This study aims to explore cooperation strategies between ASEAN and Korea from a mid-to-long-term perspective, ensuring that engagement in the U.S.-China strategic competition does not lead to reduction in domestic production capacity and exclusion from the supply chain. To this end, this paper analyzes the relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN, as well as between China and ASEAN, in a wide range of areas from trade and economic cooperation to the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition in the region. Additionally, the study examines the economic impact of supply chain restructuring due to U.S.-China rivalry on ASEAN and Korea, and investigates ASEAN’s responses. Finally, based on the research findings and Korea’s current policies toward ASEAN, the study suggests the direction of Korea’s supply chain cooperation with ASEAN.

Chapter 2 examines the dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition in the economic and trade sectors, focusing on ASEAN, and explores the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN, as well as between China and ASEAN. While the United States is actively pursuing high-level security cooperation with ASEAN, economic and trade cooperation, including free trade agreements, is perceived as relatively favorable to China. China appears to be responding to the US strategy of containing China while ensuring a stable supply chain by establishinga regional production network with ASEAN.

Chapter 3 examines ASEAN’s economic dependence on the U.S. and China by analyzing trade and investment relations. It explores the recent trade and investment status of products listed in the “Draft List of Critical Supply Chains”released by the United States. Looking at ASEAN’s exports and imports, there is a similarity in the share between the U.S. and China in recent exports, while the share of imports is overwhelmingly dominated by China. In terms of investment, the EU was the largest investor among offshore countries in 2010, but the U.S. recorded the largest investor in 2022. On the other hand, looking at the exports and imports of products listed in the“Draft List of Critical Supply Chains” in 2021, it is observed that ASEAN’s exports to the U.S. and imports from China have increased, coinciding with a decline in China’s exports to the U.S. in sectors such as critical minerals, solar energy, audio-visual equipment, computer equipment, and telecom/network equipment. While further in-depth analysis is required, but according to the above results, the trade conversion from China to ASEAN is likely to have occurred, possibly indicating that China is utilizing ASEAN as a bypass for exports to the U.S..

Chapter 4 examined the recent supply chain restructuring strategies of the U.S. and China, with a particular focus on the high-tech industry. And the impact of such supply chain restructuring attempts on ASEAN and Korea was analyzed using an international input-output model. it also examined how ASEAN is currently responding to those attempts by the U.S. and China. The U.S. supply chain restructuring policiescan be interpreted as attempts at selective decoupling to exclude China and establish high-tech industrial supply chains centered on allies. In this context, this study hypothesizesa situation where the U.S. successfully excludes China from the high-tech industrial supply chain and quantifies the spillover effects using the Global Extraction Method (GEM). According to the analysis, in the case of chemicals and chemical products and electrical and optical equipment, if China were to be replaced in the global supply chain with the existing supply chain, the United States, Korea, Japan, Germany, and others would reap the greatest benefits, while ASEAN would comparatively gain less. This result seems to be due to ASEAN’s relatively low level of participation in the supply chain for high-tech industries, implying that, at the current level of production linkage, ASEAN might not significantly benefit from diversification away from China. For some ASEAN countries with high production links with China, it appears that they may suffer from decoupling in the high-tech industries. This suggests that achieving a unified ASEAN stance in response to U.S.-China strategic competition may be challenging, and ASEAN may face difficulties in strengthening its own cohesion and centrality. On the other hand, the study shows that selective decoupling may inadvertently increase China’s participation in other industries.

As the ongoing competition between the United States and China continues, there is a potential for multinational corporations to relocate their production bases from China to ASEAN to bypass U.S. regulations on China. In fact, as the Biden administration’s imposition of semiconductor export restrictions on China has led to continued, multinational corporate investments in Singapore and Malaysia, where the semiconductor industry has developed. In re-sponse, major ASEAN countries are leveraging these investments as a foundation to promote the development and industrial sophistication of manufacturing. They are implementing various supportive policies related to semiconductors, batteries, and other industries. Particularly, ASEAN is actively fostering the electric vehicle (EV) industry as a response to decarbonization and as a new driver of growth. Major ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, plan to build a battery industry ecosystem centered around nickel and bauxite.

So far, ASEAN has maintained a neutral stance in the midst of U.S.-China rivalry. At the ASEAN community level, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019, out of concern about being caught in a situation of choosing between the U.S. and China. In 2022, a statement was issued on mainstreaming the AOIP within ASEAN-led mechanism, emphasizing the ASEAN centrality. This indicates that ASEAN aims to emphasize cooperation under its own leadership, seeking to maintain a certain degree of independence from pressure from both countries amid the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. This is interpreted as a strategy to avoid conflict by maintaining a neutral position and to continue and expand trade with both the U.S. and China.

In Chapter 5, based on the previous research findings and current policies toward ASEAN, the strategic direction for Korea toward ASEAN is proposed as follows: (1) expanding trilateral cooperation under ASEAN leadership, (2) supporting the activation of supply chains within the ASEAN region, (3) jointly responding to supply chain disruptions, (4) cooperating on critical minerals for supply chain stability, and (5) broadening trade cooperation. 

국문요약

제1장 서론

1. 연구 배경

2. 선행연구 검토

3. 연구 목적 및 주요 연구 내용

제2장 아세안을 둘러싼 미중 전략경쟁

1. 미국과 중국의 지역전략: 인도태평양전략과 일대일로 이니셔티브

2. 미국과 중국의 지역통상 협력: CPTPP, RCEP, IPEF

3. 미국과 중국의 대아세안 정책

제3장 아세안-미국 및 아세안-중국 간 경제협력 관계 분석

1. 아세안의 무역ㆍ투자 현황

2. 아세안-미국 간 무역ㆍ투자 관계 분석

3. 아세안-중국 간 무역ㆍ투자 관계 분석

4. 미국 핵심 공급망 관리 품목의 교역 현황

제4장 미중 공급망 재편 전략에 따른 전망 및 영향 분석

1. 미중의 공급망 재편 전략

2. 미중 공급망 재편 전략의 효과: GVC 분석을 중심으로

3. 아세안의 대응

제5장 한국의 대아세안 정책 제안

1. 연구결과 및 시사점

2. 대아세안 정책 제안

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary