The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 caused disruptions in the global food supply chain, heightening food security concerns. The GCC countries rely on imports for a large portion of food due to environmental conditions that restrict agricultural development. Covid-19 is increasing concerns of food crisis in these countries, limiting the movement of logistics and personnel. GCC countries are pushing for policies such as expanding domestic production, increasing investment in overseas farmland and food sectors, and diversifying sources of income, which are expected to be pursued more actively in the future. Meanwhile, the introduction of technology-based smart agriculture in GCC is expected to accelerate as agricultural innovation incorporating high-tech technologies, or AgTech, has emerged as a global issue in the agricultural sector amid the ongoing fourth industrial revolution and technological innovation. This study aims to explore the current status and characteristics of food security in the GCC countries, analyze policies, and derive cooperative implications in response to the GCC’s reinforcement of food security to provide a way to diversify Korea’s energy and construction-focused cooperation with the GCC region.
   Chapter 2 analyzes the GCC’s food security situation through the World Food Security Index and statistics related to food production and supply. GCC countries ranked 13th to 50th out of 113 countries in the 2019 World Food Security Index. Among the sub-sectors, particularly high scores and rankings were given to “affordability,” which is relevant to the country’s wealth and food purchasing capacity. GCC countries remained at the bottom of the world in terms of natural resources and resilience, a sector which is not included in the index calculation but can gauge the likelihood of future food crises due to environmental changes. Meanwhile, food production in GCC countries accounted for only 25.2 percent of total consumption. Most of the food production shortfalls were supplied through imports, especially, the proportion of imports to total consumption of grains was 93.0%. The stock of grain is also low compared to consumption. In other words, it appears GCC countries are maintaining good food security levels overall, but they will face limitations that are difficult to cope with when food supply problems arise due to their high dependence on food imports and lack of water and farmland.
   Chapter 3 examines the GCC’s food security policies and the direction of change in the post-Covid-19 era. Since the 2008 global food crisis, the GCC has been pushing for policies to strengthen food security by increasing domestic food production and increasing overseas investment. These initiatives in GCC countries are accelerating further with the Covid-19 pandemic. In announcing their national development plans, the GCC countries selected food security as one of the key areas, going on to develop detailed strategies and establish dedicated organizations. Moreover, the government is promoting sustainable agriculture that considers the environment and introducing smart agriculture projects, and is expanding corporate support and research and development around the UAE. GCC countries are also expanding investment in overseas farmland and international food companies and strengthening food stockpiles and supply and demand management.
   Chapter 4 touched upon cases of cooperation between major countries such as China, Japan, the United States, and Europe and the GCC. In addition to government-level cooperation, China is actively engaged in private and academic cooperation. Agreements have been reached between the Chinese and UAE governments on strengthening cooperation in the agricultural sector and developing technologies, and various related projects are underway. While Japan is also establishing a cooperative system at the government level, the creation of funds through public-private funds is a notable feature. Japan, in cooperation with the GCC sovereign wealth fund, is investing in joint ventures established bilaterally with local companies. Technology-based startups in the U.S. and Europe are actively entering the GCC market. The UAE is attracting and investing agricultural start-ups in these countries.
   Chapter 5 explores the current status of cooperation between Korea and the GCC region and seeks future cooperation directions. First, it will be able to strengthen intergovernmental agricultural technology cooperation and corporate support policies. At the government level, expanding cooperation in agricultural technology and carrying out joint projects will be able to facilitate entry of companies. As demand for smart farms in the GCC region increases, it is expected that introduction of smart agriculture systems will expand. While leading agricultural countries such as the Netherlands, Europe, and the U.S. are actively pushing for entry into the GCC region, it will be necessary to come up with strategies to find sectors that are differentiated from these companies and in which Korea can show competitiveness. In addition, cooperation related to farm labor education can take place as the GCC local agricultural sector is assessed to lack manpower capabilities. In this regard, the government will be able to provide education through the operation of human resources exchange programs and promote knowledge sharing projects through the dispatch of agricultural experts. In addition, these efforts will allow the government and companies to diversify entry areas according to changes in food value chain. Since the outbreak of Covid-19, there have been changes in the GCC local food market, such as an increase in online orders and demand for healthy foods. As a result, the importance of cold chains is expected to increase, and consumption of organic products, halal foods, and stored foods will continue to increase. Finally, the creation of an industrial cluster exclusively for Korea could be promoted in the food sector. The food industry cluster will be able to promote shared growth by providing incentives to agricultural and food companies and increasing synergy through corporate integration.

 

   This study aims to provide implications for policies on the part of Korea’s competition authority to prevent ICT firms from abusing their market power and carrying out anti-competitive M&As under the changing competitive environment in the era of inter-industry convergence. It may be difficult to conclude whether these firm behaviors harm market competition or consumer welfare under existing competition policies. In this regard, we focus on recent policies of the U.S. and EU competition authorities in terms of how they deal with anti-competitive behaviors in ICT sectors.
   Chapter 2 presents an overview of U.S. and EU competition policies, including policy characteristics and causes of policy differences between authorities in the two economies. Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), two U.S. competition authorities, investigated behaviors of large digital platforms such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon on whether they abuse their market power to an extent that negatively affects competition, innovation, and consumer welfare. As for the EU, the European Commission (EC) has implemented competition policies and recently announced EU-level online platform regulations to effectively implement competition policies for the rapidly developing digital platform industry.
   In chapter 3, we examine various forms of U.S. and EU regulation, focusing on abuse of market power and reviews of M&As. Largely two types of market power abuse were examined: exploitative and exclusionary abuse. The U.S. and EU take different perspectives on exploitative abuse. While the EU explicitly prohibits exploitative abuse in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the U.S. does not have any legal provisions on exploitative abuse. Moreover, the U.S. does not consider this a target of regulation, on the grounds that there is no way to confirm whether the market price is the outcome of severe competition or market power abuse. In the area of exclusionary abuse, we examine predatory pricing, conditional rebates, tying, and refusal to deal. In regard to predatory pricing, U.S. legal authorities require rigorous analysis of the economic impacts of firm behaviors, whereas the EU competition authority has aggressively regulated these behaviors. In the case of conditional rebates, while there are no cases do date of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling such behavior as illegal, EU legal authorities such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have been more likely to consider those behaviors illegal as they harm competition in the European Common Market. In regards to tying, U.S. legal authorities concluded that a Microsoft (MS) case was not illegal as technological tying might increase market efficiency and provide benefits to consumers, whereas the EU authority concluded illegality in the MS case as it could set an entry barrier against its competitors due to network effects. When it comes to refusal to deal, while the U.S. considers that the theory of essential facilities is not necessary to determine monopolistic firm behavior, the EU holds the opposite view. Finally, the difference between the U.S. and EU in regulations for conducting reviews of M&As was relatively small compared to cases of market power abuse.
   Chapter 4 relates the characteristics of the digital platform industry to the U.S. and EU competition policies. Specifically, section 1 examines how the regulation differences between the U.S. and EU arise as inter-industry convergence and active market integration further progress across industries and regions due to the development of the digital economy. First, it may be difficult to assess exploitative abuse for certain firm behaviors as the price of digital platform services is often 0, or even minus (-). Second, technological tying as the outcome of a combination of products or technologies should be analyzed considering the impacts of limiting market competition and harming consumer welfare. Third, much more attention has been paid to conglomerate M&As under the environment of the digital economy. Concerning this issue, while the EU accepts the theory of portfolio selection, which states a certain firm can transfer its market power to another market through M&As or product bundling, the U.S. does not.
   In section 2 of the chapter, we investigate representative cases of anti-competitive ICT firm behaviors in the U.S. and EU and compare legal and policy responses by their respective legal and competition authorities. For example, the U.S. DOJ argued that MS abused its market power by the tying of its Windows operating system (OS) and Internet Explorer (IE) web browser. The EU, however, closed the case after MS accepted corrective actions to guarantee freedom in choosing web browsers for computer manufacturers and consumers. When it comes to the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, the U.S. and the EU both allowed the deal as the merged entity would not harm market competition.
   Section 3 analyzes the impacts of digital platform M&As on market competition. Specifically, we examine the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, utilizing data on the characteristics of 15 mobile social network service (SNS) applications (apps) and estimation using a structural model combining generalized method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variable (IV) estimation as empirical methodology. According to the empirical results, app file size negatively affects SNS app demand, whereas the number of apps provided by an individual digital platform has a positive impact on consumer demand. Furthermore, we calculate the change of own- and cross-demand elasticity in response to changes in app characteristics. The results show a 1% increase in the number of apps provided by Facebook leads to an increase in the market share of firms in the Facebook group but a decrease in the market share of competitor apps. This indicates a tipping effect in the market for mobile SNS apps due to Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp. In addition, we compare the markups of 15 SNS apps before and after acquisition by using a simulation method. As a result, we find that apps in the Facebook group experienced more increase in markups following acquisition, relative to competitor apps. This implies that Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp harms competition in the market for mobile SNS apps.
   In conclusion, it may be difficult to determine whether firms’ abuse of market power and M&As are unlawful using the existing competition policies. Drawing upon this perspective, and the case studies and empirical results of our study, we derive the following policy implications. First, Korea’s competition authority should transition out of the current regulation paradigm and introduce new legal systems in cases where the dynamics of competition and innovation should be ensured. Second, if the authority cannot determine whether the anti-competitive impacts of a certain platform’s behavior are greater than pro-competitive impacts, it needs to use ex-post regulation instead of ex-ante regulation to promote innovation and increase efficiency. Third, the authority needs to increase personnel to respond to the increase in M&As of small- and medium-sized startups by large digital platforms. Fourth, the authority needs to find a regulation level optimal to establish an environment where competition and innovation can coexist, as innovation will drive growth under the digital economy. Finally, the authority has to apply flexible regulation measures to diverse M&A cases instead of unconditional non-approval of M&As, as small- and medium-sized startups often use M&As as their exit strategy.

   The Hallyu in India began around Manipur and other northeastern regions in the early 2000s. Until the early 2010s, interest in Korean cultural content in mainland India was low, and it was not treated as a mainstream culture. Recently, however, the Hallyu in India has been spreading around K-pop and K-drama. This study analyzed the background, level of popularity, and characteristics of the Hallyu in India and suggested some policy implications.
   Chapter 2 analyzes the characteristics of India’s audiovisual content markets. India is traditionally a country with a high preference for its own culture, but interest in various cultural content is increasing around the Millennial generation with income growth. Recently, as the digital platform has spread due to the influence of Covid-19, access to overseas content has naturally increased, which is an opportunity to expand interest in Korean music, dramas, movies, etc. In 2020, for example, major Indian satellite broadcasters opened channels exclusively for Korea, providing an opportunity for the Hallyu to expand to those who have not yet contacted online content.
   Chapter 3 and 4 analyzed the trend of the Hallyu in India, and the main results are as follows. First, the level of interest in K-drama is highest in India, followed by K-pop and K-movie. The distribution of Korean content is expanding through Netflix, Amazon Prime, and India’s own OTT (Over-The-Top). Meanwhile, K-pop is gaining popularity throughout India, with BTS at the center. The Hallyu, which began with K-drama and K-pop, has recently led to preference to K-beauty, food and Korean language learning.
   Second, India is significantly less interested in Hallyu than Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. What is special about K-pop and K-drama is that trends in Southeast Asia and India have tended to synchronize. This is related to the environment in which real-time spread of content through online has become possible, along with strengthening the competitiveness of Hallyu content.
   Third, while Korea’s flagship products and brands such as IT and home appliances are receiving widespread attention in India, brand awareness of cultural content such as BTS, which can be directly related to the formation of Korea’s national image, is relatively low. However, according to the annual survey of the Hallyu abroad conducted by the Korea International Cultural Exchange Promotion Agency, K-drama and K-pop are emerging as an important element constructing Korea’s country image in India. This shows that the Hallyu is beginning to be associated with the image of Korea among Indian people.
   Fourth, K-drama and K-pop are attracting attention in limited regions of India. The Hallyu in India is concentrated in seven northeastern states, followed by the southern region. In the rest of the region, the popularity of Hallyu is relatively not noticeable. However, according the Indian presses, it is believed that the Hallyu is now expanding throughout India. Seven northeastern states have low income levels, but are ethnically and culturally close to Korea. Pondicherry, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in the southern region are religiously and culturally open, with relatively high levels of income and education.
   Fifth, the long-term Hallyu trend in India since 2004 shows that the level of interest in the Hallyu is most noticeable as the spread of Covid-19 began. In particular, the number of K-drama-related reports in 2020 doubled from the previous year in India. This phenomenon is also seen in Southeast Asia, but is most prominent in India. By region, interest in Hallyu content after Covid-19 in seven northeastern states and southern regions is rapidly increasing. In the case of K-pop, interest tends to rise in Kerala and Delhi, which had relatively low interest in K-pop. Covid-19 made favorable condition for the spread of the Hallyu in India.
   Chapter 5 presents implications based on the above research. First, There is a need to expand Hallyu-linked cultural exchange projects in the southern part of India where the Hallyu has recently emerged, as well as in large cities such as Delhi and Mumbai. Tamil Nadu and Kerala have cultural industry backgrounds and could be a new hub for the Hallyu. In addition to K-drama and K-pop, we also needs to pay attention to K-beauty, which has high potential to expand the market regardless of India’s regional characteristics.
   Second, we need to expand Korean language education in India with the popularity of the Hallyu. Indian consumers cite linguistic factors as an important obstacle to Korean cultural content consumption. Since the spread of the Hallyu leads to demand for the Korean language, and the knowledge on the Korean language leads to interest in the Korea itself, Korean language education will be an important medium for maximizing the positive external effects of the Hallyu and improving Korea’s national brand.
   Third, it is necessary to utilize the Agreement on Cooperation in Audio-Visual Co-production signed between Korea and India in 2015. India signed audio-visual co-production agreements with 15 countries including Korea, and has jointly produced a number of films with France, Canada, etc. India has already remade a number of Korean films and is showing interest in K-drama, but there have been no cases of co-production of movies or dramas yet. Korean producers should consider what Indian consumers and producers expect from the joint production.
   Fourth, it is necessary to expand cooperation among cultural agencies. While the Korean Cultural Center in Dehli is the only institution in India, it is time to actively expand institutional-level cooperation in India.
   Fifth, regarding India, Korean government or agencies’ supports to link Hallyu to national brands are crucial. It is required to strengthen Korean companies (especially SMEs)’ marketing in India combined with Hallyu content. 

   Korea’s Free Trade Agreement with five Central American countries recently entered into force, creating substantial expectation that the Agreement would help both Parties facilitate and expand trade and investment, and thereby strengthening bilateral economic partnership. The Agreement has a comprehensive coverage from goods trade to services liberalization and investment to intellectual property rights, and even includes access to government procurement markets and a wide range of cooperation priorities. Especially, its conclusion drew substantial attentions because the Agreement marks fourth of its kind for Korea to create a free trade network with Parties from Latin American, next to Chile, Peru, and Colombia, among the 16 FTAs that the country has concluded.
   Against the backdrop, this study explores Korea-Central America FTA’s trade and investment implications. Especially, it analyzes prospective products and sectors in which bilateral trade and investment opportunities would increase, and suggests that Korean exporters and policymakers have to make stronger and continued efforts to realize the potential benefits accruing from the Agreement in those analyzed sectors and areas.
   To this end, the study is composed of three main analyses that incorporate implications for trade in goods, trade in services, and investment, respectively. Since the five Central American parties of the FTA, i.e. Costa Rica, El Salvadore, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, act individually, not collectively as a group or a customs union, the study includes a separate analysis for each of them.
   Chapter 2 examines recent trade and industrial developments and trends of the Central American parties. It also discusses their trade and FTA policies, including implementation of special economic zone or free trade zones. Major findings suggest that the Central American parties generally pursue trade liberalization, and have already concluded FTAs with various partners like US, EU, Mexico, Chile and other countries in the Latin American region as well as Taiwan, Singapore and China in Asia. Also, they show that some of the Parties - specially, Costa Rica and Panama – actively sought to attract foreign investments and participate in regional values chains, through which they have fostered open and relatively conclusive environment for investments. Nevertheless, Korea’s trade with the Parties prior to the FTA was relatively small, compared with its trade in other parts of the globe, and was even increasingly pushed away in local markets by growing competition with other suppliers like China and Japan.
   Chapter 3 analyzes prospective products in which Korea’s trade with the Central American parties would increase. To identify most relevant variables that would positively affect post-FTA trade growth, the analysis first examines cases of Korea’s FTA with Chile, Peru and Colombia. As a result, it finds that size and growth rate of the import market, and Korea’s export competitiveness generally led to trade increase in intensive margin in those previous cases. In addition, it finds that level of competition also plays important role for FTA’s trade effect, especially for trade expansion in extensive margin. Based on the clarification of relevant variables, the analysis further suggests most likely and desirable export items to each Central American market.
   Chapter 4 analyzes prospective sectors in which Korea’s services trade with the Central American parties would increase. To this end, it examines recent trends of services trade in each parties, compares levels of service market liberalization before and after the FTA, and explains important government policies for major services market liberalization. Based on the analysis of overall conditions and policy directions in major services market, the study further suggests that Korea has relative competence in public services, construction, AI education, digital government and online distribution services, among others.
   Chapter 5 analyzes investment opportunities in the Central American parties. The study explores recent trends of foreign direct investment in the five countries and discusses business environment, overall business capacity and development of investment protection under trade agreements. The analysis also finds that Korea’s investment in the region has been substantially low, which is likely to remain unchanged in the near future. Nevertheless, the FTA can help create better investment conditions in the long term, and Korea’s recent build-ups for investment and value chain formation in other parts of Latin American can positively contribute to fostering its extended investment in the Central American region.
   Overall, this study provides statistical and regulatory information of the five Central American parties of the Korea-Central America FTA. It also provides a longer-term perspective that exporters and policy-makers can consider in utilizing and implementing the FTA that recently entered into force. 

   In 1990, the socialist economic system of East Germany was incorporated into the “Social Market Economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft)” of West Germany, completing political, economic and social unification. The economic state of East Germany was in a more serious state than expected. With unification, East Germany’s GDP fell by more than 30%, and the unemployment rate rose sharply to over 15%, and in the late 1990s, the unemployment rate in East Germany drew near 20%. 
   During the time of unification in 1990, the economic gap between East and West was the biggest problem in the process of social and economic integration. Since the reunification, the German government has made various efforts to bridge the regional gap between East and West Germany. The income of East Germans has now reached 80% of West Germans, and the productivity of labor has steadily improved to 80% of the average of the West German workers. 30 years after reunification, Germany is now the largest economy in Europe and it has the world’s fourth highest nominal GDP.
   Despite these positive aspects, the income and productivity gaps between East and West are still widening, and the rate of economic convergence is falling significantly. Moreover, the bigger problem remains in that skilled or professional workers are moving to West Germany due to the fact that there are not enough attractive jobs in the East.
   The study aims to find whether the gap in economic power between the East and the West is decreasing and if the economies of East and West are converging in the process of economic integration. If the economies of the two regions have in fact converged, then it strives to discover the factors causing the convergence. It also intends to determine the remaining problems and challenges that exist to this day. In particular, by examining the factors that promoted the growth of the East German region and comparing them with the West German region, the study aims to provide policy implications for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. 

   This study has two main research objectives. First, the study evaluates the possibility of cooperation between Korea and China and proposes a number of cooperative projects, based on China’s cooperation with ASEAN, which is mainly strengthened through bilateral initiatives, particularly in the sustainable environment sector. Second, under the New Southern Policy, this study derives cooperation strategies for ASEAN in the field of environmental sustainability. Keeping the COVID-19 pandemic that is sweeping the entire world and the emerging security trend of prioritizing state sovereignty in mind, we actively seek to address human security concerns in major governmental policies, prioritizing human life and dignity. While the New Southern Policy puts an emphasis on humanity, the goal of a sustainable environment – which has a direct impact on human life – has not been properly established in the policy. As Korea’s past ASEAN policy was focused on economic profit and market acquisition, it is now crucial to build trust in the relationship with ASEAN through a human-centered approach, and to expand cooperation across broader areas. The outcome of this study will prepare measures to promote cooperation with ASEAN, which is an important component of the New Southern Policy
   The major content of this study is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 respectively analyze the overview and outcome of China-ASEAN environmental cooperation, and the overview and outcome of Korea-ASEAN environmental cooperation after 2010. Specifically, Chapter 2 describes China’s strategy with regard to environmental cooperation with ASEAN, and summarizes the overview of ASEAN cooperation and the major cooperation mechanisms. Based on these, this study identifies the outcomes and limitations of China-ASEAN environmental cooperation. The outcomes of China-ASEAN environ- mental cooperation include the launching and operation of the China- ASEAN Environmental Cooperation Center, reaching an agreement and adopting a policy concerning green development, operating the China-ASEAN Environmental Information Sharing Platform, establishing Lancang-Mekong Sustainable Infrastructure and Green Investment and Financing, and fostering active technological cooperation and human resources exchanges with ASEAN. Despite the above mentioned outcomes of China-ASEAN cooperation in the sustainable environment sector, there still remain a number of limitations in this cooperation. First of all, overseas projects based on the China’s Belt and Road Initiative follow low socio-environmental guidelines, or lack mandatory regulations. For these reasons, the lack of environmental consideration in the process of building the infrastructure has caused environmental pollution and destruction in the recipient countries, provoking the continued opposition of local communities. In addition to the complaints about environmental pollution and destruction, overseas projects are funded by Chinese capitals, laborers, companies. This does not bring much in the form of tangible benefits to the governments and nations involved in the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, resulting in a backlash among those recipient countries. In addition, there is a considerable gap between China and ASEAN countries in terms of their views on environmental sustainability, and China lacks the capacity to provide environmental assistance. In addition, the financial assistance required for performing ASEAN cooperation is insufficient in China.
   Chapter 3 presents an overview of Korea-ASEAN cooperation in the area of environmental sustainability, the major cooperation mechanisms, and ODA status in relation to the New Southern Policy. Based on this, it examines the outcomes and limitations of the current status of Korea- ASEAN environmental cooperation. The ROK government has been strengthening the cooperation with ASEAN by hosting 2019 ASEAN- Republic of KOREA Commemorative Summit. The ROK government are also currently operating the New Framework for the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund(2017-2020) and ASEAN-Korea Environmental Cooperation Project(AKECOP) across all ASEAN-Korea sectors including environmental cooperation. However, ASEAN-Korea Environmental Cooperation has limitations. For instance, this cooperation lacks strategies that integrate mid-term and long-term plans, and it is not implemented strategically from a mid-to–long-term perspective. In addition, the foundation for cooperation with individual ASEAN countries is relatively poor. The ASEAN cooperation tends to focus only on a few specific countries, including Vietnam. There are lack of consideration for mainstreaming environmental sustainability in the New Southern Policy.
   Based on this discussion, Chapter 4 presents a SWOT analysis on the current status of ASEAN-China environmental cooperation to explore implementation strategies for Korea-China cooperation and the New Southern Policy. On the basis of this analysis, this study proposes an implementation strategy for Korea-China cooperation and the New Southern Policy in the area of environmental sustainability. Some of the main strengths identify through the SWOT analysis for South Korea are; a favorable public opinion compared to China, ASEAN being our second-largest trade partner and our third-largest investment market (as of 2018), the establishment of the new ASEAN initiative, our active cooperation with ASEAN in the environmental sector, and the relatively richer ODA experience compared to China. The weaknesses are; the lack of organization and a mid-to-long-term plan for the ASEAN-Korea Environmental Cooperation, relatively smaller-scale assistance compared to China and Japan, the relatively poor channels with individual ASEAN countries and unbalanced cooperation and lack of consideration to mainstream environmental sustainability. Opportunity factors have been identified as; the emergence of production and consumption hubs as an alternative to the Chinese market, the agreement of Korea-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, continued efforts to integrate the ASEAN Economic and Social Community in the region, the government’s strong will for sustainable development following economic growth, and an increased preference for Korea owing to the Hallyu(Korean Wave). Finally, the threats are identified as; intensifying competition due to Chinese expansion to the ASEAN region, high political instability in certain countries, and the lack of governance capacity of ASEAN countries. Based on this SWOT analysis, the environmental sustainability sector for Korea-China cooperation would be the Smart Green City project that combines ICT-based environment and infrastructure. Furthermore, viable strategies under the New Southern Policy are; the human-centered human security approach along with economic consideration, discovering major cooperation priorities in the sustainable environment sector, mainstreaming environmental sustainability in the New Southern Policy, establishing a responsible organization and strategy for the ASEAN-Korea Environmental Cooperation, strengthening Korea’s soft power through environmental cooperation, increasing community awareness through bonding with civil society, and establishing a multilateral environmental cooperation system.
   The final chapter, Chapter 5, describes the main conclusion and limitations of this study. It is crucial to relate the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability with the New Southern Policy. When establishing an upgraded version of the New Southern Policy in the near future, it is necessary to integrate the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the New Southern Policy in order to mainstream environmental sustainability.
   Due to the unexpected outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, unfortunately, oversea field research was not possible. therefore, this study was conducted using only a review of the related literature and domestic expert seminars. In future studies, it is necessary to develop specific projects for all the member countries of the ASEAN cooperation, and to analyze the current status of ASEAN-Japan environmental cooperation.

 Executive Summary

 

 I. Introduction

 

 II. Progress of Financial Inclusion
 1. Achievements of Financial Inclusion
 2. Limitations of Financial Inclusion and Advent of Digital Inclusive Finance

 

 III. Fintech and Digital Financial Inclusion
 1. Definition of Fintech and Digital Economy
 2. The Impact of Fintech Development on Personal and Corporate Finance
 3. The Benefits and Costs of Fintech and Digital Financial Inclusion

 

 IV. Promotion of Digital Financial Inclusion in Asia
 1. Digital Financial Inclusion in Asian Countries
 2. Tentative Empirical Results on the Effects of Financial Inclusion
 3. Main Implications

 

 V. Conclusion

 

 References

 

 Appendix

   Since the 2008 global financial crisis, including the recent COVID 19 pandemic, low interest rates and low economic growth have continued around the world. In spite of this low interest rate trend, as the economic downturn prolongs, there is a situation of concern called the “new normal” of low interest rates and low economic growth, and low prices. In this new normal economic structure, the rapid progress of aging is increasing the necessity and desire for asset accumulation. In addition, digital finance such as Fin-tech with the evolution of the underlying technologies and the emergence of new technologies has replaced or improved many functions of existing finance in the advent of the 4th industrial revolution era.
   These changes are expected to bring benefits to the individual and corporate finance sectors, which have been subject to financial inclusion. On the other hand, digital finance, which is changing at such a rapid pace, may further isolate some individuals who were in the blind spot of finance, such as the elderly, and a support system for this is an issue that should be included in the policy of financial inclusion in each country.
   In this paper we find that Asian countries like other regions have achieved tangible results in financial inclusion while achieving financial deepening. When looking through various financial inclusion indicators such as holding accounts and loans, ATMs, and bank branches, the Asian region has achieved similar or superior performance to other regions. Compared to the income level, the growth of financial inclusion in Asia was found to be attributable to better performance in middle-income countries than in other similar regions. High-income countries in Asia are performing somewhat lower than similar peer groups in other regions, but this seems to be due to stagnation of growth. More seriously, financial inclusion in low-income countries in Asia is not appearing faster than in other income groups.
   In Asian countries there appears to be a wide variation in regional financial inclusion. However, Asian countries are expanding around the younger generation in the use of ICT technology that is helpful in spreading financial inclusion so if digital inclusive finance centered on Fintech is properly applied, Asian countries will become a new model for digital financial inclusion. However, since the gap in the use of Fintech in the region is large, how to fill this gap is being raised as an important policy task for each country as well as the whole region.
   We also tentatively examined the effects of financial inclusion and digital financial inclusion in the Asian region using the Asian country panel data collected from WDI and Global Findex data. Looking at the implications of the empirical analysis results even though it is very cautious to interpret the results of this analysis due to the lack of data of inclusive finance in Asia., first, the expansion of financial inclusion(such as ATM) in Asia seems to have some relationship with the reduction of poverty rates and income inequality which is measured with Gini coefficient. And the expansion of internet usage in Asia seems to have some relationship with the reduction of poverty rates and income inequality although we use it as the proxy variables instead of the digital financial inclusion variables. Lastly, the higher share of rural population which is used as a proxy for digital divide, which may occur due to the expansion of digital inclusive finance in Asia, has the potential to erode some of these achievements, but there is still a possibility that the expansion of inclusive finance will be effective.
   Despite the likelihood of success in digital inclusive finance in the future, digital divide spreads due to various gaps such as between urban and rural areas, between young and old, between low and high income, and between men and women, occurring in Asian countries and may worsen the performance of inclusive finance. Thus the governments in the region need to actively intervene to resolve these gaps. In addition, it is necessary to close the digital gaps that is occurring between countries through policy cooperation among APEC members.
   Considering the situation that the degree of development of Fintech in each member is expanding financial inclusion, it is necessary for Korean financial companies to set up an advancement strategy that focuses on the financially marginalized class based on the advanced system strategy of credit rating based on big data.
   Our analysis results will give some implications for the New Southern Policy. Personal and SME finance are very important business areas when financial companies currently enter the ASEAN region, and accurate analysis of each member' current status for Fintech or digital finance and financial inclusion should be given priority in terms of business expansion.

 

 Keywords: Fintech, Digital Finance, Financial Inclusion, Comparative Studies of Countries
 JEL Classification: O33, G19, G20, I31, O57

Введение 

Глава 1. Государственная политика РФ в области развития цифровых финансов 
1. Основные направления, цели, программа и приоритеты государственной политики цифровизации в финансовой сфере 
2. Система государственных мер по развитию цифровых финансов и обеспечению их безопасности 
3. Развитие электронного документооборота и облачных сервисов при взаимодействии государства и бизнеса 
4. Перспективы развития государственного регулирования в области цифровых финансов в России 
5. Обеспечение безопасности при развитии финансовых технологий
6. Перспективы развития цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 

Глава 2. Цифровизация общественных финансов 
1. Архитектура и функционирование Государственной интегрированной информационной системы управления общественными финансами «Электронный бюджет»
2. Цифровые финансы государственных внебюджетных фондов 
3. Перспективы развития цифровых общественных финансов 

Глава 3. Роль Банка России в развитии цифровых финансов 
1. Политика Банка России в области цифровых технологий 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в деятельности Банка России 
3. Регулирование цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 
4. Перспективы внедрения новых инициатив Банка России в области цифровых технологий  
5. Цифровые платформы Банка России (быстрые платежи, удаленной идентификации, маркетплейс, облачных сервисов) 

Глава 4. Рынок цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора 
1. Виды цифровых технологий для финансово-банковских организаций, представленные на рынке России и их основные поставщики 
2. Собственные разработки ИТ-подразделений крупнейших банков 
3. Опыт цифровизации деятельности в крупных банках 
4. Опыт цифровизации в мелких и средних банках 
5. Перспективы развития банковского цифрового бизнеса и развития рынка цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора

Глава 5. Цифровизация национальной платежной системы 
1. Архитектура, функционирование и управление рисками в Национальной платежной системе 
2. Развитие системы платежных карт «МИР» 
3. Развитие системы быстрых платежей 
4. Перспективы развития Национальной платежной системы России 

Глава 6. Цифровизация страховой деятельности 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия  участников страхового рынка 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в российских страховых компаниях 
3. Перспективы развития цифрового страхового бизнеса 

Глава 7. Цифровизация рынка ценных бумаг 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия на финансовом рынке  
2. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности торговых площадок 
3. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности профессиональных участников рынка ценны бумаг 

Глава 8. Домохозяйства в цифровой финансовой среде 
1. Формы и степень вовлеченности населения в цифровую финансовую среду 
2. Перспективы развития цифровых финансовых услуг для населения 
3. Состояние и перспективы развития цифровых небанковских платформ частного финансирования 

Глава 9. Перспективы развития финансовой цифровизации в  России 
1. Развитие цифровых платежных сервисов 
2. Развитие программ цифрового финансирования 
3. Развитие систем управления капиталом 
4. Развитие цифровых платформ на основе технологии распределенных реестров

Глава 10. Направления международного сотрудничества России в области цифровизации финансов 
1. Примеры международных проектов с участием России в области финансовой цифровизации 
2. Перспективы развития международных проектов России и Республики Корея по цифровизации финансов 

Заключение 

Использованная 

Список сокращений 

   Среди всех секторов экономики России наиболее быстрые темпы процессов цифровизации наблюдаются в финансовом секторе, представители которого ведут активную работу по внедрению цифровых технологий во все бизнес- процессы.
   Цель проведенного исследования - определение ключевых трендов цифровой трансформации финансовой системы России. В монографии представлена характеристика текущего состояния цифровизации финансов в России, а также обозначены перспективные траектории для дальнейшего углубления международной кооперации в данной области.
   В ходе исследования был сделан вывод о значимой роли государства и Банка России в сфере разработки и имплементации финансовых технологий. Государство активно переводит в цифровой формат собственные услуги, способствуя интеграции в этот сегмент цифровых финансовых решений, а Банк России выступает инициатором и координатором внедрения цифровых технологий на финансовых рынках, активно развивая цифровые платформы для усиления конкуренции и повышения доступности финансовых услуг. Все эти инновации потребовали приведения существующей нормативно- правовой базы в соответствие с вызовами цифровой экономики. Ход этих процессов всесторонне исследован в работе.
   Анализ процессов цифровизации банковской сферы показал, что крупные российские банки инвестируют значительные средства в цифровые технологии для того, чтобы удовлетворять растущие потребности клиентов и выдерживать высокий уровень конкуренции. Отмечено, что один из лидеров цифровизации в России - ПАО «Сбербанк» уже реализует ряд инициатив совместно с технологическими компаниями Республики Корея и нацелен на расширение взаимодействия с корейской стороной в целях разработки и совершенствования финансовых технологий. Данная успешная модель сотрудничества может быть взята на вооружение другими российскими кредитными организациями.
   В России успешно функционируют инновационные fintech- и insurtech- стартапы, некоторые из них могут быть интересны представителям Республики Корея. Кроме этого, целесообразным представляется также создание совместных площадок и акселерационных программ, объединяющих корейские и российские стартапы в сфере цифровых технологий и способствующих их взаимопроникновению на рынки обеих стран.
   Взаимодействие на уровне национальных финансовых регуляторов России и Республики Корея имеет первостепенное значение для проработки и обсуждения вопросов регулирования в сфере финтеха, а также противодействия угрозам в области информационной безопасности. Совместная работа Банка России и Комиссии по финансовым услугам (FSC) может быть организована в рамках «регуляторных песочниц» путем создания рабочих и консультационных групп.
   Авторы уверены, что объединение потенциала российской науки в области научных исследований и практического опыта южнокорейского бизнеса может также послужить дополнительным импульсом для ускорения процессов цифровизации в страховом секторе, прежде всего, за счет развития телемедицины и совместных стартапов.
   Среди других приоритетных направлений сотрудничества России и Кореи в монографии выделено также установление партнерства в сфере розничной торговли и онлайн-платежей. По мнению авторов, создание трансграничных торговых платформ, а также их интеграция с платежными сервисами позволит существенно увеличить товарооборот стран.
   Авторы изучили тенденции, характеризующиеся распространением финансовых технологий среди населения. Анализ ключевых индикаторов свидетельствует, что Россия по-прежнему уступает странам–лидерам в области цифровизации по степени вовлеченности домохозяйств в цифровую финансовую среду. В связи с этим для России важным направлением сотрудничества с Кореей является работа по совершенствованию инфраструктуры связи и распространению высокоскоростного интернета 5G по всей территории страны.
   Перспективно формирование единого международного финансового рынка, поддерживающего устойчивый информационный обмен, сопряжение регулирующих практик и финансовую безопасность. Выход иностранных эмитентов на российские биржевые площадки привел к настоящему буму среди частных инвесторов, проявивших значительный интерес к зарубежным ценным бумагам. Быстро развиваются и проекты допуска российских инвесторов к торговле криптовалютами на иностранных площадках.
   По итогам исследования авторы пришли к выводу, что потенциал расширения кооперации между Республикой Кореей и Российской Федерацией в сфере цифровизации финансовой системы весьма широк. Сближение накопленного опыта науки и практики России и Республики Корея является взаимовыгодным и, несомненно, будет способствовать ускорению и повышению эффективности цифровой трансформации в обеих странах.

Executive Summary   Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Data and Methodology 2.1. Data to Use 2.2. Landscape of APEC RTA from the database 2.3. Methodology: Text similarity as a measurement of RTA convergence Ⅲ. Analytical Findings 3.1. Overall trend of convergence 3.2. Who leads the convergence: Clustering aspects 3.3. Who leads the convergence: Development aspects Ⅳ. Further Analysis: convergence by chapters Ⅴ. Robustness Checks Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks References Appendix A. Lists of Key Variable Name B. Convergence of APEC RTAs by Chapters

In this paper, I suggest that text mining analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) can be a suitable methodology to develop a tangible measure of convergence between RTAs. By utilizing well-established text similarity concepts in related literatures, I attempt to investigate how much RTAs in APEC are converging in terms of how much similar RTA texts are. Furthermore, which areas of RTA converge more or less will be examined. The main results of the study are as follows. The RTAs signed by APEC members are gradually converging over time, and they converged (in terms of 5-gram Jaccard similarity) at an annual average of 8% for all RTAs (both inter- and intra-regional) while 9.7% for intra-regional RTAs only. The areas that converged the most are service and transparency chapters, which show 2.2 times and 1.6 times higher level of convergence than the average, respectively. The objective and intuitive indicators of regional norm convergence are expected to provide a common understanding for setting goals and strategies for regional economic integration in the future.