation, a dispatch of “market pioneers” to Latin America should be considered; with the pioneers dispersed into different organizations such as government departments, local governments, associations and so on; combined with practical use of consulting companies that have abundant experience in the region to overcome financial limitations and lack of opportunities. Finally, reinforcement of aviation cooperation is required as a way to improve the local image of Korea’s economy, culture and so on, in reference to similar efforts by Middle East countries previously.

서언 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구 필요성 및 목적 
2. 연구내용 및 방법 
3. 선행연구 현황 

제2장 MERCOSUR 발전과정과 최근 동향 
1. MERCOSUR의 특성 
가. MERCOSUR 출범의 역사적 배경 
나. MERCOSUR 통합 전개과정 
다. MERCOSUR의 위기와 재도약 
2. 역내통합 주요 정책과제의 최근 동향 
가. 무역정책 
나. 비대칭성과 구조수렴기금(FOCEM) 
3. 역외국과의 무역협정 
가. MERCOSUR의 무역협정 체결 및 추진 현황 
나. MERCOSURㆍEU FTA 
다. MERCOSURㆍ이스라엘 FTA 
라. MERCOSURㆍ이집트 FTA 
마. MERCOSURㆍGCC FTA 

제3장 MERCOSUR 역내통합 성과 및 한계 
1. MERCOSUR 거시경제적 특성 분석 
가. 국별 격차와 거시경제 변수의 동조성 
나. 거시정책 공조 필요성과 향후의 sign-post 
2. MERCOSUR 무역 패턴 분석 및 평가 
가. MERCOSUR 출범 이후 역내무역 추이  
나. 산업별 및 생산공정별 역내무역 특징 변화 
다. 역내 무역구조의 변화 
3. MERCOSUR의 경제적 성과: 무역창출 효과를 중심으로 
가. 경제성장과 무역 
나. 무역효과와 경제통합 
4. 평가 및 한계 

제4장 MERCOSUR 미래 결정요인과 발전 전망 
1. 경제위기와 MERCOSUR 
가. 멕시코 페소화 위기(1994~95년) 
나. 신흥시장 금융위기(1997~99년) 
다. 글로벌 금융위기(2008년~ ) 
라. 경제위기가 MERCOSUR에 미친 영향 
2. 통합심화 대 외연적 확장 
가. 남미통합 
나. 베네수엘라의 가입 
3. MERCOSUR 비대칭성 
가. 정책 조정 
나. 브라질 헤게모니 
4. MERCOSUR 역내ㆍ외 통합에 대한 현지산업협회(기관) 인식 
가. MERCOSUR 출범 20년에 대한 평가 
나. MERCOSUR 발전 전망 
다. 제3국과의 FTA에 대한 입장 
5. 시나리오별 전망 
가. 기존 통합과정의 재추진 및 심화 
나. 붕괴 
다. 다른 통합 프로젝트에의 흡수 혹은 보완 
라. MERCOSUR 정치화 

제5장 한국ㆍMERCOSUR 관계 
1. 경제협력관계 현황 및 평가 
가. 무역 
나. 투자 
2. 한국ㆍMERCOSUR FTA 추진 현황 
3. 한국ㆍMERCOSUR FTA에 대한 국내기업 인식 
가. 우리나라의 수출기업 설문조사 
나. 현지 투자진출기업 설문조사 

제6장 정책적 시사점 
1. MERCOSUR 평가 및 전망 
가. 역내 통합의 시사점 
나. 경제적 효과 시사점 
2. 한ㆍMERCOSUR FTA에 대한 시사점 
가. MERCOSUR 역외통합의 시사점 
나. 국내 기업의 인식 
3. 한ㆍMERCOSUR 협력대안 모색 
가. 한ㆍMERCOSUR FTA 기반 구축 
나. 대MERCOSUR 진출기업 지원 강화방안 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary