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The Indian Startup Ecosystem and Policy Implication
A startup refers to a company with a short period of experience, in many cases with ideas and innovative technologies. Recently, startups are leading the 4th industrial revolution and technological innovation and cont..
Hyoungmin Han et al. Date 2020.12.30
Economic cooperation, Industrial policy India and South AsiaDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑A startup refers to a company with a short period of experience, in many cases with ideas and innovative technologies. Recently, startups are leading the 4th industrial revolution and technological innovation and contributing to job creation and industrial productivity growth, and as a result their economic importance continues to increase. In particular, India is emerging as a startup powerhouse based on its fast-growing economy and relatively cost-efficient excellent talent pool. Also, global investment into the Indian startup market is increasing. While the number of Korean companies entering the Indian startup market is increasing, only a few have made stable inroads into the market.Based on quantitative data, literature analysis, corporate case analysis, online surveys, and in-depth interviews, this study objectively evaluates the Indian startup ecosystem and draws policy implications to increase the accessibility of the Indian market to Korean startups. The startup ecosystem is composed of many elements, such as the founder(s), financial environment, knowledge-related infrastructure, and government system. This report analyzes the Indian start-up ecosystem at the national and state level. Additionally, a survey was conducted on Korean start-ups in the Indian market to identify the policy demand of firms. The main contents of each chapter can be summarized as follows.Chapter 2 analyzes the current status of startups in three East Asian countries, (Korea, China, and Japan), along with the United States, Britain, and India. Quantitative data shows that the Indian startup market has rapid growth compared to other countries in terms of quantity such as the number of startups and investment volume. However, India's startup market is relatively focused on Indian founders, and investment is concentrated on a small number of companies with high growth potential. Also, the proportion of individual investment is relatively high compared to other countries.Chapter 3 illustrates the Indian startup ecosystem using quantitative data and literature review, focusing on components such as entrepreneurship, investment environment, knowledge-related infrastructure and human capital, and government policy. As a result of the analysis, India shows a favorable perception of entrepreneurship and an active entrepreneurial atmosphere. It was found that this is based on raising awareness through the growth of the startup ecosystem and their success cases, the multi-cultural characteristics of India, and the spirit of jugaad. The investment ecosystem for Indian startups has been continuously developed since the dot-com boom in the 2000s and funding systems recently introduced by the government, such as the “Fund of Funds for Start-ups” and “Mudra Loan,” have contributed to the rise in funding from domestic and overseas sources. In terms of knowledge-related infrastructure and human capital, India has developed a world-class knowledge infrastructure and excellent manpower pool based on the active R&D and incubation activities of higher education institutions and multinational companies in India. Meanwhile, the Indian government has laid the foundation for startup growth by implementing multifaceted startup promotion policies for many years, such as simplification of administrative procedures for startups, financial support and tax benefits, industry-academia cooperation and incubation support.In Chapter 4, we analyze the status and characteristics of startup ecosystems in Bengaluru, Delhi and Mumbai, where startups are the most active in India. Based on the Crunchbase data, this chapter also examines foreign entrepreneurs opening their start-ups in India, the proportion of startups by industry sector, and the investment environment. Each of the local governments to which the three cities belong to are promoting policies such as establishment of a startup-dedicated agency, deregulation, and infrastructure support to foster startups. Meanwhile, we also confirm that startup ecosystems with distinctive characteristics were formed according to major industries and local government policies for each city. Bengaluru, referred to as “India's Silicon Valley,” is the city with the most active startup ecosystem, with abundant human capital centered on a rich pool of engineering talents and startup infrastructure such as Tech Parks. Delhi, which includes the capital of India, offers high access to major institutions, a well-equipped business environment, and a population of more than 16 million, showing the rapid growth of e-commerce startups. Mumbai, one of India's economic centers, has built a high-level startup funding network based on the development of commerce and finance. In addition, Mumbai is the first state in India to announce its Fintech promotion policy and support related startups.Chapter 5 provides an analysis of an online survey and in-depth interview conducted to gather the experience of using the Indian startup ecosystem and evaluation from Korean startups that have entered India and to identify the demand for policy support from the Korean government. Among the respondents of startups operating a local subsidiary in India, there were cases where these subsidiaries were co-founded with local partners, or this approach was being considered, to allow more customized local business activities, but many companies replied they prefer to found their startups independently due to reliability issues. Most of the capital raising came from domestic funding sources, not from India. Many respondents lacked sufficient information on financial support provided by the Indian government and hence had little knowledge as to whether startups founded by foreigners are eligible for these supports and services from the Indian government. Moreover, there are few cases of networking activities with Indian universities, multinational companies, and Indian government-run startup support agencies or accelerators. Respondents evaluated that the competitiveness of human resources and knowledge-related infrastructure in the Indian startup ecosystem is relatively high, but the financing and government support are rated as less competitive. The respondents of the survey pointed out the local regulatory and institutional barriers and limited local networks as difficulties in entering the Indian market. The lack of reliable information on local partner companies and insufficient funding were also identified as obstacles. Based on the survey results, government policy support is needed for overseas marketability verification consulting, overseas marketing expenses/education, participation in overseas accelerating programs, working and residential spaces, and incubation opportunities from global companies, to accelerate the entry of Korean startups into India,In Chapter 6 we present policy directions and specific policy tasks to support domestic startups entering India based on the research results and analyses. First of all, it is necessary to continue promoting the New Southern Policy and Korea-India digital cooperation and create an environment amenable to startups advancing into the market. At the macro-level, preemptive efforts to reinforce digital cooperation between the two countries are needed. To this end, this study suggests measures such as upgrading the New Southern Digital International Forum into a regular event and conducting joint research on a Korea-India startup policy roadmap. In addition, taking into account that the entry of Korean startups into India is stagnating due to lack of interest and information on the Indian market, the establishment of the Korea-India Knowledge and Culture Exchange Center and annual Korea-India startup events would increase exchange opportunities between the two countries. In addition, reflecting the difficulties and policy demands of domestic startups entering India, this study recommends practical policy support measures such as operating an Indian business information desk, establishing an investment information network, preparing a pool of reliable and talented local personnel and partners, strengthening expertise in related organizations, and establishing a joint fund for startups. -
Economic Integration of MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance and Its Implications for Korea
MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance (PA) are the two major trade blocs in Latin America. Currently, Korea is negotiating a trade agreement (TA) with MERCOSUR and PA. The countries that Korea has signed FTAs in Latin A..
Yeo Joon Yoon et al. Date 2020.12.30
Economic opening, Economic integration Latin AmericaDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance (PA) are the two major trade blocs in Latin America. Currently, Korea is negotiating a trade agreement (TA) with MERCOSUR and PA. The countries that Korea has signed FTAs in Latin America include Chile, Peru, Colombia and six Central American countries. In other words, Korea has signed free trade agreements with most Latin American countries except Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Therefore, to have enhanced access to the Latin American market, Korea-MERCOSUR TA and joining the PA as an associate member is important for Korea.In this report we study the nature of internal and external integration of MERCOSUR and PA. For better integration of Korea and these Latin American trade blocs in the future, it would be important to understand their current level and nature of integration. The integration in this study has several facets. First, we take a quantitative approach. To do this an integration index is constructed and analyzed. This index considers integration in trade, value chains and so on. The second approach is more qualitative. Specifically the case of the MERCOSUR-EU Trade Agreement and PA associate member negotiation process are investigated. By doing this, we analyze the factors that hinder the external integration of these blocs.In Chapter 2, we study the integration of MERCOSUR. For MERCOSUR, the ongoing conflict between Brazil and Argentina has been a major obstacle to regional integration. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of MERCOSUR is marked by repetitions of conflict and conflict-resolution between Brazil and Argentina. Some cases were serious enough to threaten the existence of MERCOSUR and most of these conflicts stemmed from economic crises. In the second part of Chapter 2, the negotiation process of the MERCOSUR-EU TA is examined. The MERCOSUR-EU TA took such a long period of time to finalize. It is a typical trade agreement negotiation between advanced and developing regions. At the same time, it is the first trade agreement that MERCOSUR signed with a major economy. Another salient characteristic is that higher standards in environment, labor, intellectual property rights, and digital trade were included at the EU’s request.Chapter 3 examines the negotiation process between PA and Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Singapore for their associate memberships. At first, it was a multilateral negotiation that involved all the parties. But they realized that it was not easy to reach an agreement with multilateral negotiations. Accordingly, they decided to proceed through bilateral negotiations. In this regard, Singapore and Australia are considering voluntarily excluding sensitive issues in order to advance negotiations. Singapore is considering to exclude IPR and labor rights issues. Australia is considering to withdraw requests for non-discriminatory treatment of digital goods and issues regarding illegal fishing.In Chapter 4, the determinants of MERCOSUR and PA’s integration and the effect of internal integration on external integration are analyzed. The results can be summarized into three categories. First is the importance of political and institutional variables that have been relatively overlooked in previous analysis. The improvement of the political and institutional environment promotes both internal and external integration in the region. Second, in the case of PA, the promotion of internal integration also enhances external integration, while for MERCOSUR it was estimated that the promotion of internal integration did not lead to promotion of external integration. Third, the improvement of regional integration in terms of the regional value chain leads to an increase in external integration for PA. This implies that the integration of supply chain within PA would eventually lead to increasing integration with non-member countries such as the U.S. and Canada.Chapter 5 provides implications and discusses Korea’s negotiation strategies with MERCOSUR and PA. With MERCOSUR it is necessary to establish the brand of the trade agreement. For example in the case of the ongoing Canada-MERCOSUR TA negotiations, gender, environment, and labor issues are emphasized and the parties aim for an inclusive trade agreement. With the Korea-MERCOSUR TA, MERCOSUR is very much interested in technical cooperation with Korea. Therefore, these issues need to be branded and emphasized. On the other hand, if the negotiations are prolonged due to the unresolved issues of opening agricultural and industrial product markets, an alternative option would be a ‘Light Trade Agreement’ that excludes sensitive negotiation agenda. Meanwhile it is also necessary to carry out various activities to create a friendly atmosphere in MERCOSUR. It would be ideal to continuously promote the necessity of TA with Korea through joint research and seminars with local economic organizations or think tanks. PA is promoting e-commerce as one of the 23 negotiating agendas. Korea and PA have also confirmed common interest in digital infrastructure and information technology. Accordingly, Korea needs to come up with a strategy to promote cooperation in these areas. -
Changing Environment for Opening of Chinese Financial Sector and Response Measures
China's financial opening has progressed at a very slow pace, unlike the manufacturing and trade sectors that have pushed for an active opening to the outside world. The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly while ..
Sang Baek Hyun et al. Date 2020.12.30
Economic opening, Financial liberalization ChinaDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑China's financial opening has progressed at a very slow pace, unlike the manufacturing and trade sectors that have pushed for an active opening to the outside world. The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly while serving as a global production base, but since 2012, it has become necessary to modify its approaches to achieve growth as it enters the so-called “New Normal (新常態)”, an era of medium-speed growth. Recently, new reform and opening measures have been taken in various fields to improve the quality of the Chinese economy, and the need for reform and opening in the financial sector has also increased. Internally, the financial system centered on China's state-owned commercial banks has focused on indirect financing, which has served as a major obstacle to upgrading China's economy and industry to the next level, further increasing the need for reform and opening of the financial sector. Moreover, externally, the U.S.-China conflict which began in earnest in 2018, is applying strongly pressure toward reform and opening in China’s financial sector. The Chinese government began to show a proactive attitude toward financial opening amid such internal needs and external pressure, and an important development was seen in China’s financial opening when President Xi Jinping declared further opening measures at the Boao Forum in April 2018. The Chinese financial authorities have prepared follow-up measures related to financial opening, and the Chinese government’s efforts toward financial opening in the three years from 2018 to 2020 yielded more results than the ten-year opening period since its accession to the WTO.
Against this backdrop, this study examines the main contents of China’s financial opening process, which has been accelerating recently, and derives evaluation and implications. It analyzes environmental changes in internal, external, and industrial and technological aspects encompassing China’s financial opening since 2018. First of all, regarding the internal environment of China’s financial opening, we examined changes in the policy and institutions of Chinese financial opening by dividing these into the two categories of the financial service industry and capital account. Secondly, in terms of external environment, it was analyzed how the intensifying conflict between the U.S. and China affected China’s financial opening and Hong Kong’s status as a financial hub. Finally, the environmental changes in industry and technology were examined by looking at the recent development of China’s digital finance and international cooperation in the area, and their significance for the U.S.-China competition. Through this, we evaluated the financial opening of China and derived policy implications for Korea’s response and direction for financial cooperation with China.
Chapter 2 analyzes the current status and policies of Chinese financial market openness as a result of internal environmental changes. The Chinese government’s policies and systems in the financial opening were analyzed across two categories: financial services and capital account. Financial services were again divided into banking, securities, and insurance sectors. The capital account was examined by dividing it into the stock market and the bond market. In the case of the financial services sector, the Chinese government has taken the most active measures to ease or remove restrictions on the share ratio and scope of work permitted for foreign financial institutions among all sectors of banking, securities, and insurance. Compared to this, the Chinese government is taking a more cautious approach in the capital market, creating and managing channels for foreign capital to enter the Chinese capital market such as the QFII, RQFII schemes, and Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect, and bond connect programs. The opening of the Chinese capital market is mainly carried out by easing or abolishing investment limits on Chinese stocks and bonds through these channels or facilitating investment.
Chapter 3 analyzes changes in the financial opening environment in China due to intensifying conflict between the United States and China, which are external environmental changes. We reviewed the demands by the U.S. upon China to open its financial sector since the negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO. The conflict between the two countries has been complicated since the inauguration of the Trump administration, and thus, the environmental change was analyzed from the perspective of intensifying conflict between them. China’s financial opening has been accelerating since 2018 under U.S. pressure, and as a result, U.S. financial firms are actively entering China. On the other hand, however, as the Trump administration is pushing for various measures of U.S.-China financial decoupling after the Covid-19 pandemic, we carried out analyses and predictions for various scenarios according to the direction of future U.S.-China conflict. We also analyzed how Hong Kong’s status as a financial hub would develop, as it has emerged as a battleground for the U.S.-China conflict since the enforcement of the Hong Kong Security Act in July 2020. By analyzing Hong Kong’s foreign exchange and stock markets, and its capital inflow and outflow, we predicted the short- and long-term impact of the U.S.-China conflict on Hong Kong’s status.
Chapter 4 analyzes the changes in China’s financial opening environment due to the development of China’s digital finance, focusing on industrial and technological aspects. The background and characteristics of the development of digital finance in China, the status of openness and international cooperation were examined, and the competition in the Digital Belt and Road initiative and the U.S.-China digital finance platforms was analyzed. Mobile payment platforms such as Alipay in China are actively entering the mobile payment market in neighboring regions with poor financial systems, such as Southeast Asia, employing QR code payment methods based on the competitiveness accumulated in the Chinese market. The expansion of international cooperation in China’s mobile platforms is expected to be carried out in conjunction with China’s Digital Belt and Road initiative and internationalization of the renminbi, but the competition for hegemony in digital finance between the U.S. and China is also expected to intensify. Therefore, this study examined China’s countermeasures to prepare for U.S. financial sanctions, such as CIPS and QR code-compatible international mobile payment systems.
Based on the analysis of the previous chapters, Chapter 5 evaluates China’s financial opening and forecasts future developments, going on to present the direction for Korea’s response. Since 2018, foreign companies in the financial service sector have been able to enter the Chinese market with China actively opening its financial services sector, and in the case of the capital market, free flow of foreign capital has been allowed by using channels established by the Chinese government. However, although the recent opening of the Chinese financial market is significant as an institutional opening through the revision of laws and regulations, there could be many non-institutional obstacles for foreign financial companies to enter the Chinese market and actually pursue their businesses. In addition, the Chinese financial opening measures currently remain a one-way opening, focusing on the inbound market. The two-way opening that the Chinese government aims for, especially the opening of the capital account, is expected to be possible only after the capacity of Chinese financial authorities to manage financial risks and the competitiveness of Chinese financial companies have improved.
It is necessary to watch more closely how the intensifying conflict between the U.S. and China affects China’s financial opening. In particular, we may see different patterns depending on what tools are used after the inauguration of Presiden Biden. China is respon-ding to the U.S.-China decoupling, prompted by changes in the external environment of deepening U.S.-China conflict which has been in full swing since 2018, by expanding its financial opening. For China, the risks of China’s real economy can be shared with the U.S. through the financial opening, and for the U.S., the cooperation between the two countries is likely to continue to expand as the U.S. can earn profits from the development of China’s real economy. Concerns about Hong Kong’s status as a financial hub have been raised due to the U.S.-China conflict, but it looks difficult for global financial companies to move to other regions due to their business with China. However, as China's financial openness expands, competition between Hong Kong and mainland China (Shanghai and Shenzhen) is expected to intensify in the mid-to-long term.
The development of digital finance in China and overseas expansion of mobile platform companies are being driven by private companies. The Chinese government also places great importance on establishing a mobile international payment system in promoting the Digital Belt and Road initiative, so it is expected to be established in connection with future national strategies. This linkage of China's digital platforms and international payment system is likely to be utilized for the internationalization of digital renminbi in the long term. Looking at the competitive landscape between the US and China, it is expected that the US will intensify checks against China's digital finance internationalization in the future. This is because China's digital international payment system is likely to threaten the current U.S. dollar-centered international currency system.
In response to China’s financial opening, Korea’s countermeasures are to demonstrate competitive advantage through localization and differentiation in the banking sector, cultivation of its ability to integrate global resources and service transactions in the securities sector, and the establishment of sales networks with local govern-ments in the insurance sector. In the case of stock and bond markets, the risks followed by Chinese authorities' supervision on the foreign exchange market and the volatility in the Chinese stock market should be checked.
China's financial opening following the U.S.-China conflict is expected to serve as an opportunity for Korean financial companies to enter the Chinese financial market. However, Korea's financial industry will need a differentiation strategy due to a low level of internationalization and global competitiveness. In addition, until China's capital market is opened in both directions, it is necessary to establish a strategy with a long-term perspective and approach it with a 'selection and concentration' strategy. However, as the U.S.-China conflict may intensify, the U.S. may impose sanctions on China through financial means, meaning it will be necessary for Korean financial authorities and companies to closely monitor the expansion of the U.S.-China conflict, and prepare countermeasures for each scenario.
It is necessary to prepare for the possibility of separate economic blocs forming around the U.S. and China in response to environ-mental changes caused by the development of digital finance in China, and to establish a direction and strategy for our digital platform cooperation. However, prior to this discussion, it was also suggested that efforts to form the Korean digital finance market and enhance its competitiveness should be given priority.
Lastly, policy implications for Korea-China financial cooperation following the expansion of financial opening in China were derived. In regard to Korea-China financial cooperation, valid suggestions would be: expanding discussions about financial cooperation via Korea-China economic dialogue channels; establishment of a Korea- China financial stability consultative body; discussing follow-up negotiations for the Korea-China FTA and promoting pilot financial cooperation projects; expansion of research to vitalize financial investment of Chinese industries and companies; and training specialized human resources in Korea-China finance.
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Structural Factors Behind Foreign Exchange Rate and Current Account Balances And Policy Directions
The goal of this study is twofold. On the one hand, when the Korean won is weak, we provide an empirical basis and response logic to the pressure of appreciation. On the other hand, when the won is strong, we analyze ..
Minsoo Han et al. Date 2020.12.30
Financial policy, Exchange rateDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑The goal of this study is twofold. On the one hand, when the Korean won is weak, we provide an empirical basis and response logic to the pressure of appreciation. On the other hand, when the won is strong, we analyze the effect of the exchange rate on the competitiveness of Korean exporting firms, thereby providing relevant policy directions.Korea’s current account has generally maintained a surplus since 2000. However, the current account surplus did not immediately lead to an increase in net foreign assets. Indeed, Korea has become a net foreign asset country only since 2014. Korea’s continuous current account surplus and investment in safe but low-return foreign assets can be attributed to the rational choice of Korean investors who take into account that Korea has traditionally been a country with certain characteristics (e.g. the absence of a key currency, relatively less developed domestic financial market, and low accessibility to the international financial market). In Chapter 2, building on the important study by Chinn and Parasad (2003) and considering these additional determinants, we empirically analyze the determinants of current account. Our analysis shows that the more the domestic financial market develops or the access to the international financial market improves, the less the current account surplus tends to be. Therefore, for example, if accessibility to international financial markets is not taken into account, the current account gap—actual current account net of appropriate current account—can be overestimated. Our results imply that if the domestic financial market develops or access to the international financial market is strengthened, the current account imbalance will decline gradually in the long run.However, in reports on external statements of the IMF and the US Treasury Department, a country’s current account imbalance is occasionally interpreted as a sign of market distortions that stem from the foreign exchange interventions. Fortunately, according to their recent report, these institutions have assessed that Korea’s current account and exchange rate are generally consistent with economic fundamentals, and that, if any, the Korean policy authorities’ foreign exchange interventions are conducted in both directions to improve the disordered market situation. Nevertheless, in the future, pressures for appreciation of the Korean won will increase. Therefore, it is necessary to show empirically that Korea’s foreign exchange market intervention policy has a limited effect on the exchange rate in order to further reinforce the logic of responding to the pressure of exchange rate appreciation. In Chapter 3 we analyze the impact on exchange rates by explicitly considering the interaction of two policies—monetary policy and foreign exchange market intervention policy—in the model. Our main result is that the foreign exchange interventions have a statistically significant effect only in the short term. We also show that the result is robust even if we use alternative empirical methods. The results imply that the foreign exchange interventions could temporarily stabilize the exchange rate, but could not change the exchange rate level or the long-term trend.Furthermore, if the foreign exchange interventions are structurally only having a limited effect on the exchange rate, in order to address the pressure to appreciation the value of the Korean won, it will be useful to empirically identify the factors that determine the exchange rate. The recent empirical studies have already pointed out a weak correlation between the exchange rate between two countries and the economic fundamentals of the two countries, which is as opposed to the predictions of previous theoretical studies. In Chapter 4, observing the co-movement of the exchange rates of many countries, we extract common factors of exchange rate movement and empirically analyze the determinants of exchange rates, using financial and trade variables. First, we find that the dollar’s influence on individual exchange rates is found to be quite large. However, the sensitivity of individual exchange rates to dollar factors differed from country to country, and the sensitivity is highly related to the similarity between the capital inflow and outflow of individual countries and the global financial cycle, but the association with trade variables was not clearly observed. Second, in the exchange rate of most countries, the yuan factor is not statistically significant, whereas in Korea, the response of the won to the yuan is statistically significant. In particular, the yuan factor explains about 10% of the volatility of the won, and we observe a co-movement between the won and the yuan.Our above results are of policy significance in that they provide an empirical basis when addressing the pressure to appreciate the won. Meanwhile, an analysis of the effect of exchange rate changes on the Korean economy will have another policy significance. In particular, given the recent situation where the won’s appreciation pressure is expected to persist for the time being, it is necessary to examine the impact of the exchange rate on the competitiveness of the Korean exporting firms. In Chapter 5, we empirically analyze the effect of exchange rate changes on Korean export companies, using microdata on export companies. What differentiates this study from previous studies is that we classify the exporting companies based on size such as capital amount and sales, thereby analyzing how the correlation between exchange rate and the variables related to these companies’ business activities would vary by size. We find that if the won continues to be strong, the negative impact on exports, profitability, investment, and added value of small exporting companies is more pronounced than those of large exporting companies. In addition, we also find that in response to the negative effects caused by the won appreciation, the capital income of small exporting companies is the most sensitive among the factor incomes. Based on our results, we conclude that to strengthen export support for SMEs, it is necessary to pay attention to strengthening the provision of market information and re-establishing the roles of policy finance and trade insurance. In addition, it is a high time to discuss the direction of improvement of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program to support rapid adjustment of labor and capital. -
Increasing Global Climate Ambition and Implications for Korea
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the international community has been heeding the urgency of responding to climate change and calling for wider and more decisive actions to mitigate GHG emissions. In..
Jin-Young Moon et al. Date 2020.12.30
Trade policy, Environmental policyDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the international community has been heeding the urgency of responding to climate change and calling for wider and more decisive actions to mitigate GHG emissions. In particular, 2020 is the year set for review of the nationally determined contributions (NDC) previously submitted by each Party of the Paris Agreement, and for submitting long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LEDS). In addition, many countries are seeking a sustainable economic recovery plan that reflects climate change and environmental considerations to overcome COVID-19. Also, as major greenhouse gas emitters participate in the declaration of carbon neutrality vision and EU plans to introduce carbon border tax, the issue of greenhouse gas reduction is expected to affect not only domestic economic and industrial policies, but also diplomatic and international trade sectors. Accordingly, this research was carried out to present our policy recommendations by analyzing measures to strengthen greenhouse gas reduction targets and the economic impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).Chapter 2 covers recent discussions in the international community on transition to a low-carbon economy and carbon neutrality, and government policies related to GHG reduction in EU, USA, China, Japan and Korea are reviewed. In order to promote the European Green Deal to achieve carbon neutrality in the region by 2050, the EU has established action plans for each sector such as industry, power generation, resource circular economy, and transportation, while also making considerations for financial aid and support for the vulnerable. In the case of the United States, which has been pursuing a rather conservative environmental policy under the Trump administration, as Joe Biden has been elected in the 2020 presidential election, significant changes are expected in policies to respond to climate change. China, the largest greenhouse gas emitter, has shown a somewhat inconsistent policy stance in regulating fossil fuels, but the country also proposes achieving carbon neutrality until 2060. Japan has also announced carbon neutrality by 2050. Korea recently presented the vision of the Green New Deal as part of the Korean New Deal and plans to realize net zero by 2050.Chapter 3 examines the status of greenhouse gas emissions in major countries, and analyzes the characteristics of carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international trade, mainly in the EU and Korea. We have found that mainly developed countries were net importers of carbon dioxide embodied in trade as of 2015, while many Asian countries excluding Japan were net exporters. Based on the OECD’s emissions and trade data, we have estimated additional costs assuming that the EU imposes a tax of 30 euros (36 dollars) per ton of carbon dioxide embodied in imported goods from non-EU countries. These results can be considered equivalent to the costs of imposing a certain percentage of tariffs. Among the EU’s major trading partner countries, India would be required to pay extra costs equivalent to the highest tariff rate of 4.6% while China would be faced with the largest cost of over 11.9 billion dollars in scale with a tariff rate of 2.6%. Korea would be charged the same cost as the 1.9% tariff rate. Indeed, the impact of introducing carbon border tariffs or carbon taxes limited to imported goods will be determined by various factors such as the structure of global value chain between countries. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare countermeasures based on the results of objective research.The theoretical model in Chapter 4 assumed a political system with a democratic decision-making process. Specifically, this model assumes that there are two groups of economic actors ‒ Group F (Fossil fuels) and Group R (Renewable energy) in the economy under the democratic political system. The difference between these groups is their own production technology, assuming that the Group F has a fossil fuel-based production technology and the Group R has a renewable energy-based production technology. We found that economic actors with fossil fuel-based production technology prefer a relatively low carbon tax rate to those with renewable energy-based production technology. This model derives the political economy equilibrium of a carbon tax policy by analyzing the endogenous decision process of the policy through a political economy approach in which two groups engage in political competition within a macroeconomic model.At the end of 2019, the EU announced a blueprint called the European Green Deal to actively respond to climate change, including the introduction of thr CBAM. A public survey was conducted to collect opinions, with the aim of submitting legislation of this mechanism by the first half of 2021. It was found that the EU is considering three implementation plans: the first is to apply a carbon tax to imported goods and products within the EU, the second is to impose carbon customs duties only on imported goods in the form of tariffs, and the third is to apply the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) to goods imported into the EU. In this context, Chapter 5 analyzes the economic impact of the introduction of the CBAM on the trade patterns of Korea and other major trading countries. We used the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with GTAP data, and estimated the impact of imposing taxes derived in Chapter 3 on specific industries in the form of tariffs. Our approach also considered the possibility that the carbon border tax would be preferentially applied to industries such as cement and steel with high carbon emissions. As a result, we found that exports from major trading countries to the EU declined significantly as the EU’s own production increased for industries that imposed a carbon border. In particular, China, India, and Russia, which have high unit carbon emissions, saw the largest decrease in exports to the EU.Chapter 6 presents the basic strategies and policy recommendations for effective response to the introduction of the carbon border adjustment system by partner countries including the EU, and to realize Korea’s low-carbon transition and carbon-neutral goals. First, it is necessary to support low-carbon transition efforts in industries that are highly dependent on fossil fuels and are vulnerable to emission regulations. To do this, sufficient discussions with stakeholders have to be preceded. Sharing domestic and foreign policy trends and persuading the industries to reduce emissions are also required. For example, tax incentives can influence companies’ decisions, encouraging them to change their existing diesel trucks to hydrogen electric trucks. It is also necessary to support retraining and re-employment of workers in fossil fuel-related industries.Second, in order to respond to climate change, it is also important to support low-carbon technological innovation. The development of these technologies normally takes a long period of more than 10 years, so the slower the investment takes place, the slower the transition proceeds to a low-carbon economy, which may eventually result in a greater financial burden. Therefore, it is necessary to consider practical ways for the private sector that can lead industries to pursue the innovation of low-carbon technologies. Policies providing subsidies, or imposing revenue taxes on the use of existing GHG emission technologies could be considered.Third, monitoring and response measures for the carbon border adjustment system should also be prepared. There is a need to continuously monitor regulatory trends in major countries, and promote exchange and cooperation with overseas research institutes. Above all, it is necessary to discuss various policies to prepare countermeasures for the EU’s carbon border adjustment system. The purposes of introducing this system seem to be not only to reduce emissions, but also to protect its domestic enterprises and secure financial resources for the European economic recovery. From Korea’s perspective, efforts to obtain exemption are needed by presenting the effectiveness of its environmental norms and regulations. At the same time, Korea could also consider a more aggressive position of taking similar measures against the EU. It is necessary to establish environmental and trade policies while considering that other partners can introduce carbon border adjustment measures.Fourth, the private sector needs to expand voluntary efforts to mitigate emissions and environmentally sustainable investment. It is clear that the paradigm shift towards a low-carbon economy is an irreversible global trend. The prevalent outlook is that clean energy generation costs will continue to decline, and that fossil fuel regulations and investment restrictions will continue. Business models or corporate activities aimed at reducing carbon emissions are becoming an important condition in evaluating financial value of the company as well as corporate social responsibility. Global companies are already expanding their investments to achieve their own net zero targets or renewable energy use targets, and are changing new business models to suit the low-carbon economy paradigm. Therefore, it will be necessary for Korean industries to make self-sustaining efforts to develop new business models through technological innovation and investment, and to rebuild competitiveness as a responsible global company. As part of these efforts, mainstream considerations for climate change and GHG reduction must be incorporated into the decision-making process of companies.Lastly, it is necessary to actively participate in international cooperation from the viewpoint of not only reducing greenhouse gas emissions but also responding to climate change. First, at the level of the government or local governments, policy exchange and cooperation with other countries can be carried out on whether a mitigation target is appropriate, whether all necessary policy measures are considered and how to monitor the achievement of the target. In addition, as the transition to a low-carbon economy requires a comprehensive shift across all areas of society, climate change issues should be set as the main agenda in multilateral consultation system as well as a consultative body specialized in climate change. It is also important for the private sector, which encompasses business, academia, and civil society, to study success cases by utilizing global networks, and to proactively identify and respond to related technologies and policy trends in the international community.This study is meaningful in that it preemptively analyzed the CBAM issue raised by the EU while analyzing the recent efforts of the international community to respond to climate change and reduce emissions. However, we expect a more elaborate analysis could be derived when reflecting the EU’s final decision and factoring in segmented industrial items. In addition, conformity of a carbon border tax with WTO norms and a further analysis of the possibility of introducing a carbon border tax in countries and regions outside the EU will also be needed. -
ASEAN Economic Integration on Services: An Analysis of Economic Impacts and Implications
ASEAN has been pursuing economic integration on services since 1995, reducing trade restrictions on services to ASEAN member states through the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) packages commitments. ASEAN ..
Meeryung La et al. Date 2020.12.30
Economic integration, Trade policy Southeast Asia OceanDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑ASEAN has been pursuing economic integration on services since 1995, reducing trade restrictions on services to ASEAN member states through the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) packages commitments. ASEAN signed the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA) on October 2020, which includes built-in agenda to convert members’ commitments to a negative approach, replacing the AFAS 10th package. Upon this backdrop, this report aims to analyze the current status of economic integration on services among ASEAN members and the impact of such commitments on ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries.The targets of AFAS packages are summarized as follows: (i) eliminating Mode 1 and 2 restrictions, (ii) substantially eliminating market access limitations regarding Mode 3, and (iii) raising minimum ASEAN equity participation to 70%. Upon reviewing the commitments concluded in the AFAS 10th package, Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam were yet to reach the thresholds, and the overall degree of openness among ASEAN member states regarding Mode 3 restrictions remained relatively low.Meanwhile, ASEAN has restricted liberalization on the movement of natural persons (Mode 4), and signed the ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons (AAMNP) in 2012 for facilitating the movement of high-skilled labor only. According to the theoretical model used in this report, ASEAN’s approach to Mode 4 liberalization could be appropriate. This is because, if the endowment gaps among countries are large enough, factor mobility could lead to agglomeration of productions in a single large country. However, if there is a complementary relationship between the modes, ASEAN’s efforts to lower trade barriers in the services sector are not expected to be effective as long as they pursue such asymmetric liberalization among modes of supply. Therefore, it would be proper to adopt different liberalization strategies regarding Mode 4 barriers depending on whether each service sector has inter-modal substitution or complementarity.The results of the theoretical model of this report also show that non-ASEAN member countries with small economies like Korea need to secure ASEAN’s low level of Mode 1 and Mode 3 barriers in order to maintain a relative comparative advantage in the service sector over ASEAN.In Chapter 4, we examine the actual degree of openness in the ASEAN service market through the AFAS 10th package commitments and analyze its impact on ASEAN and non-ASEAN economies in the area of distributions services, which marked the highest share of investment from Korea to ASEAN. The results of the analysis show that the actual level of intra-ASEAN trade liberalization was not substantial except for the Mode 1 barrier in Indonesia and Mode 3 barrier in Malaysia. If there exist inter-modal substitution in distribution services, such reductions in Mode 1 barriers in Indonesia would increase the Mode 1 services trade from Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam to Indonesia, but reduce the intra-ASEAN services trade of Mode 3. Also reductions in Mode 3 barriers in Malaysia would increase the Mode 3 services trade from Singapore to Malaysia, but reduce the intra-ASEAN services trade of Mode 1. On the other hand, if there is inter-modal complementarity in distribution services, reducing the Mode 1 barrier in Indonesia would not have that large an effect because of the high Mode 3 barrier in the country. However, the effect of reducing the Mode 3 barrier in Malaysia was relatively large because of the low-level Mode 1 barrier in Malaysia.The integration of the ASEAN service market presents both a challenge and opportunity for Korea as well. To enhance the economic cooperation with ASEAN in the service sector, it will be quite important to make efforts to lower ASEAN’s service trade barriers. Also necessary will be to secure access to the integrated ASEAN service market by negotiating an FTA or upgrading existing FTAs with ASEAN member states. -
The Reform of the WTO’s Appellate Body and Its Implications on Strategic Trade Policies
Paper studies the reform of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) and the implications in regard to the WTO members’ trade policies and their strategic use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process (DSP). Based on an analysis of t..
Sangjun Yea and Junhyun Eom Date 2020.12.30
Multilateral negotiations, International politicsDownloadContentSummaryPaper studies the reform of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) and the implications in regard to the WTO members’ trade policies and their strategic use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process (DSP). Based on an analysis of the 2020 USTR report on the WTO AB, we characterize two main criticisms leveled by the US against rulings of the WTO AB ‒ namely, the WTO AB’s activist role in interpreting WTO agreements, and the standard applied when reviewing issues of the respondent’s domestic law. We employ a game theoretic model which extends Maggi and Staiger (2011) by allowing the WTO AB to make a strategic decision maximizing the number of proper rulings based on a noisy signal, which is correlated with the trading countries’ joint payoffs. We find that as the signal the WTO AB receives is noisier, disputing parties have more incentives to engage in the DSP. Also, by assuming that reviewing domestic law negatively affects the respondent’s payoff when the country fails to receive a favorable ruling at the AB, we show that the respondent will become reluctant to go through the DSP even if its chance of winning in the arbitration process is not low. Arguably, the reform of the WTO AB leads member countries to choose more opportunistic trade policies while less number of disputes arise via the DSP. We review a number of WTO disputes cases to support our findings. Applying our analysis to the ongoing U.S. - Safeguard Measure on PV Products and U.S. - Safeguard Measure on Washers disputes cases, we conclude that arguing parties’ litigation responses may crucially depend on how the (reformed) WTO AB will deal with the issue of the “unforeseen developments” requirement in GATT 1994 - Article XIX. -
New High Standard for Environmental and Labour Provisions in FTAs: Law and Economic Perspectives
Trade-related issues such as market access, and tariff elimination or reduction have been the main concerns of free trade agreements or “FTAs” since the 2000s. But more of the recent FTAs appear to focus on non-trad..
Cheon-Kee Lee et al. Date 2020.12.30
Trade policy, Environmental policyDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑Trade-related issues such as market access, and tariff elimination or reduction have been the main concerns of free trade agreements or “FTAs” since the 2000s. But more of the recent FTAs appear to focus on non-trade concerns such as protection of the environment and workers. A typical example is the FTA between Korea and the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “Korea-EU FTA”), which was signed in 2009 and provisionally taken into force in 2011. Ever since Korea-EU FTA the European Union has included a chapter on “Trade and Sustainable Development” or “TSD” in its FTAs to extensively provide for environment and labour obligations. Further, it is noteworthy that the United States and the European Union have resorted to dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms within their FTAs to ensure their trade partners effectively implement environment and labour obligations at the domestic level. For instance, on December 17, 2018, the European Commission formally requested a consultation to Korea under Korea-EU FTA on the grounds that the Korean government had not shown sufficient efforts in ratifying the remaining four of the eight ILO core conventions and thus acted inconsistently with the TSD Chapter of the same FTA. This is the first case that the European Union has ever initiated a dispute settlement procedure under a TSD Chapter. The Panel of Experts was composed on December 30, 2019, and it recently published the final report on January 25th, 2021.Against this background this study aims to understand recent trends in the use of environmental and labour provisions in trade agreements and provide meaningful guidance to the Korean government in conducting negotiations for new FTAs or for amendments of its previous FTAs. It discusses possible approaches the Korean government may be able to take when conducting future FTA (re-)negotiations, and responding to environment or labour claims posed by FTA partners in the future. In particular this study focuses on the aspect of “enforceability” of environment and labour obligations in FTAs.In Chapter 2 this study explores the question of linkage between trade and environmental issues, and identifies main components and key features of environmental provisions under the FTAs of the United States, the European Union, and Korea. It further examines environmental chapters of the CPTPP and the USMCA. One of the main features the U.S. FTAs have is their strong enforcement mechanism, which was first introduced in NAAEC and was virtually repeated with minor variations in the following FTAs. In the case of the European Union, since Korea-EU FTA a TSD chapter has been included in every FTA it negotiates and concludes. As opposed to the U.S. approach which is based on enforceability and sanctions, EU FTAs tend to focus on consultation and dialogue between FTA partners. Consultation and the “Panel of Experts” under TSD chapters, a provision on non-application of an FTA Dispute Settlement mechanism to a TSD chapter, and establishment of Domestic Advisory Groups (“DAGs”) and Civil Society Forum (“CSF”) are examples of such tendency.In Chapter 3 this study discusses the question of linkage between trade and labour issues, and identifies key features of labour provisions under FTAs of the U.S., the EU, and Korea. It further examines labour chapters of CPTPP, USMCA, and CETA. One of the main features the US FTAs have is their strong enforcement mechanism, which was first introduced in NAALC and repeated only with minor changes in the following FTAs. In case of the EU, FTA labour provisions were first introduced in the Association Agreement with Israel and a comprehensive labour chapter was later adopted for the first time in EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Under the TSD Chapter of Korea-EU FTA, labour provisions regarding “continued and sustained efforts” for ratification of ILO core conventions; upholding of labour protection; the TSD Committee; DAG; CSF; and a TSD dispute settlement mechanism were included, and these components have been included only with minor variations in the following FTAs.In Chapter 4, this study sheds light on the background and impacts of strengthened environmental and labour provisions in FTAs. It focuses on three aspects including (ⅰ) inherent limitations of the multilateral trading system, (ⅱ) the need for levelling the playing field, and (ⅲ) domestic politics. Theoretically, when a trade agreement is linked with new issues of non-trade character, it can broaden the scope of negotiation, and can lead to higher chances of concluding an agreement with increased social welfare. This study also confirms such results empirically: it finds that introduction of environmental and dispute settlement provisions in FTAs shows a tendency of increasing trade between FTA partners and that developing countries, by accepting enhanced environmental obligations, can increase their trade. Further, strengthened environmental and labour provisions in FTAs lead to reduction of greenhouse gas emission and a positive contribution to an index or indicators on the level of workers' right protection.Chapter 5 sheds light on the possibility of the United States’ and particularly the European Union’s further strengthening environmental and labour standards in their FTAs, and of using their FTAs as a leverage for addressing climate change issue pursuant to the Paris Agreement. It also intends to predict possible impacts on Korea and draw meaningful policy implications regarding Korea’s legal and policy responses to such changes. In particular the European Union is slowly but surely moving towards ensuring its FTA partners’ compliance of environmental and labour standards and is considering a multiple of options to improve the enforceability of its trade agreements. The Korean government needs to pay close attention to any future development of the EU’s recently created position of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) and the proposed amendment of the Trade Enforcement Regulation, particularly in relation to the recently announced report by the Group of Experts under Korea-EU FTA regarding Korea’s non-ratification of some of core ILO conventions.Lastly, as the United States and the European Union have emphasized on the need of ‘effective’ implementation of their FTAs, a rather cautious approach would be desirable in preparing and introducing provisions on effective domestic implementation of international environmental and labour standards (e.g. MEAs, ILO conventions) in future FTAs (re-)negotiations. This study further suggests that a domestic monitoring system be prepared and/or otherwise improved in order to ensure Korea’s effective (and “convincing”) implementation of environmental and labour obligations in order to avoid any unnecessary tensions with its FTA partners. -
Korea as an OECD DAC Member: 10-Year Achievementsand Way Forward
The purpose of this study is to present long-term policy directions for development cooperation through an evaluation of Korea’s ODA performance over the past 10 years. Korea’s achievements in the area of official d..
Jione Jung et al. Date 2020.12.30
DownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑The purpose of this study is to present long-term policy directions for development cooperation through an evaluation of Korea’s ODA performance over the past 10 years. Korea’s achievements in the area of official development assistance since joining the OECD Development Assistance Committee were comprehensively reviewed from the perspective of implementing major strategies and policies. The main contents of each chapter are summarized as follows.Chapter 2 examines the quantitative results of development cooperation in Korea. From 2009 to 2018, Korea’s ODA average annual growth rate was about 7%, ranking first among DAC member countries. However, the ratio of ODA to GNI is 0.16% as of 2019, which is less than the DAC average of 0.3%, and it is expected that it will be difficult to achieve the established target of 0.2% in 2020.Chapter 3 conducted a comprehensive review of the major development cooperation strategies and policies established by the Korean government. The government’s “Mid-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation” needs to be improved so that it can clearly provide the vision, principles, and basis for decision-making to be followed by several ODA-implementing agencies. Strategic documents for each priority partnership country, sector, or issue should go beyond their declarative purpose and increase their practical use.Chapter 4 examines the current status of the ODA evaluation system in Korea. Korea’s ODA performance management system has achieved significant achievements in establishing a legal and institutional foundation. However, at the level of the ODA-implementing agency, it was found that additional efforts were needed to expand the impact of the ODA projects, such as securing the necessary evaluation budget and organization, and strengthening expertise and the data collection system.Finally, Chapter 5 presents the results of an online survey on the Korean ODA policy from major policy officers in partner countries. The survey shows that resolving Korea’s segmented system in the field and promoting communication between the two governments are the most urgent areas for Korea to improve. This report argues that policy efforts are needed to ensure that Korean ODA fully considers the development goals and priorities of the recipient country. -
A Study on Unilateral Trade Policy and International Trade Structure
This study analyzes the widespread diffusion of unilateral trade policies and change in trade structures. Chapter 2 examines the trend in unilateral trade policies, the economic and trade uncertainty they generate, an..
Moonhee Cho et al. Date 2020.12.30
Trade structure, Trade policyDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑This study analyzes the widespread diffusion of unilateral trade policies and change in trade structures. Chapter 2 examines the trend in unilateral trade policies, the economic and trade uncertainty they generate, and the direct and indirect evidences of their diffusion. Unilateral trade policies are diverse in measures and unilaterally imposed on partner countries, hence increasing uncertainty in the international trade environment. In the case of the United States, after the Trade Preference Extension Act of 2015 came into force, anti-dumping and countervailing duties were actively used and higher rates were growingly imposed. Unilateral trade policies are spreading internationally. Non-tariff measures including anti-dumping, countervailing measures, SPS and TBT measures are increasing. Moreover, both developing and developed countries are adopting trade-disruptive measures and these are rapidly increasing. Uncertainty grows with the diffusion of unilateral trade policies, in particular the average value of the World Uncertainty Index almost increased to four-fivefold compared to 1990.Chapter 3 discusses changes in trade structures and factors reshaping the global value chains (GVCs). It also examines changes in import market shares by countries and industries, and it estimates the trade diversion effect due to unilateral trade policies. International trade increased rapidly with the rise of free trade agreements and the expansion of GVCs and so on, but has slowed downs after the global financial crisis. Between 1995 and 2007, the trade growth rate was on average 9% per year; after the financial crisis, it slowed to around 4% per year. This trend can also be found among developed and developing countries. Intermediate goods also grew by 19% on average per year from 2002 to 2007, and this growth rate decreased to 2% on average per year from 2010 to 2019. GVCs are being reorganized as developing countries become consumer markets, the technology gap between developed and developing countries diminishes and the development of digital technology decreases developing countries’ labor cost competitiveness. Section 2 of the chapter investigates changes in import market shares by industry for North America (United States and Canada), China, ASEAN and India, Europe and Central and South America between 2015 and 2019. First, the change in import market shares for the United States and China clearly reflects trade disputes between the two. China’s market share in the North American import market decreased across all sectors, whereas ASEAN and India’s share increased across all sectors excluding mining. However, China still accounts for a large portion of North America’s market in manufacturing sectors including electronics. Second, North America’s share in China’s import market decreased across all sectors. In particular, its share decreased around 12% in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector, around 10% in the vehicles sector and around 5% in the steel, nonferrous metals sector. Section 3 takes into account the results of the previous sector and analyzes the trade diversion effect due to the US-China trade conflict. Most of the literature focuses on the decrease in imports from China due to the United States’ imposition of tariff measures. This study pays attention to import diversions from China to other countries. If the trade diversion effect is big, it is hard to expect improvement in United States’ trade balance, and the effect of protecting domestic industries and creating jobs would be weak. According to our analysis, the trade diversion effect in the United States’ import market is statistically significant, especially for intermediate goods.Chapter 4 investigates the changes in trade structure due to unilateral trade policies by constructing a theoretical model. GVC structure is incorporated in the trade model to trace the ripple effect of unilateral trade policies. The Trade Uncertainty Index is used as a proxy for unilateral trade policies and its tariff equivalent is estimated. This is then used as an exogenous shock for the change in trade cost. How the rise in trade costs due to the proliferation of unilateral trade policies affects the trade structure of the world, regions and that between countries is examined. The change in consumption goods, intermediate goods, value-added export, GVC indices is then presented. If trade cost rises due to shocks from the United States, the share of total exports and intermediate exports out of the world’s total production both decrease. Most of the decrease can be attributed to the change in total and intermediate exports of the three North American countries (United States, Mexico, Canada). Meanwhile, the share of value-added exports out of total exports increases. This is due to the increase of North American countries’ share of value-added exports unlike that of other countries such as Korea, China and Japan, European countries and so on. GVC indices also changed for those three countries with the United States’ GVC participation rate showing particular increase. The global shock due to unilateral trade policies is stronger than shocks from the United States and has different ramifications. All regions experience a decrease in their share of consumption goods and intermediate goods’ exports and the majority of countries and regions see a drop in value-added exports’ share. In conclusion, GVC participation rate of the world declines. This means that the proliferation of unilateral trade policies works against the decades-long trend of GVC expansion, and it intensifies the rearrangement of the GVCs, negatively affecting total, intermediate and value-added export structures.The last chapter presents policy implications based on the analyses from former chapters. As the Covid-19 pandemic drags on, the global economy will not easily recover in a short period of time. It is estimated that the intensification of uncertainties in the trade environment due to trade conflicts between China and the United States, and the proliferation of unilateral trade measures will have important effects on the change in trade structures, including the reorganization of the GVCs. Followings are some suggestions the Korean government and firms could consider: (1) strengthen the nation’s ability to respond to GVC rearrangements, (2) improve capacity to generate value-added in exports, (3) continue efforts to negotiate free trade agreements and improve their contents, (4) participate actively in multilateral trade negotiations and strengthen collaboration with middle trade powers, (5) strengthen monitoring of the global trading system, and (6) continue efforts to improve competitiveness at the firm level.
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