국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구배경과 목적
2. 선행연구의 검토
3. 연구범위와 구성

제2장 EU의 특혜관세제도 현황
1. EU의 일반특혜관세제도(GSP) 도입 현황
2. EU와 아프리카 국가 간 경제동반자협정(EPA) 현황
3. EU-아프리카 교역 현황과 특혜관세제도 수혜 현황
4. 권역별 EPA 협정 구조 및 조문 비교

제3장 EU와 미국의 대아프리카 특혜관세제도 비교
1. 제도의 배경과 현황
2. 교역효과 비교 분석

제4장 결론: 한국의 對아프리카 특혜관세제도 도입에 대한 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The European Union (EU) practices various types of preferential trade schemes to promote the economic growth of developing countries through trade. The EU classifies developing countries into three groups by their income level, economic and social status and applies the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which is a non-reciprocal preferential trade scheme to reduce or exempt tariffs on goods exported to the EU or remove quotas. The EU also signs Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with developing countries in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) regions, which have long historical relationships with Europe, to open European markets to partner countries and support their trade capacity building. Major advanced economies, including the EU, implement a wide range of preferential trade schemes targeting Africa, which has the positive effect of strengthening Africa's trade capacity, supplying cheaper goods to their consumers, and supporting their entrepreneurs' investment in Africa.
   In the midst of the recent changes we are seeing in the African trade environment, trade policies like preferential tariff schemes can be used in Korea’s long-term trade strategy with Africa. On May 30, 2019, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), entered into force with a range of coverage extending across the entire African continent, and starting from July 2020 most tariffs on goods trade within the African market with a 1.2 billion population will be eliminated. Reacting to these changes, emerging countries such as Russia, China, India, and Turkey, as well as advanced countries implementing preferential trade schemes such as the GSP, are rapidly expanding their trade and investment in Africa. As a result of the changes in the trade environment surrounding Africa, major countries in the world are evaluating and adjusting their Africa strategy, while Korea still lacks any economic cooperation strategies or policies in Africa except for development cooperation policies. Korea’s bilateral trade-promoting policies widely used so far, such as free trade agreements (FTA), may not be appropriate for the circumstances in Africa, where regional economic communities are formed in each part of the continent, and import regulations are widespread for the economic development of African countries. Thus, Korea needs a long-term trade strategy with Africa that can enhance Korea’s interests in a manner that also suits the circumstances and demands of the continent.
   In this context, this study aims to investigate the current state of preferential trade schemes of the EU to establish Korea's trade strategy for Africa. While the United States has implemented the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as its preferential tariff scheme for African countries, the EU sets up different economic cooperation strategies by grouping African countries and regions according to their economic development and income level. In particular, the EU’s EPA policy to asymmetrically and gradually open markets of middle-income countries in Africa might be a good model policy for Korea.
   Chapter 2 examines the EU’s non-reciprocal and bilateral preferential tariff schemes and agreements and its trade relations with African countries. The EU divides developing countries into three groups and applies different preferential tariffs. The standard GSP reduces tariffs for exports of about 66% of products from developing countries to the EU market. Among countries eligible for standard GSP, the ones that meet the vulnerability and sustainable development standards can apply for GSP+, the framework that fully exempts tariffs for GSP-applicable products. Furthermore, least developed countries can enjoy full access to EU market for all of their export products except armament, according to the Everything But Arms (EBA) policy.
   The EU is also promoting EPAs as bilateral trade agreements with regional economic communities in the ACP region, including Africa. The EU already has implemented EPAs with some countries in Southern Africa (SADC), West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, and Central African regions, and has concluded EPA negotiations with East Africa. Under the EPA, the EU market is open immediately for most items to partner countries, while the markets of the partner countries in Africa will open later gradually and partially, as an asymmetric market opening principle. In particular, high-income countries, which are ineligible for EBA privileges, can also benefit from trade privileges under these EPAs for their EU exports. For instance, South Africa enjoys significant tariff reductions on its agricultural and fishery exports through the EU-SADC EPA. In addition to trade, EPAs strengthen and monitor the economic policy capacity of African countries, in terms of labor, environment, investment, and competition policies, to create a business environment where European entrepreneurs prefer investing in. Several EPA signing African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, are actively attracting investment from EU entrepreneurs through EPAs. However, some African countries, including Nigeria, are postponing their ratification of the EPA, with the result that it is only in force on a provisional basis within the countries that have ratified it. All EPAs that the EU has entered into or negotiated with African countries include development cooperation and economic development in Africa. However, most of Africa’s exports to the EU are still raw materials such as petroleum and agricultural products. Aid for Trade (AfT) and efforts to attract the investment of EU companies in Africa still remain important agendas.
   Chapter 3 compares and analyzes the US and the EU preferential tariff schemes implemented for Africa. Both have a common framework based on their GSP and require compliance with international norms such as labor rights and human rights. In addition to the application of preferential tariffs, both implement special programs to strengthen trade capacities and technical support for African countries. However, while the AGOA strictly enforces standards concerning US national interests , such as protection of US investment in Africa and the export environment supporting American firms, EU’s policies apply flexible standards for more comprehensive terms. Whereas the AGOA is provided for in the form of US domestic law in a scheme where the US government decides on target countries, EU policies determine beneficiary countries according to international standards, with the exception of the GSP+.
   There are significant differences between preferential tariff schemes of the US and the EU in terms of trade effects. An empirical study using imports data of the EU and the US from Sub-Saharan Africa, from the period of 2000 to 2015, indicates that the US AGOA had an estimated trade effect of approximately 31.0% on apparel products, while the estimated effect on non-apparel products was only about 2.4%. The trade effect of all the EU preferential tariff schemes including GSP and EPA was estimated at about 13.8%. Similar to the previous studies, the trade effect of AGOA is concentrated on apparel items. Since the share of non-apparel items is larger in terms of the number of items and the volume of trade, the trade effect of the EU policies is higher when comparing the trade effect of the US and EU preferential tariff schemes for Africa.
   Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the entire study and produces policy recommendations, including the possibility of Korea's preferential tariff schemes for Africa and how to utilize them. Korea has pursued several bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) since the late 1990s. More recently, Korea’s New Southern Policy and New Northern Policy also incorporate FTAs and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with regional partner countries. Korea explored FTAs with South Africa and Egypt in the past, but failed to realize any significant progress. Considering Korea is neither geographically close to Africa nor has a large market like the EU, using the non-reciprocal preferential tariff scheme as the only strategy for increasing trade with Africa would merely have limited effects. Furthermore, even if Korea introduces non-reciprocal preferential tariff policies such as the GSP, upper-middle income countries in Africa, who have the most potential for economic cooperation with Korea, are less likely to obtain beneficiary status under such a scheme.
   For this reason, it is necessary to consider a new and alternative trade agreement framework that fully reflects the needs of Korea as well as partner countries and regions, partner countries’ income and other important characteristics of bilateral economic cooperation. In this respect, the EU's strategy of promoting EPAs with major reExecutive gional economic communities and differentiating GSPs by income level of beneficiary countries can be considered as a good model for Korea. Given that the demand for local investment and technology transfer to Africa is as significant as the need to expand bilateral trade with African countries, alternative bilateral trade agreements similar to an EPA should be developed to meet the needs and environments of different African countries and regional communities. In order to expand trade and investment between Korea and Africa, it is necessary to strengthen the trade capacity of Africa and increase access to both markets. This is also the objective of Aid for Trade, which has recently been highlighted in the area of development cooperation. Korea continues to increase its amount of aid for trade every year, but the sector remains separated from the trade strategy of Korea. It will be essential for Korea to establish a Korea-African economic cooperation strategy and implementation system that can operate beyond trade policies and development cooperation policies if Korea is to systematize aid for trade and expand trade and investment between Korea and Africa.
   Finally, we could consider integrating the various high-level Korea-African policy forums currently hosted by different Korean ministries and upgrading these to the highest level. Not only the US and the EU but also China and Japan, operate regular top-level forums with African countries to expand economic cooperation with Africa. The theme of the forums has also changed from development cooperation agenda to trade and investment agenda. In line with the emerging trend of regional centrality led by the African Union (AU), Korea’s trade agenda should place more emphasis on strengthening its consultative bodies with the AU to overcome the limitations of economic cooperation with fragmented regional economic communities. Holding these Korea-AU councils on a regular basis and expanding them appear to be a promising direction when considering recent changes in the trade environment in Africa.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 중국외교의 부상과 네트워크
2. 국제정치의 권력 변환과 네트워크 파워
3. 현대 중국외교의 권력에 관한 선행연구
4. 연구의 목적 및 의의
5. 본 연구의 구성

제2장 네트워크로 보는 국제정치
1. 21세기 국제정치의 변화와 네트워크 이론
2. 네트워크 권력의 개념과 분석방법

제3장 중국의 경제성장과 네트워크 파워
1. 글로벌 경제협력 네트워크
2. 미ㆍ중 통상마찰과 네트워크 경쟁
3. 중국식 경제성장모델과 협력기제

제4장 전통안보와 중국의 네트워크 파워
1. 북핵 네트워크와 중국의 역할
2. 중국과 타이완의 외교 네트워크 경쟁
3. 국제질서의 변화와 신형국제관계

제5장 비전통안보와 중국의 네트워크 파워
1. 미ㆍ중 표준경쟁
2. 일대일로와 글로벌 에너지 네트워크
3. 사이버에서의 안보 네트워크

제6장 요약 및 시사점
1. 요약
2. 시사점

참고문헌
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 필요성 및 목적
2. 연구 방법 및 차별성

제2장 세계 에너지 패러다임의 변화
1. 세계 에너지 지형의 변화
2. 세계 에너지와 기후변화 : 깨끗한 에너지와 기후변화 위기대응
3. 세계 에너지 패러다임의 변화 : 에너지 전환
4. 에너지 개발협력과 에너지신산업

제3장 라틴아메리카 에너지 패러다임의 변화
1. 라틴아메리카 에너지 수급 현황
2. 라틴아메리카의 에너지 정세 변화
3. 라틴아메리카 에너지와 기후변화
4. 라틴아메리카 에너지 전환 전망
5. 라틴아메리카 에너지신산업 투자 동향

제4장 안데스 4개국 에너지·기후변화정책과 진출 여건
제1절 콜롬비아
제2절 에콰도르
제3절 볼리비아
제4절 페루
제5절 안데스 4개국 비교분석

제5장 한국·안데스 4개국 에너지·기후변화 협력 방안
1. 에너지·기후변화 분야 민간투자와 개발협력 현황
2. 우리나라의 안데스 4개국 민간투자와 개발협력 현황
3. 한국-안데스 4개국 에너지·기후변화 분야 협력방안

제6장 결론

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   It’s time for a paradigm shift in the global energy sector from the “energy security” to the “energy transition”. While energy platform in the past was largely defined by affordable and sustainable energy supplies, recent energy system is marked by the energy transition away from fossil fuels and nuclear power to clean and safe energy resources like wind and solar. Climate change comes to the forefront in explaining this paradigm shift. To confront the imminent challenges posed by climate change, the global community has come up with meaningful agreements for collective actions and it has strengthened the efforts for greenhouse gas mitigation and climate change adaptation. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has not been an exception in such a paradigm shift in the energy sector prompted by climate change. As a crucial member of a global community, LAC countries have taken a greater part in the collective actions to enhance access to stable energy supplies by accelerating energy transition. Accordingly, this study provides a comprehensive review of energy and climate change policies of LAC countries and the ongoing private investment and international development cooperation efforts in the renewable energy sector in LAC. Based on case studies on four Andean States which include Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, we propose policy implications to promote development cooperations between South Korea and LAC countries with a particular focus on the four Andean States.
   This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 examines a paradigm shift in the world energy sector. Global demand for energy has increased constantly. Global primary energy consumption increased 2.5 times in 45 years from 5,500 Mtoe in 1971 to 13,700 Mtoe in 2016, and it is projected to grow by 1.0 percent annually to reach 17,600 Mtoe in 2040. Fossil fuels continue to account for the largest share of energy consumption. However, the share of fossil fuels is projected to fall from 81.1% in 2016 to 74.6% in 2040 while the share of renewable energy is forecasted to rise to 19.6% from 13.9% over the same period. In particular, the share of non-conventional renewable energy, such as solar and wind power, is expected to increase from 1.6% in 2016 to 6.4% in 2040 with an average annual growth rate of 7.0%.
   Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution in the United States is on the verge of transforming the world of energy market. In consequence of the U.S. shale revolution, gas is projected to occupy the position of the world's major energy sources in the 21st century. If the U.S. gas boom spreads to other countries, the age of fossil fuels may last longer than expected. In this scenario, concerns are raised about a negative impact of the shale revolution on global warming given that it may trigger increase in fossil fuel consumption and delay in transition to renewable energy.
   Nonetheless, energy transition is imperative for humankind to cope with the threat of nearby depletion of fossil fuels and climate change. The three key dimensions of energy transition are de-carbonation, energy efficiency, and electrification. For successful global energy transition, changes in energy policy need to be combined both with development of new energy sources and with innovation in climate technologies to foster energy efficiency.
   As part of that, the global community adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in 2015 and it has strengthened its efforts to face the climate crisis. To cope with the climate crisis, it is a mandate for the global community to provide technological and financial support to developing countries. In this respect, meaningful achievements have been made in the international community to collectively cope with climate crisis. Also, private sector is another promising actor in addressing climate change through its contribution to ICT convergence in the energy sector.
   Chapter 3 analyzed the recent trends of energy sector, climate change, prospected energy transition, and investment in renewable energy sector in LAC. In accordance with the global trend, fossil fuels comprise the greatest share of LAC energy consumption, reaching at 69% (oil accounting for 37%, natural gas 22%, coal 4%, respectively). Even so, LAC countries are less dependent on fossil fuels compared with the world average of 81.1%. Moreover, the share of renewable energy in LAC is 30%, which is far above the world average of 13.9%. When it comes to the primary energy consumption, LAC consumed 666 Mtoe, accounting for 4.84% of the global total. Energy demand in LAC is projected to grow 1.4% annually to reach 936 Mtoe by 2040.
   The 20 major LAC countries emit approximately 1.83 billion tons of carbon dioxide, accounting for about 5.07% of the global CO2 emissions (35.1 billion tons). Among LAC countries, only four countries emit above 0.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide, which include Mexico (0.48 billion tons), Brazil (0.53 billion tons), Argentina (0.2 billion tons), and Venezuela (0.18 billion tons). CO2 emissions per capita in LAC was reported at 3.1 tons. If we suppose that the per capita CO2 emissions should be lowered to less than 3 tones to cope with climate crisis, LAC is already close to that level.
   Besides, investment in renewable energy sector such as solar and wind has surged worldwide. In Latin America, investment in renewable energy (except for large hydro plants) from 2010 to 2015 exceeded USD 80 billion. Accordingly, the capacity of renewable energy in LAC jumped from 10 GW in 2006 to 36 GW in 2015. Also, LAC countries are stepping up their efforts for smart grids technology deployment. Encompassing many isolated areas beyond the interconnected system, LAC countries have shown a high demand for micro-grids and energy storage devices. In addition, relatively high power dissipation of the region has called for a higher energy efficiency.
   Chapter 4 conducts case studies on the four Andean States which include Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. We selected the four countries for a county-level analysis in consideration of their high potential for cooperation with South Korea in the renewable energy sector. They have been the major partner countries in the development cooperation with South Korea. Accelerating their efforts for the development of renewable energy, the four Andean States also provide a sound opportunity for private investment in the renewable energy industry.
   As the first case country, Colombia is a leading energy power in Latin America. Colombia is a net exporter of energy, consuming only about a quarter of its primary energy production domestically and exporting the remaining three-quarters, due to its abundance of fossil energy, such as coal, oil and natural gas, and renewable energy such as hydro power and biomass.
   To counter the risk of depleting fossil fuels and the climate crisis, the Colombian government has shifted its priority in energy policy to energy transition. It has made meaningful efforts to promote non-traditional renewable energy such as solar and wind power, and it has upheld innovations in energy industry through the deployment of ICT technologies such as smart grids. Despite these endeavors, Colombia has not yet achieved a sufficient progress in energy transition. Investment in non-traditional renewable energy such as solar and wind power still stays at the initial stage of implementation, while innovations in energy industries such as the introduction of smart grids are still at the stage of planning.
   Recently, the Colombian government has actively implemented the energy transition policy in order to reduce 20-30% of greenhouse gas emissions, an objective that it proposed in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). Prompted by this policy change, Colombia’s renewable energy sector has experienced a rapid growth in private investment. Additionally, international assistance for mitigation and adaptation to fight climate change in Colombia continues to grow. Accordingly, Colombia is expected to offer greater opportunities to South Korea for private investment and development cooperations in the energy and climate change sectors.
   Secondly, Ecuador is one of the leading oil-producing countries in LAC. It has been the only members of OPEC along with Venezuela in the region. Ecuador is a net exporter of energy, exporting 60% of the primary energy production. Oil accounts for 87% of the primary energy production in Ecuador. The energy system of Ecuador is structured to be dependent on oil. Nonetheless, since the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, which is the first in the world to recognize the rights for nature, the Ecuador’s government has accelerated the efforts to transform its energy structure to be environmentally sound. More tangible changes have been made in the arena of electric energy. Driven by the renewable energy policies oriented toward hydro power, the capacity of renewable energy surpassed the capacity of fossil fuels for the first time since 2016. As of 2019, renewable energy accounts for more than 75% of the total electricity generated in Ecuador.
   The greenhouse gas emissions of Ecuador stay at a modified level when compared with the global average. Still, Ecuador’s government has joined the collective endeavors to confront climate crisis by proposing to reduce a maximum 45.8% of greenhouse gas emission in its INDC. To meet the challenge, Ecuador’s government has given policy priority to the electrification. To be specific, it has focused on supplying electric vehicles to reduce emissions in the transportation sector, which generates the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions. The electrification of the Ecuadorian economy is expected to accelerate its pace as the government passed new Energy Efficiency Law that mandates all new city and provincial buses to be electric beginning in 2025.
   Thirdly, Bolivia is a major producer of natural gas in LAC. Natural gas accounts for 81% of the primary energy production in Bolivia and 70% of natural gas produced in the country is exported. Governing for almost 14 years from 2006 to 2019, Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia tightened state control over natural resources. Driven by such policy measures as well as the increased market price of natural gas, Bolivia has accomplished an annual average of 4% economic growth over the las decade. Another remarkable achievement has been the significant improvement in the energy provision to the rural and remote zones.
   Despite these achievements, Bolivia still remains to be the poorest country in terms of its income per capita in South America. As such, the priority in her energy policy is oriented towards energy security for affordable and stable energy supplies. Rather than emphasizing energy transition to cope with climate crisis, a greater weight is given to ensure economic and social development by utilizing energy resources such as natural gas and lithium. Still, Bolivia has made meaningful progresses in energy transition prompted by recent renewable energy policies that are designed to expand the supply of electricity to remote and rural areas by fostering the development of renewable energies such as hydro, solar, and wind power.
   Tightened state control over energy resources in combination with a relatively high poverty rate have hindered active foreign investment in the Bolivian energy industries. On the other hand, the global community including South Korea has continued to provide substantial development assistance to foster energy transition and climate change adaptation in Bolivia.
   Fourthly, Peru is another leading exporter of natural gas in LAC. Fossil fuels including natural gas account for 80% of primary energy production in Peru. In addition to fossil fuels, Peru enjoys rich renewable energy resources such as hydro, solar, and wind power. Hydropower accounts for 50% of the nation’s electricity generation. In comparison with hydropower, the contribution of another renewable energy such as solar and wind remains relatively low, accounting for only 3.3% of the total electricity generation.
   To ensure economic growth by utilizing rich natural gas, the Peruvian government has actively promoted the development of natural gas. It also has worked to increase the share of gas in the domestic energy consumption. Hence, a priority has been given to natural gas than to renewable energy such as solar and wind power. Likewise, the recent renewable energy projects have replaced only a slight proportion of traditional fossil fuels. Nevertheless, we need to note that the Peruvian government has achieved significant progresses in its efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emission and to improve its adaptation to climate change. The international community has also been actively engaged in cooperating with Peru to foster greenhouse gas mitigation and climate change adaptations of the country. As well, Peru seems to be a promising market for the investors in climate-smart technology.
   In the last section of chapter 4, we conducted a comparative analysis of the four Andean countries. All these countries have abundant energy resources. Among them, Colombia boasts of the largest scale in terms of the production, export, and consumption of energy, followed by Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In accordance with the global paradigm shift to energy transition, meaningful transformations are taking place in the energy policies of the four Andean countries. All these countries have changed their energy policies in a way that emphasizes energy transition, particularly the diversification of energy mix and the improvement of energy efficiency through the development of renewable energy such as hydro, solar, wind and biomass power.
   The four Andean countries have actively participated in the collective endeavors at the global level to counter climate change, which among others include the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Pursuant to the Paris Agreement, all the four countries submitted their INDC in 2015. In addition, they have set goals for renewable energy development and have laid legal and institutional foundations to boost private investment in the renewable energy sector. Furthermore, the international community has offered a substantial assistance to foster climate change adaptation and greenhouse gas mitigation in these countries.
   In the last chapter, we propose policy implications to facilitate the cooperation between South Korea and the individual four Andean countries in energy and climate change sectors. To be specific, we suggest strategies to strengthen cooperations in the following three subjects of energy innovation: financial assistance, the establishment of cooperative framework, and smart grids.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 필요성 및 목적
2. 선행연구
3. 연구의 구성과 차별성

제2장 체제전환국의 FDI 유입 현황 및 투자 환경 분석
1. 체제전환국의 FDI 유입 현황 분석
2. 체제전환국의 투자 환경 분석(Doing Business Index)
3. 소결

제3장 체제전환국에 대한 FDI 유입 결정요인
1. 분석자료 및 실증분석 모형
2. 체제전환국의 FDI 유입 결정요인
3. 결론 및 북한에 대한 함의

제4장 북한의 FDI 유치를 위한 정책적 시사점과 우리 정부의 과제
1. 체제전환국 FDI 유치 성공요인으로 본 북한 당국의 과제
2. 우리 정부의 정책 방향과 과제

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   This study discusses North Korea’s foreign investment policy and tasks ahead of its government to revitalize the economy, based on the premise that nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the US proceed smoothly. First of all, in order to derive policy tasks, we compared and analyzed the achievements and policies of transition countries in Asia and Eastern Europe to attract FDI, also analyzing the determinants of FDI inflows, after which we present policy tasks for North Korean authorities. As South Korea may very well become the largest investor in North Korea, our study also discusses tasks for the Korean government to pursue in order for Korean companies to successfully invest in North Korea.
   Based on data provided by the Doing Business project at the World Bank, this study investigates changes in the investment environment of each transition economy and compares their investment environment, institutions, and correlations with FDI inflows. During our quantitative analysis of determinants of FDI inflows in transition economies, we came upon many cases where statistics were unstable or difficult to secure, so this study limits target group to 24 countries. For FDI inflow data, we used OECD statistics and conducted our analysis through system GMM estimation, a method in wide use recently. In addition to the determinants of FDI inflows for all transition economies, we also performed a separate analysis of the Visegrad Group (the “V4”) and the Baltic states, which are considered to be successful in attracting FDI, classified into one group.
   In addition, we analyzed the income categories by classifying them as transition economies with per capita GDP less than US$ 2,000 and those above. In the case of transition economies, we postulated that accession to the WTO or EU would have a great effect on FDI inflows for these nations. Based on this premise, we measured FDI inflows by using dummy variables based on when the nation joined the WTO or EU. In the case of the V4 and the Baltic states, the initial conditions were the externally determined independent variables. The most important success factors for investment in the early stages of the transition were the pace of reform and level of openness. This is because the performance of investment inducement policy depends on how wide open the economy has been rendered and reformed rapidly to be incorporated into the world economy.
   In the case of China and Vietnam, the improvement of the business environment was also an important factor for the inflow of FDI. The Baltic states, Macedonia and Georgia all have limited domestic markets, which has led to these countries attracting investment by carrying out drastic improvements in their business environments, thus positioning themselves as a base for advancing into adjacent and larger markets. Among the evaluation factors, efforts to improve the environment in the trade sector were prioritized. In other words, efforts were made to attract investment in sales bases in neighboring large markets to the country by radically improving procedures and reducing the time and costs required in the import and export process. In the regional characteristics of the transition country’s business conditions, the EU member states as well as the transition countries adjacent to the EU generally receive better evaluations in the trade sector than any other assessment factor.
   There are many instances of transition economies not included among the top 20 nations on the “Ease of Doing Business” ranking announced by the World Bank benefiting from a larger market or abundant resources in adjacent regions. This includes Poland in the Middle East and Europe, Russia and Ukraine in the CIS adjacent to the EU, Kazakhstan in Central Asia, and China in East Asia. Of course, reform and opening and improvements in the business environment were made, but the size of the market and the abundance of abundant resources played a significant role in FDI inflow compared to neighboring competitors. Kazakhstan has actively attracted FDI through improving its business environment, developing its own resources and utilizing this as the foundation for economic development. Even in Russia, which is not a rapidly transitioning nation, the rich potential for development of abundant resources attracted large amounts of FDI. China, now a “G2” economy, also attracted a huge amount of FDI despite carrying out reform in a gradual manner and opening its market only partially.
   In addition, improving relations with the Western world, such as the US and the EU, is one of the major success factors for transition countries to attract investment. There are many cases in the leading group of transition economies where joining the EU served as a decisive factor to increase FDI inflow, while efforts to strengthen their relationships with the EU added a similar impetus for the late stage group. Serbia, once a leading figure in the former Yugoslavia federation, continued to clash with the UN due to the Baltic Wars and its own civil wars, but is recently seeing a dramatic improvement in its FDI inflow following efforts to join the EU and improve relations with the West. Vietnam’s approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the US in December 2006 served as a new opportunity to increase its inflow of FDI.
   Based on the quantitative analysis on the determinants of FDI inflows by transition countries, and an analysis of the results of investment and reform in the transition countries, 11 policy implications were drawn for North Korea, as follows: ① efforts to secure support in advance from international financial institutions ② efforts to normalize trade relations with the US ③ efforts to expand market size and location ④ maximum leveraging of geographical proximity with other countries ⑤ attraction of foreign capital through competition-promoting policies ⑥ expansion of trade openness ⑦ expansion of the private sector ⑧ efforts to foster the manufacturing industry ⑨ stable provision of public services and macroeconomic stability ⑩ incorporation into the international trade order through regional trade agreements and membership in the WTO, and ⑪ efforts to improve elements evaluated on the Doing Business index will be necessary.
   Finally, we suggest for the South Korean government to consider the following policy tasks: ① ease US export control regulations (EAR) for Korean companies to enter North Korea ② resolve rules of origin issues to secure export markets for Korean companies, and ③ transfer experiences of SEZs to attract FDI into North Korea.
 

    This study identified trends and possibilities in the North Korean economy and seeks new policy alternatives for inter-Korean economic cooperation. First, it analyzed the achievements of new economic policies announced since Kim Jung-un took leadership and the effects these are having within the North Korean economy. In addition, it evaluated the current level of North Korea’s reform and opening up policy based on the experience of various other transition economies.   

   Chapter 2 examined recent changes in North Korean economic policies and institutions. Chairman Kim has worked to improve the nation’s “resource allocation mechanism” and “priority of resource allocation.” First of all, the “economic management system in our style” strategy was applied to reform the resource allocation mechanism. Second, the government shifted from its previous policy of parallel development of the economy with nuclear weapons to a focus on socialist economic construction to reform resource allocation priorities, reducing the share placed on heavy industries. The government appears to have reduced its investment in the military sector and increased investment in the private sector instead. Third, a total of 27 special economic zones have been designated for external open measures to promote drastic foreign investment. However, these measures have had almost no effect due to economic sanctions. Forth, the government has strongly promoted the import substitution policy, and achieved certain results in the consumer goods and light industrial equipment sectors. This series of measures is thought to be comparable to, or more advanced than, early-stage Chinese reforms, but it is difficult to identify them specifically.

     To overcome these limitations, Chapter 3 attempted to quantitatively analyze how the Kim Jung-un regime’s economic policies affected the North Korean economy. Based on the time series data of North Korea’s imports, this chapter examined four parts of the North Korean economy. First, it analyzed the qualitative and quantitative changes in the characteristics of imports shown under Kim Jung-il and Kim Jung-un leadership. There was no structural change in import between the two periods. Second, coming into Kim Jung-un leadership, North Korea’s imports of intermediate goods significantly decreased while its imports of consumer goods increased significantly, mainly from a decrease in investment by South Korea and China due to sanctions, while at the same time North Korea has increasingly produced intermediate goods by itself. Third, our analysis of technology levels of imported goods in North Korea revealed a remarkable growth of “medium-low technology” and “medium-high technology” items due to the influence of Chairman Kim’s policy to promote the science and technology sectors. The policy, however, has been adversely affected due to various sanctions causing a decline in imports of medium-low and medium-high technology items. Fourth, the results of our analysis of North Korea’s imports of intermediate goods in relation to the distribution of firms in North Korea confirm that the economic concentration in Pyongyang has increased since Kim Jung-un leadership.

   Chapter 4 conducted a case study of transition economies in order to review the economic reform and opening policy pursued by Kim Jong-un, and how it could be implemented in practice. We examine the policies that countries such as Vietnam and Myanmar have implemented over time since their declaration of economic reform and opening, and assessed under what conditions the policies produced results. Through this, the level of economic reform and opening policy recently pursued by North Korea is comparable to those of these countries, and the policy task to achieve results is presented. In light of Vietnam’s case, North Korea seems to be in a position to move toward a “new economic policy” that emulates the “Doimoi Policy” of Vietnam. Considering the case of Myanmar, the relationship between North Korea and the US seems to be in the early stages of normalization. The key is whether a roadmap for normalizing relations between North Korea and the US can be established, as in the case of Vietnam, and whether North Korea can accept US demand for lifting sanctions, as in the case of Myanmar. Our analysis indicates that the successful outcome of these countries’ opening policies depended on whether they could attract foreign capital. This means that in order for North Korea’s economic reform and opening policy to achieve meaningful results, foreign relations must be normalized first.

     Building on these results, Chapter 5 presents the possibility and remaining tasks for economic change in North Korea and the potential cooperation areas to resume and expand inter-Korean economic cooperation under the new inter-Korean economic cooperation conditions. Despite the fact that North Korea’s economy has been showing progress since Kim Jung-un took office, the North Korean economy is undergoing difficulties as the overall economy has transitioned toward a high-cost structure since the sanctions in 2016. Sanctions are limiting the domestic effectiveness of Kim Jung-un’s economic reform policies, and it would be difficult for North Korea’s economy to achieve reform and openness without lifting sanctions and normalizing foreign relations.

     The new inter-Korean economic cooperation should be aimed at supporting North Korea to normalize its foreign relations and enter the international regime. In particular, when resuming inter-Korean economic cooperation, it will be necessary to conclude an inter-Korean CEPA in order to create a stable inter-Korean economic cooperation environment. Second, in order to lower the cost of economic integration between the two Koreas, and to promote rapid growth of the inter-Korean economy, economic cooperation projects should be pursued in consideration of the establishment of the economic value chain between North and South Korea. There are two ways to establish a economic value chain division between the two Koreas: one is where North Korea takes charge of labor-intensive processes while South Korea presents a traditional way of providing technology and capital, and the other is to enter the fourth industrial sector utilizing North Korea’s low levels of regulation and industrial development. Third, it is necessary to guide North Korea to multilateral cooperation by creating and improving the conditions for foreigners to participate in inter-Korean economic cooperation, thus creating a virtuous cycle between inter-Korean economic cooperation and foreign investment. Fourth, if South Korea plays a leading role in donor conferences for international organizations supporting North Korea following its reform and opening up, it will be able to serve as a bridgehead between North Korea and the international community.

  

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경과 목적
2. 연구의 범위
3. 연구의 내용과 차별성

제2장 한국 중소기업의 직접 및 간접 수출 현황: 제조업을 중심으로
1. 직접 수출
2. 간접 수출
3. 산업별 직ㆍ간접 수출 구조
4. 수출 유형별 중소기업의 특성 분석
5. 소결

제3장 FTA가 중소기업의 직접 및 간접 수출에 미치는 영향
1. 한국의 FTA 정책
2. FTA 정책의 직ㆍ간접 수출효과
3. 중소기업의 FTA 활용
4. 소결

제4장 정책금융이 중소기업의 직접 및 간접 수출에 미치는 영향
1. 한국의 중소기업 금융지원정책
2. 정책금융의 직ㆍ간접 수출효과
3. 소결

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 주요 결과
2. 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   This study investigates how Korean SMEs’ direct/indirect exports have been changing and how they have been affected by FTAs and financial support policies, with the aim of providing implications for SME internationalization policies. In our study we define direct export as the act of selling products directly to foreign buyers, while indirect export refers to the act of selling products to other domestic individuals or firms that engage in direct export. Direct/indirect forms of export, in general, are easier for SMEs to conduct due to the smaller cost involved when compared against other internationalization modes such as foreign direct investment (FDI). Thus, a major share of all internationalization activities by SMEs is accounted for by direct/indirect exports. Despite this importance, few studies have chosen to examine the direct and indirect exports of SMEs together, mainly because the SMEs’ indirect exports are hard to measure due to data limitation. This study aims to fill the research gap by utilizing newly-developed estimation methodologies and firm-level survey.
   More specifically, this study performs the following detailed research tasks. First, we compare the direct and indirect exports of SMEs across Korean manufacturing industries during the period 2002-2017 and explore the differential characteristics of SMEs according to their main export modes. We find that the share of SMEs in total indirect exports is much larger than that in total direct exports (73.0% vs. 18.8% in 2017) and document differential direct/ indirect export structures across the manufacturing industries. We further highlight that the firm characteristics are heterogeneous depending on whether their main export mode is direct or indirect.
   Second, we analyze the impacts of FTA policies on direct and indirect exports of SMEs by detailed manufacturing industries. We also examine how Korean SMEs have been utilizing FTAs for their exports. The FTA policies have been one of Korea’s main trade policies since 2000s. The main results of our analysis show that FTAs have significantly increased Korean SMEs’ direct exports during the period 2005-2017, albeit by only half the magnitude of the effect realized by FTAs in the direct exports of large enterprises during the same period. The gap in FTA direct export effects between large and small/medium firms tends to be larger in industries which show larger polarization in the distribution of firm sizes. Compared to the FTA direct export effects, however, the effect of FTAs on indirect export are seen to benefit SMEs in a broader set of industries. When considering the direct and indirect export effects of FTAs together, we find that the gap in FTA export effects between large and small/medium firms becomes narrower.
   Third, this study investigates the effect of financial support policies, one of the representative SME support policies in Korea, on direct and indirect exports of SMEs. The main finding is that the financial supports for SMEs by the Korean government significantly increased the SMEs’ direct exports. The magnitude of the direct export effects tends to be larger for firms with larger financial support, lower credit score, less years of operation, etc. We also find that the government financial supports positively affected the SMEs’ indirect effects, although the effects were differential depending on the indirect export type.
   Lastly, we conclude with some policy implications based on the main findings. We make suggestions on what policy goals should be set to better assist SMEs’ entry to direct exports, how to facilitate SMEs that indirectly export to engage in direct exports, and how to improve the existing FTA and financial support policies to more effectively facilitate SMEs’ internationalization.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 내용과 구성

제2장 다국적기업의 투자 철수사례
1. 까르푸(Carrefour)의 한국 철수
2. 한국GM 군산공장 폐쇄
3. 미쉐린(Michelin)의 일본 오타공장 폐쇄
4. GM홀덴(Holden) 호주 철수
5. 소결

제3장 우리나라의 외국인 투자기업 현황
1. 투자자 국적·산업·지역별 분포
2. 철수하는 외국인 투자기업의 특성
3. 소결

제4장 외투기업 활동이 국내기업 고용에 미치는 영향 분석
1. 연구 배경
2. 기존 연구
3. 실증분석
4. 실증분석 결과
5. 소결

제5장 결론 및 정책적 시사점
1. 요약 및 정책적 시사점
2. 다국적기업 철수에 대응하는 정책방향
3. 연구의 한계

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   In May 2018 the permanent shutdown of GM Korea’s Gunsan plant heightened social interest in the management of multinational corporations (MNCs). It is now well understood that the biggest concern of MNCs is profitability and they do not hesitate to withdraw their subsidiaries from anywhere in the world. Due to domestic and foreign changes such as demographic changes and the rise of emerging countries such as China and ASEAN, the global economy will see frequent restructuring of the global value chain through the entry and exit of MNCs in the future. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to establish policy directions in response to the withdrawal of MNCs.
   To this end, this research conducts case studies on the previous withdrawal of MNCs and estimates the effect of MNCs’ actitivies on the domestic firms in Korea. In particular, we study four cases of the withdrawal that has negatively affected the economies of the host countries - ① withdrawal of Carrefour in Korea ② GM’s Gunsan plant closure ③ Michelin’s Otta plant closure in Japan ④ GM Holden’s plant closure in Australia. The MNCs decided to shut down their plants in response to either deterioration in profitability or changes in the corporations’ management strategy. Despite the government’s efforts to prevent the closures of plants, the gap in the bargaining power between the MNCs and the governments of the host countries was also evident. Rather than withdrawing completely, however, MNCs have maintained logistics departments and R&D departments such as design centers in line with the industrial competitiveness of the host countries.
   Meanwhile, job loss is one of the central concerns in all of our case studies. Unlike large corporations and capitalists who can diversify their investments between regions and industries, workers and small business owners are more sensitive to the impact of the MNC withdrawal because they are more subject to the restrictions on movement between regions and industries. In addition, the labor market rigidities implemented for the purpose of supporting workers in normal times can even have a substantial effect on the labor market when MNCs close their plants. If the withdrawing MNCs were able to gradually reduce the level of employment as profitability deteriorated in advance, the closure of plants would not have a steep effect on the labor market.
   As highlighted in Chapter 4, the activities of foreign-invested firms are positively correlated with the employment of domestic firms. In particular, the domestic firms in upstream industries were significantly affected. In light of the recent restructuring of GM Korea and concerns about the production cliff of Renault Samsung Motors, our estimation results highlight the potentially substantial effects of the MNC withdrawal from the comprehensive machinery industry. For example, there could be a negative impact on the employment of domestic small and medium-sized firms in the upstream industries that supply parts to the automobile corporations.
   In the long run, it is important to strengthen industrial competitiveness in response to the entry and exit of MNCs, thereby enhancing the growth engine of our economy. Moreover, our case studies and empirical analysis also suggest the implementation of more aggressive fiscal support and assistance programs for rapid sectoral and employment adjustment through re-education, re- employment, and technology development for workers and mid- and small-sized firms in the related industries and the local communities. Among others, our proposed policy measures are a more comprehensive adjustment assistance programs as in the case of the EU’s European Globalization Adjustment Fund and the purchase of goods through a procurement market to strengthen the regional economy after the withdrawal of MNCs. In addition, the Korean government should strengthen policy measures to make sure that MNCs agree to the terms and conditions imposed on an agreement that must be satisfied to receive FDI incentives and benefits. To do that, the upward legislation of the refund regulation on cash aid to promote foreign investment should be implemented.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 필요성
2. 연구의 목적과 방법

제2장 투자자 - 국가 분쟁 동향
1. 개관
2. 일본인 투자자의 중재신청 동향
3. 우리나라에 대한 일본인 투자자의 투자 현황

제3장 한·일 및 한·중·일 투자협정의 투자자 - 국가 분쟁해결제도
1. 한·일 투자협정
2. 한·중·일 투자협정
3. 소결

제4장 중재판정례 검토
1. ISDS 규정에 대한 MFN 규정의 적용 가부 관련 판정례
2. 국제법 언급 유무에 따른 FET 기준 관련 판정례
3. 간접수용 판단에서의 세부 기준 관련 판정례
4. 사법부인 판단 기준 관련 판정례

제5장 결론
1. 요약
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The Korean Supreme Court delivered a ruling on October 30, 2018, recognizing Japanese corporate liability for victims of forced labor. Since then, some assets belonging to these Japanese companies have been foreclosed. There was a news article reporting the possibility that the Japanese companies in question could file an investor-state dispute against Korea for arbitration. Although it is unlikely that Japanese companies will actually file for international investment arbitration, analyzing the prospective issues and reviewing relevant judgments can provide important reference points during the course of Korea's negotiations with Japan.
   The total number of investor-state disputes has continued to increase since 1987, with a cumulative total of 942 cases as of January 1, 2019. In the past, Japanese investors were not active in applying for arbitration compared to their overseas investment. Since 2015, however, Japanese investors have brought a case to the international investment arbitration every year until 2018.
   Against this background, this study analyzed the ISDS provisions within the Korea-Japan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Investment Treaty (TIT), which constitute the grounds for Japanese companies to submit investor-state disputes to arbitration. Our analysis shows that Korea-Japan BIT, which entered into force in 2003, is less detailed than the Korea-China-Japan TIT, which entered into force in 2014. Unlike the Korea-China-Japan TIT, there is no provision preventing MFN articles from being applied to the ISDS articles, no criteria for determining the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard, nor are there any detailed criteria for judging indirect expropriation. However, there is an explicit provision in the Korea-China-Japan TIT that investors can put forth claims based on what they think is more favorable to them.
   Thus, if an investor, a Japanese company investing in Korea chooses to apply for arbitration by selecting the Korea-Japan BIT as the applicable norm, the main issues of dispute will be: (i) whether the MFN provisions apply to ISDS regulations, (ii) whether there is a difference in FET criteria with or without mention of international law, and (iii) the detailed criteria to recognize in recognizing indirect expropriation.
   Based on these identified issues, the leading awards of prominent arbitral tribunals were reviewed. Regarding the first issue, many of these cases found that the MFN provisions largely do not apply to ISDS regulations. On the second issue, notwithstanding differences in language, awards tended to converge toward demanding the same level of obligations as international law. Third, various and detailed criteria for recognizing indirect expropriation were identified in many cases. Fourth, in the case of denial of justice, a type of violation of the FET obligation, it was recognized in the cases that judicial decisions are also subject to arbitration as a measure of a Party. However, the cases show that very strict standards are required for a denial of justice claim to be established.
   The implications from the analysis are as follows. First, although there are no restrictive provisions within the Korea-Japan BIT stating that the MFN regulations do not apply to ISDS regulations, it is expected that there will be no disadvantages for Korea on important issues. Second, although the Korea-Japan BIT does not specify international law as a criterion for FET obligations, the arbitral tribunal is expected to apply FET standards equivalent to international law to Korea, as in most cases. Third, in the case of the Korea-Japan BIT, which lacks detailed criteria for indirect expropriation, an implicit assurance by the government may be recognized by the arbitral tribunal. Fourth, when considering how stringent the criteria for acknowledging the denial of justice has been set in the leading cases, the possibility of the Korean Supreme Court's ruling constituting such a case may be very low without special circumstances. In the long term, it will be important for Korea to continuously refine and update the wording of its BITs.

국문요약

제1장 서론

1. 연구의 필요성과 목적

2. 선행연구의 검토

3. 연구내용과 방법

제2장 베트남 경제, 농업현황 및 사회경제발전 정책

1. 경제와 농업의 현황

2. 경제체제 개혁․개방과 농업개혁

3. 국가경제발전 정책

제3장 한-베트남 경제협력 현황

1. FTA 체결 현황 및 교역 동향

2. 농산물 수출 시장 분석

3. 농식품 글로벌 가치사슬 분석

4. 농업분야 경제협력의 주요 현안

5. 우리나라 민간부문의 진출과 경제협력 정책

제4장 한-베트남 개발협력 현황

1. 농업개발협력을 위한 여건

2. 베트남 농업분야 ODA 수원 현황

3. ‘무역을 위한 원조’의 성과

제5장 한-베트남 농업분야 중장기 협력전략

1. 협력의 성과와 과제

2. 협력전략의 기본방향

3. 협력 모델

4. 세부 협력추진 과제

제6장 요약 및 결론

참고문헌

부 록

​

Executive Summary 

   The so-called ‘New Southward Policy’, announced in 2017 by Korean government, declared its aspiration that the trade between Korea and Vietnam would expand to be as much as 100 billion USD by 2020. Current level of trade between two countries is 68,265 million USD which is 7.2 times as that in 2009. In agricultural sector, the trade has shown annual increase of 20.6% since 2010 by reaching 1.93 billion USD in 2018. In the same year, the share of Vietnamese agricultural products is 3.5% of total agricultural imports, and 6.7% of total agricultural exports by Korea. The budget of development cooperation with Vietnam disbursed in 2017 was 195.45 million USD, and the amount of grant aid to Vietnam is the largest in the world.
   It is required to establish mid- to long-term development cooperation strategy in agricultural sector in order to keep in pace with the ever-expanding relationship between two countries. Vietnam takes very high strategic positions in Southeast Asian region, socially and economically. Potential of Vietnamese agriculture is also high, and, as its agricultural production structure is very similar with other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam’s agricultural development will imply a lot for them. Also, Vietnam’s reformation and opening policies and experiences (Doi Moi) can provide heavy implications for exchange and economical cooperation between South and North Koreas in the future.
   This study has the purposes to give basic informations to derive challenges and future directions for expanding and improving agricultural trade and ODA (official development assistance) between Korea and Vietnam, through the analyses of current status of economic and development cooperations and reviews of Vietnam’s structural reform process and contemporary key agriculture-related policies and strategies.
   Literature and reports as well as databases from Kati, FAOSTAT, Global Trade Atlas, UN Comtrade, OECD.Stat, and ODA KOREA were used for the study. Research team visited public and private organizations located in cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and Da Lat for data collection. A part of research results were presented at the international conference held in July 24th, 2019 for comments.
   Vietnam has achieved annual economic growth rates as high as 7% since 2000s. Agricultural sector takes 14.8% in GDP in 2017. Key products are rice, maize, cassava, vegetables, troical fruits, tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, and cashew nuts. Exporting products are timber and timber products, aquatic products, fruits and vegetables, cashew nuts, rice, rubber, tea, pepper, cassava and cassava products, and so on, which are targeted to China, US, Southeast countries, Japan, and Korea.
   Vietnam adopted Doi Moi in 1986 when its economic conditions had deteriorated due to economic sanctions from Western countries and conflicts with China. Major reform measures in agricultural sector were, for instance, self-responsible agricultural management, liberalization of agricultural product marketing, enactment of agricultural land utilization for guaranteeing the execution of farmers’ land rights, and so on. Agricultural production started to increase stably since 1988, partly due to the measures.
   Recent important national development strategy is Social and Economic Development Strategy, which aims to achieve 3,200 USD for per capita GDP by 2020. Other strategic documents, including Agricultural Restructuring Towards Raising Added Values and Sustainable Development, Master Plan for Agricultural Production Development, and Agriculture Restructuring Program, also declare the targets to achieve by 2030: annual GDP growth rate of agricultural sector to be 3~3.2%, growth rate of production amount 4~4.3%, production amount per 1 hectare of agricultural land 100~120 VND, and so on. National Targeted Program on New Rural Development for 2010∼2020 (NTP-NRD) applies tactics of Korean Saemaul Undong toward 9,001 communes around the country for 10 years by 2020.
   After Korea-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA) came into effect, the amount of imports of Vietnamese agricultural products are increasing 26.6% annually. Korea exported in 2018 460 million USD, which is the fourth largest in the world.
   Food and food distribution sectors are one of the most promising markets in the world. Young-aged people as well as near 100 million total population, and their income increases are potentially powerful factors for further growth. Highly favorable trusts toward Korean brands and Korean wave (Hallyu) are opportunities, on the one hand, while high prices and too old distribution and logistics system are threats.
   The study analyzes export competitiveness by utilizing four indicators after selecting main exporting products and export potential products—Revealed Comparative Advantage, Market Comparative Advantage, Comparative Advantage by Countries, and Market Share Index.
   Global value chain (GVC) analyses show that both the export of final products and export of intermediary goods in agro-food sectors have rapidly increased. It is important, therefore, to link the sectors in their production phases through using Korea-Vietnam FTA and Korea-ASEAN FTA. The study investigates the process in which the global chains of value addition are formed when exported agro-food products are input as intermediary goods into other country’s exported products by looking at the case of instant coffee. As results, it is expected that more raw agricultural products are exported, values are added by acquiring manufacture technologies, and forward and backward linkage industries are growing. However, it is witnessed that a various non-tariff barriers hinder increased trade between two countries.
   Between 2010 and 2017, international society offered 36,432 billion USD as ODA. Among them, agricultural ODA was 441.7 million USD which is 99.7% increase compared with the previous year. Agricultural sector’s share tripled from 4.2% in 2016 to 12.8% in 2017. Japan, Germany, Korea, US, and Australia are the countries which provided more ODA than other ones. Korea’s ODA to Vietnam between 2010 and 2017 reaches 2,193.54 million USD. Grant aid’s share swelled from 8% to 17% during the same time period, however, loan is 83% in 2017 taking lion’s share.
   Aid for agricultural sector including forestry and fishery sectors quadrupled from 1 million USD in 2010 to 4.25 million USD in 2017. The assistances were concentrated on education and training, agricultural development, rural development, livestock, agricultural policy and administration. In 2019, the ODA amount to Vietnam is 170 billion KRW.
   The grant aids from Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) have been focused on rural development based on Saemaul Undong methods for province levels, whereas Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) on value chain development such as production capacity enhancement in vegetable and rice growing sectors, logistic facilities, and contract farming with private companies. Cases such as ‘Seed potato production facilities and technologies’ project by MAFRA, and ‘Rural Saemaul Undong model’ project by KOICA are excellent examples to understand differences between two organizations.
   When analyzing assistance using the perspective of aid for trade (AfT), Japan takes about half of total development cooperation, whereas Korea assisted about 100 million USD in 2017. It is maintained that future aids should be more invested into processed foods and storage projects for more AfT.
   Korean private companies occupy the position of the largest investors since September 2015, showing 6,883 accumulated cases which is also the most in the world. In agricultural sector, maize, cassava, banana and strawberry are major products produced and marketed by Korean companies in Vietnam, and some of them have been exported to Korea. Although some processing companies are operating in Vietnam for producing such as animal feeds, poor infrastructure in rural areas make it hard to attract more investment.
   Mid- to long-term agricultural strategy in the future needs to link development cooperation with economic cooperation, and to support Vietnam’s development strategies. Three cooperation models are provided here. First, it is crucial to identify the weak and/or potential parts along the value chain of specific product, and to concentrate assistances on them. Second is the linkage between raw material supplying farmers and private processors. The companies would contract with farmers and purchase agricultural produces after harvest as well as providing producing technologies and inputs, whereas infrastructure such as irrigation facilities and access roads, including drying and storing facilities, are provided through the ODA projects. It will guarantee sustainable income for the contracted farmers, and stable supply of raw materials for processing. Third is the linkage through the investment in logistics and transportation system and supports for technology and human resources. Distribution, marketing, and export are all requiring heavy investment in infrastructure which will contribute to the cost saving for private companies operating business in Vietnam.
   This study also provided three areas for future cooperation between two countries. First is the establishment of smart agriculture system. Vietnamese government already started to support smart farms and high quality, high productive enterprises through hi-tech agricultural policy. A few Korean companies have exerted their efforts to utilize Vietnam as the site to produce high technology agricultural inputs and equipments. Korean government has recently initiated so-called ‘Export Research Task Forch’ for exporting smart farm-related industries.
   Second is the establishment of production and distribution or logistic bases at key places in Vietnam. It needs to support logistic infrastructure for improving inefficiency and expanding export of Korean agro-food products. Considering territorial feature of Vietnam, the study recommends to build two bases at north and south economic complexes, for example, Saigon Hi-Tech Complex.
   Third, it is required to establish quarantine system and capacity building of the related officers. Through the establishment, it is expected that value added is continuously created and global value chains are extended by linking processes of production, storage, distribution, marketing and export. Korean quarantine system will be an excellent model as it had been well-developed in a relatively short time. Also, the ODA project about quarantine system improvement for Sri Lanka, and capacity building project for officers from developing countries can be very good cases for benchmarking.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구배경: 연구의 필요성
2. 연구의 의의(목적)
3. 가설검정

제2장 거주자 해외증권투자가 스왑레이트 및 환율에 미치는 영향
1. 서론
2. 선행연구
3. 계량모형
4. 분석 결과
5. 한국 시계열 분석
6. 소결

제3장 내국인의 해외증권투자 사례분석
1. 기관투자가의 해외증권투자 확대
2. 과도한 환헤지 비율 완화 방안

제4장 결론 및 정책 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   Since 2011, the overseas financial investment of residents in Korea has been increasing rapidly, mainly in stocks and bonds. Residents‘ portfolio investment, which was about 100 billion USD in 2010, has surged to 498 billion USD as of end-March 2019. This trend is expected to continue in the future due to macroeconomic conditions (low interest rates, expansion of savings over retirement), changes in government policies (activation of foreign investment, deregulation related to overseas investment), and institutional changes (introduction of IFRS in the insurance industry). This will have an influence on the Korean financial market through various channels. In particular, it is likely to affect the FX market, FX money market and the external macro-prudential elements such as short term external debt, meaning  it will be necessary to analyze these effects and prepare for risks in advance. Therefore, this study is aimed at presenting policy implications for stabilizing the FX market and FX money market through empirical analysis, comparative analysis of the past and recent expansion period of overseas portfolio investment, and in-depth interviews with financial experts.
   In Chapter 2, we examine the impact of the residents' foreign portfolio investments(bonds/equity) on swap rates and exchange rates. We use the Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM), which can effectively mitigate the endogeneity problem under the control of other factors that might affect swap rates and exchange rates. The empirical results of the SEM using the panel data show that the effect of residents’ foreign bond investment and foreign equity investment on swap rates and exchange rates are different. Residents’ foreign bond investment lowers the swap rates, while the residents' foreign equity investment has no impact on the swap rates. On the other hand, the effect on the exchange rates is opposite. The effect of residents’ foreign bond investments on exchange rates are statistically insignificant but, residents’ foreign equity investments are closely related to the depreciation of the Korean won. The notable result is that the effect of residents’ foreign bond investment on swap rates is more pronounced in emerging market economies. These empirical results can be explained by the different hedge practices of foreign bond and equity investment to deal with the exchange risk. In general, residents’ foreign bond investment lowers the swap rate by utilizing the swap market to hedge exchange risk. However, investors in foreign equity investment normally exchange their local currency to foreign currency in the spot exchange market. In this process, the value of the local currency is depreciated. These empirical results are consistent with the results from our VAR model using Korean monthly data.
   In Chapter 3, we conduct a comparative analysis between the past and recent periods when residents’ overseas securities investment expanded. This study examines the background, investor, investment method, and impact of overseas portfolio investment expansion in the mid-2000s and from 2010 to the latest. The expansion of overseas portfolio investment in both periods was mainly caused by current account surplus, continued inflow of foreign funds, low interest rate, and government policy to revitalize overseas investment. In other words, as foreign currency liquidity and won-denominated liquidity are abundant due to the current account surplus, the inflow of foreign funds, and the prolonged low interest rate, the seeking for high-yield overseas investments has expanded greatly in Korea. Against this backdrop, the Korean government has promoted overseas investment in order to reduce the abundance of foreign currency liquidity and to ease the pressure on the strong won.
   The two periods show differences in terms of investor and FX risk hedge pattern. In the case of the investor, overseas equity investment was expanded mainly by asset management companies in the mid-2000s, while foreign bond investment was largely expanded by insurance companies in recent years. In the case of FX risk hedge pattern, in the mid-2000s, FX risk was fully hedged when investing overseas securities, regardless of stocks and bonds. However in recent years, FX risk is not fully hedged when investing in overseas stocks, while 100% hedged when investing in overseas bonds.
In terms of the impact of overseas securities investments, there are commonalities and differences between the two periods. In the mid-2000s, foreign securities investment failed to alleviate the won's appreciation pressure due to a 100% hedge of FX risks, while causing a drop in swap rates and an increase in short-term external debts. Banks’ short-term external debts, including at branches of foreign banks, have increased thanks to increased opportunities for arbitrage transaction gains due to a drop in swap rates. The increase in short-term foreign debt has contributed to the decline in Korea's national credibility. In recent years, the rate of exchange risk hedging has been lower than in the mid-2000s. However, major overseas investors, especially insurers, still maintain high FX risk hedging rates. As a result, the impact of foreign investment on the exchange rate is limited, but instead, it acts as a factor to lower the swap rate.
   Finally, based on the results of empirical analysis, case analysis and in-depth interviews with experts, we suggest the policy implications for stabilizing the FX markets and FX money markets. These include: increased incentives for unhedged foreign currency investments, the need for a governance framework to reconcile differences between macroeconomic and financial regulators, stronger risk responses to changes in accounting standards and capital adequacy regulations, more active foreign currency denominated insurance sales, and improvements made in risk-based capital (RBC) ratio regulation.