Given the idea from my previous research that the R&D subsidy issue must be considered with IPR protection, we examine policy choices when a government chooses both R&D subsidies and IPR protection levels simultaneously. Under the circumstance, it will choose a sufficiently weak level of IPR protection that its optimal R&D policy choice will be a subsidy. Hence when both IPR protection and R&D policy choice are modeled, the case for an R&D subsidy remains, but for very different reasons than those of the original strategic R&D subsidy logic.

That is, we show that it will be optimal for the domestic government to adopt IPR protection which is sufficiently weak that, in light of this weak IPR protection, it will also want to subsidize the R&D investments of the domestic firm, so as to induce R&D investment of the foreign rival firm to rise as well, which in turn increases the profits of the domestic firm.
Like the original Spencer-Brander result, the R&D incentives that we identify lead governments to set positive R&D subsidies in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, we find that if exporting governments could cooperate over their policy choices they would continue to subsidize R&D, rather than agreeing to tax R&D as in the original Spencer-Brander setup. The reason is that under cooperation they will also agree to share perfectly the results of R&D investments (i.e., eliminate IPR protection), and R&D subsidies are then required to maintain appropriate incentives for firms to engage in R&D investments. This last result is interesting for two reasons, both of which point to the importance of examining R&D subsidies and IPR policies in tandem as we have done rather than in isolation as has heretofore typically been done.
First, by this result we show that the case for strategic R&D subsidies is more robust than previously thought, as it applies whether exporting governments are acting cooperatively or non-cooperatively, once their equilibrium choices of IPR protection are taken into account as well. And second, by this result we identify a puzzle as to why governments might wish to agree to jointly eliminate, rather than tighten, their levels of IPR protection, given that they have at their disposal R&D subsidy policies to offset the disincentive effects of agreements to share R&D outcomes. We show that the flavor of these findings extend as well to the case in which governments also have export policies at their disposal. In the original Spencer-Brander setup, the addition of export policies leads governments to tax R&D and offer export subsidies, pointing to another way in which the case for strategic R&D subsidies appears to be fragile. But again our results imply that this fragility disappears in a setting in which the choice of IPR protection is modeled as well.

Executive Summary

I. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Model
A. The Basic Setup
B. Nash Equilibrium
C. The Jointly Optimal Policy Choices among Exporting Countries

Ⅲ. Export Subsidies, R&D Subsidies and IPR Policy
A. Nash Equilibrium
B. lointly Optimal Policy Choices

Ⅳ. Patent Infringement as North-South Confrontation

V. Conclusion

Appendix A: Nash Equilibrium with 2 Instruments: R&D Subsidies and IPR Policy

Appendix B: Joint Optimum with 2 Instruments: R&D Subsidies and IPR Policy

Appendix C: Nash Equilibrium with 3 Instruments: R&D and Export and IPR Policy

Appendix D: Joint Optimum with 3 Instruments: R&D and Export Subsidies and IPR
Policy

Appendix E: Nash Equilibrium in the North-South Setup

References

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