The WTO’s 13th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) will take place from 26 to 29 February 2024 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirate. The Ministerial is expected to discuss  follow-up agenda items from the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12), such as fishery subsidies, the e-commerce moratorium, whether to extend intellectual property rights exemptions to diagnosis and treatment for COVID-19, and WTO reform. In addition, there may also be an attempt to incorporate into the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) into WTO law. Additionally, the e-commerce Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) may also attempt to conclude the negotiations at MC13.

Agriculture and development, traditional issues in WTO multilateral negotiations, are also expected to be discussed at MC13 regardless of whether there is an agreement or not. Finally, issues such as women and trade, climate change, and industrial policy (subsidies), which has recently attracted much international attention, are expected to be discussed at MC13.

The direction of Korea’s negotiation response in preparation for MC13 can be summarized as follows. First of all, the possibility of reaching a consensus at MC13 must be analyzed first. In other words, since the negotiation period for a ministerial meeting is only 3 to 4 days, it is virtually impossible to reach an agreement through short negotiations unless the agenda is one in which the differences among member countries have been significantly narrowed in advance. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the possibility of reaching agreement on each agenda and to focus negotiating strength on those agendas on which agreement can be reached.

From this perspective, the fisheries subsidies negotiations and the e-commerce JSI are agendas that have narrowed much of the differences between member countries through previous intensive negotiations. It is expected that most fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing (OC/OF) will be prohibited. In addition, Korea is likely to be amongst the 20 largest providers of fisheries subsidies, so it will be subject to additional regulations. However, there is still a big difference in the positions of major countries on special and differential treatments (S&D) for developing countries, including the notification issue of forced labor, so they may not be able to reach an agreement at the MC13. In the case of Korea, it is necessary to deal with negotiations in such a way as to postpone reaching an agreement until MC14 by uniting with other countries and highlighting the problems with the current draft text. In addition, in preparation for the future WTO fisheries subsidy notification, there is a need to closely review domestic fisheries subsidy policies and reclassify fisheries subsidies in line with fishery resource management policies. 

In the case of the e-commerce JSI, many of the key issues have been resolved due to the United Sates’ withdrawal of its original position. However, there are still issues, such as horizontal issues. In particular, whether or not to extend the moratorium on electronic transmission is a contentious issue that was difficult to reach agreement on at the previous MC12, and as some countries are still strongly opposed to extending the moratorium, it is expected that MC13 will also face considerable difficulties. Korea needs to engage to MC13 in a way that contributes to reaching an agreement on the e-commerce JSI. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the give-and-take compromise among major countries on whether to extend the moratorium in the final stage of MC13.

As with other agendas, the positions of Member countries are sharply conflicting, so it is difficult to expect any particular outcomes from the MC13. The question of whether or not to extend the scope of intellectual property exemptions to COVID-19 diagnostics and treatments is important to substantially improve access to COVID-19 diagnostics and treatments in developing countries (including least developed countries). Therefore, it is necessary to temporarily support the expansion of the scope of the exemption, but make it subject to monitoring and evaluation by relevant international organizations to analyze its effectiveness.

We have important interests at stake in WTO reform, so it is important to actively participate, but to accurately recognize our limitations by taking into account the characteristics of multilateral negotiations. In particular, the will of the United States has an absolute influence on the reform of the dispute settlement system (DSS). Therefore, it is necessary to handle negotiations in such a way that properly reflects the US interest based on the principle of a two-tired dispute settlement system with an appellate function. In particular, it is possible to propose a plan to use periodic review by the DSB(Dispute Settlement Body) or review by panel judges to keep appellate judges in check. Meanwhile, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) such as good offices, arbitration, and mediation should be allowed for efficiency. However, considering the possibility of a favorable outcome for a powerful country, the possibility of going to lawsuit (panel, etc.) should be left open.

Agriculture is a sharp conflict of interests among Member countries, so MC13 should focus on the specific content of the future work plan rather than the derivation of outcomes. In particular, the direction of future discussions on domestic subsidy reduction needs to focus on developing a work plan that meets our interests. As the conflict between developed and developing countries continues, it is unlikely that any results in development agenda will be achieved in MC13. In the case of Korea, it is necessar to be proactive in granting flexibility to the least developed countries (LDCs). To achieve this, it will be necessary to propose a plan to change the extension of benefits upon graduation from LDCs to a mandatory provision rather than a best-efforts clause.

Regrading policy space, it is important to determine our position on the industrial subsidy of major countries. Korea ay provide subsidies to develop its own high-tech industries. Therefore, some flexibility is needed in the application of WTO subsidy provisions.  However, rather than Korea's utilization, unfair competition due to the astronomical scale of subsidies provided by major countries (including developed countries as well as China and India) may be a bigger problem for Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with industrial subsidies based on the principle of effective regulation rather than permission, but in the direction of providing an appropriate level of flexibility for each situation. To this end, an institutional mechanism needs to be established within the WTO that can focus on discussing and recommending relevant subsidy policies of Member countries.

국문요약

약어표

제1장 서론

1. 연구의 배경과 중요성

2. 연구 목적과 주요 연구 내용

제2장 WTO 협상 동향과 MC13 예상 의제

1. WTO 협상 동향

2. MC13 예상 의제

   

제3장 제13차 WTO 각료회의 의제 분석

1. MC12 후속 의제

2. WTO 개혁

3. 공동 이니셔티브     

4. 도하개발어젠다(DDA) 의제    

5. 기타 주요 의제

    

제4장 제13차 WTO 각료회의 전망과 의제별 협상 대책

1. 제13차 WTO 각료회의 전망  

2. 의제별 협상 대책

    

제5장 요약 및 정책 제언

1. 요약

2. 정책 제언

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary