서언 

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국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구의 배경과 목적 
2. 선행연구 검토 
3. 연구의 범위와 구성 

제2장 중동지역 여성의 경제활동 참여 저조 배경 및 현황 
1. 여성의 경제활동 참여 저조 배경 
  가. 사회문화적 특성 
  나. 제도 및 법적 제약 
  다. 석유 중심 경제의 구조적 특수성 
2. 여성의 정치 및 경제활동 참여 현황 
  가. 여성의 정치활동 참여 현황 
  나. 여성의 경제활동 참여 현황 
3. 소결 

제3장 중동지역 여성의 경제활동 참여 확대를 위한 주요 정책
1. 여성의 사회활동 제약 요인 제거 
  가. 후견인 제도 완화 
  나. 노동참여 여건 개선 
  다. 출산휴가 및 육아 지원 제도 강화 
2. 종사 가능 직종 마련 및 확대 
  가. 취업 가능 직종 확대 
  나. 여성 고용 쿼터 지정 및 여성 전용 일자리 확대 
  다. 창업 지원 
3. 교육 및 직업훈련 지원 강화 
4. 소결 

제4장 중동지역 여성 경제 참여 확대 정책의 경제적 효과 분석: 사우디아라비아를 중심으로 
1. 연구방법론과 분석모형 
2. 분석 결과 
  가. 경제성장 효과 분석 
  나. 외국인 노동자 대체효과 분석 
3. 시사점 

제5장 중동지역 여성 경제 참여 확대에 따른 정부간 협력 방안 및 우리 기업에 대한 시사점 
1. 주요 부문별 정부간 협력 방안 
  가. 우리나라의 여성 경제활동 참여 확대 정책 
  나. 교육 및 직업훈련  
  다. 노동 및 행정 
2. 기업 진출 유망 분야 및 시사점 
  가. 진출 유망 산업 및 품목 
  나. 진출기업에 대한 시사점 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary

   This study examines the background and current status of recent women empowerment policy in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and suggests new agenda for government-level policy cooperation and favorable sectors due to recent changes. The level of economic participation by women in the Middle East remains among the lowest in the world. Laws, institutions, and cultures inherent in the region have long restrained women’s social and economic activities. Recently, however, major oil countries in the Middle East are encouraging women’s economic and social participation. Thus women economic empowerment policy is becoming a key labor policy for these countries to depart from resource-oriented rentier states in preparation for the upcoming post-oil era. This study analyzes the background, detailed policies, and economic effects of women’s empowerment in the region, as well as providing policy implications and concrete policy approaches to further economic cooperation with Middle Eastern countries.
   Chapter 2 surveys the background of low female economic participation in the Middle East and the status of female economic and political empowerment in the region, using data on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. There are three main reasons for low female economic participation in the Middle East relative to other regions in the world. First, the patriarchal system remains strong and a culture which places honor above all else places many restrictions on women. This cultural and historical background has limited the role and behavior of Middle Eastern women in many ways and still affects social perceptions of women’s economic participation. Another factor is how insufficient the institutional and legal environment is for female participation in the labor market. The male guardianship system, which requires women to earn permission from their male guardians for important social decisions like marriage or employment, remains in place in many countries in the region. More than half of the Middle Eastern countries have restrictions on women labor, including their occupations and industries. Maternity leaves in the Middle East are relatively short compared to other regions, and most countries are yet to allow parental leaves. Still, in some countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, employers are obligated to provide full pay for employees during maternity leaves. Lastly, the unique oil-dependent economic structure also discourages women from participating in the economy. The oil-based economic structure weakens the international competitiveness of trade goods producing sectors, in which female workers are traditionally more active, and increases the reservation wages for women, thus reducing both the demand for and supply of female labor. Data for GCC countries in the Middle East, where women’s economic activities are particularly more limited, show that these countries rank among the lowest, from 121st to 141st overall, on the global gender gap index. In particular, while legal/political institutions such as the right to vote and electoral eligibility are normally ensured for women, actual political participation by women generally remained limited. In GCC countries, female enrollment rates by education level are similar to or even higher than their male counterparts, especially in higher education. Although women’s education levels are higher than men’s, women account for less than 30% of the total workforce, and female economic participation rates are also relatively low. Female unemployment rates are also higher than male unemployment rates because there are few suitable and decent jobs for women due to social and cultural constraints. In private sectors where the share of foreign workers is high, many foreign female workers are housekeepers and elementary workers, with the result that wage levels of women remain a mere 20% to 47% of men’s wages. In public sectors, on the other hand, the gender pay gap is relatively small and the majority of workers are male and female nationals who are both paid well.
   Chapter 3 surveys the female economic empowerment policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia is undergoing visible changes from when women’s economic activities were virtually unheard of in the country, as it has dramatically eased and reformed restrictions against women recently. As the male guardianship system, which affects women’s lives in general, has been weakened, the environment for women to participate in economic activities has improved. Allowing women to drive has increased their prospects to find jobs. The UAE, which differs from Saudi Arabia in its economic and demographic background, has a better environment for women in terms of institutional constraints on women’s activities, as women empowerment rose as a main agenda in the country earlier than Saudi Arabia. Both countries actively support women’s participation in private sectors and, in particular, encourage women’s start-ups. In addition, as women’s economic activities expand, maternity and child-care support policies develop. To allow a work-life balance for women, telecommuting is encouraged and supported. Furthermore, support for female education and vocational training is being promoted as a key policy for women’s economic empowerment.
   In Chapter 4, we analyze the economic effect created by Saudi female nationals entering the labor market of the nation, where female economic empowerment policies have been expanded to achieve the Saudi Vision 2030. In particular, we conducted an empirical study to test the statistical relationship between Saudi national labor market participation and economic growth, as well as the substitution effect between Saudi national workers and non-Saudi workers. In Saudi Arabia, 62% of the 30 million resident population are nationals, compared to other countries in regions were more foreigners reside than nationals. Being the source country of the second-largest amount of remittances from migrant workers in the world places a huge burden on Saudi Arabia, along with the high unemployment rate of Saudi nationals. In this regard, the recent female labor policy of Saudi Arabia focuses on the substitution of migrant workers by Saudi female workers. This empirical study builds the longest time series data of Saudi national female labor market participation rates from 1999 to 2018. It is important to note that overall female labor market participation data used in most related literature are actually inappropriate because foreign workers account for the majority in the Saudi labor market. It is a key contribution of this study that it uses the longest time series data compared to some previous studies that use Saudi national data. The empirical results show a strong positive relationship between Saudi national female labor market participation and economic growth when controlling for effects from the oil sector. On the other hand, the findings for a substitutional relationship between migrant workers and Saudi female workers were not statistically significant. Despite several recent policies by the Saudi government for foreign workers, such as increasing the costs associated with hiring foreigners and limiting work permit quotas, the participation rate of Saudi women in the labor market continues to show a strong positive relationship with the share of non-Saudi workers in the labor market. It appears difficult for Saudi female workers to fulfill the demand for non-Saudi workers because Saudi nationals tend to avoid domestic jobs like private drivers or housekeepers. We believe further social and cultural change will be necessary to expand women’s economic participation in the future, in addition to legal and institutional reform, vocational education, as well as improvements in child care and welfare support.
   Chapter 5 explores the demand for government-to-government (G2G) cooperation as women’s economic participation expands, focusing on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and suggests emerging sectors and industries and implications for Korean companies operating in the countries. Korea’s experience in promoting female labor participation for economic development through women’s education and vocational training can be particularly useful to develop female education and training systems in Saudi Arabia. As the government of Saudi Arabia pushes up women’s labor participation, the development of human resources to meet demands in the labor market has become a priority in policies. Korea’s experience of implementing similar policies can be shared with Saudi Arabia in the form of cooperation between related institutes for female education in developing curricula and educational infrastructure. In addition, a platform connecting Saudi students with Korean companies in Saudi Arabia, for instance university student internship programs, can encourage exchanges in the education sector. Meanwhile, the demand for women’s vocational training in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is expected to increase cooperation in the establishment of training facilities and systems as well as training for instructors. As the demand for vocational training instructors is expected to increase, we can expect to see further cooperation in this area.
   For labor and administrative policies, the export of women’s employment support systems can be a priority item of cooperation. We expect to see a rise in demand for employment information systems within Middle Eastern countries in the near future. Based on the experience and achievements of employment support institutes operated by the Korean government, such as the Women’s New Work Center, we can fully expect further adoption and development of such employment support systems in these countries as well. Second, we can consider sharing policy experiences and know-hows in supporting work-family balance. As women’s economic activities increase in the Middle East, demand for work-family balance and child care systems will increase soon. These countries yet lack sufficient experience and know-how to develop comprehensive and systematic policies. Since Korea has been working on these policies for a long time, such as reforming related laws and establishing and implementing long-term plans since the 1990s, so substantial policy cooperation can be reached in this area. Third, Korea’s labor market forecasting system can be exported to these countries. Forecasting labor future supply and demand is important as demand for substitute workers increases due to a rise in maternity leaves, and this will increase the need for skill in these forecasts as female workers continue to diversify their fields of speciality. We can expect demand for employment forecasting systems developed in Korea. Fourth, joint research projects at women’s policy institutes and researchers can be considered. Joint research between Korea and the Middle Eastern countries can help analyze the situation of the two countries regarding participation in women’s economic activities and to develop new cooperation agenda before launching and scaling up actual cooperation projects.
   Considering the population, purchasing power, and potential of women-related markets among the Middle East countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be considered Korea’s key partners and promising markets. Korea mainly exports automobiles and their parts, power and construction equipment, and mobile phones to both countries, but the demand for various products is expected to increase due to economic diversification and the expansion of economic activities by women. In particular, changes in women policies, such as easing male guardianship, allowing women to drive, increasing women’s employment, and easing clothing restrictions, will lead to more women making independent consumption decisions and exercising their purchasing powers. This is likely to generate more demand for beauty products and services and travel to Korea with an interest in Korean culture, like the Korean Wave. We expect the export of goods and services matching women’s needs to be promising areas.
   Meanwhile, Korean companies operating in the region will have to adopt new strategies by identifying policy changes and future demands as Saudi Arabia and the UAE adopt nationalization policies in their labor markets. In the case of Saudi Arabia, where female labor policy is changing rapidly, we can expect to see enormous changes in the business environment. The additional costs incurred by segregating male and female workers in working places will decrease. Meanwhile, localization policies to ensure local content requirements along with nationalization employment policies will make it necessary to consider local joint ventures and production instead of simple export to these markets. Due to the lack of local technical capacity in Saudi Arabia as well as policy interest in local technical training, we can also expect for the operation of private education facilities for vocational and technical education to be a promising area.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 의의 및 차별성
3. 연구의 범위 및 구성

제2장 신남방지역 무역 및 투자 동향
1. 아세안 및 인도의 무역
2. 아세안 및 인도의 투자
3. 요약

제3장 신남방지역 가치사슬 구조와 산업경쟁력 분석
1. 분석배경
2. 분석방법론
3. 신남방지역 가치사슬 구조 분석
4. 부가가치 기준 비교우위 분석을 통한 수출경쟁력 분석
5. 소결

제4장 신남방지역의 GVC 관련 주요 정책 및 산업별 수요 분석
1. 아세안의 GVC 관련 주요 정책 및 산업별 수요
2. 인도의 GVC 관련 주요 정책 및 산업별 수요
3. 소결

제5장 한국의 신남방지역 GVC 구축 현황 분석: 전기전자, 자동차 및 기계, 섬유ㆍ의류 중심
1. 아세안과의 GVC 구축 현황 분석
2. 인도
3. 소결

제6장 일본의 신남방지역 GVC 구축 사례와 전략
1. 일본기업의 아세안과 인도 생산 네트워크 분석
2. 신남방지역 내 일본의 생산 네트워크 성공 사례
3. 일본정부의 GVC 활성화를 위한 전략 및 정책
4. 소결

제7장 결론
1. 연구결과 요약
2. 정책 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   ASEAN and India are prominent emerging economies within the global economy. The Korean government is also paying attention to the so-called “New Southern Region” from its perspective (i.e. ASEAN and India), which has high growth potential, and is promoting a policy of expanding trade with the region. However, in light of the decline in trade with the New Southern Region in 2019, it looks difficult to achieve this goal. This is because the internal and external environment surrounding the New Southern Region is not as good as before. The external environment is deteriorating due to such factors as the spread of global protectionism and the global economic slowdown. In addition, trade and investment policies in the New Southern Region are less favorable than before, including intensifying competition, increased production costs, and policy changes such as increased local contents proportion, an emphasis on technology transfer, and pressure to improve trade imbalance with Korea. Due to these environmental changes, it is becoming more important to find ways to expand and upgrade trade with the New Southern Region. This is also an important task in promoting policies for Korea’s economic cooperation with ASEAN and India based on the principle of co-prosperity, which is the core of Korea’s New Southern Policy.
   Therefore, the study performs various types of GVC analyses in both macro and micro perspectives, which include analysis of the GVC structure of ASEAN and India, GVC-related policy and sector-level demand, the current status of Korea’s GVC structure, and Japan’s GVC network in ASEAN and India. Through this extensive analysis, the study proposes measures on promoting an extension of trade and GVC advancement with the New Southern Region.
   We can summarize the key findings as follows. First, in Chapter 3, we found unique characteristics within the GVC structure in New Southern Policy (NSP) countries. An analysis of data from the world input-output table reveals six characteristics: ① New Southern Policy countries have a higher GVC participation rate compared to other major regions, such as the coverage areas of the RCEP and NAFTA. In particular, NSP countries use foreign intermediate goods in their exports. ② The GVC participation rate in NSP countries has gradually decreased over the years, along with increasing domestic value-added in the exports. The trend indicates the evidence of localization in production. ③ NSP countries show advancement in export items and GVC activities, in the form of many countries in the region starting to produce more intermediate goods exports than final goods. ⑤ The GVC hub of intermediate goods (re)export within NSP countries has been diversified from Malaysia to Vietnam, India, and Indonesia. ⑥ Korea’s GVC status has changed significantly over the years. Korea’s GVC participation rate is higher than other major countries, and its GVC location has increased substantially. Korea has high backward GVC participation, which means Korea uses extensive foreign intermediate goods in its exports. The improvement of Korea’s GVC location implies that Korea’s intermediate goods exports have risen over time. The major destinations of Korea’s value-added exports are Vietnam, Singapore, India, and Indonesia. Among these countries, Korea is vertically integrated with Vietnam and Singapore.
   Second, in Chapter 3, we propose country/industry-specific potential cooperation possibilities with New Southern Policy countries. The cooperation with ASEAN and India is important for Korea to expand its GVC network and promote efficient production through international specialization. To identify Korean industries with a comparative advantage at the international level and high growth potential in NSP countries, the study performs various analyses, including an analysis of value-added comparative advantage, GVC-related policy, and sector-level demand. First, the value-added comparative advantage analysis reveals that Korea has comparative advantages in the areas of Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, Chemicals and Chemical Products, Electrical and Optical Equipment, and Transport Equipment. Among these industries, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have either comparative advantages or high backward GVC participation in the Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel sector, Vietnam in Chemicals and Chemical Products, the Philippines and Vietnam in Electrical and Optical Equipment, and India and Thailand in Transport Equipment. The country-industry matching indicates potential cooperation chances between Korea and NSP countries.
   To supplement the matching above, in Chapter 4, we conduct additional analysis on GVC-related policy and industry-specific demand. We choose seven countries which have an economically significant domestic market (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and India) for the analysis. We analyze each country’s national industry development scheme, five major industries (focused on manufacturing sector), and distinguish high-growth potential industries to propose specific industries for potential cooperation between Korea and NSP countries. Korea has a potential cooperation possibility in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry in all seven countries. More specifically, Korea has better cooperation chances with Indonesia in Coke, Refined Petroleum, Chemicals, and Chemical products, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal industries, with Myanmar in Textiles and Textile Products, Construction parts, and Consumer Product industries, with the Philippines in Chemicals and Chemical products, Telecommunication Device (Radio, TV), and Construction parts industries, with Thailand in Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Rubber and Plastics industries, with Vietnam for Textiles and Textile Products, Leather Products, Computer, Office and Telecommunication Device, Basic Metal, Other Non-Metallic Mineral, Wood Products, and Rubber and Plastics industries, with India in Coke, Refined Petroleum, Chemicals, and Chemical Products, Basic Metal, Pharmaceutical products, Food, Beverages and Tobacco, Transport Equipment industries.
   Third, in Chapter 5, we examine the current status of Korea’s GVC structure in the New Southern Region. In the case of ASEAN, we surveyed Korean electronics, automobiles, machinery, textiles and clothing companies in Vietnam and Indonesia, and automobiles and electronics companies in India. Our analysis identified the five following features. ① In the area of procurement of raw materials and parts in ASEAN, Korean companies are procuring the largest proportion of their demands from Korean sources, followed by local and Chinese sources. ② In the case of trading partners, electric, electronic, automobiles, and machinery companies are engaged in active transactions with their affiliates and Korean subcontractors in ASEAN. ③ The most important factors to consider when procuring local raw materials and parts were price competitiveness, followed by meeting and shortening delivery deadlines, and the demands of major customers. ④ In the case of entry into the market, electric, electronic, automobile and machinery companies mainly aim to expand sales in ASEAN, followed by exports to the Korean market. ⑤ The most representative obstacles to GVC construction of Korean companies are the lack of quality competitiveness and technological competence of local companies, followed by lack of logistics infrastructure, lack of parts or diversity, lack of cultural or language communication, and shortage of necessary workers.
   Next, ① India's procurement structure for Korean companies entering India shows that local Korean automakers and auto parts manufacturers have a high proportion of local procurement because the auto industry has a well-established local production network. On the other hand, the electronics industry has a relatively high proportion of import procurement due to the lack of production network in India. ② In the case of Korean companies entering India, automakers are expanding their exports of Indian products. In the electronics industry, on the other hand, exports of Indian products are just beginning. ③ Korean companies are experiencing difficulties in establishing GVCs in India due to difficulties in co-operation with local companies, poor infrastructure, and frequent policy changes.
   Fourth, in Chapter 6, we investigate the case of Japan successfully building GVC in the New Southern Region. The characteristics of the Japanese GVC construction in the New Southern Region are as follows. ① In terms of procurement of raw materials and parts, the proportion of local procurement is higher than that of Korea, and transactions with local companies and Japanese companies entering the market are also active. ② By industry, GVC construction is relatively active in the fields of electrical, electronics, machinery, and automobiles. This is because the company has a long history of entry and many companies have entered the market. In particular, there are many “anchor companies” leading production bases and global production network (GPN), and there are many Japanese companies that cooperate with these anchor companies. ③ Many Japanese companies that have entered ASEAN are rebuilding their production bases in light of changes in the global business environment and expansion of ASEAN economic integration. The most representative one is the Thai Plus One strategy.
   Meanwhile, in the case of product sales, Japanese firms that have entered the New Southern Region have a higher share of the local market than Korean firms. This is because not only transactions with local companies but also B2B transactions with many local Japanese companies are active. Japanese companies can successfully build GVCs in the New Southern Region thanks to various support and policies by the Japanese government. Representative policies include: active use of ODA to support local companies to reduce service linkage costs, improve location comparison advantages, build production networks, etc.; supporting industrial development and private sectors in developing countries; developing and supporting human resources development and technology transfer; identifying and addressing difficulties for local Japanese companies, including the establishment of GVCs.
   Finally, in Chapter 7, we present policy implications for expanding and upgrading Korea's trade in the value chain. First, three policy directions are presented. ① In terms of GVC construction direction, the production network and GVC should be expanded in the New Southern Region. This is accompanied by an increase in Korea's exports of intermediate goods, components, and materials for local production, and furthermore, Korea imports these intermediate goods and final goods which are produced in the New Southern Region, leading to increased trade. ② In the case of the production network and the GVC expansion method, it is first necessary to diversify the GVC base currently concentrated in Vietnam to India, Indonesia and Thailand. In addition, value chains should be upgraded and differentiated in the New Southern Region. In Vietnam, Korea's main production network and GVC base in ASEAN, Korea should expand to other industries such as chemicals and automobiles in addition to the electronics industry. In the case of labor-intensive industries, it is necessary to induce relocation to neighboring countries such as Cambodia and Myanmar, where labor costs are relatively low. This could be a Vietnam + 1 strategy. In addition, it is necessary to expand the GVC centering on the electronic, petrochemical and automotive sectors, which Korea has strength in the New Southern Region, and to expand and strengthen the regional linkage of the GVC. ③ When expanding investment in the New Southern Region to strengthen GVC, it is necessary to select investment sectors and support these sectors in consideration of Korea's comparative advantage, participation in the local value chain, local GVC-related policies and industrial demand.
   Next, we propose some policy measures to achieve this policy direction. First, ODA should be strategically used to foster local infrastructure, industrial complexes development, and training high-tech workers. Next, trade and investment agencies such as KOTRA and the Korea International Trade Association need to strengthen their GVC consulting capabilities for local Korean companies. And bilateral and multilateral FTAs, which are effective in expanding and upgrading trade, should be expanded, and FTAs already signed will need to be upgraded. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the mechanisms for investigating and discovering and identifying the overall difficulties, including the establishment of GVCs by local Korean companies.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적
3. 보고서 개요

제2장 선행연구
1. 원청-하청 거래관계의 유형
2. 관계특수성(relation-specificity)
3. 기회주의적 행위에 대한 해결 방안
4. 신뢰

제3장 완성차기업-부품기업 간 거래관계에 대한 이론적 틀
1. 기본모형: 시장거래(arm’s length trade)ㆍ일회성 거래(one-shot transaction)
2. 관계계약(relational contract)ㆍ반복거래(repeated transaction)
3. 수직통합(vertical integration)

제4장 세계 자동차 부품산업 현황 및 완성차기업-부품기업 간 거래관계의 해외 사례
1. 세계 자동차 부품산업 현황
2. 독일 사례
3. 미국 사례

제5장 완성차기업과의 거래관계가 부품기업의 혁신성과에 미친 영향에 대한 실증분석
1. 한국과 미국
2. 한국에 대한 추가 분석
3. 소결

제6장 결론 및 정책시사점
1. 연구결과 요약
2. 정책시사점
3. 연구의 한계

참고문헌

부록 횡단면 분석

Executive Summary

   This study analyzes the impact of buyer-supplier relation on supplier’s innovation in the automobile industry. Following previous studies, this study categorizes the buyer-supplier relation into 3 types: market transaction (or one-shot transaction); relational contract (or repeated transaction); and vertical integration. These 3 types differ from one another in such aspects as the level of relation-specific investments by supplier, the distribution of bargaining power and the degree of information sharing and trust. This study first presents a theoretical framework for these 3 types of the relation in Chapter 3, which then serves as a guideline for the case studies and empirical analyses that follow. Chapter 4 looks at the cases of Germany and the U.S., aiming to shed some light on the determinants of the relation type. Chapter 5 estimates the impact of the buyer-supplier relation, especially of the degree of dispersion of supplier’s sales, on the supplier’s innovation outcomes, using the data from Korea and the U.S. Based on these results, Chapter 6 discusses policy implications for the relationship between the Innovative Growth policy and the Fair Economy policy, two of the main economic policies of the Moon Jae-in administration, focusing on the automobile industry.
   The main predictions of the theoretical model is as following. First, when the buyer-supplier relation takes the form of market transaction, that is, when the buyer and the supplier play a one-shot game, they are likely to encounter an under-investment problem, in which the supplier does not undertake socially-optimal relation- specific investment. The importance of the relation-specific investment on the buyer worsens this problem, while the transferability of the investment for an alternative buyer reduces it. Secondly, the under-investment problem can be lessened when the relation takes the form of relational contract, that is, when the buyer and the supplier play an infinitely-repeated game. The room for such an improvement increases with the transferability of the investment for an alternative buyer and the importance of the investment for the buyer, but decreases with the investment cost. Finally, vertical integration can also mitigate the problem. That is, ceteris paribus, the problem is less serious when the buyer and the supplier coordinate to maximize their combined profits. Unlike relational contract, there is more room for an improvement by vertical integration when the transferability of the investment is lower.
   In the case studies, this study first looks at the current state of the automobile parts industry in the world, focusing on business performance and R&D investment. Germany, Japan and the U.S. are 3 leading countries, while Korea lags far behind them. Interestingly, supplier’s business performance is positively correlated with the degree of dispersion of its sales across regions, which is in line with the theoretical prediction. The 3 best-performing countries also invest the most in R&D. The R&D expenditures of a supplier, both in absolute and relative-relative to physical investment-terms are also positively correlated with its regional dispersion of sales.
   The German automobile parts industry not only performs best in business and innovation and invests the most in R&D, but also has the longest history. Innovations are often initiated by suppliers, rather than car makers. The deep trust between buyer and supplier, as well as the latter’s high bargaining power resulted from the successful history of supplier-driven innovations, appear to be main contributors to the success of the German suppliers.
   The U.S. has the most top performing suppliers in the world, but its buyer-supplier relation differs from the German case. In particular, the history of the buyer-supplier relation in the U.S. shows all 3 types; and the prevailing type changed from a combination of market transaction and vertical integration to relational contract. At the beginning, the U.S. automobile industry had many small car makers but later became an oligopoly of the Big 3: Ford, GM and Chrysler. Using market transactions and vertical integration at the same time, the Big 3 retained a high bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers until 1970s. The mass invasion by Japanese cars increased competition in the U.S. market; and, at the same time, innovations in the electronics industry started being adopted in cars. These changes increased the need for innovations, and hence for a smooth flow of information between buyer and supplier, which resulted in a wide acceptance of relational contract.
   The empirical analysis of this study finds that the dispersion of sales of a supplier increases its innovation outcome, both in Korea and the U.S. In other words, a supplier innovates more when its sales are more dispersed among more buyers. This finding supports the theoretical prediction that the supplier’s incentive for relation-specific investment, and hence for innovation, increases with the transferability of the investment. This relation is further analyzed, using the additional information available only in the Korean data on the means of payment-cash or credit-and the supplier’s with a buyer, for instance. The results reveal that payment in credit negatively affects the supplier’s innovation outcome. This finding supports the Korean government’s concern on payment in credit in buyer-supplier transactions. The Korean data also shows that the aforementioned impact of sales dispersion on supplier’s innovation outcome is conditioned by such factors as the supplier’s asset size and affiliation.

국문요약 

제1장 서론

제2장 TBT의 국제적 논의 동향
1. WTO 논의 동향
2. OECD 논의 동향
3. 학술연구 동향
4. 소결

제3장 WTO TBT 분쟁 및 STC와 FTA TBT 규범 동향
1. WTO TBT 분쟁
2. WTO TBT 특정무역현안
3. CPTPP 및 USMCA 내 TBT 규범의 발전 동향
4. 소결

제4장 해외 TBT에 따른 우리나라의 수출 효과 분석
1. 전 세계 TBT 추이와 특징
2. TBT 측정방법과 데이터
3. 이론적 배경과 실증분석모형
4. 실증분석 결과
5. 소결

제5장 TBT 무역자유화 협정의 수출 효과 분석
1. DESTA 자료 설명
2. 실증분석모형 및 데이터
3. 실증분석 결과
4. 소결

제6장 결론 및 정책적 시사점
1. 전체 연구결과 요약
2. 우리나라 TBT 대응조직의 현황과 특징
3. 정책적 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   This study focuses on the issue of technical barriers to trade (TBT) as the trend of trade policy has shifted to NTM-oriented protectionism, especially in developed countries since the late 2000s. Since Jang et al. (2011), Korea’s first comprehensive study on TBT, many TBT studies have been conducted in Korea. However, there was no comprehensive study covering international legal, administrative, political and economic analysis, including a proposal of organizational structure of the government bodies dealing with TBTs. In this regard, this study examines international discussion trends, trade disputes and current issues, and the main contents of the FTA TBT Agreement, using newly released TBT data since 2010, and conducted empirical analysis through newly developed quantitative methodology.
   In Chapter 2, we illustrate the current discussion on TBT at the international level, focusing on international organizations such as WTO and OECD. Discussions on TBTs are mainly led by developed countries such as the US or EU. General characteristics derived from the analysis are as follows. First, practical and specific ways to implement and apply the WTO TBT agreement has been proposed. The WTO pushes ahead the application of Regulatory Impact Assessment and Good Regulatory Practice, standardization of the notification form, establishment of electronic notification system, enhancement of transparency by establishing inquiry points at each country and providing 90 days of notification period. Second, the WTO seeks to provide technical assistance to developing countries and to enhance SDT(Special and Differential Treatment) encouraging the participation of developed countries. Third, there are more active discussions on how to apply international standards to solve TBT concerns. However, disagreement on the scope and definition on international standards between the US and EU remains and establishment of international standards is still relatively slow compared to the rapid development of existing industries and the advent of the new industries. Fourth, due to the aforementioned difficulties of reaching an agreement on standards, post-accreditation system based on market surveillance will become prevalent through voluntary standards and SDoC(Supplier Declaration of Conformity). Fifth, OECD attempts to tackle TBT concerns based on a comprehensive guideline for cooperation between stakeholders. This guideline, International Regulatory Cooperation(IRC), is classified by 11 forms. Among the 11 forms, the most frequently used mechanism is Mutual Recognition Agreements(MRAs). Quantitative studies also show that MRAs significantly eliminate trade barriers and facilitate trade confirming the effectiveness of MRAs.
   Chapter 3 examines the main contents and characteristics of TBT provisions in regional trade agreements from the perspective of international law, focusing on the WTO TBT dispute, the current status and features of specific trade concerns(STCs), and the CPTPP and USMCA. Since the main goal of technical regulations and standards introduced by each country is to achieve legitimate policy purposes such as providing safety, health, environment, and consumer information, there is a fundamental difficulty solving the TBT issues through legal review procedures by the panel and appellate body provided by the WTO Dispute Settlement System. As a result, even though the WTO dispute settlement process has been initiated on TBT issues, most cases are resolved by mutual consultation. In this context, the STC process of the WTO TBT Committee is a practical and important system for solving TBT issues. In Korea, more than 70% of cases of STC are raised together with many other countries. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the STC process, the response capacity in terms of multilateral cooperation should be strengthened.
   The FTA TBT negotiations were generally aimed to strengthen transparency and cooperation to eliminate TBT, based on the rules and procedures of the WTO TBT Agreement. Korea has removed TBT by recognizing the equivalence of technical regulations or by introducing SDoC in the automotive, electrical and electronic sectors in the Korea-US FTA and Korea-EU FTA negotiations while labeling provisions has been introduced in Korea-China FTA. The TBT provisions of the US-led TPP(now CPTPP) and USMCA include the institutional elements that are not included as WTO or existing FTA’s TBT provisions. In particular, it has led to the opening of testing and certification services sector by making official the use of international accreditation systems related to conformity assessment and prohibiting the requirement that conformity assessment bodies to be within the territory of importing countries. In addition, the two agreements show that the strategy of eliminating specific technical barriers based on the sectoral approach has been actively used. In particular, the USMCA-related Annex contains new rules with the advent of the digital economy, including the prevention of technology transfers in the information and telecommunications sector. This has important implications for the negotiation of digital trade rules as a TBT system.
   In Chapter 4, we conduct an empirical study to assess the effect of TBTs on Korea’s exports based on disaggregated export data at HS4 along with new TBT data and export quality index during 1996~2014. The TBT data is the newly released「wiiw NTM」which minimizes the problem of sample selection because a significant share of TBT notifications do not report relevant HS codes. We examine the trade effects of TBT based on the gravity model, and use PPML to avoid the problem of sample selection due to zero trade. Empirical results show that technical regulations adversely affect Korea’s exports on average while this effect becomes larger after the Global Financial Crisis. This suggests that the negative effects may be led by the protectionist sentiment. Also, we find that TBTs by countries with higher income than Korea decreased Korea’s exports while TBTs by lower income countries actually led to more exports. The adverse effects of TBT are possibly because TBT by higher income countries require higher compliance cost. Lastly, including an additional explanatory variable, export quality index in our specification, we find that TBT actually increases Korea’s exports possibly because it mitigates the problem of asymmetric information between consumers and producers.
   Chapter 5 empirically studies how the characteristics of TBT provisions in FTAs affect international trade during 1990~2016. The empirical model is based on a gravity equation that controls for multilateral resistance terms by including exporter-year, importer-year dummies. To estimate the model, we use trade data and DESTA data that compile TBT provisions from multiple FTAs. We find that TBT provisions do increase trade between countries while the extent of the increase differs by how TBT provisions are included in FTAs. Empirical results show that FTAs that reaffirm the WTO TBT agreement has limited effects on trade while FTAs with TBT provisions that encourage the use of international standards or harmonization of TBT significantly increases trade. Examining this effect between groups of countries classified by income, we find that TBT provisions that encourage the use of international standards or harmonization of TBT have especially larger effects between developed and developing countries. We further show that the effect of TBT provisions that encourage the use of international standards decreased more recently during 2012~2016, while the effect of harmonization increased since 2007.  
   Summing up all results in previous chapters, we provide policy implications in Chapter 6. Korea currently has the official TBT organization which consists of two parts, the TBT Central Secretariat and the TBT Consortium: Korean Agency for Technology and Standards(KATS) manages the former, while private associations and public certificate institutions constitute the latter. We propose future plans and strategic approaches for TBT such as strengthening capacity in international organization, using the FTA TBT provisions, flexibly corresponding to foreign technical regulations at country-and/or sector-level, and improving domestic technical regulations and certificate systems according to international standards. In the long term, the official TBT organization in Korea also needs structural reform to be adequate for plans and strategies that we proposed.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 필요성과 목적
2. 연구 내용과 차별성
3. 연구의 구성과 방법

제2장 데이터 경제(data economy) 현황
1. 데이터의 유형과 경제학적 특징
2. 데이터와 인공지능 관련 통계 분석

제3장 데이터가 경제성장에 미치는 영향
1. 선행연구
2. 모델
3. 시장균형에 따른 모델의 특징
4. 데이터 정책과 시뮬레이션 분석
5. 소결

제4장 데이터 규제 정책과 서비스 무
1. 선행연구
2. 모델
3. 분석자료
4. 분석결과
5. 소결

제5장 한국의 데이터 정책 현황과 정책 시사점
1. 한국의 데이터 정책 현황
2. 정책 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   This report characterizes the digital economy with data and artificial intelligence, and studies the impact of data policy on economic growth and international service trade. Although there are several papers and reports that emphasize the importance of data as an engine of economic growth, there is a lack of rigorous analyses through economic models. It is also difficult to find empirical evidence showing the relationship between data policy and trade in services. The report is designed to investigate the digital economy through the lens of economic growth and trade. Several useful results and implications are provided to enhance the digital economy in Korea.
   The report divides data into two categories: private data and public data. Many countries pay attention to utilizing private data as a new resource to boost economic growth. It is often said that data is like oil, but this kind of metaphor misleads readers in understanding the nature of data and the digital economy. Data is a production input factor but also shows many other economic characteristics such as non-rivalry, non-excludability, privacy, externalities, etc. In addition, data can be combined with recent digital technology such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, deep learning, sensor, robotics, etc. The report summarizes several useful statistics relating to the market for big data, data supply and demand, and workers for the data industry by using datasets from international organizations, private research institutes, and academics.
   The authors build an economic growth model with data and artificial intelligence in a dynamic general equilibrium setting to study the impact of data policy. In the constructed model, the economy consists of representative household, final goods producer, intermediate goods producer, and R&D producer. The model also reflects how data is created and destroyed, how producers use data in their sectors, how data is related to artificial intelligence technology in the R&D sector, and how workers play roles with other input factors. The report finds that an economy with data and artificial intelligence can grow perpetually even though there is a risk of privacy violation. It also finds that data indeed is a production factor that can be used to create new technology enhancing productivity and economic growth. Still, privacy is a very important aspect in the sense that privacy determines the rate of consumption growth and allocation of resources available in the economy.
   Data policy is closely related to trade in services. The authors collect data from the World Input-Output Database and Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index to study the impact of data policy on trade in services. They estimate the relationship between restrictive data policy and service trade at industry-level by controlling exporter-industry-year, importer-industry-year, and exporter-importer-industry fixed effects. The report finds a negative correlation between restrictive data policy and trade in services, which makes sense intuitively because the restrictive data policy of a hosting country increases the production and trade costs of its trading partners. The main result remains robust under alternative measures for data policy.
   Finally, the report reviews the Korean government’s plans for boosting the digital economy and amending data-related laws and institutions, and provides several policy implications.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 필요성
2. 연구의 주요 내용

제2장 북한의 경제발전과 남북러의 협력 방향
1. 북한의 경제발전과 산업화의 역할
2. 김정은 시대 이후 경제 정책과 지역산업개발

제3장 한국의 지역산업개발 정책
1. 개요
2. 경제자유구역(FEZ: Free Economic Zone) 현황
3. 남북러 산업협력 관련 시사점

제4장 러시아 지역산업개발 정책: 극동을 중심으로
1. 배경 및 개요
2. 극동지역의 경제 현황
3. 연해주 지역 선도개발구역
4. 하바롭스크지역 선도개발구역
5. 러시아 극동개발 정책과 산업협력 측면의 수요

제5장 북한의 지역산업개발 정책
1. 지역산업개발 정책의 배경
2.제조업 중심으로 본 북한의 지역별 산업 및 기업 분포 현황
3. 북한 공업개발구 현황
4. 동해안 벨트 중심으로 본 주요 공업도시 청진과 라진
5. 동북지역 산업협력의 특징과 산업협력의 수요

제6장 남북러 지역산업개발 정책의 3각 협력 방안
1. 남북러 정책 연계의 수요와 잠재력
2. 남북러 지역산업협력 연계 방안

제7장 결론 및 정책 시사점
1. 요약 및 결론 
2. 정책 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This research focuses on the need for South and North Korea and Russia to actively promote regional industrial development policies in the Far East area. From this perspective, the purpose of this study is to suggest the direction and measures of industrial cooperation between the three countries through connecting their regional development policies with industrial policies. To realize this goal, this research analyzes and assesses the current situation of regional industrial development policies by each country, and suggests measures for mutual connection between their regional industrial development policies, also proposing the future direction of this triangular cooperation.
   The focus of this discussion is to explore promising approaches to constructing an industrial cluster in Northeast Asia based on the regional development policies of each nation. In this sense, preparation for triangular linkage is a basic task for constructing the industrial cluster. In particular, triangular cooperation could support North Korea’s economic development, and also secure the effectiveness of Russia’s Far East policies and South Korea’s industrial competitiveness in the Northeast part of North Korea.
   The necessity of triangular connection in regional industrial development policies can be found in the economic, societal and policy situations in the two Koreas and Russia.
   South Korea has continuously promoted regional industrial development policy for balanced national development since the 1990s. While there has been criticism that Korea’s policies lack consistency, the goal of balanced national development has been maintained. In particular, the Moon administration has driven forward measures to promote regional industries based on the characteristics and policies of each region. The seven Free Economic Zones (FEZs) designated nationwide are at the center of this policy. However, the FEZs in Korea have shown their limitations in various aspects, and the manufacturing industry in Korea, especially small- and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises located in local areas, are facing difficulties because of the Korean society’s structural problems and slowdown in the economy. In this situation, Korea’s FEZs and regional authorities are actively seeking for ways to increase economic cooperation with North Korea and secure new growth engines.
   The Russian Far East has long been considered less developed in economic terms compared to the central region. Looking to resolve this situation, the Russian government has been pushing for integrated economic development in Northeast Asia by developing the manufacturing sector in the Far East since 2010. To attract investment in the manufacturing industries in the Far East, the Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development and the Free Port of Vladivostok were introduced, these being created mainly for the provision of tax benefits. Among the Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development, the Nadjejinskaya Territory was created near Vladivostok, which shows the highest corporate activity among the 18 zones. The Khabarovsk Territory near the city of Khabarovsk is also highly populated by logistics and manufacturing companies due to its excellent location. However, since the benefits of these Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development are mainly focused on providing tax benefits, individual companies must consider the various surroundings and conditions before deciding to enter the Territories. Among the Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development, Bolshoi Camen is built around the shipbuilding industry. Its Zvezda shipyard is the largest in the Far East, and shows great promise for future cooperation. Russia is fostering the shipbuilding industry as an important national task and actively working with foreign companies to strengthen the competitiveness of its industries. As such, pushing for inter-Korean and Russian industrial cooperation around the Far East is meaningful in that it promotes the "new Northeast Asian value chain" for South Korea. While inter-Korean and Russian industrial cooperation cannot completely replace the existing Korea-China value chains concentrated in the manufacturing sector, this new value chain is important in that it allows South Korea diversify its overseas manufacturing base, which is currently dependent on China. In addition, if trilateral cooperation on the development and utilization of the Russian port of Zarubino is carried out step by step, it will lead to changes in the transport operation system in Northeast Asia.
   In North Korea, the policy goal in the Kim Jong-un era has been set on economic construction and improvement of the people's living conditions. Improving people's lives is, in particular, closely related to development of the light industry sector, which in turn is linked with the local industry due to the industrial structure of North Korea. Accordingly, this study focuses on trilateral cooperation projects within the Rajin and Chongjin economic development zones in North Korea. Our results show Chongjin has recently been in high demand for fisheries and shipbuilding, and the Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has achieved a considerable level of openness to Chinese companies since beginning as the first SEZ in North Korea. Through its past trade routes with South Korea, it is leading the garment manufacturing industry in North Korea. Chongjin is a promising area to conduct triangular cooperation between North and South Korea, based on North Korea's cheap labor force, South Korea's technology and capital, and Russia's energy resources.
   This research focuses on suggesting the direction or model of cooperation rather than exploring detailed policy tools. This is mainly because the external situation does not allow detailed discussion. However, this research also strives to convey the very practical message that exploring a direction towards industrial cooperation is necessary in order to prepare for the situation when external restrictions are all lifted.
   In this sense, this research suggests policy implications regarding triangular industrial cooperation as follows: firstly, the current model of triangular industrial cooperation needs to incorporate plans to construct an industrial cluster linking South Korea, Rajin and Chongjin in North Korea, and Russia’s Far East together; secondly, such projects need to actively make use of North Korea's industrial development zones in order to support North Korea’s policies; and lastly, detailed policy measures should be prepared in various areas such as market support, production support and strengthening policy capacity.

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Model and Equilibrium
2-1. Model
2-2. Equilibrium
2-3. Solving for an Approximate Equilibrium

3. The Results

4. Final Remarks

References

In this paper, I estimate the global effects of hypothetical 1% changes in US sectoral productivity. To do that, I formulate a multi-sector Armington trade model with import tariffs, trade in intermediate goods, sectoral heterogeneity, and input-output linkages. Because a closed form for changes in welfare is not available in the model, as opposed to Ossa (2015), I solve for equilibrium to conduct the counterfactual exercises. In particular, knowing that the gravity equations in this model are identical to Caliendo and Parro (2015) once we calibrate the trade elasticity and industry level productivity to the corresponding data, I modify their computation approach to estimate the counterfactual productivity changes. The model predicts that the primary channel through which the sectoral shocks affect welfare is terms of trade. I also find that both US productivity’s direct effect and effects through export prices are substantial for countries such as the US, Canada, Chile, and Mexico. On the other hand, changes in volume of trade are small and their directions of changes are also mixed across countries.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적

제2장 포용적 통상국가의 개념 및 구성요소
1. 포용국가와 포용경제
2. 포용적 성장과 포용적 통상
3. 포용적 통상국가
4. 포용성 관련 지표 검토
5. 한국경제의 포용성 검토

제3장 포용적 통상국가의 구성요소 검토
1. 서비스산업의 선진화
2. 일자리 친화적인 외국인투자환경 구축
3. 중소기업의 글로벌 경쟁력 강화
4. 포용적 통상인프라 구축
5. 대외 원조의 포용성 강화

제4장 구성요소별 정책과제
1. 서비스산업의 선진화
2. 일자리 친화적인 외국인투자환경 구축
3. 중소기업의 글로벌 경쟁력 강화
4. 포용적 통상인프라 구축
5. 대외 원조의 포용성 강화

제5장 결론

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the Korean economy has been suffering from declining growth on the one hand and worsening income inequality on the other. For the enhancement of Korea’s growth potential and income equality, a new paradigm must be established. This report looks into such a new vision, referred to as the Inclusive Trade Initiative for the Korean economy, and suggests policy strategies for the vision.
   Under the Inclusive Trade Initiative, the national economy pursues inclusive growth within an open economic environment by improving productivity and employment. The initiative also strives to achieve domestic inclusiveness in trading with other economies and contribute to global inclusiveness. This report presents five strategies for this vision of an inclusive trading nation: increasing the role of service industries, promoting an employment-friendly FDI environment, improving SMEs’ global competitiveness, strengthening inclusive trading infrastructure and upgrading ODA’s inclusiveness. Korea’s current status and problems are investigated together with practices at other nations to produce action programs for each strategy, as follows.
   Increasing the role of service industries. Korea’s manufacturing industries have traditionally served as the main driver for economic growth, but recently exports and employment potential in these industries appear to be decreasing. Korea’s service industries will have to make a larger contribution to growth and employment. Innovations and exports in service industries, e.g. medical service and tourism, need to be promoted.
   Promoting an employment-friendly FDI environment. FDI can complement domestic investment and create more jobs. FDIs that contribute to job-creation, technology/capital intensive investment and corporate social responsibilities should be promoted by providing support programs and incentive measures.
   Improving SMEs’ global competitiveness. SMEs play an important role in sustaining stable growth, generating employment and enhancing income equality. SMEs should be offered access to more opportunities in government procurement and support programs aimed at promoting electronic trade. At the same time, stronger trade facilitation measures with other developing countries should be established for SMEs.
   Strengthening inclusive trading infrastructure. Korea’s trade policy has been mostly focused on trade negotiations up to now, but more emphasis should be placed on inclusive trade outcomes. Korea’s trade adjustment assistance will have to increase its role in supporting workers.
   Upgrading ODA’s inclusiveness. Korea has to keep increasing the volume of its aid and the inclusiveness of its aid policies. More aid for trade (AfT) programs have to be tailored to poor and vulnerable groups in aid partner countries. Also, coherence among trade policies and aid for trade should be strengthened.

국문요약 

영문요약

제1장 서론

제2장 터키 서비스산업 개관
1. 서비스 부문의 중요성
2. 서비스 부문의 지식집약도
3. 서비스 무역

제3장 터키 건설산업
1. 산업 개황
2. 관련 산업정책
3. 세부 부문별 동향
4. 성장잠재력 및 진출 가능성

제4장 터키 문화콘텐츠 산업
1. 산업 개황
2. 관련 산업정책
3. 세부 부문별 동향
4. 성장잠재력 및 진출 가능성

제5장 한ㆍ터키 서비스산업 협력방안
1. 서비스시장 개방에 관한 국제 논의
2. 터키의 서비스 무역자유화와 진출 가능성
3. 한ㆍ터키 FTA 서비스협정 활용방안
4. 주요 산업별 협력방안 및 터키 유망 서비스산업 진출전략

참고문헌

부록

   Amid the rise of Korean export in services, the focus has been placed on China, the US, and Japan. Korea needs change in its strategies to diversify markets to other prominent emerging countries, such as Turkey. The Korean government has set its policy goal to increase services export to the amount of USD 1.5 billion by 2022 and create a trade surplus in the sector. In accordance with this goal, the Korean government is creating an ecosystem for services enterprises, reorganizing the system to support services, eliminating foreign entry barriers through FTAs, and customizing strategies for overseas expansion. However, the cost of trade in services for Korea is relatively high, compared to other countries with strength in services trading, meaning that competitiveness remains rather low. The reason for this low global competitiveness in trade in services is the underperforming productivity in this area mostly led by SMEs.
   The Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Investment between Korea and Turkey came into effect in August 2018. It took a long time to “upgrade” into a comprehensive high-leveled FTA. The services agreement follows a positive list approach. Both Korea and Turkey have agreed to open their services market to a higher level than that of the GATS under the WTO system. Although the new agreements are designed to reinforce Korean and Turkish economic cooperation in the services industry, as of yet not much research has been done on the subject.
   This study aims to analyze the current status of the Turkish services industry and to seek prominent sectors for both Korea and Turkey, as well as to find cooperative measures to maximize the synergy effect. Particularly, this study contributes to realistic cooperative measures in the services sector, performed by joint research between Korean and Turkish researchers. Beginning with the introduction, Chapter 2 takes an in-depth look into the importance of the services sector in Turkish economy. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the construction sector and cultural contents sector, reviewing the overall industry, related policies, current situation and market growth potentials. Chapter 5 explores how to utilize the Korea-Turkey Agreement on Trade in Services, by showing the pathway of services cooperation in general and in selected sectors, with suggested strategies for Korean companies to enter into the Turkish services market.
   Turkey signed into its first FTA including the services sector with Singapore in 2015, which came into effect in October 2017. The agreement includes liberalization of trade in goods, services, investment, e-commerce, competition, transparency, etc. When the Korea-Turkey FTA came into effect in May 2013, trade in services and investment chapters had not been included until February 2015, and only came into effect in August 2018. This agreement is an advanced version of GATS bindings, guarantees market access to services providers in both Korea and Turkey, and provides a rule-based stable environment for investors in services. It allows both countries to enter into their counterpart’s market to enjoy economies of scale and spillover effect. Cooperation between various services sectors in Korea and Turkey would provide great possibilities by expanding geographical and cultural limits. In this sense, the widening of the Korea-Turkey FTA to the services sector is a welcoming opportunity for both countries. Korean companies, which have strength in the knowledge-intensive fields, could create better possibilities with Turkish local companies, utilizing the strengths of their competent working population and superb infrastructure.
   Abolishing trade barriers in the services sector would not only be profitable in the short run, but also beneficial for both countries in the long run by serving as an entry point for nearby markets. It would also have the ripple effects of accelerating transfer of skill, knowledge and experiences, and enabling possibilities to gain additional access to other markets. If the Korea-Turkey FTA is sufficiently utilized, it would enhance bilateral services in trade, as well as generating a positive effect in trade in goods. The benefits realized by this increase in services trade would not be limited to the economy but also strengthen social and cultural ties between Korea and Turkey.
   Turkish construction companies have been showing excellent results in winning overseas construction contracts since 2000. The Korea-Turkey FTA can maximize mutual benefits in the services sector. Here we suggest measures for Korea-Turkey cooperation in the construction sector.
   First, Korean and Turkish construction companies can form a consortium for joint entry into overseas construction markets. Turkish construction companies have a strong presence in the Middle East, Africa, Russia, CIS countries, etc. If Korea and Turkey could form a consortium to enter into these countries, it would improve their industrial competitiveness and enable expansion into a wider range of overseas construction markets.
   Second, the knowledge-based R&D field of Korea could be combined with the Turkish construction sector to complement the education level and lack of R&D investment in the Turkish construction industry. These kinds of cooperation will have positive effects in the labor market of both countries.
   Third, Korea and Turkey can cooperate in the manufacturing sector to add value in the construction sector. The close relationship that the manufacturing sector holds with the construction sector could generate a synergy effect. As of yet Korea and Turkey account for only a small share in terms of value added in each other’s construction market, but the expansion of their FTA in 2018 will enable cooperation in industrial sectors, such as metal manufacturing, metal process manufacturing other than machinery and equipment, and strengthen value added creation in the construction sector by building a closer link in the global value chain.
   Fourth, financial cooperation in the construction sector between the two countries would ease order imbalances and facilitate financing, adding stimulus to the construction industry in both countries. Turkey has recently been experiencing temporary financing challenges in new projects, due to the excessive supply of housing. By cooperating with Korean companies, the Turkish construction sector can enjoy sufficient financial support from Korea, while Korea can increase value added through these channels.
   Fifth, due to the Korea-Turkey FTA in services and investment more opportunities will be made available to take part in the Turkish infrastructure building market. Turkey, being a country with great potential, has been commissioning infrastructure development projects on a relatively large scale compared to other developing countries. Korean companies could play important roles in Turkish megaprojects, such as urban development by the Housing and Development Administration (TOKI), the 3-story Grand Istanbul Tunnel under the Bosphorus, Haliç Port, and Istanbul canal, by meeting the requirements stated in the Turkish Public Procurement Law.
   Sixth, Korean companies may participate in the Turkish construction industry’s plans to expand into the sub-Saharan African market and in the Syrian reconstruction project. The Turkish construction industry has been showing efforts to enter into the sub-Saharan African market lately. Recent projects commissioned by Turkey in Africa, such as in Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, etc., are leading to expectations of larger projects being executed in this area. Turkey is also eyeing investment possibilities in Syria to be realized during the process of its reconstruction.
   The cultural contents sector is growing fast in Turkey. Having many possibilities to cooperate with promising sub-sectors of Korean cultural contents, it could be the largest beneficiary of the Korea-Turkey FTA services chapter. In the following we suggest such cooperation methods, by comparing the strengths and weaknesses in the cultural contents sector of the two countries.
   First, Turkey is a demographically young society, in which internet use is rapidly increasing. In particular, the increasing supply of smartphones has led to internet access becoming easier. The on-line gaming sector has enjoyed the most benefits from the wide usage of internet, such that renowned private companies in Turkey are actively supporting e-sports. In light of this trend, Korea and Turkey could co-organize an e-sports competition or host a linked game league to contribute to the development of the gaming industry in the two countries.
   Second, Korean broadcasting cultural contents services can be provided through the adequate streaming services in Turkey. As restrictions on illegal streaming services are tightening, Korean cultural contents services could collaborate with Turkish broadcasting services to open a legal channel. This would also contribute in enhancing Turkey’s interest in Korean culture.
   Third, although Korea and Turkey differ in their religious and cultural background, one promising direction could be to export Korean wave (Hallyu) contents, for instance in the form of co-producing Korean dramas, broadcasts, and movies based on an understanding of the culture code in Turkey. Moreover, with the Korea Communications Commission and the Radio and Television Supreme Council of the Republic of Turkey (RTÜK) signing an MOU for joint production, this is expected to have a positive effect on administrative processes, such as deliberations on broadcast content. The resulting contents could also be distributed to the MENA area or Central and South America, where Turkey has a strong presence. Such cooperation would enable a high level of cooperation in trade in services, by creating jobs and human exchanges.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 필요성
2. 연구의 방법 및 구성

제2장 미국의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 트럼프 정부의 세계전략
3. 트럼프 정부의 지역전략 - 중국과의 전략적 경쟁
4. 트럼프 정부의 한반도 정책

제3장 중국 시진핑 정부의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 시진핑 정부의 세계전략: 목표와 과제

제4장 러시아의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 푸틴 정부의 세계전략: 목표와 과제
3. 푸틴 정부의 한반도 정책

제5장 결론

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study aims to analyze in depth grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia, and to draw implications for the realization of ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’
   The grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia are directly reflected in their policies on the Korean Peninsula. The Policy toward the Korean Peninsula of the Trump administration develops as follows. First, there are nuclear negotiations with North Korea. However, these negotiations remain deadlocked after Hanoi Summit because of differences between the White House and the Washington bureaucracy over the solutions for denuclearization. Second, there is the economic pressure on the Republic of Korea. Trump administration has criticized the allies for ‘Free-Riding’ on the US security commitments and demanded an increased share of defense expenses. And at the risk of damaging the alliance Trump also has put economic pressure on allies to solve its trade deficit, demanding revision of FTA and invoking the safeguard clauses. Third, there is a demand for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and switching allied strategy. Trump administration is pushing to strengthen the alliance to expand the Republic of Korea’s role in Indo-Pacific strategy. However, the US also reveals the intention to maintain military influence on the Korean Peninsula by expanding the role of UN Command even after the return of wartime operational control.
   There is no significant difference in policies of Xi Jinping administration toward the Korean peninsula from those of previous administrations. The basic principles that China invariably adheres to in the process of its policies toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, the stability and peace of the Korean Peninsula, Second, problem solving through dialogue and negotiations, Third, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Fourth, maintaining and expanding its influence on the Korean Peninsula using equidistant diplomacy and geopolitical means. Until now, Xi jinping administration has faced many complicated problems in relation to the Korean Peninsula. The biggest problem among them is the denuclearization of the korean Peninsula. China in association with Russia has proposed alternatives called ‘Freeze-for-freeze and dual-track approach’ to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and promote peace, but the negotiations between the US and North Korea remain deadlocked. China is participating in international sanctions and economic support for North Korea at the same time, leading to denuclearization and contributing to the stabilization of the North Korean regime while still regarding North Korea as a strategic asset. Also, Xi jinping administration is attempting to expand its‘One belt, One Road’ project into Northeast Asian region. The linkage of ‘One belt, One Road’ with the Korean Peninsula would serve as an opportunity to promote minilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in the region.
   Tasks of Putin administration’s policy toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, Adherence to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas. Since the 2000s, Russia has made an effort to maintain a balanced friendship with the two Koreas to enhance its strategic value on the Korean Peninsula. Second, Peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. For Russia, the North Korean nuclear issue is regarded as a immediate threat, but the regional confrontation centered on the ROK-US, the US-Japan and the China-North Korean alliances is a more intrinsic threat. Therefore, by establishing multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia and allaying its security concerns in the region, Putin administration strives to focus on developing Far East. Third, Expansion of economic cooperation with both Koreas and realization of tripartite economic cooperation. After the acceleration of so-called ‘Eastern Policy’ since 2012, in which Russia has tried to develop Far East through close economic cooperation with countries in Northeast Asia, these economic cooperations have become a major task on Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
   If so, how should the Republic of Korea respond to realize the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’ initiative? Under the Trump administration, it appears that the existing alliance between the Republic of Korea and the US seems to be nearing its end, and the ‘Pursuit of common interests’ has also been replaced by ‘Seeking American interests.’ Therefore, to pursue its own interests, the Republic of Korea also needs to make a complete revisions to its strategies as follows: First, when it comes to excessive calls for increased share of defense expenses, the government of the Republic of Korea should weaken the justification of the pressure, utilizing Washington’s bureaucracy and Congress’ concerns that excessive demands could lead to Seoul’s departure from the alliance. Second, regarding calls for participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, the government of the Republic of Korea should express its willingness to strengthen the role of the Republic of Korea in the defense of the Korean Peninsula, reducing pressure of Washington’s bureaucracy, taking advantage of President Trump’s indifference. Third, in order to reduce the security vulnerability caused by security dependence on the US, the government of the Republic of Korea should seek a ‘shift in alliance’ that fills the security vacuum by establishing a multilateral security regime in the long-term.
   The Republic of Korea is facing a diplomatic dilemma due to China’s growing influence and hegemonic competition between the US and China. As the competition between the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy is getting intensified, diplomatic options of the Republic of Korea will narrow more. Considering this situation, the Republic of Korea needs to implement the following strategies. First, it needs to be emphasized that even if the Republic of Korea participates in the Indo-Pacific strategy limitedly, this does not mean that it participates in any hostilities or siege against China. Second, the Republic of Korea should actively support the ‘One Belt, One Road’ connection to the Korean Peninsula, the conclusion of the Korea-China-Japan FTA and the institutionalization of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). This could not only contribute to paving the way for the initiation of minilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia, but could also serve as a framework for providing economic rewards to North Korea in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
   Since the 2000s, Russia has adhered to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas that maintains balanced friendship with the two Koreas, while steadfastly pushing for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the establishment of a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia, the expansion of economic cooperation with the South and North Korea and the realization of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia. Therefore, the Republic of Korea needs to make active use of Russia’s policy on the Korean Peninsula as follows: First, in order to maintain the impetus for the peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, it is necessary to ask Russia to provide a firm support for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and to play a role in preventing any heightened tension in the face of an unexpected crisis. In this process, strengthening relations between Russia and North Korea can be a positive factor in reducing North Korea’s excessive security and economic dependence on China. Second, the Republic of Korea should work closely with Russia in relation to ensure the security of the North Korean regime and to establish a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to cooperate closely with Russia to establish this mechanism as means and process for realizing a peaceful cooperation community, a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’ Third, with regard to the development of the Far East and the promotion of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia, the level of cooperation with Russia should be raised step by step. the Republic of Korea has to Recognize that Russia’s development of the Far East and promoting tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia can serve as a basic driving force for the realization of the economic cooperation community, which is a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’, and should improve the level of cooperation with Russia gradually, as the situation on the Korean Peninsula changes.