The Evolution of US Policy towards FTA and its Implications for Korea
Since the 1980s, the US approach towards trade liberalization can be broadly characterized as a two-pronged approach; while pursuing trade liberalization under the multilateral system of the GATT/WTO, the US also searches for opportunities to realize trade liberalization bilaterally, through the establishment of FTAs. This two-pronged approach to trade liberalization has often been complementary rather than contradictory. Such a strategy was seen at work as the US declared that it would go it alone when the Uruguay Round did not show satisfactory progress in the late 1980s. This threat was seen as successful as a number of countries blocking progress appeared to cave in to the US pressure. Due to the strong direct and indirect influence the US exerts on the Korean trade environs, Korean trade policymakers must not only keep abreast of US trade policy and the strategy of its trade negotiators, but must shape policies to best capitalize on the trade position of the US.

The US signed the Israel-US FTA in 1985, the Canada-US FTA in 1988, and NAFTA in 1992. Following establishment of NAFTA, momentum in the US for free trade has seemed to wane, with President Clinton failing to receive renewal of fast track authority from the Congress. However, loss of attention and supporting legislation have not altogether halted free trade initiatives deriving from the US. The US already offered to begin formal negotiations with Chile regarding the country's joining of NAFTA and the US has agreed with the 34 countries in the Western hemisphere to conclude the Free Trade Agreement in Americas (FTAA) by 2005.

The US administration has continued to study the feasibility of the establishment of FTAs with Asian countries. The report by the USITC (1989) analyzed the feasibility of an FTA with Japan, ASEAN, and a number of other Asian nations, including Korea. The report found that, except for Japan, the US would stand to benefit economically from the establishing FTAs in the region.

However, various political roadblocks and costs were found in almost all areas of Asia outside of Japan. For example, while an FTA with Korea was assessed as likely to benefit the US economically, it was believed that such a pact would intolerably increase anti-US sentiment in Korea.

Turning to discussion of APEC, while the US appeared only passively interested following joining the group in 1989, it appeared that President Clinton viewed APEC as offering great promise as a vehicle through which to open the Pacific region's markets. Thus, the US enthusiastically held the first APEC Leaders'meeting in Seattle in 1993. Upon APEC declaring region-wide free trade as its goal in the following year, the US enthusiasm for APEC began to surpass its interest in establishing bilateral FTAs in the region. To achieve the goal of free trade, APEC economies agreed to the Individual Action Plan (IAPs) and the Collective Action Plan (CAP). However, while touted as trade liberalization plans, nothing in the agreements signified binding guidelines and symbolized, at least from the point of view of the US, the end of any opportunity in the short-term to realize a multilateral free trade agreement in the Pacific.

This failure to reach real trade liberalization through APEC has seen the US alter its position to where it now views bilateral FTAs with Asian countries as offering the best hope to promote trade liberalization in the region. Korea would likely be near the top of any list of candidates, due to its already strong trade partnership with the US and the substantial decrease in anti-US sentiment since the early 1990s.

The current US administration, following its loss of fast track authority in 1994, has not been very active in pursuing trade liberalization. However, this may soon change. Signs are promising that the US Congress will restore fast track authority to the President at the end of 1999 or early 2000. Business community support for increased free trade initiatives has been strong. Many business leaders see the relative loss of competitiveness in Chile, caused by Canada and Mexico signing bilateral FTAs with the country after the US blocked expansion of NAFTA to Chile, as a precedent that needs to be immediately reversed. Furthermore, the Congress wants to conclude within three years the new WTO Round, which will resume at the end of 1999. Increasingly active business community pressure and growing Congressional support will likely see the US administration resume its search for ways to promote free trade.

So far, Korea's normal reaction to any expansion of regional trading blocs has been to push for the WTO to enact barriers to such spread. The major ruling regarding regional trade agreements under WTO is GATT XXIV. Altering this article to where it becomes more restrictive of the establishment or further expansion of regional trade agreements is unlikely as most WTO member countries already participate in one or more regional trading blocs. Thus, the most realistic policy for Korea to follow is to actively explore the establishment of FTAs with major trading partners. This will require Korean trade policy makers and politicians to adopt an entirely new approach and even mindset; however, no other option is currently available.

서 언
國文要約

Ⅰ 서론

Ⅱ 경제통합의 일반적 고찰
1. 경제통합체의 종류와 현황
2. 경제통합의 경제적 효과
3. MFN원칙과 지역무역협정

Ⅲ 무역자유화와 미국의 FTA 정책목표
1. 미국과 GATT체제
2. 80년대의 통상정책
3. 90년대의 통상정책
4. 미국의 FTA 정책목표

Ⅳ FTA와 신속처리권한
1. 미국 관세정책의 역사적 고찰
2. 의회와 통상정책권한
3. 신속처리권한(Fast Track Authority)

Ⅴ NAFTA의 내용과 평가
1. NAFTA
2. NAFTA의 주요내용
3. NAFTA 부속협정
4. NAFTA에 대한 평가

VI. 미국과 FTAA
1. 클린턴 행정부의 대중남미 정책
2. 미주경제통합의 이슈
3. FTAA에 대한 미국의 입장

Ⅶ 정책 시사점
1. 미국의 FTA 체결 대상 국가
2. 우리나라의 대응방안

참고문헌

Executive Summary