Supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the vulnerability of supply chains that are concentrated in certain countries around the world, and have led to policies prioritizing economic security and reducing dependence on certain countries. Major developed countries have been pursuing reshoring strategies to rebuild their domestic production base, while also aiming to establish reliable supply chains through “friend-shoring” with trusted partner countries. This recent movement of supply chain restructuring, summarized as geoeconomics fragmentation, has particularly intensified in strategic technology sectors related to security.
While the Korean government's participation in friend-shoring policies by some developed countries is not intended to exclude China from supply chains, it is true that participating in cooperative frameworks with those countries may lead to worsening relations with China. As the U.S. continues to expand its efforts to restructure supply chains excluding China, it may prove difficult to deepen economic relations with China, which could lead to a decrease in Korea’s national interests.
Against this backdrop, ASEAN holds high strategic value as a cooperative partner in the midst of the U.S.-China rivalry. ASEAN plays a central role in political, security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region through mechanisms like the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Through such mechanisms centered on ASEAN, it is expected that cooperation in East Asia can be sought without directly facing sensitive issues within the U.S.-China strategic competition. Therefore, this study attempted to explore ways to cooperate with ASEAN in the context of U.S.-China rivalry.