This report examines the impact of external shocks on cross-border capital flows and major macroeconomic variables, and analyzed the effects of economic stabilization policies on economic conditions. An open economy with free cross-border capital flows has achieved faster economic growth than a closed economy with similar resource endowments, thanks to a more sophisticated financial system and robust macroeconomic institutions and policies. However, it is well known that building a sophisticated financial system by opening capital markets has the advantage of promoting economic growth, but it also increases the risk of economic crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999) confirmed that in 18 out of 26 banking crisis episodes that occurred from 1970 to 2000, the financial markets of the respective countries had been opened within five years prior to the onset of the crisis. As the freedom of cross-border capital movement increases, large-scale capital flows into fast -growing countries in pursuit of higher investment returns, leading to an increase in asset prices and triggering credit expansion.

Ultimately, large capital inflows can lead to the overvaluation of a country's currency, increase the current account deficit, and increase the likelihood of a “sudden stop” economic crisis. Reinhart (2012) reports that the precursors of financial crises are large capital inflows accompanied by rapid increases in stock prices, surges in real estate prices, -shaped economic growth rates, and a sharp increases in debt levels. In other words, excessive capital inflows stimulate lending, boost asset prices, and increase debt in both the private and public sectors. Therefore, cross-border capital flows play a positive role in activating investment for economic growth but, at the same time, can transmit shocks in the external economy, causing spillovers and increasing macroeconomic volatility.

This report aims to reassess the issue of cross-border capital flows in the era of uncertainty, as the global economy faces the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in March 2020, the global economy has entered an era of uncertainty. With the pandemic declared and the infectious disease crisis reaching its peak, countries around the world implemented economic lockdowns to curb the spread of the coronavirus, which lacked treatment and vaccines. As a result, the infectious disease crisis translated into an economic crisis, leading to a rapid contraction in economic activity. In response, governments worldwide implemented unprecedented fiscal stimulus measures, and central banks eased financial conditions through interest rate cuts and quantitative easing, providing substantial liquidity to the markets. In April 2020, the United States implemented a $3 trillion stimulus package, and the Federal Reserve cut the benchmark interest rate to 0% in March 2020. The Federal Reserve embarked on an unprecedented asset purchase program (quantitative easing), purchasing not only Treasury bonds but also municipal bonds, corporate bonds, junk bonds, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Even Japan, which has the highest government debt-to-GDP ratio, announced a stimulus package of 108 trillion yen, equivalent to 20% of the GDP, in April 2020. Similarly, the European Union has prepared stimulus packages of between 10% and 20% of GDP for its member countries. As a result of these fiscal spending and quantitative easing, massive liquidity flowed into the asset markets of each country. This created an imbalance where asset prices rose, while the real economy stagnated. Moreover, a much larger amount of funds flowed into the asset markets of emerging economies compared to the global financial crisis in 2008 and the taper tantrum in 2013. These financial imbalances deepened the concerns of policymakers regarding global inflation and rising interest rates in 2022, complicating efforts to maintain financial market stability.

Cross-border capital flows are an important channel for the cross-border transmission of international risks. Sudden capital movements under external shocks, trigger systemic risks domestically, increasing the likelihood of a financial crisis. In the current context, trends such as the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Russia-Ukraine situation, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the strengthening of protectionism and nationalistic tendencies are causing the international regime of trade norms and financial infrastructure to be weaponized as sanction tools. This trend towards deglobalization adds greater uncertainty to the ripple effects of cross-border capital movements between nations. Accordingly, this paper aims to assess the major external shocks and policy responses, as well as the status of cross-border capital flows, in the aftermath of the pandemic crisis. It also seeks to re-examine the impact of uncertainty on cross-border capital movements. Additionally, it aims to derive policy implications using key models from the Integrated Policy Framework currently being implemented by the International Monetary Fund.

This report consists of five chapters, including an introduction in Chapter 1 and a conclusion in Chapter 5. Chapter 2 discusses the major external shocks that occurred after the 2020 pandemic crisis, outlining patterns of capital inflows and outflows and policy issues arising from them. Initially, during the 2020 pandemic crisis, the global economy contracted by -2.8%, indicating a more severe economic downturn than the -0.1% contraction during the global financial crisis in 2009. In 2009, China initiated large-scale infrastructure investment, driving global economic activity and propelling the economic recovery in commodity-exporting countries. India also recorded a strong growth rate of 8.5% in 2009, contributing to the rapid recovery of emerging economies with high trade dependence on China and India. However, in the 2020 pandemic crisis, not only advanced economies but also emerging economies experienced severe economic downturns. During the peak of the COVID-19 crisis in March and April 2020, significant capital outflows occurred in emerging economies, recording a scale more than three times larger than the capital outflows during the tightening period in 2013.

As volatility in cross-border capital flows increased to unprecedented levels, the stability in exchange rates and financial markets in emerging economies became a crucial issue. Emerging economies that adopted a floating exchange rate regimes showed more flexible current account adjustments and a faster economic recovery than those that adopted fixed exchange rates pegged to the U.S. dollar. Despite foreign capital outflows during the pandemic crisis, the U.S. Treasury market maintained its safe haven status, benefiting from the Federal Reserve’s extensive quantitative easing measures.

In contrast, emerging economies faced challenges as their currency values depreciated, and bond yields rose, making it difficult for them to implement quantitative easing measures similar to the United States. In these countries, the issuance of bonds for fiscal spending led to high bond yields due to concerns about sovereign default risks. To lower bond yields, central banks would have to issue new currency to buy bonds, but this process could further depreciate the value of the currency in emerging economies, increasing the potential for inflation and foreign exchange crises.

Therefore, there is a significant difference in policy space between advanced and emerging economies in terms of quantitative easing. Moreover, the large amount of liquidity injected into the market through extensive fiscal spending and quantitative easing, and the resumption of economic activity from the second half of 2020, translated into delayed supply due to disruptions in value chains. This, in turn, resulted in supply delays, increased production costs, and price hikes for production factors and goods, as demand quickly recovered but supply struggled to catch up.

This indicated the deepening global inflation in 2022, eventually serving as the tipping point for a rapid shift in monetary policy toward interest rate hikes. Concerns about the fiscal room for maneuver of countries worldwide increased as public debt sharply rose in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

Since 2014, there has been a steady decline in government bond yields among major economies, leading to the belief that economic stabilization through government debt would be possible. However, the key question was, to what extent private demand absorbed the government bonds supplied to the market.

In the year 2020, the United States and Canada, where government debt relative to GDP increased the most, saw more than 40% of the government bonds were absorbed by private demand. However, in European countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and others, the majority of government debt has been absorbed by central bank quantitative easing. This indicates that the fiscal space for these European countries should be considered limited.

Chapter 3 empirically analyzes the effects of uncertainty shocks on capital flows and macroeconomic variables. Panel regression analysis results show that an increase in the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (GEPU) decreases total capital inflows relative to GDP, but the Country-specific Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (CEPU) did not yield a statistically significant relationship with capital flows. This suggests that fluctuations in capital inflows are more closely related to external factors rather than domestic uncertainty factors.

Subsequently, a panel VAR analysis was conducted on three external shocks: global uncertainty, US policy interest rates, and international oil prices. The results showed that a one-unit increase in economic policy uncertainty led to a 0.1 percentage point rise in short-term interest rates, a 0.08 percentage point decrease in stock market indices lasting over 7 months, and a 0.1 percentage point decrease in fund inflows relative to quarterly GDP, recovering after 3 months.

When US interest rates increased by one unit, individual countries’ short-term interest rates rose by 0.1 percentage points, with a lasting effect. Stock market indices fell by 0.013 percentage points in the short term, and capital inflows decreased by 0.03 percentage points relative to quarterly GDP. Oil price shocks had a very limited impact on capital flows compared to other external shocks.

Analyzing the effects of global economic policy uncertainty (GEPU) shocks separately for developed and emerging countries revealed that interest rates slightly decreased in developed countries in response to uncertainty shocks, while no statistically significant results were found for emerging countries. In the short term, developed countries' stock market indices fell by 0.1 percentage points, and fund inflows decreased by 0.3 percentage points relative to quarterly GDP.

High-debt countries showed a statistically significant decline in industrial production in response to global economic policy uncertainty shocks, and relatively larger decreases in stock market indices and nominal currency values. Lastly, countries with higher degrees of financial openness experienced greater capital outflows following global uncertainty shocks.

In Chapter 4, we investigated the economic fluctuations resulting from the overseas interest rate hike shock through the integrated policy framework of the IMF and compared the effects of economic stabilization policies. The impact of the overseas interest rate hike on economic fluctuations differed significantly between emerging small open economies and advanced small open economies, especially in terms of inflation volatility. While in advanced countries inflation remained stable even in the presence of external shocks, significant inflation occurred in emerging economies. Thus, in advanced countries, the decline in overseas export demand led to a reduction in output, prompting a policy rate cut for economic stimulus. In contrast, in emerging economies, it was observed that, to achieve price stability rather than counteracting output decline, interest rates were increased. Furthermore, when foreign exchange market interventions and capital flow management policies were combined with monetary policy, the stabilizing effects on the economy were more pronounced in emerging countries. Particularly, it was found that foreign exchange market intervention policies, when limiting the rise of the real exchange rate to the same extent as capital flow management policies, enhanced macroeconomic stability more than capital flow management policies alone.

Countries with positive net external assets experienced a relatively limited appreciation of the exchange rate in response to the interest rate hike abroad. Consequently, the cost of imported intermediate goods did not increase significantly, resulting in a smaller output contraction than in countries with a balanced external asset position. The results of the policy experiment indicate that in the case of countries with positive net external assets, when foreign exchange market interventions and capital flow management policies were combined with monetary policy, the volatility of output stabilized. However, there was an observed increase in the volatility of consumption and trade balances. It was noted that, with exchange rate stability, the price fluctuations of imported intermediate goods were reduced, which consequently reduced the amplitude of output fluctuations. Nevertheless, the increased volatility of consumption and trade balances is attributed to the direct impact of financial transactions in the international financial markets. This impact is influenced by foreign exchange market interventions and capital flow management, ultimately leading to a higher amplitude of economic fluctuations.

Discussions to establish common rules for digital trade and to enhance cooperation in the digital economy are taking place on various platforms. At the multilateral level, WTO e-commerce negotiations are in progress, and at the bilateral level, e-commerce chapters of regional trade agreements are being revised. South Korea is also expanding its digital trade network by promoting a number of digital trade agreements. Digital trade rules introduced by digital trade agreements are expected to have an economic impact via multiple channels. Digital trade rules have the potential to facilitate digital trade by reducing trade barriers, leading to overall trade expansion. Expanding trade not only boosts production through increased imports and exports, but can also increase productivity through the spillover of new technologies and increased competition. As the digital trade network expands, the need to analyze the economic impact of digital trade agreements also grows. In recognition of these developments, this study quantitatively analyzes the economic effects of digital trade agreements through a general equilibrium model. We first identify the key digital trade rules in digital trade agreements and estimate how much they reduce trade barriers. Then we build a general equilibrium model that includes the characteristics of the digital economy to analyze the macroeconomic impacts of introducing digital trade rules.

This study largely consists of five parts. In Chapter 2, we explore digital trade barriers, such as policy restrictions and technology barriers that can limit digital trade between countries and review the key provisions in digital trade agreements in order to mitigate the barriers. While there are still no explicit rules at the multilateral level such as the WTO, except for a moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, digital trade rules in RTAs have become more comprehensive over time and the level of liberalization is increasing. In addition, Digital Economy Agreements have emerged that contain provisions for cooperation in areas such as SMEs, AI, and fintech.

In Chapter 3, we analyze the impact of digital trade rules on trade costs and trade barriers. In particular, we examine the impact on trade barriers, an exogenous variable, instead of the impact on trade, an endogenous variable. This choice was valid because this study analyzes the impact of digital trade rules through a general equilibrium model in the next chapter. We analyze the impact of digital trade rules on importer trade cost as well as bilateral trade cost because digital trade rules may have non-discriminatory effects on all trading partners through changes in domestic law and institutions. Our analysis shows that provisions such as consumer protection, data flow, and data localization measures have a significant negative impact on trade costs. In particular, provisions about data flow reduce trade costs in most service industries. However, it is possible that effects that would have been observed if the data were more disaggregated by country or industry are estimated to be statistically insignificant. For the sake of consistency with the general equilibrium analysis, this analysis uses ADB MRIO data, which contains only 35 industries in 60 countries/regions. In particular, ADB MRIO mainly contains data in major countries which have multiple agreements, making it difficult to estimate the impact of specific provisions of the digital trade agreement with statistical significance.

In Chapter 4, we build a theoretical model as a framework for analyzing the macroeconomic impact of digital trade rules. Based on Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Antras and Chor (2018), we model multi-country, multi-industry production and trade in the same way as previous literature, but with household decision-making reflecting the characteristics of the data economy. In the model, data is generated from the household's consumption, and as more data is generated, households experience disutility due to concerns about data leakage and abuse. Household decisions are made considering data generation and externalities. Then we simulate the impact of WTO e-commerce negotiation with this model and the estimation results in Chapter 3. The analysis scenarios are as follows: i) a low level agreement that includes only e-commerce facilitation and consumer protection-related provisions; ii) a high level agreement that includes privacy, source code, and data-related provisions as well; and iii) a separate high level agreement between only a few countries, including South Korea, given that the withdrawal of the U.S. proposal has made high-level agreements under the WTO more difficult. If the WTO e-commerce negotiations are concluded at a low level, our results show positive trade effects and welfare effects for the participating countries. On the other hand, non-participating countries lose both exports and imports, reducing their share of world trade. Trade and welfare effects in scenario 2 are greater than those in scenario 1. It is worth noting that non-participating countries also experience minor increases in exports, imports, and welfare. This is likely due to the fact that digital trade rules lower trade costs for all trading partners through improvements in domestic laws and institutions. In the case of a separate agreement between countries that support the adoption of high-level digital trade rules, the difference in economic impact between the participating and non-participating countries is clear, as in scenario 1.

In Chapter 5, we build a growth model of the dynamic data economy and analyze the economic effects on growth from a general equilibrium perspective when domestic data regulations are improved by the introduction of digital trade rules. We consider the impact on companies utilizing data in final goods, intermediate goods, and R&D sectors as well as on consumers due to privacy violations and abuse of data in the long run. The changes in domestic data regulation due to the digital trade rule are assumed to affect stock and accessibility of raw data. Domestic regulatory changes that increase data volumes or improve data accessibility due to the adoption of digital trade rules - coupled with changes in the share of labor in the final goods, intermediate goods, and R&D sectors, as well as changes in the growth rates of industrial and R&D data - will lead to higher economic (and technological) growth through increased data utilization. The model shows that even in the absence of regulatory changes that increase data volumes sufficiently, if the digital trade rule leads to regulatory changes that improve data accessibility, consumer welfare will increase.

In Chapter 6, we explore the application of the methodology proposed above in policy formulation and implementation. The analytical methodology presented in this report is expected to contribute to improving the ex ante and ex post evaluation of digital trade agreements. A wider range of scenarios can be considered when ex ante assessing digital trade agreements using the estimation results in Chapter 3. More rigorous analyses and comprehensive assessments of domestic economy-wide impacts could also be conducted, after negotiations have been concluded. Once it is determined which provisions are included in the agreement, a quantitative analysis can be conducted by considering how much trade cost will be reduced due to each provision. Finally, we also analyze the economic impact of different types of digital trade agreements with different countries, or groups of countries, to identify potential negotiating partners for a digital trade agreement.

The Ukrainian War has dealt a severe blow to the global order, which has yet to recover from the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the resulting changes are becoming irreversible. Changes that were already underway before the war are accelerating in an amplified form during the conflict. The Ukrainian War marks the end of the 30-year post-Cold War, post- globalization era . Over the next 3 to 5 years, the results of the restructuring of the global order will reveal its true nature. It is predicted that rather than a recovery of the old order or the emergence and solidification of a new order, it will be difficult to establish a single global order, and various orders will coexist, inevitably leading to ongoing power struggles. In other words, the global order will essentially evolve into a world of multiple orders.

The competition between the superpowers over the security and military sector is expected to be a fundamental factor in determining the nature of the order after the end of the post-Cold War order. A fierce confrontation is expected in the security sector as a whole after the Ukrainian War. The basis of the Biden administration’s China strategy is to strengthen international solidarity for the defense of the rules and norms order through the recovery of international leadership. The responses of adversaries to this US-led framework, such as Russia and China, are also strong. The Ukrainian War is likely to cause significant changes in the global military order and poses a multifaceted threat to the nuclear non-proliferation order. The Ukrainian War will also intensify traditional arms race among the superpowers and increase military tensions.

The United Nations and other international organizations have been criticized for not being able to function effectively due to conflicts between the US, China, and Russia. However, despite the criticism of the weak influence in the international community and the fatal institutional flaw of not being able to effectively respond to agendas where the permanent members are in conflict, the expectation of the UN to respond to global conflicts and crises is still high. In the international economic institutions and systems, there is a competition between the US-led forces and the forces led by China and Russia, but it is difficult to say that one side has the upper hand.

The war in Ukrainian further plunged the international economy, which had not yet overcome the shock of COVID-19, into a recessionary crisis and caused disruptions in the supply of goods and services, including food and energy. The economic interdependence, such as the value chain, which was maintained under the overwhelming economic logic of the post-Cold War era, showssigns of being reorganized into a form of supply network centered on one’s own country or trade and economic bloc formation centered on allies and friendly countries according to the security logic. Of course, this does not mean that the phenomenon of de-globalization, the formation of separated blocs and the fragmentation of the economic order means the complete collapse of globalization and the emergence of a new economic order, but for the time being, the phase where the logic of security is reflected in the overall economic relations between countries and the tendencies of economic protectionism are strengthened is expected to continue.

It is not easy to declare the end of the post-Cold War order in digital governance. This is because digital governance corresponds to a very wide range and layers, and the wide range of these issues makes it difficult to define as one single order. Rather, it can be said that each subfield has different characteristics. Looking at these areas before and after the Ukrainian War, it is difficult to say that there has been a clear change in direction. The Ukrainian War is accelerating various order transitions triggered by the US-China strategic competition, such as the decline of the liberal international order and the rise of the bloc order, the decline of free trade and the rise of protectionism, the rise of nation-centered industrial policy and technological nationalism. At the same time, there are growing concerns about the emergence of an unstable bipolar order and a new Cold-War style order . Moreover, as the two central orders, led by the US and China, are being established, a complex pattern is unfolding in which the center is deviating and multiconnectedness outside the center is strengthening.

Due to the conflict between the US and China before and after the Ukrainian War, the pattern of hegemonic competition is intensifying, and the field of climate change is an area that needs to be addressed through multilateral international cooperation as an issue related to the global commons, so there is a high possibility of deepening confrontation and obstacles to cooperation. Discussions on major cooperation agendas are currently underway as scheduled, but the situation is latent with the possibility of conflict and suspension of cooperation.

The transition to a world of multiple orders poses a major challenge to Korea’s national policy as a whole. Korea needs to meticulously analyze the process of the order reorganization by field and area and find ways to maximize Korea’s national interests. It is necessary to minimize the costs caused by the change of order, seize new opportunities, and establish a status that can guarantee Korea’s national interests not only in the short term but also in the medium and long term. In addition, Korea should not only react to changes in the order, but also actively participate in the reorganization of the order and strive to shape the new order in a way that is compatible with Korea’s national interests.

It is very important to establish a multidimensional framework for analyzing how changes in one area will affect other areas. In the future, policy authorities should be able to respond effectively by comprehensively evaluating and forecasting the direction of changes occurring in different areas. The status secured in one area can have a positive effect on the formation of the order in another area. The bargaining chip in one area should be applied to other areas, and if the conditions unfavorable to Korea must be accepted, compensation should be demanded in other areas.

This report examines the status of U.S. semiconductor export controls and estimates their impact. We focus on two major areas of semiconductor export controls implemented by the Biden Administration: restrictions on certain semiconductor manufacturing facilities and AI chips.

In Chapter 2 reviews the history of U.S. semiconductor export controls, which progressively became stronger and broader in scope during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. In doing so, we confirmed that semiconductor export controls have become more frequent and in an effort to overcome the limitations of existing sanctions. Regarding export controls attempted by the Obama administration, American companies were able to circumvent them by assisting Chinese companies. The Trump and Biden administrations have closed such loopholes by expanding existing sanctions. The scope of the Trump administration’s sanctions against some companies, such as Huawei and SMIC, has been greatly expanded to include export controls targeting all of China under the Biden administration. Additionally, Chapter 2 reviews the concerns of various companies, associations, and organizations regarding these broader export controls and reviews key countries’ responses to the semiconductor supply chain.

In Chapter 3, we conducted an analysis of the semiconductor industry’s supply chain, encompassing equipment, materials, foundry, memory, and design sectors. For each sector, we scrutinized major companies and their relevance to semiconductor export controls, as well as the competitiveness of China’s semiconductor industry. By reviewing various public announcements and company disclosures, we investigated the potential impact of export controls on individual companies, particularly in the areas of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, memory semiconductors, and semiconductor design. It became clear that Chinese semiconductor companies were rapidly improving their technical capabilities with substantial support from the Chinese government in all areas.

In Chapter 4, we delved into the repercussions of semiconductor export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI chips, the two main targets of export controls. Our analysis showed a statistically significant decline in China’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Furthermore, Korea’s exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which serve as a complement to American semiconductor manufacturing equipment, have also declined as a result of the impositionof semiconductor export controls. Additionally, the imposition of export controls on AI semiconductors could potentially lead to a modest decline in demand for high bandwidth memory (HBM). While the baseline estimate indicates a smaller decline in demand due to the export controls compared to the broader memory market, the long-term impact could be significant, depending on the evolution of future export control measures and the expansion of the AI semiconductor market.

In Chapter 5, we projected possible extensions of semiconductor export controls to encompass heterogeneous integration technology and next-generation power semiconductors. Furthermore, we also considered the possibility of broadening the scope of countries involved in semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In addition, this report outlines policy implications, including the need to ensure the competitiveness of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to establish alternative production facilities to mitigate risk exposure, and to enhance the competitiveness of fabless companies.

In general, negative discussions and impressions regarding outward FDI, such as capital outflows, job losses, leakage of trade secrets, and hollowingout of domestic industries, seem to dominate. The controversy, which focused on greenfield investments in the past, seems to be widely applied to recent mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Against this backdrop, the purposeof this report is twofold: first, to improve the understanding of how the increase in Korean firms’ FDI through M&As and related innovation activities in the U.S. market affects the performance of the investing Korean firms and their domestic affiliates; and second, to provide objective long-term policy directions on outward FDI and firms’ innovation activities based on the results found using firm-level data. The following results and findings in each chapter of this report are presented as follows.

On the theoretical side, based on the theoretical model developed by Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti (2018), Chapter 2 examines the mechanisms through which FDI can affect the incentives to innovate and the financial performance of investing firms. Market integration through M&As creates a scale effect and a competitive effect. The cost of innovation also plays a role in firms’ innovation incentives and financial performance. A spillover expected from knowledge sharing resulting from access to a new market is an additional channel. Regarding the scale effect, access to large, developed markets is one of the reasons why direct investment is a rational choice for a firm’s innovation. Large markets tend to have more intermediate resources to use and a larger pool of information to share. However, access to a new market through FDI can change the competitive structure that the investing companies face. Direct access to a foreign market creates higher expected profits if an investing firm’s innovation is successful. Still, if it is not, the firm may face stiffer competition or be forced out of the market. The degree of monopoly power is indeed the main factor determining the profits of successful innovations. However, the firm’s current profit only lasts until the next innovation occurs, and if there is no subsequentinnovation that is better than that the competitor’s, the company’s profit will decrease or it will be exited from the market. To survive, companies need to continuously invest and work on innovation. The spillover of technologies and the knowledge embedded in the R&D performed or in the patents filed as part of these efforts are another channel through which companies strive for better quality and innovation.

Based on the theoretical discussion, empirical analyses from two perspectives are conducted using firm-level data such as patent data from the USPTO, M&A data from Eikon, and the financial data of Korean firms from KED: changes in innovation activities (the number of new patent applications, the number of patents cited (backward citation), and the sum of patent applications and patents cited) and financial performance of the investing firms in the U.S. The analyses in Chapter 4 show that the innovation activities of Korean firms have improved statistically significantly after an M&A with a U.S. firm. The results show that the effect of an M&A on the number of backward citations is positive (statistically significant at the 5% level). In other words, the citations of Korean firms to innovations (patents) in the U.S. increased after the M&As compared to firms without successful M&As, confirming that M&As play a positive role in the utilization of innovations generated in the U.S. by Korean firms. We also find short-term improvements in an innovation outcome indicator of patents held by the merged firm after M&As. This suggests that the M&A investment in the U.S. by Korean firms has a positive effect on the innovation activities and innovation quality of the integrated firms.

Chapter 5 examines whether the acquisitions of U.S. patents by Korean firms affected the financial performance of their Korean parent firms (acquirers) and first-tier suppliers. The results show that the financial performance of the parent firms in terms of total sales and operating profits starts to improve two to four years after the U.S. patent acquisition. The longer the period of the patent acquisition, the better the financial performance, in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance. Specifically, an additional unit increase in the number of U.S. patent citations four to six years prior is associated with an average increase of KRW 4.3 billion in sales and KRW 1.5 billion in operating profits for Korean parent firms. It is important to note that most of the significant results come from acquirers in high-tech industries. For high-tech acquirers, U.S. patent quality, as measured by patent citations also improves the financial performance of the acquirer’s domestic first-tier suppliers. However, it appears that it takes an additional one to two years to be reflected in the subcontractors’ financial performance. Specifically, the total sales of a high-tech acquirer’s first-tier subcontractors began to show a significant positive relationship with the acquirer’s U.S. patent citation after three to five years and an even stronger positive relationship with U.S. patent acquisition after four to six years.

Asia’s infrastructure needs are estimated to exceed $1.7 trillion annually by at least 2030. However, the country’s or MDB’s financing is unlikely to meet even half of this demand. For this reason, PPP projects, which can leverage private capital to finance infrastructure development in emerging markets have become increasingly important internationally. In the case of Korea, it is also necessary to expand support for PPP projects in order to revitalize the participation of domestic companies in infrastructure development in recipient countries and to reduce the financial burden on recipient countries. To this end, it is necessary to leverage the expertise of the network of international financial institutions such as MDBs and DFIs to secure opportunities to enter regions where it is difficult to find direct business. In this study, we analyzed Korea’s PPP-related ODA policies and cases, as well as the PPP operation methods and cases of MDB, and derived MDB utilization plans centered on Korea’s PPP.

Chapter 2 examined how MDBs operate PPPs. Based on the analysis of PPP types, business structures, and stakeholders, the role of MDBs in the PPP business was analyzed in depth. This study examined the specific services that MDBs provide to create an enabling environment for PPP promotion and to build PPP capacity in developing countries, as well as how they participate directly in PPP projects through equity investments, loans, and guarantees to reduce credit and political risks are carried out. The analysis of the PPP operations of the MDBs, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank Group (WBG), provides some important lessons.

First, this report finds that the MDBs operate their PPP programs and specific projects based on exactly defined procedures and processes. More specifically, it is found out that the MDBs develop and operate PPP projects through five stages that can be divided into upstream and downstream stages. Therefore, it is one of most important recommendations of this study that the Korean government, related institutions and private companies interested in participating in the international PPP projects must pay policy attention to the entire project cycle of PPP programs, and not only to specific PPP projects tendered by the MDBs.

Second, this study recommends that the Korean government to more ativiely participate in the trust funds established by the MDB, such as the AP3F of the ADB and the GIF of the World Bank Group, as they often function as a vehicle for transferring relevant information on PPP projects. Countries that provides financial contribution to such trust funds can have a seat in the steering committee, where relevant information flows and important decisions are made. More active participation will lead to an increase in Korean voice and influence. After committing USD 5,000,000 to the AP3F in 2023, the Korean government is well advised to look into the possibility of financiallly contributing to the GIF, as well.

Third, the Korean government is recommended to make every possible effort to increase project influence by rapidly increasing the number of regular Korean staff in MDBs. Indeed, Korea is counted as a country with a comparatively large gap between the financial contributions and the number of regular staff of Korean nationality. It is also important to strengthen the human capacity and capabilities of the local offices of MDBs established in Korea, as they are the first point of contact for private-sector actors when interested in international PPP projects tendered by the MDBs.

Fourth, by establishing a ‘PPP Focal Point’, the effectiveness and efficiency of policy efforts to increase Korean companies’ participation in international PPP projects can be strengthened substantially. The PPP Focal Point, which can be established in cooperation with related public institutions such as the KIEP, the KOICA and the KOTRA, should serve as a center for gathering PPP-related information and for formulating operational strategies related to international PPP projects, with the ultimate goal of stimulating the private sector participaton.

Chapter 3 analyzes the cases of MDBs and PPPs in major donor countries. This study examined the current status of MDB and co-financing in public development cooperation projects, and analyzed the PPP cases of MDBs with a focus on climate change-related projects. Through the case studies of hydroelectric power, solar power generation, wind power generation, waste-to-energy, and green power transmission upgrades, the background and purpose of each project, business structure and financing, and business characteristics were analyzed. In addition, through the case of Proparco, a French development finance institution (DFI) that supported the biomass power plant in Ivory Coast, was used to analyze how a French company won the PPP project. The following implications derived from the analysis of the MDB PPP cases will help Korea derive ways to participate more effectively in MDB PPP projects.

First, the amount of private finance mobilized for blended development finance projects is steadily increasing. Most PPP development finance projects involving private finance are led by MDBs. In the future, the role of bilateral development finance institutions (US DFC, Proparco, BII, FMO etc) in mobilizing private finance is expected to increase.

Second, when an MDB leads a development finance project, the MDB assists the recipient country’s government in preparing a master plan and development plans for the project area well in adavance of the project. Based on this, the project structure, financing plan, and risk mitigation plan are derived. Korea’s aid and development cooperation agencies need to be involved from the pre- and early stages of project formation, which will help Korea’s private companies get more opportunities for project participation.

Third, in the World Bank Group’s Scaling Solar program, the one-stop package of advisory services, investment and guarantee played a decisive role in attracting private investment and securing favorable electricity rates. Korea’s aid agencies and development finance institutions could adopt the one-stop package approach and improve the performance of PPP projects in which they participate.

Fourth, bilateral development finance institutions in developed countries actively participate in PPP projects by providing loans to SPCs. Korea needs to strengthen the role of the EDPF and establish a bilateral development finance institution that will help Korea promote PPP projects and support Korean companies’ participation in SPCs and EPCs.

Chapter 4 focuses on the need for and support status of ODA through PPPs in Korea, the opportunities and limitations of co-financing with MDBs, and the cases of co-financing and PPP. We have examined the need to expand development finance in Korea and how the Economic Cooperation Fund (EDCF), the Economic Cooperation Fund (EDPF), and the Overseas Infrastructure Fund are being used to promote Korean companies’ participation in PPPs in developing countries. In addition, we introduced the government’s proposal to revitalize co-financing with MDBs and pointed out the limitations of this plan. In particular, the cases supported under the EDCF were comparatively analyzed by PPP type. The following implications can be drawn from the case of ODA using PPP in Korea.

First, private companies that want to use EDCF need to understand the EDCF process from a developing country perspective and consider introducing EDCF at an appropriate time. However, in Korea, most private companies contact EDCF at the financing stage. Therefore, companies need to consult with EDCF from the business discovery stage.

Second, to identify promising PPP projects that can be linked to the EDCF, information sharing and cooperation channels with relavent ministries and agencies need to be expanded.

Third, the EDCF-MDB cooperative financing system should be utilized to discover large-scale PPP projects. It is necessary to list up the candidate PPP projects that comprehensively consider the policy relevance and the possibility of Korean companies’ participation through annual consultations with MDBs. In addition, it is necessary to understand where the priorities of international organizations lie.

Fourth, cooperation channels with recipient countries should be strengthened by linking them to EDCF policy consultations. The mid- to long-term project pool should be expanded by actively identifying candidate PPP projects in recipient countries. To this end, it is necessary for the EDCF local office to identify the recipient country’s PPP policies and candidate projects and strengthen consultations with the recipient country’s aid ministry and PPP management office.

Fifth, as PPP projects have recently become larger and more specialized, there is a need to promote grant and aid cooperation to strengthen the capabilities of recipient countries. An F/S suitable for the PPP project needs to be supported by matching the grant agency’s own master plan (M/P) and business feasibility study with the EDCF F/S resources.

Sixth, risk management related to PPP needs to be strengthened. A proper preliminary assessment of risks at each stage and countermeasures must be prepared, and who will bear the burden for each risk must be determined in advance. In addition, efforts should be made to obtain coverage from MDBs for interest rate swaps, foreign exchange risk hedging, and political risks.

MDB’s participation in the PPP project can provide important opportunities in terms of resolving the accumulated deficit or creating new business for Korean public enterprises. Major public enterprises should form a task force and actively participate in international PPP projects, and the Korea Eximbank should also pursue business exploration beyond the simple business guarantee. Considering that the traditional powerhouses in the PPP field are global accounting firms and law firms, interest in the PPP projects they discover is also necessary. In addition, Korean companies do not yet have much experience participating in international PPP projects, so their expertise is not high. Therefore, it is necessary to train human resources to accumulate experience and secure expertise.

based on the policy implications of the MDB’s PPP operation (Chapter 2) and the implications of the MDB’s PPP case (Chapter 3) and Korea’s ODA case (Chapter 4), Chapter 5 presents the necessary policy recommendations are presented to expand MDB participation in PPP. In order to expand the participation of Korean companies in the MDB PPP project, it is necessary to actively review the following points.

First, it is necessary to establish a development finance institution (DFI). In our case, the problem of the fragmentation of concessional loans and grants has not yet been significantly improved, so we need to drastically change the governance of aid process in order to increase the effectiveness of aid. In addition to grant and concessional loan, various development finance instruments such as equity participation and guarantees should be organically utilized to increase participation in development projects of developing countries. In order to overcome the problem of fragmentation, increase opportunities for overseas infrastructure projects in large-scale developing countries, and revitalize participation in MDB projects, it is necessary to establish a Korean-style DFI.

Second, government support needs to be systematized. In our case, it is difficult to find a strategic direction because various ODA funds, such as the Development Cooperation Fund and the MDB Trust Fund, are being implemented individually, and as a result, ODA funds have not been used effectively to win MDB projects. We also need to systematize cooperation with MDBs through selection and focus.

Third, in order to expand participation in the MDB project, it is necessary to deepen the understanding of the MDB project and establish a long-term strategy for it. Instead of focusing only on the bidding participation stage to win the contract, it is necessary to collect information throughout the entire project cycle and identify key stakeholders for marketing. In addition, it is necessary to establish an informationsharing platform so that both private and public companies can accumulate and share the experience of failing to win business orders.

Fourth, we need to strengthen channels for sharing information with the private sector and enhance two-way communication. To this end, it is necessary to meaningfully increase the proportion of private sector entrepreneurs among the members of the International Development Cooperation Commission.

This research analyzes the economic impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy and explores measures to stabilize economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia. Even if the war between Russia and Ukraine are resolved in any manner, it is highly likely that Western sanctions on Russia may persist in the long term, given the difficulty in resolving deep-rooted traditional conflicts between Western ideologies and Russian ideologies. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a systematic analysis of the long-term impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy. Additionally, it is crucial not to passively observe a deterioration in economic cooperation between the two countries due to the sanctions. This is because the potential for economic cooperation between the two countries has not yet been fully realized, and expectations are high for a mutually beneficial collaboration through dense future economic cooperation. Consequently, exploring measures to stabilize economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia in the face of anticipated prolonged Russian sanctions is a highly meaningful undertaking.

For this purpose, this study comprehensively compares and analyzes the diverse characteristics of Western sanctions against Russia after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War with those imposed after the 2014 Crimean Peninsula crisis. While the 2014 sanctions primarily exhibited targeted and cautionary features in specific areas, the 2022 sanctions are characterized by an all-encompassing comprehensiveness and substantial punitive nature without sectoral limitations. Due to these contrasting features, the impact of the 2022 sanctions on key macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy was profoundly severe.

To rigorously analyze the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, this study employs Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) for time-series analysis as well as a new theoretical framework, extending and modifying a general macroeconomic model dealing with structural transformation to suit the economic conditions of Russia. Through this framework, the prolonged duration of the sanctions and their potential effects on Russian economic growth are systematically examined. Initially, we construct a comprehensive index measuring the overall intensity of the sanctions by categorizing the sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom from March 2014 to June 2023. The analysis considers a VAR model composed of the constructed sanction index, natural gas prices, industrial production index, export/import ratio, and real effective exchange rate. The results confirms the long-term impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy. In particular, VAR analysis reveals that the sanctions shock significantly contributed to a sharp decline in Russian industrial production, with the negative effects persisting over a year.

This study theoretically analyzes the long-term effects of the sanctions on the Russian economy from the perspective of structural transformation. Considering that the core elements of the sanctions include deepening financial constraints, restricting imports of intermediate goods crucial for advanced industrial development, and limiting technological cooperation, the study rigorously examines the potential impact on Russia’s economic structural transformation when financial friction intensifies and sectoral productivity declines due to the sanctions. To achieve this, a multi-sector growth model is constructed, accounting for varying productivity across sectors and the presence of financial friction. The theoretical analysis suggests that when financial friction intensifies, the productivity of high value-added sectors decreases, delaying the necessary industrial structural transformation for Russia’s long-term growth. Following the same logic, if technological advancement in high value-added sectors is hampered by the sanctions, resulting in delayed productivity improvement, structural transformation further delays. Consequently, by delaying a crucial structural transformation for Russia’s long-term growth, the sanctions may increase the risk of the Russian economy falling into what is commonly referred to as the middle-income trap.

If the long-term impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy is deemed significant, the Russian government recognizes the imperative to exert various domestic and international efforts to mitigate these adverse effects. Accordingly, this study examines the Federal Government of Russia’s external and internal strategies in response to the sanctions. Russia’s post-war external strategy, addressing changes in the existing external cooperation environment, revolves around countering threats to the national economy due to sanctions-induced economic and technological isolation. Within the structural shifts of the international order, Russia indicates its intention to strengthen efforts for survival and development, seeking diverse partnerships across various domains. Moreover, Russia has unveiled a post-war industrial development strategy focusing on high-value-added manufacturing sectors such as automotive, metal, microelectronics (semiconductors), and communication industries. In light of deepening credit constraints resulting from the financial sanctions, efficient restructuring in the financial sector is essential for successful industrial transformation toward high-value-added industries perhaps necessary for the qualitative growth. Therefore, Russia has announced a financial industry development strategy aimed at modernizing its domestic financial market. This study also examines this financial market development strategy.

Finally, based on the analysis presented earlier, we explore short-term and medium- to long-term directions for stabilizing economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia. Specifically, we consider the short-term scenario, assuming South Korea is in a situation where lifting sanctions against Russia is inevitable. We examine the directions for cooperation stabilization required in such circumstances. Additionally, we contemplate the directions for cooperation when South Korea can impose more flexible (relaxed) sanctions in the future.

The persistent global inequality crisis has long been a critical social issue due to its substantial economic and social cost. Despite continuous international efforts to mitigate inequality, the issue remains severe. The outbreak of COVID-19 and associated lockdown measures have further exacerbated inequality in various forms, including poverty rates, gender-based labor gaps, and educational gaps. Moreover, global inequality is expected to intensify further due to multiple post-pandemic crises like inflation, climate change, and conflicts.

This study analyzes the post-pandemic inequality levels in developing countries and derives policy implications for Korea’s development cooperation to help reduce inequality, especially in the education sector. Multidimensionality of inequality requires a comprehensive approach to understand the nature of inequality and its resolutions fully. However, paradoxically, because of the vast dimensions, the complexity of inequality cannot be fully explored in a single analysis, no matter how comprehensive it might be. Hence, this study thoroughly explores a single dimension of inequality—education. Education is one of three critical components of human capital, along with inherent abilities and skills, thus crucial in mitigating and preventing inequality. Because the pandemic led to an unprecedented global disruption in education, including prolonged school closures, analyzing its effect on the education sector is even more urgent.

Chapter 2 assesses the overall impact of COVID-19 on inequality, especially in the economic, health, and education dimensions, and global efforts to address the issue. The results suggest that both across- and within-country inequalities have worsened, with low-income countries or groups experiencing bigger negative impacts. Globally, numerous discussions on inequality acknowledge the severity of the issue and the urgency to solve it but fail to propose specific strategies or solutions.

Chapter 3 summarizes the role of education in mitigating inequality based on previous literature and uses macro-level data to explore the global education levels and gaps from 2010 to 2020. In the 2010s, education levels increased globally, and intra-country educational gaps narrowed. However, the pandemic triggered a sharp decline in education levels and widened educational gaps. Notably, students from low-income countries or rural areas participated less in learning activities during the pandemic school shutdowns, exacerbating the pre-existing educational disparities.

Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth micro-level analysis of the post- pandemic education levels and gaps in Ethiopia and Cambodia. Based on the two countries’ quantitative and qualitative analyses, the study finds that both countries experienced learning loss, with vulnerable households affected more. However, there were some differences across countries due to the economic, social, and cultural differences. For instance, with weaker institutional foundations in education, Ethiopia experienced quantitative educational loss, including a drop in school registration rates and learning activities. However, Cambodia, a higher-income country with stronger foundations than Ethiopia, faced challenges due to the low quality of education, including teachers’ capabilities to hold virtual classes. Meantime, most Cambodian students returned to schools when schools reopened after the lockdown.

Based on the analysis results, the study derives implications for inclusive recovery from COVID-19. Globally, supporting vulnerable groups affected by COVID-19 and multiple crises is critical while providing various quantitative and qualitative educational opportunities and incentives to compensate for learning gaps. As for the social role of education, incentives must be provided to students and teachers to regain their motivation to educate or learn and enhance parents’ awareness of education. At the same time, education policies that can protect students, especially vulnerable ones, should be implemented to reduce educational inequality. Strengthening financial and technical capacity to implement these measures is also essential. In addition, just as the two countries and urban and rural areas within each country show different patterns of educational disconnection and learning loss, recovery plans must be tailored to address the context-specific impact of the pandemic and the consequent new educational conditions. For example, in terms of education infrastructure, in low-income countries with poor educational environments, such as Ethiopia, there is an urgent need to restore basic education to make up for the loss of basic learning, and in countries with higher levels of infrastructure, such as Cambodia, reducing the digital gap is more important than basic learning. In other words, for countries like Cambodia, expanding the digital education base, such as building ICT education infrastructure and strengthening teachers’ digital capabilities, should be prioritized.

Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the analysis results and derives implications for Korea’s international development cooperation(IDC) in education based on the characteristics of Korea’s current IDC or ODA projects. The study finds that Korea’s ODA projects in education can be summarized into three characteristics. First, most ODA projects are materialistic support such as infrastructure and equipment provisions; second, the focus is on higher and vocational education rather than primary and secondary education; and third, there is little differentiation across countries. Combining the new post-pandemic educational environment in developing countries analyzed in earlier chapters and the characteristics of Korea’s ODA projects, Korea’s challenges in IDC in education can be summarized into three tasks. First, as the educational environment differs across countries, ODA projects should be customized for each context to be more effective. For example, as mentioned earlier, low-income countries need support to strengthen basic education, and middle-income countries with higher levels of infrastructure need support to expand digital education infrastructure and strengthen digital capacity. Training parents and teachers and providing high-quality educational content is also needed. The pandemic has deteriorated not only the quantity but also the quality of education. Therefore, the institutional education base and the social role of education must be strengthened to recover qualitatively by training human resources and producing high-quality teaching materials. In particular, as teachers’ low digital literacy and technological capacity led to educational loss during the pandemic school lockdown, training teachers to strengthen their technical capabilities should be prioritized to support the digitalization of education in developing countries with relatively higher infrastructure. Since Korea’s ODA projects already focus on vocational training, expanding vocational training projects for teachers can effectively achieve such goals. Lastly, support for vulnerable children, including girls, should be expanded. Currently, most of Korea’s ODA projects aim to improve a country’s overall educational environment. If the average education level of a country increases, it can contribute to alleviating inequality. However, a more proactive way to tackle inequality is to focus on vulnerable children and resolving the within-country education gap, especially because the study finds that the pandemic hit vulnerable students harder.

As the international environment rapidly changes due to developments such as the war in Ukraine and the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China, major countries are pursuing new forms of economic security policies such as reorganizing supply chains, fostering industries, and strengthening research security. The study aims to examine the threats and opportunity factors posed by economic security policies of the U.S., China, and the EU, particularly in the areas of supply chain and science and technology diplomacy, amid growing uncertainty in the economic security environment. It goes on to suggest countermeasures, focusing on items and technology areas that are expected to have a significant impact on Korea’s economic security.

Chapter 2 describes the geopolitical conflicts and changes in the international order over the past 30 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, focusing on the revival of competition between major powers due to China’s rise, the weaponization of interdependence and rise of “de-risking” strategies, and bloc formation and solidarity competition. In particular, while the international order that prevailed in the post-Cold War era for more than 30 years was characterized by global free trade and economic interdependence, the focus has now been placed on network reorganization to find and unite with more sustainable and reliable supply chain and economic exchange partners, since 2018 as the world experienced U.S.-China competition, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. In addition, the background and implications of supply chain stabilization policies were a government-led increase in industrial policies and trade threat measures, the weaponization of interdependence, and the effect of supply chain gateways. Finally, it was suggested that most countries faced changes in science and technology cooperation, pursuing diplomatic strategies based on their own interests and making fostering key emerging technologies a top priority for economic security.

In Chapter 3, supply chain policies of the United States, the EU, and China were analyzed, focusing on semiconductors, secondary batteries, and core minerals, and trade threats were examined. In the semiconductor field, both the U.S. Semiconductor and Science Act and the EU’s European Semiconductor Act are based on a multilateral export control system. However, despite cooperation in export controls through the decisions of a multilateral council, there is a possibility that competition for subsidies will intensify in the future as the EU and the United States prioritize the fostering of their own industries. China has not enacted a support law specifying semiconductors, but in order to cope with U.S. export regulations, it is continuing to promote support policies to create an ecosystem of semiconductor industries in China and strengthen innovation.

With the enactment of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022, the U.S. is pushing to foster the secondary battery industry within its borders, also introducing Section 13401, which stipulates the requirements for critical minerals and secondary battery components for tax credits related to eco-friendly vehicles. The clause is currently under discussion, for instance regarding the expansion of regional conditions for the mining and processing of critical minerals to countries with close economic cooperation relations with the U.S. and that have signed key mineral-related agreements through subsequent implementation guidelines (drafts), but the economic impact of detailed implementation measures is expected to increase as the scale of tax credits is expected to be implemented on a larger scale, contrary to estimates from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The EU is focusing its policy capabilities on attracting companies in the region, presenting the target ratio of manufacturing capacity in the region through the Climate Neutral Industry Act. In particular, while leading the establishment of a circular economy related to secondary batteries, it is rushing to support companies by easing subsidies for companies in the region through the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF). Since 2009, China has expanded demand and created an ecosystem for the secondary battery industry by distributing eco-friendly cars in China, and local Chinese companies are seeking to enter the global market with lithium iron phosphate (LFP) battery technology supported by the government from the beginning of the technology.

In the critical mineral sector, unlike semiconductors and secondary batteries, China is trying to control exports in some resources, such as rare earths, gallium and magnesium, which have international influence, but considering that China has also been converted into the largest consumer of critical minerals in the course of its economic development, China is unlikely to pursue a policy to weaponize critical minerals. However, the overlap in lists of critical minerals in each country, and the difficulty of diversifying supply chains due to the regional ubiquity of some minerals, could pose new trade threats.

When considering the above, caution is required in that China, the EU, and the United States are pursuing various industrial policies to stabilize the supply chain, with the possibility of this developing into a trade conflict between the EU and the United States in the future. In addition, the United States is considered to be the leading country in supply chain management. In particular, the United States collected opinions from various stakeholders by releasing a list of key supply chain items as part of follow-up measures to an executive order, and it is expected that a new policy will soon be implemented that contains the direction of supply chain management based on the final list. Since the items in these lists are likely to be managed as items related to economic security in major countries in the future, an import dependence analysis was conducted in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4 analyzes the science and technology foreign policies of major countries. Although cooperation between the United States and EU member states is actively conducted in areas of ICT technology which include nuclear power and cybersecurity and dual-purpose technology, cooperation between the EU and the United States and China in the area of technology has been reduced. In particular, the United States has been gradually expanding technological cooperation since 2021 through agreements in nuclear and space-related technologies with European countries, similar countries such as Korea and Japan, rather than with the countries of concern. In addition, through the Trade and Technology Commission (TTC) with the EU, it is pursuing a strategy to secure leadership in areas that are expected to have a significant impact in the future by promoting the enactment of international standards for artificial intelligence and genetic biotechnology.

We examined the current state of science and technology diplomacy being promoted by the EU through Horizon 2020, the EU’s international science and technology cooperation project. In terms of project implementation, 89.1% was executed by EU member states, 9.1% by quasi-member states, and 1.8% by third countries without quasi- member status. This demonstrates the importance of non-EU member states joining as quasi-member states for science and technology cooperation with the EU. The scale of science and technology cooperation between the EU and China through Horizon 2020 has been greatly reduced, but cooperation is still underway to address global issues such as climate change and pandemic response. China has also reduced its technological cooperation with the EU and the United States, but is conducting joint research with the United States to respond to climate change.

Taken together, we can see the trend of bloc formation proceeding in areas of cooperation in key technologies (AI, quantum computing, next-generation information communication, etc.) that the U.S., EU, and China are competitively fostering, while technological cooperation to solve global problems such as climate change and biodiversity is still being promoted between even the U.S. and China. In this regard, it is necessary to examine Korea’s technological influence in key technology areas where cooperation with similar countries is becoming increasingly important, strengthen domestic technological competitiveness, and seek cooperative countries in each field. Accordingly, by compiling the technological impact assessment indices of major countries, including Korea, in core technology fields, mid- to long-term cooperation partners necessary from the perspective of economic security were presented in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 analyzes Korea’s supply chain and its influence in key technology fields, focusing on the items and technology fields presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Supply chain analysis was conducted with the aim of identifying Korea’s supply chain problems by analyzing Korea’s dependence on imports from the world by item unit. When looking at the import dependence by selecting the items related to the economic security-related policies of major countries among Korea’s semiconductor imports, the amount of imports for the relevant items is gradually rising, while the proportion of total imports has decreased. Korea mainly imports the items from Japan and China, but its dependence on imports from a single country by item is mostly in the 60% range or less, and there are at least one alternative importing country. However, caution is required as the proportion of the items among Korea’s semiconductor imports is gradually increasing.

Korea’s imports of secondary battery items have been increasing rapidly in recent years, and the proportion of imports related to secondary battery materials and parts has increased. Among Korea’s secondary battery imports, the number and amount of items related to the economic security policies of major countries are increasing rapidly. In particular, Korea’s imports of these items are largely from China, and its dependence is also becoming more pronounced. Therefore, Korea needs to carefully examine the policies of major countries related to secondary batteries.

As a result of analyzing the indicators that evaluated the impact of key technologies, Korea was evaluated to have a greater technological impact in the energy, environment, and advanced information and communication fields than in others, but it was evaluated to have a lower impact in quantum-related technologies and detection and navigation technologies. In addition, six technology fields with low technological influence in Korea and large differences in influence between the top countries with high technological influence were selected among the core technology fields, and the need to strengthen domestic technological competitiveness and mid- to long-term cooperation targets was suggested from the perspective of economic security.

Chapter 6 summarizes Korea’s economic security policy, focusing on the designation of key technologies through legislation, promotion of supply chain stabilization, and the status of international cooperation. As policy implications, measures for economic security cooperation with major countries were suggested. First, as a cooperation plan with the United States, it was suggested to facilitate the movement of manpower in key areas, establishing a coordinating mechanism related to bilateral supply chains, together with cooperation in the development of critical minerals. Other suggestions were to participate in the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, concentrate capabilities in joining Horizon Europe as a quasi-member, and to re-establish relations with the EU by revising provisions on supply chain cooperation within the Korea-EU FTA. It was also suggested to promote cooperation through ODA, supply chain dialogue channels, and green transformation cooperation with developing countries (ASEAN, India, Mexico and China), which are important in Korea’s supply chain, in addition to developed countries. Other implications of the study to promote Korea’s economic security included: establishing a communication system between ministries to promote active economic security policy, promoting the supply of premium intermediate goods in the global supply chain, and promoting cooperation with key partner countries (Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, etc.) that comprehensively considers the supply chain and critical technology competitiveness.

This study defines the concept of ‘strategic ODA,’ which has recently gained attention, and proposes ways to improve the Korean ODA system to promote strategic ODA. Strategic ODA is defined based on a literature review of related academic fields. Elements for promoting strategic ODA are derived for different stages of the ODA process – planning, implementation, and performance management. Policy recommendations are drawn based on an evaluation of the Korean ODA system, an analysis of major donor countries, and interviews with international development cooperation experts from a strategic ODA perspective.

Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature in business administration, public administration, and political science to define the concepts of strategy and the term ‘strategic’. This study defines strategic ODA as “ODA as a means to achieve foreign policy goals, with differentiated competitiveness, and clear goals and action plans to achieve desired results.” An analytical framework for pursuing strategic ODA was derived to determine factors to consider at each stage of planning, implementation, and performance management. First, it is essential to have planning capabilities that encompass the vision, strategic goals, targets, and performance indicators. Coordination and cooperation between relevant ministries is a given. After that, it is necessary to decompose the strategic objectives into executable units, form the required organization, and establish a budget plan and periodic performance review process. For result management, the main elements are setting performance targets and indicators, and disclosing performance-related information.

Based on the strategic ODA concept and analytical framework developed in the previous chapter, chapter 3 presents case studies of the leading bilateral ODA donors for benchmarking. The United States implements the strategic ODA considerations proposed in this study throughout the planning, implementation, and performance management phases based on the principle of Managing for Results (MfR) framework. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a central role in ODA implementation, working closely with the Department of State. While Germany stands out as the only country among the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members with a ministry dedicated to international development cooperation, Germany’s development cooperation also involves a variety of actors, such as local governments and the private sector. Therefore, Germany invests incoordinating among implementing actors towards unified development cooperation goals. Japan’s ODA Charter explicitly states national interest as a goal, and this factor is considered in evaluating its ODA performance from a national interest or diplomatic perspective. In some cases, different ministries or agencies play specialized roles according to their development cooperation objectives. For example, FinDev, a Canadian development finance institution provides various instruments to support private sector development in developing countries, which also helps to promote the entry of Canadian companies into these markets. The Netherlands has a mechanism for international trade linkage that considers development cooperation and overseas expansion of Dutch companies. The Netherlands’ performance framework and information disclosure system are the most noteworthy among the donor countries we analyzed. Finally, as Denmark strives to consolidate its position as a leaderin the action against climate change, the country also shows coherency in development cooperation. It systematically strives for results by setting a specific strategy and allocating the budget accordingly.

Chapter 4 reviews Korea’s ODA system from the strategic ODA perspective. First, the chapter explains the legal and institutional system of Korea’s international development cooperation and then summarizes the implementation procedures of grant and concessional loan projects, respectively. Although Korea’s ODA system has improved since the enactment of the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation in 2010, there is still work to be done. In particular, to promote strategic ODA as defined in this study, further efforts are needed to better align ODA with foreign policy goals, promote competitiveness in the local context, and pursue systematic goals and action plans to achieve results. Based on the analysis of government policy documents and institutions, this chapter identifies areas for improvement for each phase of planning, implementation, and performance management. The Comprehensive Strategy, a top-level implementation strategy published every five years, should contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in the Framework Act. There are various levels of thematic or sector policies and strategies, national or regional strategies, which need to be complementary. International development cooperation policies should also be consistent with other relevant policies and strategies, such as the foreign policy and the national security strategy. The criteria for approving individual ODA projects should be clear, be transparent, and align with the overarching strategy. By ensuring that each project is aligned with the strategic objectives, the project would effectively achieve the intended results of the Korean government.

The case studies of the five donor countries provide valuable insights and lessons for Korea's strategic ODA implementation. By carefully examining the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s system, Korea can identify best practices and adapt them to its own context to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its ODA programs.

Chapter 5 presents the survey results on strategic ODA. The purpose of the survey was to verify the understanding of strategic ODA among the academics and practitioners in international development cooperation and to identify areas for improvement in promoting strategic ODA. The experts agreed that the planning phase most critical in promoting strategic ODA. However, under the current system, there is some question as to who is responsible for planning strategic ODA. There was a consensus that a unified approach involving more than 40 implementing ministries is urgently needed to implement strategic ODA in the planning stage. The experts also argued that it is essential to set clear targets for strategic ODA. At the same time, a regular performance management plan is needed to monitor the achievement of targets.

The study suggests the following to improve Korea’s strategic ODA system:


1. Deepen expert engagement in high-hevel decision-making:
Recognizing ODA as an essential instrument of economic cooperation abroad, expertise in international development cooperation should be integrated into national-level decision-making processes regarding foreign policy and economic partnerships. This integration can be achieved through designated positions within relevant top-level decision-making structures.

2. Improve the roles of the Committee on International Development Cooperation (CIDC):
Strengthen the CIDC’s capacity to develop unified development cooperation programs that are consistent with national foreign policy aspirations. This could include expanding its expertise to enable comprehensive program planning and coordination.

3. Prioritize resource allocation and streamline processes:
Allocate dedicated budgets to strategic ODA priority programs to ensure flexibility and agility in resource allocation. Consider alternative budgeting mechanisms that bypass traditional annual review processes for individual projects within a priority program while maintaining accountability and transparency.

4. Implement blended finance for greater impact:
Utilize a mix of financial instruments, including grants, concessional loans, and innovative development finance solutions, to maximize the effectiveness of strategic ODA programs.

5. Strengthen results monitoring and measurement:
Establish robust performance measurement frameworks for strategic ODA, using measurable indicators aligned with program objectives and overall ODA goals. Ensure that individual program targets are clearly defined, quantifiable, and contribute to the broader strategic vision.