Normal;The Russian Financial Crisis and Its Implications

From late 1997, the Asian financial crisis has subjected Russia to recurrent financial market pressures. Such pressures finally became too onerous and on August 17, 1998 the Russian authorities announced emergency measures including de facto devaluation of the ruble and a partial moratorium on Russian debt.

The Asian financial crisis affected the Russian financial crisis in two ways. First, the crisis emphasized the high risks of emerging markets in the eyes of capital investors and thereby helped lead to a massive outflow of capital from Russia. Second, it aggravated Russia's balance of payment situation by lowering world prices of raw materials which constitute most of Russia's exports.

While the Asian crisis was the spark, the roots of the Russian crisis appear to lie in the weakness of the Russian economic system - namely, the increasing budget deficit and mounting short-term debt. Problems of the Russian banking sector and the unstable Russian political situation also contributed to the outbreak of the Russian financial crisis.
In the wake of the collapse of the Russian financial sector in August, many feared the advent of a worldwide depression. While such a deep recession has not yet materialized, soon after the Russian crisis stock prices fell sharply all over the world. While financial asset prices recovered by the end of year in most advanced economy markets, the negative impact was more pronounced and long-lasting in developing economies as the Russian crisis extended the financial crisis, which had previously been limited in Asia, to other developing countries facing structural economic difficulties.

International markets aside, the damage by the August financial crisis on the Russian economy has been enormous. In 1997, Russia recorded its first economic growth since the beginning of economic reform in 1992. However, in September 1998, GDP shrank 9.9 percent and industrial output fell 14.5 percent off September 1997 levels. Still more dramatic were the rise in consumer prices and the devaluation of the ruble. In September, the consumer price index increased 38.4 percent, and the ruble fell from the pre-crisis level of R6.3 to the dollar to over R20 to the dollar on December 8. Furthermore, imposing the moratorium has rendered the Russian government unable to borrow from either domestic or international capital markets. This leaves Russia with no sources of funding other than printing money. However, this option can only further deteriorate the financial credibility of the Russian government both domestically and internationally as well as cause inflation to further soar.

In probing for solutions, no easy fix is apparent. Instead, Russian economic recovery will entail a long and painful process of economic reform where political stability is a sine qua non. With the nomination of Yevgeny Primakov as prime minister, Yeltsin has, at least for the moment, avoided further political turmoil. The Primakov government revealed its anti-crisis program in November 1998. Although it was supported by some politicians in Russia, the lack of details concerning financing have drawn criticism both in Russia and especially from abroad. The most damaging dissent of the Primakov program has come from the International Monetary Fund, which suspended funding to Russia. The short-term outlook of the Russian economy is decidedly gloomy and in 1999 the economy is expected to decline by 5-7 percent.
Unsurprisingly, Korea-Russian economic cooperation has also been negatively affected by the outbreak of the Russian financial crisis. Such impact can already be seen in the fall of bilateral trade between the two countries. Korea's exports to Russia shrank 78.7 percent and 82.5 percent, respectively, in September and October, from a year earlier. This trend of plunging Korean exports to the country is expected to last until Russia recovers from its financial crisis. As Korea-Russian trade represents only about 1 percent of Korea's total trade, it will not have a significant impact on the Korean economy. However, manufacturers of certain food products and electronic goods, the latter of which has been Korea's largest export to Russia, will certainly suffer from the shrinking Russian markets. Furthermore, Korean direct investment in Russia, which had already fallen in before the Russian financial crisis, has further contracted and is unlikely to recover until Russia begins to show signs that it will get its economic house in order.

In order to overcome these difficulties, Korean firms must adapt as quickly as possible to rapidly changing Russian markets. In particular, they must take into account the following factors: Russian consumers' reduced purchasing power, the Russian government's expected restrictive import policy for consumer goods and the collapsed Russian banking system. Therefore, Korean firms must search for new markets in which to diversify and thereby broaden their presence in Russia. For electronics and automobiles, they must continue to expand after service networks and attempt to increase automobile part exports. Meanwhile, the most promising area of Korea-Russian economic relations, where governments can play a constructive role, is science and technology cooperation.

머리말
요약

Ⅰ 서 론

Ⅱ 러시아 금융위기의 전개과정 및 원인분석
1. 모라토리엄 이전 러시아 금융위기의 전개과정
2. 러시아 금융위기의 원인분석

Ⅲ 모라토리엄 선언 이후 러시아 경제상황의 변화와 향후 경제전망
1. 모라토리엄 선언과 루블화의 평가절하
2. 모라토리엄 선언 이후의 경제/정치동향
3. 프리마코프 내각의 경제위기 타개노력과 향후 경제전망

Ⅳ 러시아 금융위기의 대외적 파급효과와 우리의 대응방안
1. 러시아 금융위기가 세계경제에 미치는 영향
2. 우리 경제에 미치는 영향
3. 한-러 경제협력의 나아갈 방향

참고문헌