In 2011, COP17, Parties agreed to launch a new process, called Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP), to negotiate a new climate agreement after 2020. The most distinguishable feature of the expecting new agreement is that it will be ‘applicable to all’ Parties. Though ‘applicable to all’ does not imply applicable to all in a symmetrical fashion, Parties’ positions on legal form will not be fall along developed and developing country lines any more. This critical change asks COP to develop new aspects of operating mechanisms under UNFCCC, accordingly. Especially to Korea which has been non-Annex I member so far, the change requires her to engage more actively in the climate negotiation process with suggesting constructive ideas to design the new regime, rather than simply to express her own position.
The purpose of this research is to lay out a basic theoretical and logical foundation which may help to design key mechanisms in new climate regime. To do this, in Chapter III, we first develop a model of a new climate agreement which satisfies key characteristics of Durban Platform. Then, we identify limitations of an old approach which can be summarized into (a) national reduction target and (b) international emission trading. The main result is that when a degree of heterogeneity in benefit from mitigation between countries is high enough, the old approach cannot achieve a social optimal mitigation level, though emission trading contributes to a broad participation. In this sense, relaxing the heterogeneity will be the key for the new regime. And that is the reason financial and/or technology transfer is necessary, besides mitigation efforts.
In this study, we focus on a specific issue among possible alternatives in designing the new regime, which is integrating market mechanism and financial mechanism. In Chapter IV, we survey the current and prospecting relevant mechanisms and investigate issues needed to be tackled for each mechanism. In Chapter V, we discuss interactions between two mechanism spheres in general and the importance of an integrating approach. A relationship between two mechanisms can be simplified as follows. The most fundamental element of market mechanisms is the demand for mitigation such as reduction targets and energy security. The demand induces flows of climate finance and they enable mitigation actions to be scaled up. Based on these observations, we qualitatively explore what expecting challenges to overcome will be. For the developing countries in general, lack of voluntary mitigation incentive is the basic problem. Supported NAMA type financial mechanisms, which requires corresponding mitigation actions, may be in a right direction to solve such incentive problems. The developed and the advanced developing countries may have voluntary mitigation incentives with seeking a new economy growth engine. For them, the key question is how to scale up the private resources in mitigation investments. A solution can be found with answering how to connect effectively the mitigation incentive into financial incentive, and vice versa. A necessary condition to construct those incentive schemes is to have transparent and objective MRV systems.
In Chapter VI, we present several possible tasks to develop both market and finance mechanisms in an integrated way. First, it needs to expertise best practice of the ‘inter-mechanism’ MRV system which is about coordination between a market mechanism and a financial mechanism. Various mechanisms in each market and finance sphere are expected to appear within and out of UNFCCC in near future. In the short run, more attentions will be paid to develop the ‘intra-mechanism’ MRV system which is about coordination among mechanisms within each sphere. However, having inter-mechanism MRV system will be very effective in the long run. Before a certain system without the integrating consideration becomes status quo, noting its importance and pursuing the best practice of them will be desirable. The other two are about how to provide more incentives toward environmentally more friendly private investments while the developed countries fulfill their financial contribution obligations. Depending on a type of private financial flows, its impacts on recipient country’s mitigation actions are different. Thus, a more environmentally favorable type of private financial flows needs to be more appreciated. To reflect this on incentive mechanisms, a more volatile financial flow can be discounted more in accounting financial contributions by developed countries, besides evaluation on environmental consequences of each investment. Also, we may consider to develop the technology spillover effect index which can differentiate private investments into the degree of mitigation technology spillover. Treating private investments with a higher index as the one with a more marginal contribution can help to create incentives.

서언 

국문요약 

제1장 서 론 
1. 연구 배경 및 필요성 
2. 연구목적 
3. 선행연구 차별성 및 본 연구의 한계 
4. 글의 구성 

제2장 기후변화체제의 불안정성과 신체제의 기본과제 
1. 논의 배경: 유엔기후변화 협상의 전개과정 
가. 기후변화체제 연혁 
나. 최근 협상동향 
2. 기후변화체제의 내재적 불안정성 
3. 전통적 접근방식의 한계와 신기후변화체제의 설계과제 
4. 소결 

제3장 기후변화체제 성립 및 유지의 게임 이론적 이해 
1. 기존 연구들의 주요 결과 
가. 기본논의 
나. 협상 참여의 자기구속성 
다. 협약 이행의 자기구속성 
2. 의무감축량 설정과 시장 메커니즘을 통한 재정이전 
가. 기본설정 
나. 벤치마크: 범세계적 최적 감축 
다. 국가별 감축의무 부과 메커니즘 
라. 시장 메커니즘의 역할과 한계 
3. 소결 

제4장 개별 메커니즘의 이해: 구조와 주요 쟁점 
1. 지원 메커니즘 
가. 구조 
나. 주요 쟁점  
다. 전망 
2. 감축 메커니즘 
가. 기본요소 
나. 신규 시장 메커니즘 
다. 과제와 전망 
3. 소결 

제5장 신체제 운영 메커니즘 설계에 대한 통합적 접근 
1. 감축·지원 메커니즘 간 연계 필요성 
가. 개별 메커니즘의 목적과 과제 
나. 양 메커니즘의 상호작용 
다. 메커니즘의 통합적 설계와 국가 이질성 완화 
2. 효과적 통합 메커니즘 설계를 위한 과제 
가. 개도국 일반의 감축유인 부족문제 해결 
나. 선진국 및 선발개도국의 자발적 감축·지원 유인 제고 
다. 통합적 MRV 시스템의 공유 
3. 소결 

제6장 신체제의 성공적 안착을 위한 정책 제언 
1. 메커니즘 간 통합 MRV 시스템 모범관행 설정 
2. 민간자본의 유입유형별 감축·지원의 가치 할인율 차별화 
3. 기술지원의 확산효과 지표(spillover effect index) 개발 
4. 신규 시장 메커니즘의 허브(hub), ‘녹색개발은행’의 구축 
5. 결언 

참고문헌 

부록 
부록 I. 국가 이질성으로 인한 기후체제 불안정성 
부록 II. 3장 정리들의 증명 

Executive Summary