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연구보고서 중국의 제조업 발전 현황과 한국의 대응방안 경제관계, 산업정책

저자 이현태, 최장호, 최혜린, 김영선, 오윤미, 이준구 발간번호 17-23 자료언어 Korean 발간일 2017.12.27

원문보기 저자별 보고서 주제별 보고서

  중국 제조업은 어디까지 왔고 어디로 가고 있으며 한국은 어떻게 대응해야 하는가? 본 연구는 현재 중국의 제조업 발전 현황과 중국정부의 ‘중국제조2025’ 정책을 분석하고 시사점과 대응방안을 모색하였다.

 

  지난 2015년 5월 중국정부는 제조업 발전 정책인 ‘중국제조 2025’를 발표하고 지속적으로 추진하고 있다. ‘중국제조 2025’는 인터넷과 전통 제조업 간 융합을 통해 제조업의 혁신능력과 품질 제고, 친환경성장 및 산업구조 최적화 등을 목표로 한다. 이 정책은 향후 IT, 조선, 자동차, 화학, 기계, 철강 등 주요 제조업 분야에서 현재 협력 관계에 있는 한국에도 커다란 영향을 미칠 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 본 연구는 ‘중국제조 2025’의 구체적 내용과 진행상황이 한국에 주는 시사점을 도출하고 대응방안을 마련하고자 하였다.

 

  분석 결과, ‘중국제조 2025’ 정책이 한국에 주는 기회요인은 ① 중국 신성장 첨단산업(차세대 정보기술, 신(新)에너지 자동차, 고성능 공작기계·로봇 등)을 중심으로 방대한 정보통신기술(ICT) 분야의 소프트웨어와 장비 수요 창출 ② 대외개방 확대 정책(네거티브 리스트 방식의 외자도입, 안전·투명·예측 가능한 경영환경 조성, 무역 원활화, 개방을 통한 철강·화공·선박산업 조정, 고속철도·전력장비·건설장비 해외진출 지원)으로 외국기업의 신(新)비즈니스 기회 증가 ③ 중국 각 지역별로 다양한 분야에서의 제조업 국제협력기회 창출 등이었다. 한국은 이 기회요인을 활용하기 위해 ① 글로벌 강소기업 육성으로 중국 신성장산업의 신(新)수요에 부응하는 맞춤형 중간재 제공 ② 대외개방 확대로 사업기회가 증가할 외국기업의 재중(在中)창업, 대(對)중국기업 선제 인수합병(M&A), 지분투자, 합작투자 모색 ③ 중국 내 ‘중점협력지역 및 분야’ 선정과 진출 등을 고려해야 한다.

 

  반면 ‘중국제조 2025’가 한국에 주는 위협요인으로는 ① 중국의 중간재 수입대체화 및 세계시장 점유율 확대로 인한 수출 감소 ② 중국의 해외기업 M&A 강화로 국내기업 보호에 어려움 가중 ③ 중국 내 특정 기술과 산업의 과잉 및 중복 투자로 세계적 과잉생산, 과잉설비, 가격폭락 야기 ④ 중국시장 진입규제를 둘러싼 외국기업의 신(新)통상 분쟁과 경영장애 발생 등이 있었다. 한국은 이런 위협에 대응하기 위해 ① 중국 외 제3국 시장 및 중국의 소비재시장 개척, 시장 변화에 맞는 신비즈니스 모델 구축 ② 중국의 적극적 M&A에 대비한 전략산업, 기술, 인력 보호 정책 구상 ③ 중국 신성장산업들의 미래 공급량 예측 및 대비책 마련 ④ 중국의 각종 로컬 기업에 대한 부당 지원 모니터링 및 세계무역기구(WTO) 제소 준비 등에 힘써야 한다.

 

  아울러 본 연구는 최근 중국의 제조업 발전 현황을 다양한 산업 및 무역데이터와 방법론을 사용하여 정교하게 분석해 시사점을 찾고자 하였다. 중국 제조업에서는 중고위기술 산업 등에서의 발전이 두드러졌으나, 고위기술 업종에서는 글로벌 시장 점유율 상승이 지체되는 모습을 보였다. 또한 중국 GVC상에서의 역할 확대가 상당 부분 외자기업에 의해 주도되고 있었고, 최근 동남아와 같은 기타 국가 중심의 역내 신(新)교역망이 등장하는 등의 특징을 띠고 있었다. 이에 대한 한국의 대응방안으로는 ① 중국 제조업의 고위기술산업 점유율 지체를 한국 제조업의 고위기술산업 점유율 상승으로 유도하는 방안 연구 ② 중국 수입대체화의 산업별, 제품별 편차에 대한 맞춤형 대응전략 마련 ③ 중국 신성장산업의 GVC 확대를 활용할 참여전략 수립 ④ 남방정책의 적극적 추진을 통한 아세안(인구 6.3억 명), 인도(인구 1.3억 명) 등 새로운 무역 및 투자 시장 개척 등이 있다. 또한 정부는 ‘중국제조 2025’와 4차 산업혁명 등에 조응하는 장기산업정책을 추진할 중립적이고 독립적인 컨트롤타워를 구축하여 중국의 부상에 대비할 필요가 있다.

 

  결론적으로 중국의 제조업 발전을 지나치게 비관적으로만 바라볼 필요는 없으며, 이것이 한국에 주는 기회요인과 위협요인을 철저히 분석하고 대응방안을 마련하여 우리 기업 및 산업의 장기적인 경쟁력을 강화하는 방향으로 나가야 한다. 

  Since 2015, the Chinese government has been strongly promoting its “Made in China 2025” initiative, which aims to accelerate the transformation of China from a “big manufacturing country” into a “world manufacturing power” by boosting manufacturing competitiveness through innovation and nurturing high-tech manufacturing industries. China’s “Made in China 2025” strategy is both a threat and opportunity for Korea. This study aims to analyze the development status of Chinese manufacturing industries and the policy of “Made in China 2025,” and to provide implications and countermeasures.
  As a threat, first, “Made in China 2025” could hurt existing manufacturing powers such as Korea, an economy heavily dependent on Chinese exports, by promoting import substitution in the manufacturing industry and increasing global market share. Second, the preferential benefits and financial support provided by “Made in China 2025” to local companies could be used to fund overseas technology and acquisitions, which could lead to difficulties in protecting domestic companies. Third, if “Made in China 2025” leads to excessive investment and redundant investment in specific technologies and industries, it could cause problems such as overproduction, overcapacity, and price collapses around the world. Fourth, if China adopts a policy to prevent foreign companies from entering the domestic market and nurture high-tech new industries through “Made in China 2025,” new trade disputes could increase and pose obstacles for foreign companies.
  As an opportunity, first, “Made in China 2025” can create demand for software and equipment in a vast ICT field centering on the new growth high-tech industries: next-generation information technologies, new energy vehicles, high-performance machine tools and robots. Second, the expansion of open-door policy in “Made in China 2025” – such as negative list type foreign investment; safe, transparent and predictable management environment; trade facilitation; industrial adjustment of the steel, chemical, ship sectors through opening up; and support for overseas expansion of the high-speed railway, electric power equipment, and construction equipment sectors – could increase new business opportunities for foreign companies. Third, each region in China is promoting “Made in China 2025” and this could lead to international cooperation in several sectors based on regional differences in the level of manufacturing development, the industries each region specializes in due to their comparative advantage, and the core industries of “Made in China 2025” by region.
  In addition, this study analyzes the Chinese manufacturing industry’s development status in terms of industrial structure and trade structure, using indicators related to China’s manufacturing industry, import and export data, and indicators of localization. First, the results of our industrial structure analysis show that the Chinese manufacturing industry has been actively developing under the Chinese government’s aggressive policy of promoting and investing in the high-tech manufacturing industry. The mid-high technology and high technology sectors’ sales ratio has increased over the past 10 years and R&D investment expenditure on high-technology has increased as well. Second, our analysis of the trade structure shows that the export comparative advantage of China has generally increased regardless of the technology level, but the high-tech sector has been stagnating recently. In addition, import substitution has been progressing at a rapid pace due to the expansion of production and procurement of general intermediate products in China. These results provide the following implications. First, the development status of China’s manufacturing industry and “Made in China 2025” show that the mid-high and high tech industries and new industries related to the 4th industrial revolution are developing remarkably. Therefore, Korea can expect to be fully exposed to competition with China in these areas. Second, from the perspective of technology levels, China’s recent advancement in high-tech and medium-to-low technology industries is remarkable, but high-tech sectors are showing signs of being stalled or delayed. It is unclear whether China will be able to achieve the goal of developing its own technologies and product competitiveness in these sectors as rapidly as planned.
  In addition, this study analyzes the effect that the recent development in China’s manufacturing sector has had on Chinese global value chains (GVC), employing a GVC analysis based on WIOD and ADB data. As a result of the analysis, the proportion of intermediate goods in the Chinese domestic market has increased significantly in the areas of textile manufacturing, clothing and leather manufacturing, computers, electronics, and optical product manufacturing (by industry), and in mid-high manufacturing (by technology). The proportion of gross exports’ overseas value-added has declined gradually and dependency on foreign countries has decreased. We also confirmed that China has been shifting from a rear to front position in the GVCs, as its GVC participation based on vertical specialization has decreased. Also an analysis of China’s exports to Korea - mainly in the manufacturing of electrical and optical components, chemical and chemical products, and primary metal and metal processing industries, which account for a large trade volume between Korea and China - shows that China’s GVC participation rate decreased while Korea’s position in GVCs has relatively increased as the overseas value-added portion of its intermediate goods declined. The increase in intermediate goods imports due to China’s economic growth was greater than the import substitution of intermediate goods, which had no negative impact on Korea’s intermediate exports to China.
  This study also confirms changes in the status of China’s global value chains by analyzing the intra-Asia trade network using the international trade data of major industries. The results indicate a Chinese “centrality,” in which most intra-regional trade relations were linked through export or imports from China, in the textile and apparel and mobile phone intra-regional trade networks. In other words, our results confirm that the scope of China’s intra-regional specialization structure is gradually expanding upstream of the value chain. Meanwhile, in the automotive industry, China still has not become a leading player in GVCs. And the centrality of China weakened in 2007-2015 as other Asian countries formed new intra-regional trade relations that did not go through China. The implications of the analysis are as follows. First, there is a clear distinction between industries in the intra-regional trade network structure, and these inter-industry differences provide the implication that differentiated strategies for each industry will be needed to respond to the emergence of China. Second, the expansion of China’s centrality and role in the value chain is being led by foreign capital firms. Third, the emergence of the new intra-regional trade network is the result of a reorganization in the intra-regional specialization structure, as the Korea-China-Japan-based specialization structure centered on Northeast Asia expands to other regions in Asia such as Southeast Asia and South Asia.
  This study seeks the countermeasures of Korea in response to the above opportunity and threat factors. The countermeasures against the opportunity factor of “Made in China 2025” are as follow. First, we should pay attention to the huge demand that China will create by fostering new-growth industries in the “Made in China 2025” initiative. The Korean government should selectively support the technology development of small- and medium-sized companies that possess global competitiveness in the parts, materials and equipment sectors, and strive to secure their sales network in China. Second, it is necessary to actively seek Korean companies’ entry into China by utilizing the internationalization of “Made in China 2025” and further opening up of the Chinese capital market. Innovative ICT venture entrepreneurs can increase their chances of success by cooperating with rich funding partners and the broad market in China. We can also consider entering into the Chinese market through preemptive mergers and acquisitions (M&A), equity investments, and joint ventures with promising Chinese companies in new growth industries. Third, Korea should select “key cooperation areas and fields” in each region of China and seek for entry through selection and concentration. In particular, it is necessary to seek strategic entry into regions with high demand for economic cooperation with Korea but with little competition between domestic and foreign companies.
  The countermeasures against the threat factors of “Made in China 2025” are as follows. First, China’s import substitution and expansion of global market share are inevitable developments, but China still imports core parts and technology from overseas. Therefore, we need to steadily develop high technology, high quality and high value- added products and identify opportunities within China’s fostering of new growth industries and expansion into the global market. Second, there is a possibility of domestic technology and company leakage due to China’s aggressive M&A strategies, but M&A can also be one of the ways for Korean companies to enter the Chinese market. Third, there is the possibility of global overproduction due to the concentration of resources in specific industries and technologies in “Made in China 2025.” Therefore, when the Korean government and industry establish their market supply forecast, facility investment plan, and future strategy, they should take into account the future supply of major industries supported and nurtured under “Made in China 2025” and study the impact on future global markets. Fourth, as the preferential benefits, financial support, and trade barriers provided to local companies under “Made in China 2025” could have a market distorting and deteriorating effect on the competitiveness of foreign capital companies, we will have to continue monitoring the various subsidies for local enterprises and other support measures by China to seek appropriate response measures.
  There is also a need for countermeasures against changes in China’s industrial and trade structure. First, China’s manufacturing industry has a wide development gap by industry and technology. Therefore, Korea should design differentiated responses by industry, product, and technology levels. Second, the Chinese manufacturing industry has reached a certain limit in its global market share, especially in the high-technology sector. And this suggests that we need to understand the status of global market share and future market share forecasts for the Chinese manufacturing industry and seek the detailed countermeasures. Third, although import substitution is proceeding in line with China’s expansion of intermediate production and procurement, it should be noted that this trend is also large in terms of industry and product variances, and a countermeasure strategy should be prepared in light of this. In addition, as China’s core components and technologies are still highly dependent on foreign companies, it is necessary to maintain the mass exports of intermediate goods through the development of high-technology, high-quality and high value-added products.
  The countermeasures against the GVC phase change in Chinese manufacturing can also be considered as follows. First, we must develop new industries and new products through sustainable innovation, protect core technologies and technicians who possess competitiveness while maintaining differentiated technologies, and make China’s rising in GVC an opportunity for us. Second, regional manufacturing GVCs are likely to be led by China, but the centrality levels of China show big differences depending on the characteristics of each industry and product. Therefore, we should study how GVCs centering on China will form in the new-growth industries of “Made in China 2025” and how Korea will participate in these industries. Third, the expansion of China’s role in the GVC does not necessarily indicate a central role being played by Chinese local companies or a shift to high value-added areas; the role played by foreign companies is still important. Thus companies should position themselves to utilize and benefit from China’s expansion. Fourth, with the Korea-China-Japan-based specialization structure being expanded to other regions in Asia, such as Southeast Asia and South Asia, and the intra-regional specialization structure undergoing a reorganization process, a new intra-regional trade network has emerged that does not have China as its main axis. We should actively seek out third countries as our future production base and consumer market.
  Government policy to respond to development in the Chinese manufacturing sector is important. However, the policy-making must be designed from the initial stage to be bottom-up, sector-specific, in which industry and industry experts participate. In addition, the government should prepare policies to foster long-term new growth industries for the next 30 years and cope with “Made in China 2025” and the 4th industrial revolution. It will be essential to establish a neutral and independent control tower that will consistently promote industrial policy, regardless of political changes. Related government departments, research institutes, and industry associations should participate in the project to act as a control tower where information is shared on China’s development status, policy changes, and future prospects, and appropriate countermeasures are taken. 

서언


국문요약


제1장 서론
1. 연구 목적
2. 연구 내용 및 구성
3. 선행연구 검토


제2장 중국의 제조업 발전 정책 평가
1. 시기별 산업 발전 정책
    가. 11차 5개년 규획(2006~10년): 조정과 진흥(调整和振兴)
    나. 12차 5개년 규획(2011~15년): 전환과 업그레이드(转型与升级)
    다. 13차 5개년 규획(2016~20년): 제조업과 ICT 융합(智能制造)
2. ‘중국제조2025’ 내용 및 현황
    가. 배경
    나. 주요 내용
    다. 추진 현황 및 성과
    라. ‘중국제조2025’와 국제협력
3. 소결


제3장 중국 제조업 발전 현황 I: 산업 및 무역구조 분석
1. 중국 제조업의 산업구조 변화
    가. 중국 제조업의 발전 추이
    나. 첨단기술산업(高技术产业) 발전
2. 중국 제조업의 무역구조 분석
    가. 업종별 수출입 추이
    나. 기술 수준별 수출입 추이
3. 중국 제조업의 수입대체화 현황과 평가
    가. 무역형태 및 가공단계별 수입구조 변화
    나. 국산화율 지표 분석
4. 소결


제4장 중국 제조업 발전 현황 II: GVC 분석
1. 중국 제조업의 GVC 위상 변화 분석
    가. 글로벌 가치사슬 측정 방법
    나. 분석 데이터
    다. 분석 결과
    라. 소결
2. 아시아 역내 교역네트워크 분석으로 본 중국 제조업의 GVC 위상 변화
    가. 섬유의류산업
    나. 휴대전화산업
    다. 자동차산업
    라. 소결


제5장 결론: 시사점 및 대응방안
1. 요약 및 시사점
    가. 중국의 제조업 발전 정책 ‘중국제조2025’
    나. 중국 제조업 발전 현황 Ⅰ: 산업 및 무역구조 분석
    다. 중국 제조업 발전 현황 Ⅱ: GVC 분석
2. 대응방안
    가. ‘중국제조2025’의 기회요인
    나. ‘중국제조2025’의 위협요인
    다. 중국 제조업 산업ㆍ무역구조 변화
    라. 중국 제조업 GVC 변화
    마. 기타 대응방안
3. 결어


참고문헌


부록


Executive Summary 

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