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GVC and RVC of Latin America under the US-China Competition
Competition between the U.S. and China has intensified since the imposition of tariffs in 2018, and can be observed across various sectors. The competition between the U.S. and China, originating in the trade sector, is now expand..
Sungwoo Hong et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic security, economic cooperationDownloadContentSummary<Competition between the U.S. and China has intensified since the imposition of tariffs in 2018, and can be observed across various sectors. The competition between the U.S. and China, originating in the trade sector, is now expanding into areas such as technology, ideology, and supply chains. As globalization progresses and the global division of labor continues to evolve, the impact of U.S.-China competition becomes increasingly complex and widespread due to the naturally established global value chain involving various stakeholders. This study examines the current state of U.S.-China competition in Latin America and analyzes its effects on the global value chain of the region.Chapter 2 explores the different types of competition between the U.S. and China in Latin America. This is achieved by reviewing their investments in Latin America and public funds, as well as summarizing the recently announced U.S. initiatives in the region. The review shows that U.S. investment in Latin America and ODA aims to create forward links to the United States and China in the value chain of the region. Notably, while the U.S. has prioritized Official Development Assistance (ODA) through development cooperation agencies, China has focused on Other Official Flows (OOF) through state-run banks. However, the United States is likely to encourage private investment due to the limitations of securing ODA resources.In response to China’s initiatives in Latin America, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-CELAC Forum, the Biden administration announced a new cooperation initiative for the region. Besides the ongoing challenges of economic growth, poverty, anti- corruption, and rule of law in Latin America, the Biden administration’s initiative aims to promote leadership in the areas of environment, labor, and digital economy. Furthermore, the initiative highlights the differences between China’s cooperation efforts and the value- oriented approach promoted by the United States. It serves to check China’s influence, emphasize partnerships with major allies, international organizations, businesses, foundations, and civil society, and promote a multilateral approach.Chapter 3 examines the progress of U.S.-China competition in Latin America’s manufacturing and mineral resources sectors, which are key areas of contention between the two countries. The U.S. has taken steps to strengthen support for nearshoring in Latin America through bills, such as the Latin American Nearshoring Act (H.R.7579) and reshoring, which presents an opportunity for the region to become a major production location. However, in the manufacturing sector, it appears that there is no specific industrial policy in place for Latin American countries to leverage the U.S.-China competition to their advantage. The competition between the United States and China in the mining sector should be viewed in the context of the electric vehicle supply chain. Ultimately, the U.S. aims to establish domestic production for all stages of the electric vehicle supply chain, from mining core minerals like lithium to manufacturing finished cars. However, given the short-term impracticality of commercial lithium production in the United States, the U.S. plans to source it from a third country or one that has signed an FTA with the United States rather than from China. On the other hand, China is moving towards vertical integration, starting from raw material production such as lithium, and moving towards battery production, even in third countries like Latin America.Chapter 4 examines the level of forward and backward linkages of major Latin American countries using the export value-added decomposition methodology developed in previous researches. It also analyzes the formation of the value chains in Latin American countries and the impact of U.S.-China competition on them. As a result of the analysis, first, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have emerged as hubs in Latin America, and regional integration in Latin America has improved in terms of forward links. Second, it is noteworthy that during the U.S.-China competition, the proportion of intermediate goods from Latin America used for China’s exports to third countries increased. On the other hand, the fact that the proportion of Mexican intermediate goods included in U.S. exports has decreased slightly suggests that active incentives, such as investment incentives, must be supported in Mexico to turn the U.S.-China competition into an opportunity factor, such as near-shoring in Mexico. Third, the proportion of foreign value added included in Brazil and Chile’s exports to China increased. This result can be interpreted as the expansion of the input of intermediate goods from other countries, including China. Fourth, except for Guatemala, the proportion of foreign value added inherent in exports to the United States has increased in major Latin American countries, indicating that major Latin American countries have strengthened their backward linkages with the United States. In particular, it is noteworthy that the value added of the U.S. in exports to the U.S. by major Latin American countries has increased slightly. This supports the fact that U.S. companies attempted near-shoring to some Latin American countries during the intensifying competition between the U.S. and China, or that U.S. investment in Latin America increased slightly. Therefore, like China, the U.S. still remains an important partner for Latin American countries by forming a value chain with Latin American countries amid the intensifying competition between the U.S. and China. Finally, the value chains of Latin America and the United States are highly linked forward across various industrial sectors in Latin America, whereas the value chains of Latin America and China are primarily formed in the mining sector. Moreover, as the competition between the U.S. and China intensified, the value chain between Latin America and the U.S. has become more consolidated in various industries, while the value chain between Latin America and China has somewhat weakened around mining.Chapter 5 presents implications based on the research results. The fact that Latin American countries, including Mexico, are mentioned as candidates for near-shoring for U.S. companies, suggests that Korean companies seeking to enter North America or increase their market share in North America need to watch changes in Latin America more closely than in the past. In particular, due to the enactment of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), it is necessary to pay attention to Latin American countries that have signed FTAs with the U.S. or so-called like-minded countries that pursue common values. Mexico and Brazil, with high backward links in U.S. trade, are base countries for entering or incorporating supply chains centered on North America.Since 2013, the Korean government’s support for overseas resource development has declined, while Japanese and Chinese companies have continued their active overseas resource development with support from their respective governments. While the results of the value chain analysis indirectly confirm the influence of China and Japan in Latin America, the establishment of the value chain between Korea and Latin America is relatively weak compared to China and Japan. Taking into account the cases of China and Japan, and in light of the recent emphasis on economic security, it is imperative for the government to strengthen its role by regarding Latin American countries, which are major producers of minerals like lithium, as crucial partners in securing a stable and diversified supply chain for key minerals. In particular, considering that the trend of resource nationalism in Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia is strengthening, it is difficult for private companies to independently discover and promote development and exploration projects. Thus, the role of the government has become more important. -
50 Years of ROK-Indonesia Partnership: A Vision for Future Development
South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Indonesia celebrate their 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2023. Since establishing a strategic partnership in 2006, the two countries have developed close ties based on mutual trust an..
Ina Choi et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic cooperation, international politics Southeast Asia OceanDownloadContentSummary<South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Indonesia celebrate their 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2023. Since establishing a strategic partnership in 2006, the two countries have developed close ties based on mutual trust and respect. In recognition of the growing common interests and strategic values perceived by each other, Korea and Indonesia elevated their bilateral relations to a “special strategic partnership” in 2017. Indeed, amid intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, Indonesia has emerged as a major partner for Korea to diversify its economic and diplomatic relations. And with the Russia-Ukraine war adding to the woes in the global supply chain already disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia has become a key partner for Korea to expand its supply chain cooperation. From Indonesia’s perspective, Korea is considered a major economy that can contribute to the modernization of its manufacturing industry, relocation of the capital city and the growth of its defense industry. Among other things, as middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, the two countries share the common goal of promoting inclusive regional order amid the increasing Sino-U.S. rivalry. Against this background, this study evaluates 50 years of Korea- Indonesia relations and analyzes what opportunities and challenges lie ahead for upgrading bilateral cooperation. Based on the above analysis, the study provides policy recommendations for further strengthening strategic partnership between Korea and Indonesia.Chapter 2 reviews the development of diplomatic and security partnership between Korea and Indonesia. The two countries gradually increased diplomatic exchanges after the Cold War and set out to intensify their partnership in the late 1990s in line with Korea’s enhanced cooperation with ASEAN. In particular, defense industry cooperation – where mutual interests are identified – has been the primary driver of enhancing strategic bilateral ties in the field of defense and security cooperation. Since the 2000s, Korea has established itself as a major arms importer for Indonesia and defense cooperation between the two sides has led to the joint development of fighter jets. Based on the trust built up through close cooperation in the defense industry, Korea and Indonesia have expanded bilateral defense cooperation through high-level personal exchanges and multilateral joint exercises. The two countries have also continued to cooperate on diverse regional security issues, including those surrounding the Korean Peninsula, through the ASEAN-led multilateral dialogue platforms. Notably, Indonesia has been the most active ASEAN member in supporting inter-Korean dialogue. In addition, Korea and Indonesia, as members of both the G20 and MIKTA, have developed a middle power partnership on a wide range of global challenges. The opportunities and areas where the two countries can collaborate have recently been expanded further. Above all, amid growing strategic competition surrounding the Indo-Pacific region, Korea and Indonesia share the common goal of shaping inclusive regional order and securing strategic autonomy. Indonesia played a pivotal role in rolling out the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), with which Korea’s new Indo-Pacific strategy shares a similar stance. Given the growing importance of Indonesia as Korea’s strategic partner, Indonesia is expected to play a key role in pushing ahead with Korea’s new Indo-Pacific strategy and its new policy towards ASEAN – the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI). There is sufficient room for further enhancing strategic ties between the two sides, but the different key interests held by each other – promoting peace in Korean Peninsula for Korea and securing its independent and active (bebas aktif) foreign policy for Indonesia, respectively – are challenges to be addressed. It is important that the two countries continue to strengthen strategic dialogues and thereby deepen their understanding of respective core interests and develop mutual trust as a reliable security partner.Chapter 3 assesses Korea-Indonesia economic cooperation over the past 50 years, with the provision of future directions for upgrading the bilateral partnership. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, Indonesia has been a major supplier of natural resources – particularly wood, crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) – for Korea. Korea has maintained a trade deficit in trade with Indonesia, but given how the raw materials imported from Indonesia contribute to the growth of Korea’s manufacturing industry, it can be seen that the two countries have developed a complementary form of economic cooperation. Korea’s investment in Indonesia, which originally began with mining and labor-intensive manufacturing, has recently expanded to high-tech manufacturing and financial sectors with the gradual growth of the Indonesian economy. In particular, Indonesia’s rich natural resources and fourth-largest domestic market in the world have attracted large-scale investments from Korea in areas such as steel, automobiles, petrochemicals and electric and electronics. Despite the economic downturn caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, Korea’s direct investment to Indonesia reached a record high of 183.2 million USD in 2021. This large-scale investment to Indonesia can largely be attributed to Indonesia’s policy to support growth in the high value-added manufacturing industry, for example through the “Making Indonesia 4.0” initiative announced in 2018. In fact, Korea is increasingly seen by Indonesia as an important partner for promoting its industrial policy aimed at becoming a “high-tech manufacturing powerhouse.” As supply chains have emerged as a critical issue since the Covid-19 pandemic, there is a growing consensus in Korea that Indonesia is not just a raw material importer but a strategic partner to cooperate for the establishment of stable supply chains. In particular, as Indonesia attempts to develop downstream manufacturing, capitalizing on its position as a key provider of critical minerals, large-scale investments from Korea have recently been made in electric vehicles and battery production. In addition, infrastructure development has emerged as one of the most promising areas of cooperation between the two countries as the Indonesian government embarks on building a new capital city in East Kalimantan. On the occasion of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s visit to Bali in November 2022, Korea and Indonesia reaffirmed their mutual desire to strengthen economic cooperation with a series of MoUs signed in the field of supply chains for critical minerals, strategic cooperation in high-tech sectors and various development projects for the new capital city. As Indonesia, the world’s top 10 carbon emitter, pledges ambitious carbon emission cuts, room for bilateral cooperation on climate change is increasingly growing. Given that the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector takes more than half of Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target, and that Indonesia accounts for 75% of Korea’s overseas afforestation projects, cooperation on forestry management is also promising. Yet, the instabilities in the global supply chain and Indonesia’s resource nationalism are considered challenges for enhancing strategic partnership between the two countries.Chapter 4 reviews the socio-cultural partnership between Korea and Indonesia, with an analysis on the achievements and limitations of their bilateral exchanges. Although the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1973, it was not until the 2000s that the bilateral people-to-people exchanges began in earnest. Mutual exchanges between the two peoples have gradually increased over the past 20 years, but are yet to show impressive achievement compared to other ASEAN members such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Furthermore, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically reduced the number of people migrating or traveling between the two countries for both short-term visits and long-term stays. The pandemic led to a dramatic drop in people-to-people exchanges with all ASEAN member countries, but it is worth noting that Indonesia’s rate of reduction was particularly high against the overall decline rate of ASEAN people living in Korea. This implies that Korea is not a preferred country to live in for Indonesians. The low public perception of cultural diversity in particular creates an unfavorable environment for Indonesian Muslims to reside in Korea. In order to recover the bilateral people-to-people exchanges which dropped due to the Covid-19 pandemic, more efforts are required by Korea to increase public awareness of cultural diversity. Meanwhile, we have witnessed dramatic development in cultural exchanges between the two countries over the past 20 years, as the Korean Wave has sparked the public interest in Korean culture and language within Indonesia. It is important to note, however, that the level of understanding regarding the Indonesian culture and language still remains relatively low within Korea. Similarly, while the popularity of Korean studies is growing in Indonesia, awareness of Southeast Asian studies, including Indonesian studies, is still low in Korea. Such asymmetrical and unbalanced cultural exchanges are the major challenge for Korea to overcome in strengthening socio-cultural ties with Indonesia.Based on the above analysis, Chapter 5 provides policy recommendations for further upgrading the Korea-Indonesia strategic partnership. Under the vision of forging a comprehensive strategic partnership for a peaceful, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific, this study suggests four major objectives to strengthen bilateral relations: 1) strengthening the basis of cooperation; 2) realizing major advances as a trusted partner in addressing regional and global challenges; 3) consolidating an open, future-oriented and mutually beneficial economic partnership; and 4) promoting sustainable people-to-people exchanges and raising mutual awareness. First, in order to advance the special strategic partnership, it is necessary to strengthen the basis of trust as key strategic partners. As vigorous summit meetings have played a critical part in deepening bilateral relations, it is important to hold regular summit exchanges to enhance mutual trust. Intensifying high- level strategic dialogues will also help the two countries share key issues faced by each other and maintain consistency in their cooperation regardless of leadership change. For key areas of cooperation identified through summit talks and high-level dialogues, the establishment of a joint committee or working group is required to put relevant agendas into action. In addition, 1.5 and 2-track dialogues should be held more actively so that expert groups of Korea and Indonesia can gain better understanding of each other. Second, in order for the two countries to strengthen their status as strategic partners, Korea and Indonesia should more actively cooperate on addressing each other’s key security agendas, as well as promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region and global peace. In particular, the two countries should closely work together to enhance ASEAN centrality and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, which are the core interests of Indonesia and Korea, respectively. In addition, building upon their close partnership at the United Nations and MIKTA, Korea and Indonesia should strengthen their cooperation on tackling various global challenges. Most importantly, the two countries should step up efforts to address complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR). Finally, as defense industry cooperation has been a key driver of growth in their bilateral defense partnership, the two countries should solidify their status as key defense industry partners by establishing a win-win strategy to boost defense industry ties. Third, capitalizing on the growing opportunities of cooperation, the two countries should build a mutually beneficial economic partnership. Apart from boosting trade and investment further, the two countries should seek to strengthen supply chain cooperation on key minerals in particular. Furthermore, Korea and Indonesia need to strengthen cooperation in the fields of electric vehicles, batteries, digital economy, and start-ups, while expanding cooperation in sustainable infrastructure, including the new capital construction project. It is also necessary to bolster bilateral cooperation for renewable energy and forestry, while enhancing partnership in maritime environmental management. Fourth, as the transition to a digital society is a key factor to facilitate more people-to-people and cultural exchanges between the two countries, Korea should support the development of science and technology in Indonesia, as well as foster talented youths that can lead Indonesia’s creative industry. Most importantly, more efforts should be made to increase awareness between the two peoples through various cultural and educational programs – for example, the establishment of an Indonesian cultural center in Korea and the promotion of Korean studies in Indonesia, and vice versa. -
Russia's Relations with China in the Era of US-China-Russia Strategic Competition
This study comprehensively examines the development of Russia’s strategic relationship with China amid intensifying strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia. Specifically, we analyze the basic meaning and ..
Joungho Park et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic relations, economic security United States of America China Russia EurasiaDownloadContentSummary<This study comprehensively examines the development of Russia’s strategic relationship with China amid intensifying strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia. Specifically, we analyze the basic meaning and direction of Russia’s strategy toward China in the process of shaping a new global order, and the key features and characteristics of cooperation between the two countries in a wide range of fields spanning politics, diplomacy, security, military, economy, society, and culture. Accordingly, this research seeks to derive useful policy implications for Korea based on evaluation of the direction and level of Russia-China cooperation from the Russian perspective.This study consists of four major chapters. Chapter 2 examines the background and strategic significance of Russia’s political, diplomatic, and security relations with China. The deterioration of US relations with China and Russia, which is currently progressing at the global level, is acting as a decisive factor pushing Russia and China closer to each other. In order to grasp the dynamics of US- China-Russia relations and Russia’s perception of the international order, we seek theoretical and historical approaches to the strategic triangle relationship, while examining the possible formation of a new type of triangle relationship. Based on this, the chapter describes Russia’s perception of China and its policy direction, as well as the evaluation and prospects of Russia-China relations.Chapter 3 analyzes the background and strategic significance of Russia’s economic, trade, and industrial relations with China. First, Russia’s perception of economic security and the background of deepening economic relations with China are comprehensively identified. In particular, we examine the opportunities and constraints associated with Russia-China cooperation in the fields of advanced technology, energy, and finance, which are key strategic areas for strengthening Russia’s economic security in the face of intense Western sanctions against its economy.In Chapter 4, the development process and strategic significance of Russia’s social and cultural relations with China are examined. To this end, we explore the current status and characteristics of cooperation in the fields of education and research, culture and arts, mass media, tourism, sports, and healthcare.Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the main research contents and presents policy implications for Korea. In particular, promising directions and tasks for the Northern Policy are suggested, as it faces a major turning point in the changing external environment. These include establishing a cooperative environment for stable management of Korean Peninsula issues, creating a cooperative model to secure external status as a “pivotal middle power,” setting national interests at a strategic level, and raising social awareness of the strategic value and importance of the northern region, etc. -
Effects of Environmental Changes on Migration and Labor Market Outcomes
This report provides a comprehensive investigation of environmental migration, which is expected to accelerate in the future due to the direct and indirect effects of climate change and natural disasters. The report is the first K..
Youngook Jang et al. Date 2022.12.30
international immigration, labor marketDownloadContentSummary<This report provides a comprehensive investigation of environmental migration, which is expected to accelerate in the future due to the direct and indirect effects of climate change and natural disasters. The report is the first Korean-language study to address the various aspects of environmental migration and employs various research methods, including field research, expert interviews, case studies, literature review, and empirical analysis.Chapter 2 classifies migration due to climate and environmental factors into three categories: i) displacement due to extreme weather events and disasters, ii) displacement due to gradual climate change, and iii) displacement due to a combination of factors. It reviews the current status, cases, and prospects of each category. This chapter also highlights the impact of various environmental factors such as typhoons, floods, extreme heat events, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions, which can cause immediate displacement of large numbers of people.Chapters 3 through 5 conduct case studies in Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, respectively. Chapter 3 provides case studies of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, examining how climate change and the frequent occurrence of intense natural disasters are linked to migration in these countries. In these countries, declining agricultural productivity, particularly among subsistence farmers and seasonal laborers, is likely to worsen the socioeconomic situation, leading them to choose migration as a last resort climate change adaptation mechanism.Chapter 4 examines climate and environmental factors and migration trends in Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, and Somalia. This chapter illustrates how climate change and environmental change are driving migration in these countries through case studies and field research. The impact of drought on migration in Morocco, Senegal, and Nigeria is particularly significant, with increased internal, international, temporary, and permanent migration due to drought. The more agriculturally dependent and drought-affected communities are, the more likely they are to choose to migrate themselves or their family members as an adaptation to environmental change.Chapter 5 explores the cases of environmental migration in four Southeast Asian countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. The findings presented in the chapter reveal that the Philippines experienced the most severe environmental impacts, with the highest increase in temperature and precipitation, and the most frequent natural disasters such as storms and floods, leading to the highest number of out-migrants. Indonesia also faced frequent floods and earthquakes, resulting in significant human and economic losses and domestic migration due to natural disasters accounting for the majority of migration. While Thailand experienced less severe floods and storms than the other countries, the back-to-back floods in 2010 and 2011 displaced over 2.5 million people.Chapter 6 reviews the literature and conducts empirical analysis to examine the impact of climate and environmental change on migration and labor markets. The analysis shows how temperature changes, precipitation changes, and natural disaster in sending or receiving countries have a significant impact on bilateral migration. Additionally, environmental change is found to lead to migration outflows only in low- and middle-income countries, while income decline has a deterrent effect on migration in low-income countries. This chapter also highlights the scarcity of research on the impact of climate change on labor markets as a route to migration and suggests expanding research in this area.Finally, in Chapter 7, the report draws policy implications based on its findings. The chapter recommends expanding humanitarian assistance to migrants, strengthening international and development cooperation on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and improving administrative procedures to accommodate the increasing influx of foreign labor. The report emphasizes the need for proactive predictions on the demand and supply of foreign labor and elaborating strategies to accommodate them, given the anticipated demographic changes in South Korea. While the report does not propose specific policy alternatives, its findings are recommended as a basis for future policy responses. -
The Impact of Anti-Russian Sanctions and Implications for the Economy of Central and Eastern Europe
The Russia-Ukraine war and EU sanctions against Russia are having a negative impact not only on Russia but also on the overall EU economy, and these negative effects are expected to continue into 2023 as the war prolongs. Central ..
Cheolwon Lee and Cho Rong Kim Date 2022.12.30
economic cooperation, overseas direct investment Europe Russia EurasiaDownloadContentSummary<The Russia-Ukraine war and EU sanctions against Russia are having a negative impact not only on Russia but also on the overall EU economy, and these negative effects are expected to continue into 2023 as the war prolongs. Central and Eastern European countries, which enjoy relatively strong trade, business and energy-related links with Russia, have been hit particularly hard. Central and Eastern European countries bordering Russia and Ukraine are relatively dependent on Russia for energy, and are expected to suffer the greatest economic damage in terms of trade relations.Policies toward Russia in Central and Eastern Europe have maintained various stances depending on country, ranging from Poland, which consistently maintains an anti-Russian stance, to Hungary, a typical pro-Russian country, or have recently undergone a change in stance. Central and Eastern European countries located on the EU border or those close to Russia and have some legacy of past socialist alliances, regardless of their pro-Russian or anti-Russian ties, generally have close economic ties with Russia. Therefore, after the invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s sanctions on Russia will inevitably have a serious impact on the Central and Eastern European countries in various sectors such as trade, investment, and finance as well as the energy sector, which is expected to suffer a direct short-term impact.In 2004 and 2007, Korean companies entered Central and Eastern Europe in large numbers including the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), set production bases in Europe, and then made further investments. The Visegrad V4 countries represent the largest export market for Korea in the EU, accounting for 28.3% of its exports to the EU in 2020. As such, Central and Eastern Europe, where Korea has the most active economic cooperation in Europe, is expected to suffer the most serious and diverse negative impacts from geopolitical crises, including the recent Russia-Ukraine war. We analyze that major countries in Central and Eastern Europe will experience slightly different economic impacts and show disparate policy tendencies toward Russia in the face of geopolitical crises, and accordingly, it will be necessary for Korean companies to prepare differentiated countermeasures. In particular, it is time to review Korean companies’ strategy toward Europe based on an in-depth analysis of the economic impact of the geopolitical crisis on countries in Central and Eastern Europe.The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of EU sanctions against Russia on Central and Eastern European countries from various angles after the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine, and to draw implications for Korea’s economic relationship with Central and Eastern Europe. This study is largely composed of the following three issues. First, it shows how these Central and Eastern European countries have close economic relations with Russia, second, how the geopolitical crisis originating from Russia will affect the Central and Eastern European economy, and finally, third, how Korean companies and governments should respond to economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 sheds light on the relationship between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, including trade, investment, and energy. And in Chapter 3, the EU’s sanctions against Russia and their future trajectory, the impact on the Central and Eastern European economy, and the changes in the local business environment of the companies entering the market were analyzed. Finally, in Chapter 4, based on the above-mentioned analysis and economic relations between Korea and Central and Eastern Europe, implications for Korean companies and governments were derived. -
EU’s Medium- to Long-term Trade Strategies and Korea-EU Cooperation Plans
This study examines recent changes in the European Union’s (EU) mid- to-long-term trade strategy. The trade environment has been greatly affected by the weakening of multilateralism, intensification of the US-China strategic comp..
Youngook Jang et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic cooperationDownloadContentSummary<This study examines recent changes in the European Union’s (EU) mid- to-long-term trade strategy. The trade environment has been greatly affected by the weakening of multilateralism, intensification of the US-China strategic competition, COVID-19 pandemic, and the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In response, the EU has announced new strategies. This study categorizes the motivations of these strategies into internal and external ones, and identifies ways for Korea and the EU to cooperate in these areas. Specifically, the EU is currently focusing on policy areas such as supply chain reorganization, digital transformation, and climate change response due to internal motivations, and it is passively responding to external pressures in policy areas like the energy crisis and pandemic response.Chapter 2 analyzes the EU’s supply chain reorganization, which includes policies to increase the competitiveness of intra-EU companies in strategic industries and reduce extra-EU dependence. This chapter examines a series of EU policies to strengthen semiconductor and battery supply chains, including the Single Market Emergency Instruments and the Critical Raw Materials Act. To ensure that Korea’s participation in the EU’s reorganization of offshore supply chains increases, it is necessary to actively promote the idea that Korea is a reliable partner. Supporting Korean companies to invest in the EU to strengthen cooperation in the semiconductor industry and actively reflecting the position of Korean companies in setting international standards for batteries are also worth considering. Technical exchanges with relevant organizations and companies in the EU should be actively promoted. Bilateral cooperation in critical minerals, which are necessary to combat climate change, is also promising. EU experts suggest linking respective early warning systems and monitoring of critical minerals to share information and promote joint purchases.Chapter 3 examines the priority areas for digital cooperation between Korea and the EU, based on the EU’s key digital policies and agreements. The chapter identifies several potential areas for cooperation, including the Korea-EU Digital Partnership, which is expected to encompass emerging technologies such as 5G/6G, high-performance computing, quantum technology, artificial intelligence, and blockchain, as well as regulatory areas such as privacy, cybersecurity, online platforms, and data movement. Additionally, the chapter suggests that modernizing e-commerce provisions in the Korea-EU FTA could help facilitate digital trade and strengthen digital economic cooperation. Another area for cooperation is in creating a regulatory environment that enables the digital market to grow appropriately, as digital-related regulations are strengthened in each country. Finally, the chapter recommends upgrading cooperation in digital and information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and technical cooperation, including future networks such as 6G, high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, ICT supply chains, e-government, and R&D. By leveraging their advanced digital technologies and shared interests in promoting and developing these areas, Korea and the EU can deepen their digital cooperation.Chapter 4 examines the key issues of the EU’s climate change response and proposes possible areas of cooperation between Korea and the EU. The EU is implementing one of the world’s most advanced and forward- thinking environmental policies. With the recent announcement of the “Fit-for-55” legislation, the EU is accelerating its eco-friendly structural transformation by reducing carbon emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030. Additionally, the EU will ban internal combustion engine vehicles from 2035, raise the target for renewable energy, expand the scope of the emissions trading system, phase out free allowances, and introduce a carbon border adjustment system for offshore countries. Chapter 4 suggests three areas of cooperation: first, cooperative programs to jointly develop eco-friendly technologies; second, joint participation in multilateral discussions on climate change response; and third, joint participation in supporting climate change response and adaptation in developing countries. Climate change is beyond the scope of individual national governments or bilateral issues, and effective responses can only be achieved through multilateral cooperation.Chapter 5 examines the energy situation in the EU and its major member states, and then examines the energy security policies implemented before and after the Russian-Ukrainian war. In response to the green transition discussed in Chapter 4, major European countries have generally sought to expand renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. However, their stance on nuclear power and natural gas has varied across member states. It is expected that the reliance on nuclear power generation will remain high for the time being, as the deadline for operating or retiring nuclear power plants has been extended to resolve short-term energy supply and demand imbalances. In response, Korea should continue energy cooperation with major EU member states such as Germany, France, and Poland, but consider alternatives for cooperation that are consistent with each country’s policy.Chapter 6 proposes potential avenues for cooperation between the EU and South Korea in the area of public health, based on the EU’s COVID-19 response. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the EU, resulting in high numbers of infections and deaths as well as a sharp decline in economic growth. To combat the pandemic, the EU has implemented various policies, including establishing joint response procedures among member states, jointly purchasing and distributing vaccines, providing financial support at the EU level, and actively participating in multilateral cooperation. Korea can continue to cooperate with the EU in three key areas: first, promoting bilateral cooperation to respond to future infectious disease crises; second, jointly participating in multilateral organizations as similarly situated countries; and third, providing technical cooperation in the pharmaceutical field. By improving relevant provisions within the EU-Korea FTA and strengthening cooperation through diplomatic channels, the EU and Korea can continue their cooperation in the health sector.Overall, this study highlights various ways in which Korea and the EU can strengthen their cooperation in areas such as supply chain reorganization, digital transformation, climate change response, and energy security. By working together, both sides can achieve their common goals and respond more effectively to global challenges. -
The Social and Economic Impact of the Spread of Populism in Latin America
Populist forces continue to emerge in Latin America, causing instability and uncertainty across the region. Populist forces in the region first rose to prominence during the beginning of the period of import substitution industria..
Seungho Lee et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic cooperation, political economy Latin AmericaDownloadContentSummary<Populist forces continue to emerge in Latin America, causing instability and uncertainty across the region. Populist forces in the region first rose to prominence during the beginning of the period of import substitution industrialization in the 1930s. They emerged taking advantage of the growing demands of the rapidly expanding urban working class for mass politics and the expansion of social benefits. Populism was rampant in Latin America for more than 30 years following the 1930s, but fell into decline with the emergence of military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. However, populist forces emerged yet again in the 1980s with the wave of democratization and the accumulation of public dissatisfaction due to a series of economic crises. The so-called neopopulist forces took power in Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s, combining neoliberal economic policies with the typical ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse that is typical of populists.While a rapid transition to neoliberal policies led to various social and economic problems, traditional parties and politicians were not able to respond effectively to those problems. In this context, a new populist wave, combined with what was called the 21st-century socialism, emerged in the 2000s. In the 2010s, new breeds of populism appeared one after another, and the spread of populism is not expected to disappear in Latin America in the near future. Social and economic inequality is worsening across the region in the aftermath of COVID-19, and public distrust of established party politics and existing democratic institutions is growing higher than ever. All in all, there is fertile ground for populist forces to spread even more, claiming that they are the only ones who can eliminate the ‘incompetent and corrupt’ establishment and truly represent the “virtuous” people.With the spread of populism expected to continue in Latin America, there is a growing need to investigate the social and economic impact of populism. Against this backdrop, this study examines the impact of populist forces in power on the inflow of foreign direct investment, the quality of democratic institutions, and the foreign policy directions of Latin American countries. Based on our empirical evidence and qualitative analysis, we provide several recommendations for the Korean government and corporations. The contents of our research are as follows.In Chapter 2, we examine how populism has been defined in the existing literature and provide an explanation about the definition of populism we adopt for this research. This study follows the ideational definition of populism, which conceptualizes populism as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. At the core of diverse phenomena labeled ‘populist,’ ranging from classical populism from the 1930s to 1960s and neopopulism in the 1980s across Latin America to recent populism not only in the region but also around the world, there is this ‘thin-centered’ ideology. In addition, we provide in this chapter a literature review that can hint at how the core characteristics of populism may affect our variables of interest.Chapter 3 examines the impact of populist forces in power on the inflow of foreign direct investment, quality of democratic institutions, and foreign policy directions. We conduct empirical analysis using a panel dataset including 18 Latin American countries from 1999 to 2021, employing regression analysis and synthetic control methods. We then complement our empirical evidence with some case studies on populist rule. Our findings are as follows.First, our regression results show that the presence of a populist government or a stronger populist tendency of the ruling government do not necessarily lead to a decrease in foreign direct investment inflow. We find that the negative impact of the presence of a populist government or a stronger populist tendency of the ruling government is pronounced in left-wing regimes. A populist in power or a stronger populist tendency are associated with a larger inflow of foreign direct investment under centrist and right-wing governments. Our findings from synthetic control methods suggest that a populist in power on average leads to a decrease in foreign investment inflow regardless of its ideological orientation. In our case studies, we examine how a number of populist governments in Latin America have implemented their economic policies and how they have affected foreign direct investment inflow.Second, our findings from regression analysis and synthetic control methods suggest that a populist in power and a stronger populist tendency adversely affect the quality of democratic institutions regardless of the ruling government’s ideological orientation. Our case studies illustrate a typical populist strategy to attack democratic institutions, with examples of left-wing and right-wing populist governments from the early 2000s to recent times. They confirm how populism and democracy are inherently incompatible. Moreover, we suggest that the authoritarian tendency of populist governments has strengthened during the recent COVID-19 period, which provided a number of populist governments with an excuse to suppress civil liberties while strengthening executive power.Third, we suggest that a populist in power tends to politicize foreign policy. The role of the governing ideology becomes more important than pragmatism in foreign policy decision-making, which is personalized and has authority concentrated on the ruling populist’s inner circles. In order to secure support from their core constituencies, populist governments attempt to break away from traditional policy directions and follow their governing ideology in foreign policy decision-making. We complement our case studies with our findings from synthetic control methods. We employ a variable quantifying how close individual countries’ voting patterns in the UN General Assembly are to that of the United States as a proxy for their policy stance towards the United States. Our findings show that left-wing populist governments tend to design their foreign policy to decrease dependence on the United States.Chapter 4 presents the implications of our research for the Korean government and businesses. First, it is necessary to pay attention to the recent movement of resource nationalism led by left-wing populist governments across Latin America. One should note that resource nationalism, including nationalization measures, is an important variable to consider for investment and cooperation decisions by the government and companies interested in securing critical minerals and strengthening supply chains across the region. Most of the left-wing populist governments in Latin America seem to be expanding the role of the state in strategic industries such as oil, core minerals, and electricity through anti-neoliberal and nationalist rhetoric. The Korean government and businesses are required to respond actively to the changing political landscape.Second, the Korean government and businesses should keep in mind that once populist rule is consolidated through referendums and constitutional amendments, it can result in a rapid transition from a democratic regime to an authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, the authoritarian tendency of populist governments has strengthened with the spread of COVID-19, which makes the possibility of a regime change even greater in some countries across the region.Third, the foreign policy directions of Latin American countries in which populist forces are in power can be ideologicalized and personalized at any time, breaking away from their traditional policy directions. It is also being observed that like-minded populist governments in Latin America are strengthening their solidarity with other countries both within and outside the region based on ideological similarities. In this context, this study recommends the Korean government pursue its foreign policy based on values and norms while making additional efforts to cooperate with countries under populist rule employing instruments such as economic cooperation or high-level diplomacy. -
U.S. Medium- to Long-term Trade Strategies and Korea-U.S. Cooperation Plans
Recently, not only responses to various major economic and trade issues, but also discussions at the global level to prepare measures for cooperation in the international community for each issue are taking place, centering on the..
Gusang Kang et al. Date 2022.12.30
economic cooperation, trade policy United States of AmericaDownloadContentSummary<Recently, not only responses to various major economic and trade issues, but also discussions at the global level to prepare measures for cooperation in the international community for each issue are taking place, centering on the U.S. Due to external shocks at the global level, such as the hegemony competition between the U.S. and China and the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. and other major countries have begun to consider ways to change their existing supply chains based on cost-efficiency to resilient supply chains for major materials essential to their national security. In addition, the intensifying spread of the coronavirus has prompted the expansion of non-face-to-face economic activities such as telecommuting and online shopping. Accordingly, it has become more important to discuss standard digital trade norms to support a digital platform economy. Moreover, the Biden administration announced its 2050 carbon net-zero goal to respond to climate change while implementing related policies and leading discussions on climate change response in the global community. Lastly, as each country's policy measures are being used to recover from the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, major countries including the U.S. and South Korea have paid more attention to development cooperation policies targeting developing countries. Therefore, this study tried to derive South Korea's future trade strategy and cooperation measures with the U.S. by identifying the U.S. position and response strategy for each of the major economic and trade issues previously mentioned.First, we present the U.S. policy responses related to the semiconductor and battery sectors and their implications in terms of the U.S.-centered supply chain reorganization policy. In particular, semiconductors and large-capacity batteries are important industries in which Korea holds an important position in the global supply chain. Based on the U.S.-centered supply chain policy, Korea needs to expand local investment and production within the U.S. in the semiconductor and battery sectors, and seek ways to maximize national interests through close cooperation between the government and companies. In addition, in the process of Korean companies entering the U.S., it is necessary to explore ways to cooperate in technology, such as promoting joint R&D with the U.S. Furthermore, it is essential to carefully review whether there are any trade legal problems in relation to the detailed regulations of the IRA implemented by the U.S., and consider the possibility of legal response as well as institutional arrangements to compensate for damages that may be suffered by companies within or connected with the domestic electric vehicle industry following the implementation of the IRA.Next, in the field of digital trade, as the trend of digital transformation continues to gain pace worldwide, we review major digital transformation and trade policies of the U.S. to strengthen cooperation in the digital field between Korea and the U.S. Moreover, we derive cooperation plans between the two countries based on each country’s policy measures. First of all, Korea needs to actively participate in international discussions led by the U.S. to establish advanced communication network standards such as 5G and 6G as essential infrastructure in the process of global digital transformation. In addition, to overcome the limitations of the digital trade rules stipulated in the KORUS FTA and to strengthen cooperation with the U.S., Korea should actively lead discussions on trade pillar working groups within the IPEF to prepare a roadmap for digital trade rules with participating countries.In the field of climate change response, we review the current status of major related policies being promoted in the U.S. and Korea and important technologies as targets for cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, we present a plan for cooperation between Korea and the U.S. based on this. Carbon reduction and next-generation nuclear power technology were focused on as major technology fields for cooperation between Korea and the U.S. First, as carbon reduction technology is included in the 10 climate innovation technologies selected by the Biden administration, R&D on the technology to be used in various sectors such as buildings, energy storage systems, and vehicles is expected to be promoted. In addition, the Biden administration has allocated a large budget to the old nuclear power plant support program, citing nuclear power as a realistic alternative that can stabilize electricity rates while reducing fossil fuel use. Korea, like the U.S., plans to select carbon-neutral technologies such as secondary batteries and hydrogen as “national strategic technologies” and provide extensive R&D support. Thus, the Korean government will provide various programs and budget support for these sectors.Finally, in the field of development cooperation, we review policies promoted in Korea and the U.S., and provide measures for cooperation between the two countries. First, it is necessary to expand infrastructure investment in developing countries in the region and to share know-how and experiences of success in development through the IPEF, which is promoted by the U.S. to check China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Korea, along with the U.S., needs to strengthen the joint support system for Pacific Island countries exposed to climate change and with small economies and low levels of economic development. Lastly, we need to clearly define what can be done in cooperation with the U.S. by expanding support through international development finance organizations such as the World Bank and IDB for Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are part of the Central American “Northern Triangle”, and by actively responding to the efforts of the U.S. -
Utilizing Paris Agreement Article 6 for Achieving Korea’s NDC towards 2030
At the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) held in Glasgow, the Parties finally agreed on the Article 6 rulebook for the Paris Agreement (PA). This was a long overdue task since the signing of the PA in 2015. The PA al..
Jione Jung et al. Date 2022.12.30
ODA, foreign aidDownloadContentSummary<At the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) held in Glasgow, the Parties finally agreed on the Article 6 rulebook for the Paris Agreement (PA). This was a long overdue task since the signing of the PA in 2015. The PA allowed the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) towards achieving nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nevertheless, it was a challenge for the Parties to implement greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation projects under Article 6 without detailed guidelines. This development is especially significant for Korea as it plans to use voluntary cooperation under Article 6 as a complementary measure to its mitigation efforts. 11.5% of the 2030 GHG reduction target, amounting to 35 million tons, is expected to come from international mitigation activities. Thus, it has become an urgent task for Korea to develop an overarching plan as well as specific guidelines for the implementation of international mitigation activities.This research reviews Article 6 of the PA and its rulebook specifying ITMOs. The study also addresses the issue of improving Korea’s institutional arrangement for international mitigation activities in light of the rulebook. An example is to determine whether a company should use the emission reductions obtained from a project abroad for its compliance or the NDC target. Our study outlines the limitations associated with utilizing more flexible approaches under the Article 6.2, as the current legal and institutional arrangement is designed on small-scale Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-typed projects.Developing countries indicates their interest in Article 6.2 activities involving low-carbon investment. To utilize the Article 6.2 cooperative approach, both transferring and transferred parties of mitigation outcomes need to comply with the reporting requirement of the enhanced transparency framework of the PA Article 13 and corresponding adjustment. Multilateral development banks and bilateral development agencies support various activities to enhance readiness, enabling environments and infrastructure within developing countries to participate in Article 6 activities. Those activities are reviewed in this study to provide insights for the Korean government as it intends to create synergies between international mitigation activities and its international development cooperation.This research proposes two approaches to utilize the PA Article 6 activities towards Korea’s NDC achievement: i) transferring the mitigation outcomes acquired from the activities conducted under Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 in a host country, ii) purchasing mitigation outcomes from the host country or private companies. For the former approach, this study presents an implementation process and explains several issues to be considered under the PA and its rulebook. In the latter, we highlight that the corresponding adjustment of ITMOs might be adapted differently, depending on whether the partner is a government or companies within the boundaries of the PA.Under the Paris Agreement, all Parties have obligations to reduce GHG emissions, regardless of their stage of national development, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus not only on cost-effective aspects but also pursuing sustainable development and global environmental integrity when mitigation outcomes are internationally transferred. Based on a clear understanding of the PA Article 6, Korea needs to implement its international mitigation activities. The Article 6.2 approach will require selecting partner countries and government funding. In particular, there is a need to explore ways to link with international mitigation activities as the volume of climate change related-ODA expands. Above all, there is an urgent need to resolve legal and institutional uncertainty related to the private sector’s utilization of mitigation outcomes obtained internationally. -
Impacts of Climate Change and Policy Implications on Food Security in Africa and the Middle East
As a result of the recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the global agri-food supply chain has collapsed, thereby raising concerns about food security in Africa and the Middle East. The international community is paying great..
Munsu Kang et al. Date 2022.12.30
ODA, agricultural policy Africa Middle EastDownloadContentSummary<As a result of the recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the global agri-food supply chain has collapsed, thereby raising concerns about food security in Africa and the Middle East. The international community is paying greater attention to the issue of food security caused by climate change, which is actually affecting food supply and demand in Africa and the Middle East as a result of frequent weather conditions, such as droughts, flooding, and heat waves. As a result of an intensifying drought, North Africa increased its imports of external grain in January 2022, and East Africa has experienced droughts that have adversely affected its crops in recent years. It is therefore increasingly important for the international community to cooperate to respond to the food security crisis resulting from climate change, and Korea should expand its cooperation to address climate change, food security, and agriculture in Africa and the Middle East.Climate change has both a global and a national impact, and African and Middle Eastern developing countries, especially those with insufficient climate resilience, are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change on agriculture and food production. It is therefore necessary to develop policies that can help lead the discussion of climate change in the international community while also increasing support for the agri-food sector through official development assistance (ODA) funded by Korea.Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to analyze the food security crisis in Africa and the Middle East caused by climate change from the perspective of supply and demand, and to identify potential areas of cooperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as “a situation in which everyone is always physically, socially and economically accessible to a sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food, while meeting individual dietary needs and preferences for a healthy and active life.” Therefore, food security should be considered throughout the entire food production and consumption process, toward which this study also examined the current state of the African and Middle Eastern food security crisis, causes of food insecurity, and policies to address it.This study can be summarized as follows. A first observation is that the average temperature is increasing across Africa and the Middle East, and this represents a higher increase than in previous years, particularly in East and North Africa. Additionally, droughts and floods have become more frequent in recent years, which can pose a threat to agricultural production in the future. The impact of climate change on agricultural production is increasing, but the FAO and the World Food Program have already warned of the increase in hunger and undernutrition caused by climate change, which means that rising temperatures and frequent droughts could pose a greater external shock than normal.Second, when droughts occur frequently and intensify in Africa and the Middle East, agricultural prices generally rise, especially for corn and rice. The agricultural production of developing countries in Africa and the Middle East is largely dependent on natural water rather than irrigation and shows various structural characteristics susceptible to weather changes. Moreover, most countries except North Africa have high rates of self-sufficiency in corn, rice, sorghum, and millet, whereas Africa and the Middle East lack adequate stockpiling capacity to buffer drought. As soaring food prices in Africa and the Middle East between 2007 and 2011 caused instability, and the recent prolonged Russian-Ukraine war caused public discontent, climate change and long-term increases in food prices could also contribute to instability.Thirdly, as natural disasters such as droughts and floods become more frequent, problems related to consumption such as nutritional disorders and slow development are exacerbated. In Africa and the Middle East, malnutrition has generally declined, with the exception of conflict-affected countries such as Yemen and Iraq. Consequently, indicators also improved in terms of strengthening food security and sustainable agriculture, which are the second goal of the Sustainable Development Goals. There has been a rise in both absolute and proportional food crisis populations in recent years, especially in Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the proportion of the population experiencing serious levels of food insecurity has doubled to 20.7% in 2021, compared to 10.2% in 2014. There is a higher incidence of children’s poor development and nutritional disorders in countries with more droughts or floods, indicating that climate change impacts both agricultural production and consumption.Fourth, the international community and major African and Middle Eastern countries are taking a variety of measures to combat climate change. Several countries, including Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, and Tanzania, have developed comprehensive policies aimed at addressing climate change and protecting water resources, as well as establishing support systems for the vulnerable. Despite this, few countries have developed production and reserve policies to ensure food security, and technological capabilities are lacking, necessitating international cooperation. Climate change response strategies and social protection strategies have been developed by international organizations. The African Climate Innovation Mission (AIM for Africa), the African Agricultural Climate Change Adaptation Plan (AAAI), the African Green Revolution Alliance (AGRA), the World Bank, the International Agricultural Development Fund (IFAD), and the International Agricultural GIAR Group are representative organizations addressing climate change and food security in Africa and the Middle East. Likewise, international cooperation on food security is on the rise, and is on the agenda of both the 2021 Foreign Ministers' Meeting and the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Convention (COP27).Using the results of the analysis, this report proposes policies in the areas of climate change and water resources, agricultural production and stockpiling, crop consumption, and assistance for the vulnerable. First, it is important to cooperate to introduce an early warning system during times of drought or flooding throughout Africa and the Middle East, as weather events such as these are becoming more frequent. Climate risk and early warning systems have been established by the World Bank and the World Meteorological Organization in 60 countries, including most of the countries in West and Central Africa. As Korea expands its disaster warning system domestically, it may be possible to extend its cooperation with vulnerable countries in Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, cooperation for the application of low-carbon agricultural technology should be expanded. Low-carbon farming methods include mixed farming, forestry, and cultivation, and agriculture is considered one of the major greenhouse gas emission factors in Africa and the Middle East, so cooperation in introducing agricultural technologies to combat climate change should be conducted as well. In areas where Korea can cooperate with either Africa or Middle East in agricultural production, heat-resistant and resistant varieties can be developed, as well as pilot projects for smart farming in low- and medium-sized countries.Secondly, it is necessary to increase cooperation in order to ensure the security of water resources and prevent flooding. The expansion of irrigation water facilities is the first factor to ensure the security of water resources in Africa and the Middle East. The Korean government has provided support for the modernization of irrigation facilities in Ghana as well as the construction of irrigation facilities in Ethiopia coordinated by KOICA, as securing agricultural water during the sowing season becomes increasingly important. The scale of Korea’s development cooperation with Africa and the Middle East is expected to increase in the future, and Korea should also expand its support for irrigation channels to improve access to water resources. It is also becoming increasingly important to ensure fresh water through wastewater recycling and desalination.The third recommendation is to expand support for the vulnerable in Africa and the Middle East in terms of consumption. Approximately 50,000 tons of rice were provided to six countries by Korea’s Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs in 2021. Due to a lack of stockpile capacity, there are few alternatives available in Africa and the Middle East to support the residents in these regions in the event of severe changes in weather patterns. Accordingly, major donor countries and international organizations continue to provide food to areas affected by the food crisis. In order to prepare for the rapid increase in food insecurity and severe food shortages occurring in Africa and the Middle East as a result of climate change, Korea will also need to establish a support system in advance for vulnerable groups in Africa and the Middle East.As a final point, the cooperation system should include not only bilateral cooperation but also multilateral cooperation with international organizations. In the area of expanding technical research cooperation with international researchers, the Rural Development Administration should assume a more prominent role. The majority of African and Middle Eastern countries are classified as vulnerable countries due to climate change, and accordingly, Korea has limitations in cooperating in agriculture or food assistance alone. Therefore, it is necessary to cooperate with international organizations that have already entered many countries and are carrying out projects in those countries. Moreover, CGIAR research institutes have conducted a number of studies on the demand for agricultural technology in Africa and the Middle East, facilitating the development of agricultural technology research and development projects in Africa and the Middle East by conducting joint research with CGIARs and internationally recognized agricultural research institutes.
공공저작물 자유이용허락 표시기준 (공공누리, KOGL) 제4유형
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