1. Introduction 

2. Literature Review

3. Data and Summary Statistics

4. Empirical Analysis 

5. Main Results 
5-1. Wage Trends 
5-2. Asian Developing Countries
5-3. Developed Countries 

6. Conclusion 

References

Low cost of labor has been one of the major incentives that foreign firms invest in many developing countries. Yet, many developing countries including China and ASEAN have recently experienced a rapid increase in labor costs. Using the wage information provided by JETRO, this study examines how Korean FDI outflow is affected by the increase in labor costs of the manufacturing industry in host countries. The results indicate that the worker’s and engineer’s wages in Asian developing countries, who accumulated at least 3 and 5 years of work experience, have generally a negative impact on Korean FDI outflow. However, there exist positive relationships between the wages and FDI when the wages stay at very low levels. We do not find evidence that labor costs make a significant impact on Korean FDI outflow to European or Developed countries.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구 배경 
2. 연구 목적, 차별성 및 연구 구성

제2장 중국의 기술 발전 전략 
1. 과학기술 육성 정책 
2. 첨단산업 육성 전략
3. 과학기술 인재 육성 전략 

제3장 중국의 부상과 미ㆍ중 기술격차 분석 
1. 중국의 부상 
2. 미ㆍ중 기술격차 분석 
3. 소결

제4장 미국의 기술 분야 대중국 제재와 중국의 대응 
1. 미국의 기술 분야 대중국 제재 
2. 미국의 제재에 대한 중국의 대응

제5장 결론 및 시사점  
1. 요약 및 평가 
2. 시사점 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

   Since March 2018, when President Trump decided to impose additional tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports, the U.S.-China trade dispute has continued to this day. This study was conducted from the viewpoint that the nature of the U.S.-China conflict is not a tariff war but essentially a technological rivalry, represented by the U.S. Section 301 report and U.S. sanctions against Huawei.
   Recent developments in technologies are changing the concept of national security and that of hegemonic competition. The key feature of technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution is dual-use. Emerging technologies such as 5G, AI, big data, robotics, aerospace, supercomputers and quantum computer-related technologies can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The more you invest in the development of advanced technologies, the closer you will be to economic and military hegemony. Therefore, it is no wonder that the U.S. harbors great concerns facing the rise of China in these advanced technologies.
   Chapter 2 examines China’s science and technology development policy, high-tech industry development strategy, and national talent development plan. The rise of Chinese science and technology was not achieved overnight. Since the nation’s founding in 1949, China has always been devoted to developing science and technology. Especially after China’s reform and opening, as economic construction became the central task of the country, science and technology have been perceived as “productive power.” The recent Xi Jinping government continues to place emphasis on science and technology, and aims to build China as a world-leading “Innovative Power.” This is also reflected in various statistics.
   Chapter 3 describes the data that support the rise of China. China is now the world’s largest economy in terms of real GDP (USD PPP) and trade volume, and has grown into the world’s second-largest country following the U.S. in terms of military expenditures, R&D expenditures, and international patent applications. In addition, this study constructs a structural estimation model in which each country produces international patents using R&D expenditures and R&D researchers. Empirical results have presented novel findings indicating that China’s innovative productivity has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2015.
   In light of these developments, Chapter 4 discusses at great detail the U.S. sanctions against China. The U.S. views China as not adhering to the principles of market-based trade and investment systems, rather utilizing a form of state-led mercantilism following its accession to the WTO. Based on the perception that China has used illegally and unfairly acquired U.S. technologies to undermine the national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S., the U.S. is strengthening trade and investment sanctions against China. This study, in specific, investigates the backgrounds, contents, and actual applications of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), Article 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authority Act, and the Financial Foreign Investment Risk Assessment Modernization Act (FIRRMA). In return, China is responding to the U.S. sanctions with a new “Long March” strategy rather than a tit-for-tat strategy. In other words, China has been setting long-term goals and responding to the U.S. sanctions by improving institutional arrangements, refining industrial policies, and developing its own technologies.
   Chapter 5 diagnoses the impact of the U.S.-China rivalry on the Korean economy by predicting the possible scenarios of the U.S.-China tensions. An international environment without conflict between the U.S. and China is the best for Korea in terms of both national security and economic growth. This is because South Korea has to strengthen cooperation with China based on a solid ROK-U.S. alliance for security and economic development. The more the conflict between the U.S. and China intensifies, the less policy choices and room for profits are left to Korea. However, the conflict between China and the U.S. is expected to be prolonged due to several reasons including China’s unfair practices, bipartisan anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S., the institutionalization of tensions, and China’s strong response to the U.S. measures.
   In the short run, it seems important for Korea to pay attention to the negative impacts that might occur due to the expansion of U.S. sanctions against China, rather than expecting the benefits that might be brought by the U.S. sanctions to delay China’s technological progress. Recently, there are signs of the U.S. sanctions against China even further expanding the scope to financial sectors. Ironically, increasing pressure from the U.S. is expected to further strengthen China’s R&D capabilities in advanced technology and accelerate its competitiveness in emerging industries. With the onset of the 4th Industrial Revolution, China is rapidly closing the quality gap and technology gap in major industries where Korea has a comparative advantage. If Korea does not adequately respond to changes, it may be difficult to maintain a comparative advantage over China. Thus, now that U.S.-China tensions are intensifying, Korea is facing a pivotal moment in determining the future path of its economy.
   Moreover, the greater the conflict rises between the U.S. and China, the likelihood increases of pressure being applied on Korea to choose between one or the other. However, as the recent China-Japan relations imply, if you have what the other country needs, it is possible to secure strategic autonomy to realize national interests. Facing the 4th Industrial Revolution, “what every country needs” is “technological power.” We must keep in mind that a cooperative partnership with others and respect from other countries can only be guaranteed when Korea maintains global competitiveness in innovation capacity.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구의 배경  
2. 선행연구 
3. 본 연구의 차별점 및 연구 방법론과 범위  

제2장 체제전환을 위한 민영화와 극복 과제들 
1. 체제전환국이 직면했던 도전 과제와 북한의 체제전환 시도 
2. 체제전환 국가들의 차이점과 공통점: 점진적 방식과 급진적 방식  

제3장 러시아의 체제이행과 민영화 정책 
1. 러시아의 체제이행 배경 
2. 러시아의 민영화 과정과 특징
3. 러시아의 민영기업 및 기업가 특징과 사례 분석 
4. 러시아 민영화에 대한 평가 

제4장 베트남의 체제이행과 민영화 정책 
1. 베트남의 체제이행 배경 
2. 베트남의 체제이행 과정과 특징
3. 베트남의 민영기업 및 기업가 특징과 사례 분석
4. 베트남 민영화에 대한 평가 

제5장 결론: 북한에 대한 시사점 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary

   Privatization is the first priority of transition economies because it is the most critical process of shifting from a planned economy to a market economy. Even state enterprises can gain competitiveness by attracting foreign capital and adopting foreign technologies. Meanwhile, the most important element of privatization is confirming ownership. For this, it is necessary to go though complex negotiation and mediation between conflicting parties. Otherwise, privatization cannot be completed and the expected effects will not be realized. Based on this understanding, chapter 2 examines the economic plight and challenges faced by the planned economies before the transition process.
   Chapter 3 reviews the major features of Russia’s privatization by period and of Russian businessmen. In addition, success factors and failure factors are presented through an analysis of privatized companies. Against this backdrop, implications for North Korea are drawn, centered on potential issues that could arise during its transition process.
   In chapter 4, Vietnam’s case is analyzed. Vietnam had a different social and economic structure from Russia when it began privatization. Russia was a large autarkic economy with a highly industrialized structure, whereas Vietnam was a small autarkic economy with a low level of industrial development. Thus, privatization in Vietnam proceeded differently as the collective leadership system by the labor party remains intact.
   The first lesson we learn from Russia’s and Vietnam’s experiences is that institutionalization is the prerequisite of privatization. Structural changes of a society and economy can be accomplished only through legislation and institutionalization. Without these crucial developments, investors or capitalists in the market can be discouraged from participating. Another lesson is the importance of forming ardent reformist groups. Such groups can prevent any attempts to reverse progress and return to the past. As seen in Russia’s and Vietnam’s cases, North Korea can implement reforms and transition successfully by quickly developing the private sector and nurturing capitalist businessmen. Establishing a business-friendly climate is a significant factor of success in privatization.
 

Executive Summary 

1. Introduction

2. The Conflict Game with Two Asymmetric Players 
2.1 The Conflict Game with Cheap-Talk Communication 
2.2 Effective Cheap-Talk Communication 
2.3 Ineffective Communication
 
3. Discussion 

References 

We present a version of Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players contemplate whether to take an active engagement action to compel the leader of a neighboring state (an extremist) to give up his risky weapons. We show that a player with greater damage from the extremist is more likely to choose an active engagement action than a player with lesser damage. Furthermore, we examine cheap-talk communication equilibria with the extremist. The likelihood of both players choosing the active engagement action decreases by a hawkish extremist who can send a provocative message, if both players are coordination types. If both players are opportunistic types, a dovish extremist can send an appeasement message that causes one player to be more active while another to be more inactive. Lastly, we show that there does not exist any other communication equilibrium for either kind of extremist, for any other combination of player types.
 

   The trends of North Korean tourism policy and implications for inter-Korean cooperation Since Kim Jong-un has taken over as the leader of North Korea, North Korea has been pursuing aggressive and open tourism policies to secure stable means to earn foreign currency and improve its image. In March 2013, North Korea adopted a “Simultaneous Development Policy of Economy and Nuclear Weapons” at the 23rd Plenary Meeting of the 6th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and called for the revitalization of tourism by successfully creating various tourist areas, including the Wonsan and Chilbosan districts. The Five-Year Strategy for National Economic Development (2016 2020) announced at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in May 2016 also emphasized the operation of economic development zones and revitalization of the tourism sector. In particular, since 2016, economic sanctions by the international community have expanded and deepened, making it difficult for foreign currency to flow in through foreign trade, and North Korea has become more interested in the revitalization of the tourism industry, which can also contribute to the improvement of the national image while bypassing sanctions. As if to reflect this, Chairman Kim Jong-un's tours of tourist areas and on-site guidance of major tourism areas have increased from only twice in 2016 and once in 2017, to 10 in 2018 and 11 in 2019. The major tour areas include Samjiyon City, Yangdeok Hot Spring Culture Recreation Area, and Wonsan Galma Coast Tourism Area, which are classified as the top three tourist areas.
   Compared to other industries, the initial investment cost of the tourism industry is relatively lower, and if a certain level of infrastructure is secured, a reasonable amount of foreign currency can be earned stably. In the case of socialist transition countries such as Vietnam and Cuba, the acquisition of foreign currency through tourism at the beginning of the transition was used as a driving force for economic growth. North Korea is also believed to harbor intentions to earn foreign currency to restore its poor industrial base by invigorating the tourism industry using its relatively well-preserved natural environment. The nation is also attempting to break away from its closed-off image and create the image of a normal country through more active tourism policies than in the past. The tourism industry is relatively free from sanctions against North Korea by the international community, making it a promising channel for inflows of foreign currency while bypassing sanctions. Above all, Kim Jong-un has experience studying in Switzerland, which has a well-developed tourism sector, and seems to have been trying to fortify the economy and improve people's lives by revitalizing the tourism industry.
   This study analyzes the trends in tourism policy promotion in North Korea since Chairman Kim Jong-un took office in 2012, and promotes the New Northern Policy such as multilateral tourism cooperation including North and South and the New Economic Plan of the Korean Peninsula. The intention is to provide the necessary policy implications by grasping recent changes in North Korea's tourism policy, analyzing North Korea's policy intentions, and establishing concrete and feasible multilateral tourism cooperation plans including the two Koreas. Most notably, to promote individual tourism on a humanitarian level proposed by the government, as well as individual tourism via third countries through travel agencies of third countries, and individual tourism by foreigners in a form connecting the two Koreas, we have analyzed in detail the major North Korean tourism products currently being traded, and go on to derive important implications.
   Chapter 2 examined the changes in tourism policies in North Korea since Kim Jong-un took power as the leader of North Korea and analyzed perceptions of the tourism industry through North Korean literature. Amid international sanctions against North Korea due to the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea is struggling to come up with measures to develop its economy by fostering its tourism industry. It was judged that the government is trying to boost the economy by revitalizing the construction industry and in particular the development of major tourism facilities, including the hot spring cultural resort in Yangdeok-gun, which was completed in 2019, the Wonsan Galma Coast Tourism Area, which is scheduled to be completed in 2020, and the construction of Samjiyon City. North Korea has been pushing forward with an all-round economic development zone policy, requiring 18 of the 28 economic development zones to include tourism development plans. In addition, the North Korean government has been showing its willingness to foster the tourism industry through the readjustment of tourism-related physical and human infrastructure. North Korean tourism products have diversified beyond the previous simple sightseeing tourism products to experience- and life-oriented tourism products, as the state becomes more active in promoting tourism to attract tourists.
   Due to the North Korean government's policy demand for tourism industry development, North Korea's tourism industry-related research has also increased significantly compared to previous times. Recently, North Korean academics are focusing on areas of interest such as exploring tourism industry development in line with trends in the world tourism market, attracting foreign capital through tourism development and eco-tourism development. Regarding the analysis of trends in the global tourism market, the recent development of information processing and information and communication technology (ICT) has led to a growing number of tourists calling for more convenient and comfortable trips, which provided a glimpse into North Korea's demand when looking at the possibility of promoting smart tourism between the two Koreas in the near future. To attract foreign investment through tourism development, tourism development areas are also strategically approached by dividing them into mountain tourism development areas and coastal tourism development areas, urban tourism development areas and rural tourism development areas, cultural and traditional tourism development areas, treatment tourism development areas, resting tourism development areas and comprehensive tourism development areas. Based on this analysis, It was judged that South Korea and North Korea have the potential to develop wellness tourism products using hot springs and forest resources across the country, as well as Korean traditional medicine, healing and meditation, and beauty spa facilities. To promote the development of eco-tourism sites, North Korea has analyzed the need for eco-tourism and emphasized the fundamental purpose of eco-tourism, and makes a particularly interesting claim that ecotourism is different from ordinary tourism and requires less investment in establishing tourism volunteer facilities. Our review also revealed the North should consider developing eco-tourism centers mainly in areas that could guarantee economic efficiency, such as the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Mt. Geumgang.
   Chapter 3 examined the current state of the tourism industry in North Korea through tourism resources and infrastructure by region, promotion of tourism development projects since Kim Jong-un has taken over as the leader of North Korea, and analysis of tourism products in North Korea by overseas travel agencies. As a result, it was analyzed that the environment of the North Korean tourism industry will change as follows. First, the two pillars of the North Korean tourism industry are expected to be Pyongyang and Wonsan. As of 2020, most of the North Korean tourism products started in Pyongyang, where tourism resources and infrastructure were most concentrated, and ended in Pyongyang. It was analyzed that if the development of the Galma Coast tourism area in Wonsan is carried out smoothly, it will be possible to develop products that encompass the full scope of Pyongyang and Wonsan or Pyongyang and East Sea Coast area. Secondly, as of 2020, tourism to North Korea is only conducted in limited areas, but the open areas are expected to expand further in the near future. Areas that are likely to be further developed as conditions improve are analyzed as Gangnyeong, Sukcheon in the West Sea, Eorang in the East Sea, Sakju and Onseong in the northern part of the country. Third, North Korea's leisure sports and tourism products are expected to increase as well.
   Since the early days of the Kim Jong-un administration, the government has built or rebuilt recreational and tourism facilities where people can enjoy a variety of leisure activities. Overseas travel agencies are also selling products that allow them to enjoy the forest and marine leisure in the East Sea region. It was judged that North Korean authorities’ interest in leisure sports tourism will continue to expand. Finally, it was expected that tourism products will be developed in cooperation with the Northeast Asian region when domestic and international conditions improve. Overseas travel agencies sell tourism products in cooperation with South Korea, China and Russia to North Korea, and inter-Korean cooperation tourism is conducted using flights and cruise ships. It was analyzed that if tourism to Mt. Geumgang and Gaesong is resumed, various products will continue to be developed.
   Chapter 4 describes the megatrends in the tourism industry and examines the tourism promotion environment in the North and South by analyzing the opportunities and threat factors of tourism cooperation between the North and South. First, in connection with the megatrends in the tourism industry, it was possible to derive the need to develop products that reflect the characteristics of the aged and younger generations, taking into account the changing needs of tourists. This also highlights the need to develop ecological tourism models and develop ecological tourism destinations that reflect the growing trend of sustainable tourism. Considering the trend that technological progress is promoting so-called “smart tourism,” the need to build an ecosystem for smart tourism and gradual expansion of cooperation can also be seen. As a result of the analysis on the increase in travel mobility, the necessity of activating cruise tourism between the North and South was also derived.
   The opportunity factors for inter-Korean tourism cooperation were identified as the interest displayed by the South Korean government, the North Korean authorities, and the neighbouring countries of the Korean Peninsula. The plan for inter-Korean cooperation in tourism by central ministries and local governments such as the North-South Economic Cooperation Commission and the Ministry of Unification, which is being promoted on the premise of the development of inter-Korean relations, was also analyzed as a major opportunity factor for the expansion of inter-Korean cooperation. Above all, the experience of tourism cooperation between the two Koreas, such as in Mt. Geumgang and the Gaesong Industrial Complex, was also evaluated as an important opportunity factor. Along with this, the experience of social and cultural exchange between the two Koreas based on ethnic homogeneity is an important foundation for tourism to gain momentum. However, there are still issues to be resolved before full-scale tourism cooperation between the two Koreas can be promoted. We had to consider the international community's sanctions against North Korea. Although U.N. sanctions and U.S. sanctions on North Korea do not explicitly ban tourism, they are analyzed to have an impact on the resumption of inter-Korean cooperation, including tourism. This is because the Korean government holds the view that individual tourism is not subject to U.N. sanctions and can proceed independently, but due cautions must be made. On the domestic front, it was evaluated that it will be necessary to secure a national consensus on promoting tourism cooperation with the North. For this reason, it was decided necessary to create a solution to the three major issues to be resolved before resuming Mt. Geumgang tourism with the North Korean authorities and to discuss the improvement of laws and systems for sustainable inter-Korean tourism cooperation. Coming into 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is spreading throughout the world and, together with other health and sanitary issues, is acting as a threat factor blocking the progress of inter-Korean tourism cooperation. However, as the leaders of the two Koreas promised to strengthen cooperation in the areas of quarantine measures, health and medical cooperation to prevent the spread of infectious diseases in the 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration, the response to the COVID-19 threat was also considered as constituting an opportunity factor.
   Chapter 5 presents the opening of an “age of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula through tourism cooperation” as the vision for inter-Korean tourism cooperation, therefore proposing a direction for promoting multilateral tourism cooperation which includes both inter-Korean approaches and multilateral projects involving the two Koreas. First of all, South Korea will implement tourism cooperation projects to the extent that they do not fall outside the framework of sanctions imposed on North Korea by the international community. It is necessary to promote cooperation projects to improve the environment for promoting individual tourism while promoting individual tourism cooperation projects at the same time. Cooperation projects under the concept of “voluntourism” should be promoted, and projects that can feasibly be conducted at this point of time should be identified first, such as holding exhibitions of North Korean tourism products and academic exchanges in the tourism field, and jointly participating in international tourism exhibitions. We can also consider “event tourism” projects which can serve as a form of exhibition tours aimed at foreign tourists and conducted on an individual basis, or individual tourism events for Korean separated families living overseas. Second, the government will develop “partnership products” that promote the joint prosperity of the two Koreas. It is necessary to diversify existing inter-Korean tourism products, developing theme tourism products along the lines of Gaesong Peace Tourism, History and Cultural Tourism, Ocean and Mountain Forest Leisure Tourism, and Wellness Tourism, which can meet the needs of young people who place great value on unique experiences. In addition, it is necessary to develop competitiveness to a global level in the tourism market, through tourism cooperation with Northeast Asian countries such as China, Russia and Japan. Third, we should expand our cooperation in sustainable tourism. Mutual interest by the two Koreas in sustainable forms of tourism can serve as the starting point for establishing a “community of life” on the Korean Peninsula. A South-North Sustainable Tourism Cooperation Committee should be formed to expand inter-Korean cooperation from a mid-to-long-term perspective. In addition, inter-Korean cooperation should be expanded with ecotourism as a point of contact. It is necessary to develop eco-tourism model projects focused on areas and products that can be agreed upon for inter-Korean development. Fourth, a foundation for promoting “smart tourism” should be built. With sanctions against North Korea continuing, inter-Korean cooperation to build a “smart tourism” base is likely to be a distant prospect. However, we can conclude that the expansion of cooperation for smart tourism must be pursued to ensure future-oriented cooperation between South and North Korea. First of all, it is necessary to gradually expand cooperation in constructing a smart tourism ecosystem centered on five major factors: experience, convenience, service, mobility, and platforms. Also, the range of cooperation must be expanded through the construction of smart tourism experience halls and the promotion of virtual reality (VR) tours.

국문요약

제1장 서론 및 문제 제기 
1. 연구 배경 및 목적 
2. 기존 연구와의 차별성 

제2장 중국 진출 한국 중소기업 사업 환경의 변화 
1. 중국의 외부 경영 환경 변화 
2. 중국의 산업구조 고도화와 경쟁 환경의 변화 
3. 외국인 투자기업에 대한 경영 환경의 변화 
4. 경기 분석과 인터뷰를 통한 경영 환경의 악화 요인 분석 

제3장 주요국의 대중국 비즈니스 전략 변화 
1. 주요국 중국 비즈니스 개황과 특징 
2. 일본의 대중국 비즈니스 전략의 변화와 특징 
3. 대만의 대중국 비즈니스 전략의 변화와 특징 
4. 이스라엘의 대중국 비즈니스 전략의 변화와 특징 
5. 독일의 대중국 비즈니스 전략의 변화와 특징 

제4장 한국 중소기업의 중국 사업 전략 도출 
1. 중국 진출 중소기업 유형화의 선결 과제 
2. 유형별 중소기업 현황과 전략적 이슈에 대한 인터뷰
3. 한국 중소기업의 중국 비즈니스 전략 제언

제5장 결론과 정책 제언 
1. 연구결과 종합 및 주요 시사점
2. 한국 중소기업의 중국 비즈니스 정책 과제 

참고문헌

   This study conducts a comprehensive evaluation of Korea’s ODA to Rwanda’s agriculture sector and seeks ways to enhance its quality from a holistic point of view. Against this backdrop, this study carries out an evaluation using sub-sectors (hereafter ‘clusters’) of ODA as the basic unit, rather than assessing the performance of individual projects. This study is based on the view that cluster evaluation

— grouping projects with similar purposes into clusters and evaluating overall performance by cluster — will enable comparative evaluation of different project sectors and provide meaningful insights in devising strategic plans for development assistance. With the establishment of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), the demand for comprehensive evaluation of aid performance at the industry level or the overall national development level, rather than at the level of each individual project, has been increasing. The research pursues evaluation in line with this policy demand.
   Recently, there has been a growing consensus in the domestic and international aid community that sporadic project aid should be avoided, while achieving CPS-level performance goals, and seeking state-level development assistance that meets the national development strategies of recipient countries.
   Chapter 2 examines the current state of Rwanda’s agricultural ODA as well as its main characteristics. Based on the cluster classification criteria of this study, it was observed that Korea dispersed aid funds in a more decentralized manner compared to other developed countries. In addition, various aid projects of different characteristics were observed within a single cluster, making fragmentation in aid practice more evident. For example, in the case of the “agricultural development” cluster, three aid agencies have each carried out assistance projects with different characteristics. Aid projects have been executed independently without any link among different clusters. Considering Korea's relatively small aid scale and insufficient aid capacity, a decentralized resource allocation structure and sporadic aid delivery are not desirable.
   In Chapter 3, a comprehensive evaluation was conducted on Korea’s ODA projects in Rwanda’s agricultural sector between 2013 and 2017, using three frameworks: planning, operation and performance. The evaluation criteria consists of four indicators (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability) widely used in the evaluation of international development projects. This study devised Cluster Performance Index (CPI) by numerically calculating each cluster’s performance by each indicator. In addition, the Resource Allocation Index (RAI) was formulated to assess Korea’s presence in the Rwandan agriculture ODA sector, where a number of international actors competitively provide aid. The RAI and CPI were then mapped in quandrants to visualize each cluster’s performance compared to the amount of funds injected. The results of the comprehensive evaluation are summarized as follows.
   First, in terms of planning or strategic management, it appears that projects are mostly planned appropriately, but in some clusters, large amounts of the budget have been invested in poorly planned projects. Project sites being dispersed across multiple provinces was also a problem. Although Rwanda’s small land area reduces inconveniences caused by such dispersion of sites, it would still be advisable to carry out similar or related projects in neighboring areas and to strategically conduct projects in the same cluster within the same district or cell through aid harmonization. Such strategic planning would promote efficiency in project management and lead to synergy between projects.
   Secondly, in terms of operational management, there was considerable room for improvement in all clusters. Particularly, all clusters scored below average in the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) category. The number of monitoring sessions should be increased, and there is much to be improved in terms of monitoring quality. While it is important to build partnerships with aid agencies in the recipient countries in order to implement projects efficiently, all clusters scored moderately in this category. In terms of the rate of budget execution versus budget commitment, most clusters implemented their budgets efficiently as planned. While there were few cases of project periods being extended, there were several cases of modifications being made to the project contents. Considering that project planning cannot be perfect due to the shortage of professional ODA consulting agencies in Korea’s ODA sector, this study avoided lowering CPI scores entirely based on the number of changes made. Instead, the background and gravity of each change were considered in the evaluation. Nevertheless, some projects had made significant changes that could undermine project efficiency, indicating some improvements would be necessary in terms of the efficiency of project operations.
   Third, in terms of performance evaluation, all clusters scored relatively high in effectiveness. On average, scores were also high in sustainability, but relatively lower in effectiveness. Within the effectiveness category, scores were particularly high in goal achievement with many projects exceeding the planned goals. On the other hand, some inadequacies were revealed in ex-ante evaluations of the project implementation environment. While it is important to achieve planned goals, it is also crucial to improve effectiveness by considering the characteristics of the project site during project implementation. Rwanda’s distinct project environment characterized by a high percentage of unschooled farmers and multiple official languages also necessitates improvement in communication through strengthening the capacities of local coordinators and interpreters, or having dispatched Korean workers learn the local languages. In terms of sustainability, no case was observed where Rwandan government’s policy changes hampered the sustainability of projects. On the contrary, risk management was found to be relatively inadequate in all clusters. Stakeholders tended to perceive potential risks as relatively less important than other factors. Feasibility study reports also had very little content related to risk analysis, and in-depth analyses were scarce. In some cases, project sustainability was jeopardized due to poor response to risks. Further efforts should be made to analyze risks at the planning stage, and risk management capacities should be strengthened by sharing cases of risk occurrence and successful risk management. In terms of follow-up management, all clusters scored average. While post-completion project maintenance largely depends on the coordination system with the recipient country as well as the administration capacity of the local government in the project site, as projects are mainly carried out in areas with high poverty rates, the local governments tend to lack capacity. Korean ODA agencies can do little about the local governments’ capacity, while they can make efforts to strengthen cooperation with the recipient country to ensure project sustainability. The better the partnership is, the more willing the recipient government will be to maintain completed projects. Overall, in terms of cluster average scores, projects have done best in the area of effectiveness, followed by relevance and sustainability, and scored lowest in efficiency.
   Chapter 4 comprehensively analyzes Korea’s ODA to Rwanda’s agriculture sector through network analysis and contribution analysis. Firstly, the “consistency” of Korea’s ODA with regard to the goals presented in the Rwandan national development strategy and the CPS of the Korean government was measured through network analysis. While in the previous chapter the degree of consistency was simply measured by indexing, in this chapter, the degree was measured quantitatively. Considering that Korea’s CPS is based on the development needs of the recipient country, it could be said that the CPS and Rwanda’s national development strategy share common goals, but this study assumes that in reality they could have different priorities and examines both sides independently when measuring the degree of relevance of Korea’s agricultural ODA with regard to them. Secondly, using System Dynamics Simulation, this study estimated the contribution of Korea’s agricultural ODA to Rwanda’s GDP and its employment inducement effect. The contribution of Korean ODA to Rwanda’s GDP was analyzed by industry, and the contribution of the agricultural sector relative to that of other sectors was subsequently calculated in proportion.
   Quantitative measurement of the consistency of Korean project- type ODA with respect to Rwanda’s national development needs showed the highest consistency with the goal of expanding agricultural productivity, while there was little consistency with other objectives such as good governance, economic integration, etc. Combined analysis of project-type ODA and training-type ODA showed links, albeit weak, to development goals in fields other than agriculture. Moreover, contribution analysis showed that Korea’s agricultural ODA to Rwanda has contributed approximately $100 million to Rwanda’s GDP in 2016. Agricultural ODA contributed more to Rwanda’s GDP than ODA in any other field. This implies that Korea should continue to prioritize the agricultural sector in its ODA to Rwanda. Furthermore, it was estimated that Korea’s agricultural ODA has led to an average of about 4,000 jobs being created per year over the analysis period.
   Chapter 5 draws suggestions and lessons from the aforementioned observations and analysis results and presents several measures to improve aid quality, summarized as follows. First, budget allocation optimization was presented as a means of better strategic planning and management. Strategic allocation of ODA resources is directly related to efficiency in goal achievement and is an important issue to be addressed at the planning stage. Rwanda is one of Korea’s 24 priority partner countries, and ODA budget allocation is becoming more complex as aid sectors and means in agriculture grow diverse and participating entities expand. In turn, strategically deciding how much resources, within a given budget, are to be invested in which sector through systematic analysis has emerged as an important issue. This study seeks ways to optimize budget allocation by applying cluster performance index (CPI) and resource allocation index (RAI) values to Fiedler’s Contingency Theory Model. According to the analysis, resource allocation efficiency would be improved if ODA is expanded significantly in the Agricultural Training and Education cluster (C3), gradually expanded in the Agricultural Policy and Administration cluster (C1) and Rural Development cluster (C5), and gradually reduced in the Agricultural Development (C2) and Agricultural Cooperatives (C4) clusters.
   Secondly, this chapter presents measures to improve monitoring efficiency in terms of strategic operational management. Project evaluation results showed low overall efficiency scores across all clusters, and among efficiency assessment categories, scores were particularly low in M&E. Based on stakeholder interviews, this study proposes that considering the distinct features of agricultural ODA projects, agencies could dispatch Korean or local employees in the vicinity of the project site to frequently monitor projects in order to enhance efficiency. Moreover, with projects conducted by multiple agencies, monitoring quality could be improved by enabling monitoring experts to obtain necessary information through direct communication with the recipient government and project beneficiaries, rather than by relying on project implementation agencies. In addition, this chapter points out that project efficiency and performance can only be assessed properly with a thorough baseline survey to refer to in evaluating progress and performance with regard to the project plan. Furthermore, this chapter emphasizes the necessity to supplement inaccurate data through qualitative assessment when considering the risk of data collected from surveying farmers lacking accuracy. Lastly, this chapter suggests that establishing feedback measures for monitoring results warrants more attention and effort.
   Third, this study proposes enhancing synergy in ODA through cluster integration. Among its five East African priority partner countries, Korea provides the largest amount of agricultural ODA to Rwanda. Compared to other advanced donor countries, Korea’s agricultural aid to Rwanda is characterized by decentralized investment of aid funds. Differences in the allocation of funds could be due to each donor country’s unique aid policies or comparative advantages, so it is not an issue to be simply judged right or wrong. However, such dispersed allocation is not desirable considering Korea’s limited aid capacity and the “selection and concentration” ODA strategy. This study proposes intracluster, intercluster linkage or convergence as a strategy to enhance ODA effectiveness. We must seek measures to combine individual projects currently implemented and build a meaningful program. Combining multiple projects and forming a program targeting a single purpose can reduce the administrative burden caused by fragmentation and enhance aid effectiveness. However, since it would be difficult to create a “convergence program” simply by tying existing projects without a framework established at the planning stage, we would need an approach where a core cluster is selected as the backbone and other clusters are linked around it or reinforced with future projects.
   Lastly, this study presents the agricultural value chain program approach. Rwanda’s agricultural development strategy aims to shift away from its subsistence-level agriculture and transform into a market-led structure, while Korea’s CPS is aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and increasing farmers’ income by strengthening self-help capacity in rural communities. Considering Rwanda’s development goals and Korea’s aid objectives, Korea’s ODA approach needs to expand beyond the current individual project level to a higher program level supporting the value chain. Given Korea’s limited aid capacity and experience, it is likely that Korea would only be able to plan “narrow-range” value chain projects in the initial stage, and it would first need to seek connection and convergence between the agricultural sector and other key areas such as education and ICT. This is also presented as an important strategy in Korea’s CPS. Rwanda is a country with underdeveloped agriculture and has been pushing for transformation in its agricultural structure through value-added agricultural products, and demand is expected to surge in the agricultural industry; in turn, Korea should include areas such as processing, packaging, and quality control technologies in vocational education and training projects to seek synergy in ODA. Projects that connect agriculture with ICT should also be actively promoted. As ICT has cross-cutting characteristics, it should be used as a solution for improving access to technical information (cultivation techniques), spreading market information on agricultural products (trading volume and price), and increasing financial accessibility (mobile microfinance and payments). In Rwanda, the proportion of people who own mobile phones has surged from 6% in 2006 to 71% in 2017.
   To successfully lead Rwanda’s agricultural ODA, efficient operation (implementation) management must be emphasized along with systematic planning (strategic) management. Many of the improvement measures presented in this study regard planning and management. As most agricultural ODA projects are carried out in rural areas with poor conditions, problems such as additional expenses due to unexpected logistical costs, weak monitoring, and delays in project schedules are inevitable. Considering such realities, the stance of this study is that strengthening the planning stage through, for instance, feasibility studies and basic design studies (BDS) based on sufficient information is more important than repeatedly pointing out similar problems that recur in operational management. Budget allocation at the planning stage is important in terms of strategic management because funds should be allocated appropriately to each cluster early on for ODA predictability and effectiveness to be enhanced. Enhanced aid predictability helps improve the stability of project operations, which can lead to higher aid quality. Rational allocation of aid funds is also in line with the policy demand calling for a top-down approach. Without proper planning and adequate resource allocation corresponding to each cluster’s respective potential aid effectiveness, there will be limits to achieving goals no matter how much effort and time is spent on operation and management. While it is important to increase the overall quantity of aid, in terms of achieving objectives, it is essential that given budgets are strategically allocated and efficiently executed.

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구 배경 
2. 연구 내용 

제2장 일본 산학협력정책의 추진 현황과 과제
1. 산학협력정책의 추진 배경과 현황 
2. 산학협력의 발전 현황 
3. 소결

제3장 산학협력 모델 사례분석 
1. 서론 
2. 도쿄대학
3. 교토대학
4. 오사카대학
5. 큐슈대학
6. 소결 

제4장 결론 
1. 일본 산학협력의 성과
2. 일본 산학협력의 한계
3. 한국 산학협력에 주는 시사점

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

  In this study we examine the current state of industry-academic cooperation conducted at Japan’s national universities and government policies to support these cooperation programs, also analyzing cases of industry-academic cooperation by major national university foundations (the University of Tokyo, Osaka University, Kyoto University, and Kyushu University). Cooperation between businesses and universities is on the rise within Japan, centered on joint research projects and venture incubator programs at universities. According to data released by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, a total of 2,278 new venture companies were formed on university campuses in the year of 2018 alone. How can we explain the recent rise in active cooperation between businesses and universities in Japan? To formulate a comprehensive answer to this question, this study examines policy efforts by the Japanese government, measures taken to reorganize industry-academic cooperation systems at universities, and changes in innovative strategies adopted by businesses.
 

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 선행연구

제2장 중국의 사이버보안 전략
1. 중국의 대내외 사이버보안 전략
2. 사이버보안 국제 협력 동향

제3장 중국의 사이버보안 정책
1. 네트워크 보안
2. 정보 보안
3. 암호법

제4장 한국의 사이버보안 현황 및 한중 비교
1. 한국의 사이버보안 연혁 및 전략
2. 한국의 사이버보안 정책
3. 한중간 사이버보안 정책 비교

제5장 결론
1. 평가
2. 한국에 대한 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study examined the Chinese government's cyber security policies and compared and analyzed cyber security policies between Korea and China to draw implications for Korea, recognizing the increasing importance of cyber security worldwide and how the technology hegemony conflict between China and the U.S. continues to intensify.
   Firstly, we analyzed the Chinese government's cyber security policies at the national strategic level in Chapter 2. China has implemented information control over cyberspace at the national level to maintain social order. Especially, Xi’s administration has positioned cyberspace sovereignty as a part of national sovereignty, in line with which cyber security strategy is established. In the field of cyber security, international cooperation is required, but there are difficulties arising from the disparity between the regulatory scope and priority areas of cyber security by country. Therefore this study examined international cooperation with major countries in the area of cyber security currently pursued by the Chinese government to identify major issues in the nation’s cyber security strategy. China and the U.S. operate upon different concepts in their scope of cyber security. China is a centrally controlled country that sets the priority of cybersecurity as a matter of “national security,” whereas the U.S. regulates cyber security, focusing on "protecting privacy" based on individual rights and the freedom of expression. On the other hand, Russia operates upon a similar perception of cybersecurity to China in terms of strengthening its national sovereignty in cyberspace, controlling the country's information flow, and applying changes to the international cyber governance system. In the case of the EU, its position varies by individual case.
   Chapter 3 analyzed the main contents and features of the recently implemented Cyber Security Act to examine the Chinese government's cybersecurity policy from a legal system perspective. The Chinese government has been announcing follow-up measures to implement the Cyber Security Act since 2019 and strengthen its enforcement power. The Act mandates certification of network security management systems, security grade protection systems, and network security related products and services. In addition, a "safety review" has become mandatory and regulations related to the transfer of personal information and important data to foreign countries have been included in recently announced laws. In order to start information management in earnest, the Cryptographic Act was enacted in 2020, therefore further expanding the scope of regulations on cyber security.
   In Chapter 4, we look into the main contents of Korea's cyber security policy and compared and analyzed the cyber security policies between Korea and China. Currently, Korea lacks a cyber security law that covers both the public and private sectors, such as in effect within China. However, based on the national cyber security strategy announced in April 2019, the government announced the “National Cyber Security Basic Plan 2019-2022” in September 2019 and is gradually implementing 100 detailed tasks in areas such as strengthening cyber security, establishing legal systems, and international cooperation.
   Based on this analysis of the cyber security policies of China and Korea, we derive the following conclusions for Korea.
   It is important for Korean companies to continuously monitor and prepare related systems in order to adapt to changes in the business environment situation where China is strengthening cybersecurity measures to manage internal and external risks. The government should also seek areas that can be supported at the national level. First of all, China's implementation of the Cyber Security Act has made it mandatory for Korean companies to obtain security grades. In Korea, the network security level is a recommended standard, but in China this is compulsory. Hence, Korean companies must independently come up with their own countermeasures in related fields, and government support is also needed to minimize confusion during this process. Next, certification in the network equipment sector has become more complex, and new regulations on personal information and data security are being prepared to take effect. Consequently, related policies and regulations are expected to be announced in the near future. In response, the Korean government should hold regular briefing sessions on related policies for Korean companies operating in China. It is also necessary to consider the ongoing cooperation at the national level and make efforts to further strengthen communication channels.