This report analyzes Chinese policy measures to cope with the global economic crisis and the economic relationship between China and the US. It focuses mainly on China’s policy responses to the global economic crisis and their effects, followed by the impact on Sino-American economic relationship of policy changes made by China in the direction of economic development for the long term. Especially, it attempts to analyze policies related to trade, Renminbi exchange rate and the foreign reserve operations for a more precise understanding of present Sino-American relations.
After the explosion of the American financial crisis that engulfed the rest of the globe in mid-September of 2008, the Chinese government opted for a more aggressive economic stimulus policy, setting a goal of 8% economic growth by providing a boost for the domestic market. A 4-trillion yuan (US$586 billion) stimulus package over 2 years was announced on November 9, 2008, subsequently revised and confirmed with detailed expenditures for specific sectors.
In addition, the government continued active efforts to boost domestic consumption by lowering tax rates, expanding the home appliance trade-in policy, developing the 10 Major Industry Plan, invigorating the real-estate market, and taking measures for stabilizing exports etc. These policy measures resulted in the rapid recovery of the economy in terms of GDP growth, industrial production, consumption, investment, exports, employment, etc.
The government investment to overcome the crisis, however, was biased toward the infrastructure investment; including SOC investment, reconstruction of areas hit by the earthquake and housing construction etc. Consequently, growth driven by large-scale public investment intensified the imbalance between investment and consumption, and actually created new problems in the form of redundant facilities and overinvestment in state owned enterprises. Furthermore, bank loans surged as expansionary fiscal policy was implemented simultaneously with a loose monetary policy, and overcapacity became a problem in some industries. Also, the reform of state- owned enterprises fell behind and the real wages of the workers increased.
After the crisis, the trade dispute between China and the US became more intense. The bilateral trade volume was only US$2.4 billion at the time when Sino-American diplomatic ties were established in 1979, but rose sharply to US$409.2 billion in 2008 after China became a member of the WTO. The two countries have remained most important trading partners for each other even after the global recession and the US is the largest export destination and third largest source of imports for China. China has achieved the biggest trade surplus vis-à-vis the US since 2001, and the increasing volume of the bilateral trade between the two countries deepened the trade imbalance in favor of China.
In other words, American deficit in trade with China has widened since the global economic crisis, reaching its highest level in 2008. Under the circumstances, demands for a strong trade policy against China became much more vocal, which led to trade remedies against China and increasing pressure for Renminbi appreciation. But in responding to such pressures actively and aggressively, China has aggravated the bilateral trade disputes between it and the US.
Meanwhile, the dialogue channel between high-level officials of the two countries has changed after the global economic crisis. The two countries started the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in 2009 to discuss global issues in anti-terrorism, science & technology, education & culture, and environment & energy (including climate change) as well as economic and trade issues. Though S&ED has not presented obvious solutions to sensitive issues, it is still significant as a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate the various issues intertwined with national interests of the two countries and for maintaining stable bilateral relations. Also, S&ED ingrained the rising status of China in the international society, highlighting the fact that a new phase of Sino-American relations have just begun, where the two countries are now ‘equal’ partners leading the global political economic order in the 21st century.
The Chinese exchange regime has been the crux of the bilateral trade dispute even before the global economic crisis, and especially after Chinese government fixed its exchange rate against US dollar after the crisis.
Some American scholars or policy makers argue that the low exchange rate of Renminbi maintained artificially amounts to de facto subsidies for Chinese export companies that cause harm to China’s trade partners. They claim that the Chinese government's manipulation of the Renminbi exchange rate should be met with the trade sanctions. This prompted a change in China from the fixed exchange rate into the managed floating system in June 2010, but it is argued that the real currency appreciation of the Renminbi has been modest, at best.
Meanwhile, in September 2010, the US Congress passed the “Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act” aimed at China; that enables retaliation with tariff on goods imported from countries suspected of manipulating the exchange rate. Also, the second quantitative easing policy called QE2 was announced in November 3, 2010 and the current account target was presented in Seoul G20 summit in November 2010. The long argument related to the Renminbi exchange rate policy is still continuing.
The Renminbi appreciation issue is at the center of ever-sharpening dispute between the US and China. Some Chinese studies recently assessed that the undervalued Renminbi is one of the various factors causing the external imbalance of the Chinese economy. Therefore, they suggest that the policies for reforming systems such as privatization, normalization of the financial system functions, fiscal reform to minimize the internal reserves of state-owned enterprises and the reform of the factor market etc., are more important than Renminbi appreciation for decreasing the Chinese current account surplus and resolving the external imbalance.
China is actively investing much of its foreign exchange reserve investment into buying US treasury bonds. China’s US Treasury Bond purchase accounts for 33.4% of total foreign exchange reserve as of the end of September 2010 and China surpassed Japan to become the largest holder of US Treasury Bonds in 2008. Though the global economic crisis caused the US dollar to become weak, which created the risk of net loss for China in holding on to US dollar assets, China could not help but continue its purchases of US treasury bonds because it could not find any other place to invest its huge foreign exchange reserve. At the same time, buying US dollar assets has similar effects to the US economy as Renminbi appreciation so that the pressure could be relieved. Even without abrupt exchange rate appreciation, China could secure some time to change its economic development strategy from an export-and-investment driven economy into one driven by domestic consumption. In the short and medium term, the current trend where China keeps buying US dollar assets is likely to continue, but for the longer term, it is accepted that there is a rising need for a strong international currency that can replace the US dollar. The Renminbi is considered by some as an influential currency which can assume such a role, and the Chinese government has been accelerating the Renminbi internationalization after the crisis.
The bilateral trade disputes in the future will continue due to the national interests of both the US and China, and attempts to arrive at a compromise will occur at the same time. Meanwhile, a serious confrontation is expected concerning the Renminbi exchange rate policy. A consensus has developed inside China that a too rapid Renminbi appreciation is not the solution to the surplus in current accounts. On the contrary, it may harm its export industries.
Finally, we will examine the direct and indirect influences of the Sino-American trade dispute on the Korean economy so that Korea can stay prepared, as detailed analysis and strategies on Korea’s position are required in coping with a potential Renminbi appreciation.

 서 언 

국문요약 

제1장 서 론 
1. 연구 배경 및 목적 
2. 선행연구 검토 및 연구방법론 
가. 선행연구와의 차별성 
나. 연구방법론 

제2장 글로벌 경제위기와 중국의 정책 대응 
1. 경기부양정책 추진방향 
2. 주요 경기부양조치 
가. 10개항 경기부양조치 및 투자계획 
나. 금융완화조치 
다. 내수소비 확대조치 
라. 10대 산업 진흥계획 
마. 부동산 및 주식시장 활성화 조치 
바. 수출둔화 방지 조치 
3. 위기대응책의 성과와 문제점 
가. 위기대응책의 성과 
나. 위기대응책에 따른 문제점 

제3장 글로벌 경제위기 이후 미ㆍ중 간 통상관계  
1. 무역 현황 
가. 중국의 주요 수출대상국 
나. 미ㆍ중 간 주요 교역 현황 
다. 양국간 무역불균형 
2. 미ㆍ중 통상분쟁 격화 
가. 반덤핑ㆍ상계관세 제도 개관 
나. 양국간 분쟁 현황 
다. 분쟁의 전개과정 
라. 분쟁의 특징 및 배경 
마. 향후 전개방향 
3. 미ㆍ중 고위급 대화채널의 변화 
가. 미ㆍ중 전략경제대화(SED) 
나. 미ㆍ중 전략 및 경제대화(S&ED) 
다. 미ㆍ중 경제 및 전략대화에 대한 평가 

제4장 위안화 환율정책과 미ㆍ중 관계 
1. 중국 환율 제도 및 정책 
가. 중국 환율정책의 변천 
나. 중국 환율정책의 3대 원칙 
2. 위안화 평가절상 논의의 주요 쟁점
가. 중국의 위안화 환율조작 여부 
나. 위안화 환율의 저평가 여부 
다. 환율의 안정적 유지와 여타 거시경제정책 목표와의 관계 
라. 중국의 위안화 절상과 글로벌 불균형 해소 여부 
마. 위안화 절상에 소극적인 중국 
3. 위안화 환율 관련, 미국의 새로운 전략
가. 미국의 2차 양적완화정책과 위안화 환율
나. 미국의 경상수지 목표제 제안 

제5장 중국의 경상수지 흑자 축소방안
1. 경상수지 흑자 확대요인 
2. 중국의 내부ㆍ외부 불균형 문제 
가. 고(高)저축률의 주요 요인 
나. 경상수지 흑자 축소정책 

제6장 채권국으로서의 중국과 위안화 국제화 
1. 중국의 미 국채 보유 현황 
2. 글로벌 경제위기 이후 투자 다변화 시도 
3. 위안화 국제화와 전망 
가. 중국의 위안화 국제화 시도 
나. 위안화 국제화 추진 현황
다. 위안화 국제화 가능성과 전망 

제7장 결론 및 시사점 
1. 연구내용 요약 
가. 글로벌 경제위기와 중국의 정책 대응 
나. 글로벌 경제위기 이후 미ㆍ중 간 통상관계 
다. 위안화 환율정책과 미ㆍ중 관계 
라. 중국의 경상수지 흑자 축소방안 
마. 채권국으로서의 중국과 위안화 국제화
2. 시사점 
가. 미ㆍ중 경제관계에 대한 시사점 
나. 한국경제에 대한 시사점 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary