Recent regulatory proposals on competition in digital markets, such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, emphasize the importance of ensuring fair competition in markets to sustain innovation and avoid long-term monopolies. There is a growing concern that markets are becoming increasingly concentrated, with a small number of data-rich companies gaining prominent positions in horizontally or vertically linked markets and large user bases. This report identifies considerations for introducing policies to mitigate the market power of data-rich global digital platforms and protect the openness of digital ecosystems for potential new entrants. To this end, we examine data-related regulatory trends in major countries and theoretically discuss the implications for inter-platform competition when data gives digital platforms a competitive advantage. We then focus on data portability, the most prominent data-related regulation of digital platforms, to explore the impact of data portability regulation on digital platform competition.

This study largely consists of five main parts. Chapter 2 outlines the basic characteristics of the platform economy, including its multi- sided nature and indirect network effects, and describes the role of data in the platform economy, in order to better understand the discussion that follows. Indirect externalities are prominent in digital platforms, which are intermediaries that allow multiple independent groups of economic actors to interact through digital connectivity, due to their two-sided market nature. If one side can initially attract a certain number of people to the platform, it becomes easier for both sides to attract additional platform users in a virtuous cycle through indirect network effects, making it easier for market tipping than in other markets. In these digital platform markets, data is utilized to improve the quality of services provided by the digital platforms and to expand their user base. Digital platforms collect, process, and analyze personal-level data generated from users’ interactions with the platform after obtaining their consent. As more data is accumulated, search and recommendation results are tailored to the user, which increases the utility or profitability of the platform for both users and merchants. Digital platforms can also collect and use data to create new business opportunities. By merging with other digital platforms, or by entering the market for complementary services, digital platforms can create additional commercial value by combining their own data with that of other platforms.

In Chapter 3, we examine the current state and future prospects of antitrust regulation in key countries, focusing on issues related to data concentration. While the need to regulate data concentration on global digital platforms has been increasingly recognized as monopolies impede sustainable innovation, appropriate regulatory measures have not been implemented due to the potential negative impact on innovation through regulation of digital platform data and the risk of falling behind in competition in the global marketplace, both domestically and globally, if there are competing domestic players in the country. In the U.S., five antitrust bills targeting digital platform companies were introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2021, but all but the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act were abandoned. The EU has emphasized privacy and personal data protection and has included the right to data portability in the GDPR, which to some extent limits the tendency of global digital platform companies to monopolize data. In addition, the EU recently enacted the EU Digital Markets Act(DMA) and the EU Digital Services Act (DSA). Through the DMA, gatekeepers are obliged to ensure the free portability of data generated through end-user activities and to provide business users and authorized third parties with free access to and use of data, including personal information. In China, where domestic platform companies dominate the local market, no specific laws or policies have been issued to address the issue of data monopolization by dominant platforms. In South Korea, where there is significant competition between domestic digital platforms and foreign platforms, the KFTC has been strengthening its regulatory focus on platform monopolies. The KFTC considers each operator’s ability to collect, retain, and utilize data, gaps, and the possibility of competitors’ access to data when assessing market dominance, and is expected to consider the effect of increasing entry barriers through data and the possibility of transferring dominance in platform merger reviews. The Online Platforms Bill, which stipulates data portability so that dominant platforms can safely move data from user to user with the user’s consent, has beenproposed, but there are also warnings that it could act as a de facto regulation of domestic platforms and stifle innovation.

In Chapter 4, we explore the impact of data on competition among digital platforms, based on the findings in the previous literature. First, we review the findings on whether more data gives digital platforms a competitive advantage. While more rigorous analysis is still needed, as that many of the analyses are based on limited levels of firm data, most previous studies suggest that more data has a largely positive impact in terms of making predictions about consumer profiles, preferences, and behaviors. And if data gives digital platforms a competitive advantage, how does this affect competition between platforms, based on prior research? We summarize prior research that has modeled the process by which digital platforms gain a competitive advantage from data, by using data collected from consumers as an input to innovation activities to provide higher quality services to consumers. We find that there is a first-mover advantage among platforms competing for R&D investments based on data. Unless the initial quality of the entrant’s service is sufficiently high, the first mover will invest aggressively, and the difference in demand between the two platforms will not decrease once it occurs. The effect of a data sharing policy as a policy to address this problem is that competitors who are somewhat competitive in initial service quality or who can compete with the market leader in terms of innovation efficiency will decide to enter the market and engage in innovation competition in the market over a long period of time. The welfare effects of data sharing policies are ambiguous but generally positive.

In Chapter 5, we examine the impact of data portability regulation on competition on digital platforms as data portability regulation is one of the most prominent data-related regulations. In particular, we analyze the consequences for competition between gatekeepers and potential market entrants given the asymmetric nature of data portability regulation in the recently implemented EU DMA, where obligations are imposed only on market dominant firms. We find that when data portability regulation is imposed only on the market leader and the entrant is less productive, the entrant, despite its lower productivity, can leverage the rent from tying future consumers in the initial price competition phase and eventually displace the gatekeeper and capture the market. In such cases, regulatory asymmetries can lead to the displacement of efficient producers by inefficient producers, thereby reducing social welfare.

In Chapter 6, we discuss the implications for data-related competition policy for digital platform markets. We assess economic benefits and costs of policy measures related to limiting the ability of market- dominant platforms to collect more user data and combine different datasets, such as reducing data retention periods, restricting combinations between different data, limiting app pre-installation and default settings, and restricting lines of business. We also examine measures to improve access to data from dominant platforms, divided into two categories: data sharing by a broad range of users and data sharing by specific users, taking into account the general direction of adoption and the characteristics of different types of digital platform markets.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 구성 및 내용

제2장 디지털플랫폼과 데이터
1. 플랫폼 경제의 특징
2. 디지털플랫폼에서의 데이터의 역할
3. 디지털플랫폼에서의 데이터와 경쟁

제3장 디지털플랫폼의 데이터에 대한 주요국의 규제 동향
1. 플랫폼 데이터 집중화 규제의 배경
2. 미국의 디지털플랫폼 데이터 관련 규제
3. EU의 디지털플랫폼 데이터 관련 규제
4. 중국의 디지털플랫폼 데이터 관련 규제
5. 한국의 디지털플랫폼 데이터 관련 규제
6. 소결

제4장 데이터와 디지털플랫폼의 경쟁에 대한 이론적 고찰
1. 개요
2. 데이터와 디지털플랫폼의 경쟁우위
3. 데이터와 디지털플랫폼 시장의 경쟁

제5장 데이터 이동성 적용이 디지털플랫폼 경쟁에 미치는 영향
1. 데이터 이동성 적용의 특징
2. 선행 연구
3. 이론 모형 분석
4. 소결

제6장 디지털플랫폼의 데이터에 관한 정책적 시사점
1. 데이터 수집 제한 관련 조치
2. 시장지배적 플랫폼의 데이터로의 접근성 향상 관련 조치

참고문헌

Executive Summary