This study aims to examine the importance of intellectual property rights(IPR) protection in digital content trade, particularly focusing on the economic impacts of the international diffusion of IPR protection. Additionally, it seeks to identify the appropriate roles and responsibilities that can be assigned to platforms, which play a significant role in the international distribution of digital content, in order to protect IPR in digital content trade. The study also explores the necessity of international cooperation to facilitate these efforts. In Chapter 2, we examine the trends in Korea’s digital content market and trade to understand the changing significance of digital content in the economy. The revenue of Korea’s digital content industry increased from 20.3 billion USD in 2013 to 45.8 billion USD in 2021, with an average annual growth rate of 10.7%. During the same period, revenue per business entity in the digital content industry grew by an average of 11.6% annually, and revenue per employee also increased by an average of 8.8% annually, indicating an overall improvement in business performance. Exports of Korea’s content industry rose from 9.62 billion USD in 2018 to 13.24 billion USD in 2022. The trade surplus in the content industry expanded significantly from 8.4 billion USD in 2018 to 12.09 billion USD in 2022, with substantial trade surpluses recorded in industries such as gaming, music, broadcasting, character, and content solutions.

Chapter 3 outlines the trends in discussions on IPR protection for digital content from a trade perspective. IPR protection issues for digital content have been heavily addressed through bilateral or other agreements. In order to track developments in IPR protection provisions in bilateral agreements, we create a database containing the level of IPR protection for digital content in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) globally. The digital content-related IPR provisions in FTAs were categorized into three areas: i) compliance with the WTO TRIPS Agreement and adherence to international IPR treaties under WIPO, ii) provisions on copyright and related rights, and iii) enforcement- related provisions. We find a steady increase in the FTAs which include digital content-related IPR provisions.

Additionally, we look into regulatory trends concerning global platforms that dominate the distribution of digital content and services but, due to their vast scale and influence, create challenges that existing regulations struggle to address. To this end, the main features and characteristics of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) were summarized. Previously, platforms were often granted exemptions from liability for copyright infringements occurring on their services. In contrast, the DSA emphasizes platforms' responsibility for copyright infringements. This reflects the growing significance of platforms in content distribution and copyright infringement cases.

Chapter 4 empirically analyzes the impact of IPR protection in FTAs on digital content trade. We explore the effects of FTAs with TRIPS-plus provisions for digital content (referred to as IPAs) identified in Chapter 3 on digital content trade. The analysis distinguishes between countries that signed IPAs between 2005 and 2019 and those that did not, comparing their global and bilateral trade patterns to derive the trade effects of IPAs. The study focuses on industries closely related to digital content such as telecommunications, computer and information services; royalties and license fees; and personal, cultural, and recreational services. In terms of total imports, countries with IPA experienced a relative increase in imports in the telecommunications, computer, and information services, and personal, cultural, and recreational services sectors compared to countries without IPA. On the export side, personal, cultural, and recreational services exports showed a positive relationship with IPA adoption. We also analyze by income level and find that the relative increase in imports of telecommunications, computer, and information services through IPAs was primarily led by lower-middle-income countries. In contrast, the relative increase in exports of telecommunications, computer, and information services was statistically significant in high-income countries, suggesting that IPA may have facilitated cross-border supply from high-income to lower-income countries in this sector. These results align with theoretical and intuitive predictions about how IPR protection could influence cross-border supply.

Chapter 5 looks into the necessity of imposing copyright protection liabilities on global platforms. Using a two-country theoretical model, we examine when it is necessary to impose copyright protection obligations on digital platforms from a global perspective that considers the total welfare of both countries. We also explore how the incentives to impose such obligations differ between countries when strengthening copyright protection liabilities from a total welfare perspective, and whether these countries can enhance such obligations through voluntary agreements, such as FTAs. From the perspective of total welfare, regulations that strengthen platforms’ copyright protection obligations positively impact innovation in both countries, thereby increasing producer surplus for content creators. However, consumer surplus may either increase due to the availability of more content or decrease due to reduced competition among creators resulting from monopolistic supply. In such circumstances, if regulations strengthening copyright protection obligations lead to a positive impact on consumer surplus compared to the monitoring level voluntarily chosen by platforms, the total welfare of the two countries is always positively affected. The analysis also examines whether each country independently has an incentive to impose stronger copyright protection obligations on platforms. It demonstrates that even if there is an incentive to enhance platforms’ copyright protection efforts from the perspective of total welfare, such regulations are unlikely to be implemented when each country makes decisions independently. In this situation, if the two countries are relatively symmetric in terms of the scale of content providers and consumers, we show that there is an incentive to strengthen copyright protection obligations through voluntary agreements such as FTAs.

Based on these findings, implications for Korea’s current EPA policy are presented. Countries with which Korea is pursuing EPAs can be broadly categorized into three groups based on the level of IPR protection in their existing FTAs and the current state of their domestic IPR legal frameworks. Countries in Group 1 have already signed FTAs with a relatively high level of IPR protection and established strong domestic legal frameworks to protect IPR. For Group 1, ensuring the effective enforcement of digital content copyright is critical. It is necessary to introduce provisions regulating IPR enforcement, particularly in digital environments. The enforcement clauses included in recent FTAs signed by the UK could serve as a useful reference. Countries in Group 2 have included comprehensive IPR protection provisions in their existing FTAs but whose domestic legal systems are insufficient to effectively protect digital content copyrights. For Group 2, it is worthwhile to include protection provisions not covered in their existing FTAs. Especially, many countries in this group are not parties to the WIPO Internet Treaties so their accession to these treaties should be a priority. Countries in Group 3 have not signed FTAs with significant IPR protection provisions and have domestic legal systems that make it challenging to efficiently protect digital content copyrights. For Group 3, it is more important to assist these countries in establishing and growing a foundation for the content market rather than immediately introducing high-level IPR protection provisions in the EPA. This can gradually increase the necessity of IPR protection. For instance, including agreements on joint content production or cultural cooperation protocols within the EPA can help create a foundation for the content industry by fostering skills and expertise through international joint production efforts. Additionally, sharing Korea’s experience in developing its content industry through strengthened IPR protection via initiatives like the Knowledge Sharing Program could further enhance the interest and participation of partner countries.

Since the establishment of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 and the launch of the World Trade Organization multilateral trading system in 1995, trade liberalization has led to an increase in global trade and the internationalization of production through the globalization of supply chains. More recently, however, as non-trade values such as national security, domestic industry development, labor rights, and environmental protection have become important considerations, supply chains have become an end in themselves rather than a means of pursuing efficiency, and are subject to regulation to achieve various policy goals pursued by governments. Major trading partners, including the United States, are moving away from supply chains based on efficiency and focusing on building supply chains that share values and ideologies, and as economics and security are closely linked, major countries are strengthening their national-level responses by announcing economic and security strategies and utilizing various policy measures, including subsidies, to build their own local production and supply chains.

The problem then lies in the fact that traditional WTO/FTA international trade rules do not adequately address the proliferation of such unilateral measures that regulate global supply chains linked to various non-trade issues, including national security, environment, labor, and human rights. Due to the legal limitations of international trade rules, affected companies are facing increased compliance costs from emerging supply chain regulations, despite their legitimate expectations of market access (previously) promised in trade agreements under existing bilateral agreements. In light of these issues, this study identifies and characterizes the phenomenon of global supply chain regulation, whether international (mainly bilateral) or unilateral, and identifies the status and limitations of current international trade rules in this regard, and draws policy implications for the future direction of our foreign trade policy and domestic legislation.

Chapter 2 identifies the various legal, institutional, and policy efforts aimed at regulating global supply chains and characterizes the emerging phenomenon of unilateral supply chain regulation. Given the current geopolitical and geoeconomic conflicts, nationalism, and the trend of strengthening domestic industry protection, most unilateral supply chain regulations are focused on supply chains such as key minerals and raw materials, industrial subsidies, and high-tech industries, as well as national security, labor rights, and environmental protection. In light of this, Chapter 2 examines the main areas of recent unilateral supply chain regulation, categorized by supply chain and security, environment, labor, and other issues, and provides a detailed review of the measures.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine unilateral supply chain regulation itself and the trade law issues that arise from its implementation. Chapter 3 discusses the current state of international trade rules governing supply chain regulation and their limitations, focusing on the WTO’s multilateral trade rules. It focuses on the role that international trade rules have played in the formation of unilateral supply chain regulation in terms of who, what, and how it is formulated and implemented, its categorization according to the legal nature of the measures, and its legitimacy, as well as the extent to which it is applicable and whether it is actually deterrent. It also looks at the possible evolution of the case law on the legality of trade measures based on non-product-related process or production methods or “NPR PPMs” and the future development of the national security exception.

Further this study reviews the current state of disciplines in bilateral and multilateral trade rules, including FTAs, on unilateral supply chain regulation, focusing on the chapters on trade in goods. Overall, FTAs’ chapters on trade in goods directly incorporate or contain similar provisions as the WTO’s multilateral trade rules, but in some cases provides for “WTO plus” provisions that go beyond the disciplines of the WTO agreements. This study assesses whether this bilateral and multilateral approach may have the effect of reducing incentives for unilateral supply chain regulation.

For more recent examples of sectoral agreements and memoranda of understanding that are specific to supply chain issues, this study reviews the critical minerals sector. Leading examples include the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement, the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA), the U.S.-EU CMA under negotiation, the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), and the EU’s Strategic Partnership. Characterize recent developments in the formation and discussion of supply chain-related international rules and draw implications for the development of new components of national trade agreements and new types of international (trade) agreements to promote security of critical minerals and related supply chain stability.

Chapter 4 discusses (i) trade secret protection issues in the course of unilateral supply chain regulations, and (ii) what should be prepared for in light of the increasing involvement and influence of private actors in supply chain regulatory regimes. As major supply chain regulation cases have demonstrated that regulators are leveraging their markets to demand information from regulated companies on a fairly comprehensive range of production and processing methods throughout their supply chains, this paper will examine the current state of trade secret issues in international law and in the national laws of major countries, and suggest responses at the international and national law levels. The phenomenon of private actors’ participation in supply chain regulation at the government level is not a case of unilateral supply chain regulation, but it is indirectly related. It focuses on the trend of public participation and emphasis on corporate responsibility that has been in full swing since the Facility-Specific Rapid-Response Labor Mechanism or “RRM” under the USMCA.

Chapter 5 provides the following policy implications for how to respond to each type of unilateral supply chain regulation, both as recipients and as designers and addressers of domestic policies that may affect global supply chains. Firstly, as an addressee of unilateral supply chain regulation, it is important to have sufficient information prior to the adoption of a particular country's policy that may affect our supply chain and to respond quickly at the pre-policy formulation stage to minimize concerns for our companies and industries. In order to reduce dependence on certain raw materials in the supply chain and to ensure stable supply and demand of key minerals important for clean technology and semiconductor production, it is necessary to diversify import lines, actively participate in international agreements and consultations on key minerals, and strengthen linkages and cooperation among similarly positioned countries. It is necessary to consider how to design and utilize bilateral and multilateral agreements as an international legal policy instrument that can effectively support Korea’s core mineral supply chain policy direction and cooperation among countries. Regarding supply chain regulations related to forced labor, companies may have limitations in assessing the actual presence of forced labor and monitoring various partners scattered within global supply chains, so the government should consider ways to support companies by proactively assessing the risk of forced labor in countries and providing the results to relevant companies. Given that minimizing the risk of forced labor in supply chains may be the duty of the state as well as companies in the context of sustainable development, it is also necessary to consider strengthening domestic legislation to meet global standards so that Korean companies do not face additional burdens in their overseas operations.

As for the exposure of corporate trade secrets to unilateralist supply chain regulation, Article 1.9 of the U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement signed in 2020 during the Trump administration can be referenced in multilateral and bilateral negotiations and discussions in which Korea participates. This agreement is the only example of a trade secret protection provision that includes a separate section on “trade secrets and confidential business information” and protects trade secrets from potential leakage in regulatory proceedings. Regarding the trend toward greater public participation and corporate responsibility for labor standards compliance, which is being led by some trading partners such as the United States through domestic legislation or multilateral agreements, efforts should be made through multilateral channels to secure a common understanding among countries on public participation in the international trading environment to ensure a common and uniform standard that is acceptable to all countries, and institutional improvements should be made to safeguards to prevent abuses, and transparency mechanisms to ensure the right of reply and access to information for companies under investigation.

Finally, as an addresser of domestic policies that may affect global supply chains, there is a need for strategic use of policy discretion to the extent permitted under current international trade rules and for institutional design to pursue multiple policy objectives, particularly within climate, labor, and supply chain policies. When pursuing multiple objectives, i.e., where industrial objectives and non- traditional value objectives coexist, careful consideration should be given to the design of measures to ensure that non-traditional value objectives are set as the primary objective. Korea also needs industrial support policies centered on core items and industries, but should be cautious about introducing laws and systems similar to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. This study stresses careful design of domestic industry support policies regarding the use of subsidies related to local parts usage requirements (LCRs) and encourages ‘commercial considerations’ in the design of domestic industrial support policies. Further it suggests that the Korean government make efforts to strengthen the external ‘durability’ of domestic legislation and policies in the face of various new trade issues, including new types of industrial support policies, including preparations for possible WTO complaints and consideration of countervailing duties that may be imposed by major trading partners.

Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, the country has rapidly expanded its international development cooperation efforts. Today, Korea ranks 15th among the 31 DAC member countries in terms of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on evaluating the outcomes of these aid initiatives and identifying ways to enhance their effectiveness. The government is actively exploring strategies to improve ODA performance, with a particular focus on project packaging, large- scale project development, and branding.

In parallel with this budgetary expansion and the drive for increased effectiveness, building a knowledge ecosystem for international development cooperation has become a central priority for all stakeholders involved. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), development consulting firms, academic associations, and research institutes all play vital roles in this process to ensure greater impact. Facilitating smooth interaction between these stakeholders is crucial for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international development cooperation efforts. Furthermore, managing the supply and demand for professional human resources is key to strengthening the knowledge ecosystem. Policymakers should focus on how to train and effectively deploy entry-level professionals in this field.

The primary aim of this study is to identify the policy measures needed to train and utilize entry-level professionals, a critical factor for more efficient and effective implementation of international development cooperation in Korea, where the knowledge ecosystem is still in its early stages. In addition to a comprehensive literature review, the study employs two other research methodologies. First, a survey was conducted among graduates and current students of graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) at selected universities. The aim was to gather practical insights into the current state of education and training for entry-level professionals, thus yielding policy recommendations. Second, case studies were carried out in Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom to identify lessons that could be applied to Korea’s context.

The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the research identified several key challenges in the operation of the knowledge ecosystem, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of professional human resources. On the supply side, three primary obstacles were identified: (ⅰ) the lack of an integrated curriculum that balances both field knowledge and practical experience; (ⅱ) insufficient synergy between regional expertise education and courses related to international development cooperation; and (ⅲ) the underperformance of the qualification system for professionals in this field. On the demand side, two factors hinder the effective functioning of the ecosystem: (ⅰ) the lack of competitiveness among private consulting firms capable of executing ODA projects efficiently and effectively; and (ⅱ) the absence of a robust support system for job placement and career development for professionals.

Based on these findings, the study offers three key policy recommendations. First, it is recommended that the government reorganize the national education system for training professional human resources and play a more active role in this process. While the government has concentrated on quantitative expansion of the ODA budget since joining the OECD DAC, it is now essential to prioritize quality assurance by assessing how effectively and efficiently the budget is being utilized. A critical aspect of this process is improving the quality of professionals involved in international development cooperation, which aligns with the main objective of this study. To achieve this, we recommend that the government review existing human resource training programs, with a focus on supporting select graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) that provide foundational education for professionals. By enhancing the quality of their programs and expanding their reach, the government can significantly improve overall training standards. Additionally, programs run by public institutions like KOICA should be expanded and strengthened through increased budgets and synergies with GSIS programs. In the medium to long term, the study suggests considering the establishment of a “National Graduate School for International Development Cooperation” (tentative name), where the government would take a more direct role in training professional human resources.

Second, to ensure more efficient and effective use of the national budget, we recommend the creation of a demand base for professional human resources by increasing the participation of private consulting firms. Although this sector is still in its infancy, involving more private consulting firms is essential for expanding the demand for qualified professionals. Development consulting is a high-value knowledge industry, and greater participation from private firms will facilitate the accumulation of valuable knowledge and experience. This, in turn, can benefit Korea’s international development cooperation efforts and foster opportunities for collaboration on larger-scale ODA projects led by international organizations such as the World Bank and ADB.

Third, while the first two recommendations focus on the supply and demand sides of professional human resources, it is equally important to ensure smooth matching between the two to maximize the efficiency of job support and employment services. Our recommendation is to establish an integrated platform to manage professional human resources in international development cooperation. This platform should act as a two-way mechanism, facilitating job matching and capacity building for both early-career and mid-level professionals, ensuring more efficient alignment between the supply of trained professionals and the demand for their skills.

China’s digital trade is developing at a rapid pace. Exports of digital service trade, categorized as “digital delivery trade,” grew to account for 56.7% of China’s total services exports in 2023. In cross-border e-commerce, also categorized as “digital order trade,” China became the world’s largest B2C trade market in 2022. Comprehensive policy support on the part of the Chinese government has been instrumental in promoting this development of China’s digital trade. The Chinese government has been supporting technology development and institutional opening-up measures in the digital domain for several years now, in order to promote the quantitative and qualitative development of digital trade. In addition, China’s digital platforms have been able to expand overseas rapidly because smartphone-based mobile cross-border payment platforms have enhanced the affordability and convenience of international payments. The development of China’s mobile cross-border payment platforms has been largely influenced by the government’s institutional support. In addition, it is noteworthy that the Chinese government has been increasingly developing policies related to the construction and management of data infrastructure systems over the past year or two, and since the announcement of the Regulations on Facilitating and Regulating the Cross-border Data Transfers in March 2024, it has been piloting the implementation of negative lists in free trade pilot zones. China’s main focus has been to ease “the measures affecting cross-border data flows,” which have been criticized as a major digital trade barrier in China. However, it is difficult to detect a change in China’s basic stance as the deregulation measures of the above Regulations have only made detailed adjustments through subordinate laws, such as sectoral bylaws, while maintaining the overall framework stipulated in China’s three data laws. At the same time, it is significant that the Chinese government is attempting to make institutional changes to support China’s rapid digital trade growth in preparation for joining the DEPA and expanding its voice in international digital norm-setting and Chinese digital standards.

Meanwhile, the digital platform industry, which plays a key role in China’s digital trade, is also developing rapidly, with e-commerce and social commerce platforms at its center. Major players such as Alibaba, Jingdong, Pinduoduo, and Kwaishou adopt short-form video-based sales methods having a significant impact on the market. This growth has been driven by policy support and regulation from the Chinese government, as well as a rapidly changing market environment. The government has enacted various legal norms and policies to ensure the safe and transparent operation of digital platforms, with a particular focus on ensuring consumer protection and market order.

China’s position in the cross-border e-commerce market is further strengthened by the increasing overseas expansion of Chinese digital platforms that are competitive in the Chinese e-commerce market. The United States has emerged as the largest market for Chinese cross-border e-commerce exports, and China has become the largest source of online shopping services in Europe. As Chinese platforms showed rapid growth after gaining entry into the Korean market, China has emerged as Korea’s largest overseas direct purchasing destination. Chinese platforms have targeted overseas consumers with aggressive strategies such as building efficient production and logistics networks and flexible supply chains, real-time data analysis, convergence strategies using shopping apps, large-scale advertising, targeting consumers (Generation Z), and price competitiveness. The biggest challenges for China’s digital trade policy in the future is how to balance domestic and foreign demand and integrate it with international digital trade rules to facilitate the overseas expansion of Chinese digital enterprises and enhance their international competitiveness. Meanwhile, as the global digital economy gradually expands in scale, the Chinese government is actively establishing a digital platform management system. In particular, the balance between “innovation incentives” and “regulatory fences” and the integration of domestic systems with international rules may expand the scope of the Chinese government’s influence in the digital realm. In response, companies conducting business with China need to pay close attention to the Chinese government’s data supervision practices and details, strengthen data and supply chain management across the company, and prepare in advance to comply with regulations.

This report makes several policy recommendations. First, China’s digital trade norms need to be taken into account in the follow-up negotiations of the Korea-China FTA. The digital trade norms in China’s regional trade agreements do not yet contain a full e-commerce chapter, and mainly focus on measures related to e-commerce facilitation. The privacy and e-commerce cooperation provisions in the e-commerce chapters of China’s pending FTAs are vaguely worded and lack specific implementation details, which may make it difficult to resolve disputes in the future. It is important to keep this in mind when negotiating a follow-up FTA with China, and ensure that the text of the agreement is detailed and precise from the outset. Another characteristic is that the content of the digital trade norms in the agreement differs depending on the target country and its interests with China. This suggests that when Korea negotiates a follow-up FTA with China in the future, it may be possible to revise the text of the agreement in accordance with circumstances in the two countries. China highly praises the Korea-China FTA, which was signed in June 2015 and entered into force in December 2015, as China’s first agreement to include an e-commerce chapter. However, the China-Australia FTA, which was signed and entered into force around the same time, includes provisions that are not included in its FTA agreement with South Korea, such as consumer protection and data protection. In addition, FTAs with other countries that were signed or revised after the Korea-China FTA include the same provisions as Australia. In addition to consumer protection, the China-Chile FTA, revised in September 2017, includes articles on cooperation in cross-border payment supervision and support for SMEs to overcome e-commerce barriers. As consumer complaints continue to rise about goods sold on large Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms that have recently entered Korea, it is necessary to explicitly include the phrase “consumer protection” in follow-up negotiations. In addition, when conducting follow-up negotiations with China, it is necessary to supplement the agreement to support the overseas expansion of SMEs, as both countries are facing a difficult situation due to sluggish domestic demand. Based on the examples of the China-Chile and China-New Zealand FTAs, it is worth considering adding phrases such as “opening up markets for SMEs through e-commerce” and “helping SMEs overcome barriers to e-commerce” to the e-commerce chapter. This could be an institutional and policy support measure to support the development of cross-border e-commerce platforms as a sales channel for products in which Korean and Chinese SMEs have a comparative advantage.

Second, Korea needs to take a more forward-looking stance on China’s participation in global digital norms. As industries move toward AI and data-driven forms in the future, if DEPA’s new technology governance specifications become a global consensus, the embedded intellectual property rights will determine the competitive space of our products in related markets, such as related smart devices or smart gadgets. China’s accession to DEPA will expand the scope of digital trade governance norms discussions, and proactively identifying relevant technological innovations and best practices will impact the long-term competitiveness of existing industries in the digital economy.

Third, we suggest that the government balance its regulatory and supportive policies for platform companies. As China’s digital economy grows in size, the country has been active in establishing institutions related to the digital economy. In the past, China has been wary of the monopolistic influence of large platform companies over entire industries. However, it now recognizes the role of large platform companies in the digital economy. As such, China’s future policies are likely to focus on building an orderly system while encouraging platform operators to operate in a compliant manner. China first announced a government-level policy to promote the digital economy in 2019, and has since announced more specific and proactive measures to foster related industry infrastructure, data resources, digitization of industry and government, digital industries, and international cooperation. This can be interpreted as an attempt to encourage China’s large platform companies to go abroad and expand the domestic economy. While this may have a negative impact on China’s domestic economy, the government hopes that large Internet companies can play a greater role as national growth engines, creating jobs, helping traditional manufacturing enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises develop, and increasing their international competitiveness. China’s regulatory measures for platform companies are not necessarily applicable to Korea’s situation. However, government policy should not be limited to regulating platform companies’ anti-competitive behavior or illegal activities in the six services of brokerage, search, video, SNS, operating system, and advertising. It is necessary to balance regulatory-oriented platform enterprise policies with supportive policies to encourage the development of derivative industries and create jobs, while allowing Korea’s globally competitive platform enterprises to expand overseas.

Fourth, we propose the following two measures as Korea’s response to the increasing overseas expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms. Firstly, we believe that it is time to thoroughly prepare for the rapid entry of Chinese platforms into the Korean market. It is necessary to review the cross-border e-commerce related systems, including domestic market protection, safe trade and consumer protection, privacy and cybersecurity, etc. Secondly, as concerns grow over the problems arising from the expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms overseas, regulations in major economies such as the U.S. and EU have been strengthened. As a result, Korean e-commerce platforms seeking to expand overseas should prepare for trade risks arising from the regulation of cross-border e-commerce platforms in major countries. The U.S. and the EU have abolished the tax exemption system for cross-border e-commerce platforms and are strengthening regulations on the import of goods related to environmental degradation and forced labor. As such, it is important to recognize that factors such as labor and environment may also be subject to trade regulations. Therefore, in order to expand cross-border e-commerce, Korean companies need to proactively prepare for new trade regulation risks by preparing overseas expansion strategies that consider ESG management in addition to enhancing their own competitiveness. In addition, as major economies including the U.S. and the EU are expected to expand cross-border e-commerce regulations, it is necessary to monitor new regulatory trends and proactively assess their potential impact on Korean companies.

This study investigates the consideration of unintended effects within South Korea’s burgeoning Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs. Despite Korea’s growing role as an emerging donor, research on the unintended consequences of its aid interventions remains limited. This analysis addresses this gap by examining how key Korean ODA implementing agencies, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) and the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH), address unintended consequences in their evaluation reports.

Employing a mixed-methods approach – literature review, text analysis, and qualitative content analysis – the study explores the extent to which these agencies analyze and report on unintended effects in evaluations conducted over the past decade. Text analysis of agency reports (extracted from KOICA, KEXIM and KOFIH websites) identifies the frequency and nature of unintended effects discussed, utilizing software (CAQDAS) and keyword searches (“unintended,” “unplanned,” etc.). Thematic analysis then categorizes identified effects based on established typologies(Koch 2024; Jabeen 2018).

Findings reveal that Korea’s major aid agencies analyzed unintended effects in approximately 8% of evaluations, with KOICA featuring a balanced view of both positive and negative effects, while KEXIM and KOFIH focused predominantly on positive effects. The most frequently observed positive unintended effect was the spill-over effects, spread of benefits to non-beneficiary groups and area, fostering community solidarity, economic gains, and empowerment for women. A microcredit program targeting women for increased household income inadvertently led to partners’ awareness of women’s economic and social capacity, leading to enhanced understanding of human rights. Additionally, a cross-sectoral effect was observed in a school feeding program, where children’s educational outcomes improved as a result of better nutrition.

In contrast, negative unintended effects, such as elite capture and regressive targeting—wherein benefits unintentionally excluded vulnerable populations—highlighted gaps in project design and stakeholder engagement. Notably, rural development programs like the Samaeul initiative were found to unintentionally benefit wealthier farmers, excluding poorer ones (regressive targeting, Koch, 2024). Similarly, vocational training for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-conflict settings risked unintended discrimination within IDP communities, potentially undermining social cohesion. In microcredit program targeting former refugee villagers provided loans for agricultural activity, unintentionally marginalizing female-led/elderly-led household as they tend to have insufficient labor to increase agricultural productivity.

Conversely, macro-level effects like anti-aid sentiments, governance issues, and environmental impacts were rarely mentioned. These findings may be attributed to factors like East Asian cultural tendencies that discourage open discussions about failure, the relatively recent and smaller scale of Korean interventions, and the absence of a colonial past unlike traditional donors.

Additional semi-structured interviews with domestic and international evaluation experts, reaffirmed the study’s conclusions and contributed to refining its recommendations. The analysis underscores the importance of developing more complexity theory and systems thinking based Theory of Changes that could help predict and indentify not only intended but also potential unintended consequences of the evaluated intervention. Strategies include assessing risks and designing safeguards for negative unintended effects during project planning, fostering mechanisms to enhance positive spillover, and strengthening human rights and gender considerations. In performance management, recommendations emphasize monitoring not only outputs and outcomes but also underlying assumptions and risks, and refining ToRs to mandate or recommend UIE evaluation where relevant. Additionally, evaluators could adopt open-ended, exploratory interview technique and evaluation methods like outcome harvesting, and participatory narrative inquiry (PNI) which are arguably better suited to identify the unintended effects in development interventions.

The study suggests institutional measures to conduct more strategic evaluations with long-term perspectives. Establishing a culture that distinguishes evaluation from auditing is also recommended as a precondition for further discussion and evaluation of unintended effects of international development cooperation as donor agencies are reluctant to openly discuss the unintended effects of their intervention, which are often perceived as negative results of mismanagement of taxpayer’s money.

This study marks the first in-depth examination of unintended effects in Korean ODA evaluations. By comparing practices across donor countries and defining unintended effects in the Korean context, the study provides critical insights for enhancing developmental effectiveness, helping policymakers, evaluation managers, and researchers consider new, often-overlooked aspects of development cooperation. Importantly, this research underlines the need to address both planned and unintended effects in Korea’s ODA, setting a foundation for resilient, inclusive, and sustainable aid interventions.

The evaluation of international development cooperation has become increasingly institutionalized as Korea’s ODA budget has grown, together with awareness regarding the importance of evaluations, accompanied by a surge in the number of evaluations. This study explores whether this expansion has been matched by a corresponding increase in their practical contribution, as originally intended. It aims to diagnose the current state of evaluation use in Korea’s development cooperation, analyze both the demand for and barriers to such use, and identify practical strategies to enhance evaluation utility. While acknowledging broader structural and institutional constraints that may influence overall evaluation use, the study focuses on “evaluation implementation factors” that can be reasonably adjusted or influenced by evaluators and commissioning bodies during the evaluation process, with a view to proposing realistic and actionable strategies to improve the usefulness of evaluations.

Chapter 2 builds a conceptual foundation for evaluation use and utility by synthesizing relevant theories and international practices. It reviews existing literature on the concepts, types, and influencing factors of evaluation use, and closely examines specific cases and strategic efforts undertaken by major international organizations and donor agencies to strengthen the use of evaluations. Drawing on previous research, this study defines “evaluation use” as the various ways in which evaluation can influence stakeholders through different pathways, and analyzes the characteristics of evaluations with high utility. Rather than focusing on structural constraints that are difficult to change in the short term, the study emphasizes barriers that can be addressed through improvements in evaluation practice. It highlights the importance of providing information that meets user needs and adopting flexible methodologies as key strategies for enhancing the utilization of evaluation results.

Chapter 3 analyzes the current state of evaluation use in Korea’s development cooperation and proposes directions for improving its utility. Despite the institutionalization of evaluations across implementing agencies, actual use remains limited in both scope and depth. Repeated evaluations with unclear objectives, resource constraints, and a focus on compliance-driven feedback mechanisms have contributed to low perceived utility. Survey findings reveal that evaluations are often used symbolically—for promotion or justification —rather than instrumentally or for learning. Stakeholders pointed to persistent mismatches between what the information evaluations provide and what users actually need—such as forward-looking insights for agenda-setting or practical solutions to implementation challenges—as well as limited accessibility and poor readability of evaluation reports. Moreover, evaluations are primarily used by internal managers, while higher-level decision-makers and local stakeholders remain under-engaged. These findings underscore the need to broaden the user base and diversify the forms of evaluation use so that evaluations can more effectively support learning and problem-solving throughout the program cycle. In particular, the results suggest the need for more diversity in methodologies to better accommodate varied information needs.

Chapter 4 highlights the importance of flexible and fit-for-purpose methodologies in enhancing evaluation utility. Building on the conceptual and empirical insights of the previous chapters, it examines five approaches—impact evaluation, economic analysis, outcome mapping, outcome harvesting, and real-time evaluation—and analyzes their characteristics from the perspective of utility. Among these, impact evaluation and economic analysis are suitable for verifying causal links and cost-effectiveness through quantitative methods. These approaches are particularly useful for instrumental use by policymakers and managers in strategic planning and resource allocation, while also enhancing the credibility of project results through rigorous evidence generation. Outcome mapping and outcome harvesting are participatory and qualitative approaches that help capture complex and non-linear changes in dynamic development contexts. Real-time evaluation (RTE), which allows for immediate feedback during implementation, is especially relevant for humanitarian assistance and other time-sensitive projects. Participatory approaches not only improve the responsiveness of evaluations but also strengthen learning and capacity among stakeholders by involving them directly in data collection and analysis—thereby supporting continuous improvement and more effective collaboration.

The analysis concludes that evaluation methods should be selected based on their alignment with the evaluation’s purpose, subject, stakeholder needs, timing, and available resources—and that mixed-method approaches are often necessary in practice. In the Korean context, the study emphasizes the need for more diverse and advanced training programs to strengthen methodological capacity, and recommends a gradual approach to piloting new evaluation methods to assess their feasibility and scalability under practical constraints such as limited time and budget.

The final chapter offers practical policy recommendations for enhancing evaluation utility at both the implementing agency and national coordination levels. For implementing agencies, a strategic approach is needed throughout the evaluation process. The study proposes core checkpoints for each of five key stages of the evaluation process—(1) selection and planning, (2) design and implementation, (3) quality assurance, (4) communication of findings, and (5) follow-up and knowledge management—to ensure that evaluations produce relevant and usable insights.

At the national level, institutional improvements are recommended to encourage demand-driven evaluations, promote diverse methodologies, and strengthen evaluation knowledge systems. These include enhancing evaluator capacity, offering flexibility in evaluation mandates, and ensuring that feedback processes lead to meaningful action rather than symbolic compliance. Ultimately, the study calls for a shift from a compliance-oriented approach to a more strategic, user-centered evaluation culture. By aligning evaluations with stakeholder needs, adopting flexible methodologies, and embedding findings into knowledge systems, evaluation can become a more meaningful driver of learning, accountability, and effectiveness in Korea’s development cooperation.

The Refugee Act of the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) came into effect in 2013 and has just passed its tenth anniversary. However, since the very first case of recognizing refugee status in 2001, the cumulative number of recognized refugees remains just over 1,400, reflecting Korea’s conservative approach to accepting, supporting, and accommodating refugees. It is worth noting, though, that since the enactment of the Refugee Act, the yearly number of asylum seekers has increased nearly tenfold, surpassing 18,000 in 2023. This suggests it is time to reflect on whether the country can maintain its current refugee policy.

Recent international developments, often described as a “complex crisis,” which includes mass migration inducing events such as, but not limited to, regional conflicts and climate change, have generated new forms of forced displacement, prompting host countries to expand their roles in providing protection and residence.

Earlier research on South Korean refugee policy has focused largely on normative discussions and the question of whether to accept refugees. However, the public opinion remains polarized, often fueled by suspicion toward so-called “fake refugees” and vague anxieties about immigrants. Instead of engaging in debates on refugee acceptance, this study aims to empirically examine the possibilities for refugee settlement and social integration, provided that a group of immigrants have already been accepted and settled in Korean society. Through this empirical lens, the study seeks to emphasize the need for a reconsideration of existing controversy on Korea’s refugee policy.

In the introduction of this report, four key factors influencing refugee policy are considered. The “external-normative factor” refers to global agenda and the expected role of Korea’s refugee protection. The “external-positivistic factor” involves the actual status of the process of refugee generation, migration, and settlement. The “internal-normative factor” encompasses South Korea’s national identity and social values. The “internal-positivistic factor” refers to the socio-economic and institutional capacity to settle forced migrants and integrate them as members of Korean society.

While the first three factors are well discussed in the existing literature, individual-level empirical study of the actual settlement of refugees within Korean society remains scarce. Therefore, this study focuses particularly on the internal-positivistic factors: the socio-economic settlement of refugees and their integration with local communities in the context of Korea’s response to the complex crisis era.

Chapter 2 provides a review of international discourse and longitudinal trends on forced migration.

Section 1 of this chapter outlines the historical evolution of international refugee discourse, and examines how the global community has conceptualized the refugee issue over time. The discourse has expanded from providing migrants with “temporary protection and minimal support for their vulnerability” to a more robust aim of “supporting the potential capability of immigrants for better settlement and social integration.” Accordingly, the forms of refugee protection have diversified, including resettlement, complementary protection, and family reunification. Traditionally, refugees were seen as passive recipients of humanitarian aid. In contrast, recent discourse increasingly understand them as not only active members, but also as contributors to society, which put further emphases on the refugee as a potential benefit to the society.

Section 2 explores the global trends in forced migration. Since the mid-2000s, the absolute number of forcibly displaced people has surged, with particularly rapid increases in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Furthermore, forced migration routes have become more complex, and refugees increasingly move to neighboring low- and middle-income countries, aggravating the burden of protection on those states and calls for international coordination and cooperation among the destination countries, to share the responsibility.

This trend is also confirmed through quantitative analysis. A series of cross-country level factor analysis for refugee recognition rates shows that the rate has a positive correlation with GDP, restricting the sample to high-income countries. However, without restricting the sample, the correlation becomes negative. Korea, in particular, has demonstrated a notably low rate of refugee recognition, given its income level. While part of this reluctance can be explained by socio-economic factors considered in the factor analysis model, this study confirms that South Korea’s conservative refugee policies persist even after controlling for those variables.

Section 3 provides an overview of institutional background and statistics of refugees and related policy in Korea. As aforementioned, the number of asylum seekers has steadily increased, and both the countries of origin and reasons for seeking asylum have diversified. In contrast, the refugee recognition rate has steadily declined, recently falling below 2%, majorly due to an increase in the number of asylum seekers. However, it is worth noting the number of individuals granted “humanitarian status” has increased over time, and how the status may be potentially understood as a de facto refugee status.

While the budget for refugee recognition and settlement support is classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA), South Korea’s support has remained relatively passive. The largest portion of refugee-related expenditure is still allocated to screening processes, and settlement support is often fragmented, provided primarily by local governments and civil society organizations.

In this study, a survey was conducted in collaboration with civil society organizations which support the Ukrainian evacuees who had settled in Korea following the Russia–Ukraine war. In Chapter 3, we report the key statistics of these 293 refugees, as well as the results of causal analyses. Through this case study, we provide a empirical assessment of the actual experiences of their migration and settlement.

The survey revealed two key insights about the refugee’s socio-economic status in Korea.

First, contrary to the common perception of refugees as impoverished and dependent, many of the evacuees have achieved a self-reliant economic status. Although their participation in the labor market is somewhat limited compared to their careers in Ukraine, most were able to self-sustain their own family, mostly through labor income. In addition, the fact that the majority of these refugees were renting their homes, paying rent through their own efforts—at a rate even higher than that of resettled Ukranian refugees in Europe, where temporary shelter is a common option—is particularly encouraging.

Furthermore, a survey experiment was conducted on public donation behavior to assess refugees’ willingness to contribute to the community. Approximately half of the respondents voluntarily donated money to the CSO which supported them. Interestingly, donation amounts increased when respondents were reminded that their contributions would help the settlement process of later refugees. This behavior suggests that many refugees are not only unwilling to free-ride on the host society, but also willing to contribute back, demonstrating their will to actively participate in building a self-sustainable and self-reliant community.

Second, the study found that these evacuees had not yet been fully integrated into Korean society. While most expressed overall satisfaction with life in Korea, they reported linguistic, cultural, and institutional barriers, particularly when seeking employment. The limited experience with social safety nets—aside from the national health insurance system—raises concerns that they may be at risk of falling through the cracks of the welfare system, which deserves a further follow-up study of a separate issue.

Alarmingly, nearly 30% of respondents reported experiencing verbal abuse or hostile behavior from local residents or in the workplace. This indicates that even when refugees achieve economic independence, incomplete social integration remains a persistent challenge between the refugee community and Korean society.

Chapter 4 explores the other half of the social integration equation: local perception and attitude toward the refugees in the host community. Another survey was conducted among residents of Gwangsan-gu in Gwangju City, where nearly 800 Ukrainian evacuees have settled since the Russia–Ukraine war began. A series of previous studies presents conflicting hypotheses for the attitude formation of the host community: one suggests that increased contact with immigrants reduces public anxiety (inter-group contact theory), while another argues that such exposure can trigger social backlash (group threat theory). Therefore, this study focuses on whether local residents' experiences of contact with evacuees influenced their perceptions and attitudes toward refugee groups.

Despite being a primary settlement area, overall hostility toward refugees remained high among host community residents, especially when compared to attitudes toward other foreign/migrant groups,. The study found that “passive contact and exposure”—such as simply seeing or hearing about refugees—had limited impact on forming the attitudes.

In contrast, “active engagement and communication”—direct, intense interactions—were consistently associated with more inclusive and positive attitudes toward refugees. Additionally, respondents who had participated in multicultural education programs were, in a complementary manner, more likely to support refugee acceptance. These findings suggest that the frequency of contact alone does not ensure integration; instead, well designed educational programs and active, community-driven engagement are more effective in alleviating public anxiety and prejudice.

Based on the analyses, this study proposes Korea’s refugee policy to target an “orderly settlement” of the refugees and forced migrants. An uncoordinated and spontaneous inflow of immigrants may lead to lack of support for a sound settlement of the immigrants, and may push them outside the social safety net, while simultaneously fueling anxiety among host community. Moreover, such negative impressions formed may become long-term obstacles to social integration.

To facilitate this orderly settlement, we recommend leveraging small-scale, open communities led by civil society organizations and local governments. This approach would enable tailored, context-sensitive support while also alleviating the administrative burden on central authorities, which currently carry enough burden for screening processes. By building on existing small-scale communities, this model can support a self-help mechanism among the immigrants for more sustainable settlement, give immigrants a opportunity to contribute to the local community, and strengthen interactions between immigrants and the host community.

This report aims to enhance understanding of refugees and forced migrants who have settled in Korea, by offering a micro-level, empirical analysis of their actual settlement experience. However, it acknowledges that the challenges and insights presented here represent only a partial view of the broader and more complex international issue of forced migration. As outlined in the introduction, the patterns of displacement, migration, and settlement of the refugees, are deeply multi-layered and multifaceted, as are the solutions. This study aims to add on to the discussion on refugees settlement in Korea, and provide a new agenda to related policy. While the pioneering case study and topic deserves further attention, we also expect the limitations of the study to be continuously and critically challenged, through future studies.

In an era where global climate change responses increasingly manifest as unilateral trade measures by major countries, cooperation continues to evolve into novel forms. This research defines Green Economy Agreements (GEAs) as innovative cooperative frameworks that seek to achieve a balanced realization of environmental protection and economic growth, centered on carbon neutrality. These agreements aim to generate new economic opportunities through cross-border trade and investment in green economies while establishing stable climate-trade cooperative relationships through regulatory harmonization for climate change response.

Currently, GEAs are being implemented in various forms, including non-binding MOUs with partnerships, FTAs that integrate climate change and environmental policies with trade policies, and independent climate-trade treaties. These agreements can be broadly categorized into two types: comprehensive green economy transition agreements pursuing environmental transformation of economic structures, and cooperation agreements focusing on specific climate change response measures such as carbon reduction collaboration.

Notable examples of trade agreements for green economy transition include the IPEF Clean Economy Agreement, the sustainable development chapter of the EU-New Zealand FTA, and the Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement. Korea is pursuing this comprehensive approach through environmental chapters in existing FTAs and partnerships such as the Korea-Australia Green Economy Partnership and the Korea-EU Green Partnership. Meanwhile, cooperation agreements specialized in climate change response focus on specific mechanisms like cross-border carbon credit transfer, exemplified by Switzerland's Paris Agreement Implementation Agreement and Japan's Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) bilateral memoranda. As of 2024, Korea has established basic climate change cooperation agreements with seven countries and is conducting additional negotiations with over 20 nations.

Global and Korean GEAs are structured around five core domains: energy transition, environmental goods and services, technological cooperation, market mechanisms, and implementation support. The energy transition domain encompasses clean energy development and utilization centered on renewable energy and hydrogen, along with sector-specific decarbonization challenges in transportation, industry, and agriculture. The environmental goods and services domain addresses trade facilitation through list compilation, non-tariff barrier reduction, government procurement expansion, and the establishment of standards and certification systems. The technological cooperation domain focuses on R&D and commercialization of core technologies such as CCUS, while the market mechanism domain includes participation in international carbon markets, establishment of MRV systems, and promotion of ESG investment. The implementation support domain defines governance systems including capacity building for just transition, stakeholder engagement, and dispute resolution.

Here's the continuation of the comprehensive translation:
As GEAs pursue climate change response and sustainable economic growth, the scope of related goods and services continues to expand. A comparative analysis of recently concluded GEAs reveals varying scopes of environmental goods: the Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement designates 372 items at the HS6 level, the UK-New Zealand FTA includes 293 items, and the EU-New Zealand FTA lists 48 items. While the Australia-Singapore agreement encompasses the most items, the quantity alone cannot determine the agreement's sophistication, as the nature and scope of environmental goods differ significantly across agreements.

At the enterprise level, approximately 30,000 firms annually export environmental goods as defined in the UK-New Zealand and EU-New Zealand FTAs. Despite entry and exit dynamics, the number of exporting firms remains relatively stable. These environmental goods exporters demonstrate notably higher total sales, sales per employee, and R&D expenditure, indicating the capital-intensive and innovation-driven nature of the sector. Given that different countries define environmental goods according to their interests, strategic approaches aligned with Korea's industrial conditions are essential for future GEA negotiations.

The economic impact analysis employs general equilibrium mode, especially GTAP E-Power model, to simulate various cooperation scenarios. Results reveal differentiated effects across partner country groups. From Korea's perspective, technological cooperation proves most effective with nations that have completed carbon neutrality legislation, while carbon credit linkage also shows high effectiveness compared to other country combinations. Market opening and tariff reduction mechanisms demonstrate greater impact with countries in the policy development phase. For partner countries, those without NDC submissions show the highest expected benefits from technological cooperation with Korea.

Regarding Korea’s strategic positioning, Chapter 4 analyzes Korea’s green economy cooperation policies through four critical domains - technology, supply chains, investment, and international mitigation - that implement the key GEA components outlined in Chapter 2. The analysis evaluates current policies against recent GEA trends to develop actionable recommendations for an effective roadmap and implementation strategy. The country's climate technology capabilities currently stand at approximately 80% of advanced nations’ levels, with notable gaps in hydrogen, fuel cells, and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies. The government is actively pursuing international collaboration with technology leaders such as the United States, Germany, and Japan to secure foundational technologies, participate in large-scale demonstration projects, and establish international technical standards. However, challenges persist, including shortages of specialized personnel, financial constraints, and difficulties in market localization.

Korea’s green supply chain cooperation policy aims to secure stable supplies of critical resources for future industries such as hydrogen, batteries, and essential minerals while strengthening supply chain resilience. Given the country's high dependence on imports for crucial resources like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, diversifying import sources and developing green supply chain infrastructure are paramount. The government has established domestic legal and policy frameworks while fostering strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries through MOUs focusing on resource development and processing cooperation.

In terms of international investment cooperation, Korea's approach combines government-led bilateral agreements, ODA linkages, and collaboration with international organizations, alongside public-private partnerships involving various councils, project development, and financial support measures. Recent GEAs demonstrate a trend toward linking climate and environmental sectors with trade and investment, emphasizing cooperation in clean energy investment expansion and promoting sustainable finance mechanisms. The private sector's international cooperation is expanding, primarily through voluntary cooperation groups such as the Hydrogen Business Council.

Korea's international mitigation cooperation policy encompasses international reduction projects based on climate change cooperation agreements, mitigation cooperation through FTAs, and initiatives linked with ODA. A notable feature of recent GEAs is their provision for cooperation in developing, operating, and participating in carbon markets. Some agreements extend beyond GHG reduction outcomes to include objectives for investment expansion and export of green technologies or products.

The research proposes a modular agreement structure centered on four pillars: trade, technology, investment, and emissions reduction. This is accompanied by a phased implementation strategy: developing a Korea-specific model in the short term (by 2028), implementing an integrated K-Green Solution Package for technology, human resources, and financial support in the medium term (by 2035), and ultimately establishing a comprehensive Asia-Pacific climate trade governance framework in the long term. This research provides strategic insights for policymakers navigating challenges of intensifying nationalism and diminishing reduction commitments, offering practical strategies for effective international climate cooperation while securing economic growth opportunities. The findings underscore the importance of tailored approaches to international partnerships, strategic resource allocation, and innovative policy mechanisms in advancing global climate objectives while maintaining economic competitiveness.

Infrastructure is an important area for expanding Korea- India cooperation. With the Indian government continuing to expand its investment in infrastructure, India’s market potential is high. Infrastructure development is an important factor in supporting Korean companies as a partner to foster India’s manufacturing industries, which is what India needs most at the moment. Moreover, the participation of Korea in infrastructure projects is an effective way to enhance its national image in India. As the Korean government is expected to make a bilateral EDCF framework agreement with India, this study aims to contribute to expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation, especially with a focus on EDCF.

Chapter 2 analyses the infrastructure development plans of the Indian government. The Indian government recognises infrastructure as a key driver of economic growth and is promoting a comprehensive infrastructure policy centred on the National Industrial Corridor Development Programme. Infrastructure development in India is important for promoting the growth of manufacturing, securing national connectivity, stabilising water resources, and diversifying energy sources, ultimately leading to an improvement in national income and a reduction in income inequality.

The third Modi adminstration maintains policy continuity by allocating 11 trillion rupees, equivalent to 3.4% of GDP, to the infrastructure sector in the 2024/25 budget. The Indian government is actively promoting private and foreign investment through a trinity structure consisting of PM Gati Shakti, the National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP), and the National Monetisation Plan (NMP). This is evident in the state-level infrastructure development plans, with roads, railways, ports, energy transition, power supply, and water resources/management at the core of their development plans.

In Chapter 3, the current activities and plans (demand) for infrastructure development in India are analysed on a project basis. As of July 2024, a total of 14,923 investment projects are underway, with 10,357 projects in major infrastructure sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, electricity, industrial complex public infrastructure, and water resources. By sector, the largest number of projects, 5,560, are concentrated in the transportation sector, followed by 3,110 in the water sector, 1,117 in the power sector, and 531 projects in the industrial complex.

In India, there are currently about 1,000 major infrastructure projects in the planning stage. Uttar Pradesh has many projects in the railway sector, while Maharashtra is planning projects centered in railway and logistics infrastructure, and water and environmental management. Gujarat is now focusing on water and environmental management. In West Bengal, 149 projects are in the planning stage for the road sector alone, and there are many plans in the railway, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water and environmental management sectors. Rajasthan is focusing upon railway and power projects, and Haryana has many railway projects. In Tamil Nadu, there are projects planned, especially in the aviation, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water management sectors. In Andhra Pradesh, many projects are planned in the sectors of roads, railways, urban public transport, industrial complexes, and water resources. Karnataka has major projects in the sectors of roads and water resources management.

Chapter 4 analyses the ODA strategies and cases of Japan, Germany, France, and EU for infrastructure in India. They have established ODA strategies focusing upon the infrastructure sector. More than 90% of their ODA are concessional loans. They prioritise untied loans, but also adopt tied loans. For example, Japan is providing tied loans in railways. These countries focus their support on areas that align with their own ODA strategies. Japan takes programme-oriented approaches rather than participates in individual projects, while Germany and France tend to focus on individual projects through ODA policies that are segmented by field.

Institutional and policy cooperation is an important part of infrastructure ODA. For example, Japan is working with the union and state governments of India to supplement the overall systems and policies. It also work closely with their own companies in infrastructure development projects to identify challenges in the project, collect opinions, and design the project so that its own companies can benefit. A common problem in infrastructure ODA projects in India are the delay of the project period.

Chapter 5 identifies the potential for Korean companies in India through surveys and interviews. Korean companies have shown strong performance in industrial facilities such as thermal power plants, oil refineries, and chemical plants. They positively evaluate India’s high growth potential and show strong potential for high-value projects such as high-speed railways, sea bridges, and port development, etc. Korean companies cited India’s complex administrative procedures and strong competition as major constraints. They are keenly aware of the need to mitigate administrative risks and secure financing in India.

Chapter 6 presents policy recommendations for expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation. As a latecomer in development cooperation with India, Korea’s ODA for India’s infrastructure needs to be carried out in consideration of India’s strategic importance as a market as well as production base. In particular, the EDCF should be prioritised to promote Korea’s investment in India. However, rather than pursuing infrastructure projects in India from the perspective of short-term profits, Korea should make diverse project portfolios that meets the needs of India so that build a relationship of trust between the two countries.

When identifying infrastructure projects in India, it is necessary to find some states to cooperate with and to closely contact them. The areas that have been prominent in India’s recent infrastructure development plans are roads, railways (including metros), ports, energy conversion and power supply, and water resources/water management; they are reflected in infrastructure projects that are underway or planned. It is necessary to proactively present to India the areas where Korea has a technological advantage, centering on areas above mentioned.

In addition to the financial scale, the ‘plus’ factors such as knowledge sharing and technical cooperation are important in the ODA for India. In other words, it is necessary to discover a package project that covers consulting for development, programme loans for policy development, construction projects, technical cooperation, etc. To promote such comprehensive projects, Korean government need to combine the ODA tools of each ministry in a single project.

Korea has to enhance India’s understanding of Korea’s technological competitiveness in the infrastructure sector. It is necessary to invite India’s top-level decision makers such as the state prime minister and high-level officials to conduct workshops and field trips. In addition, partnerships should be promoted between Indian union or state-level institutions and Korean institutions in key areas, which will help understand India’s needs and secure local partners.

Efforts should be made to participate in projects from the planning stage. This will reduce the risk of the project and contribute to the discovery of projects in which the interests of both countries match. In addition, the dispatch of sector experts should be expanded to identify the development intentions of India’s state government, and to match Korean companies that have relevant technologies. In this process, these experts can play a leading role in arranging meetings between Indian government offcials and Korean institutions and companies.

The Korean government and related organisations’ support for companies operating in India is also needed. Government- wide cooperation is essential to discuss the demand for infrastructure cooperation between Korea and India. This is because infrastructure cooperation demand is often linked to industrial cooperation, and there are differences in the areas of authority of the two governments. Also, Relevant institutions or organisations need to systematically and continuously provide companies with information on India’s legal system, taxation, financing, etc. and train of local market experts. Korean companies are raising the need to establish local support centres, which is the idea that stress local networks that can help with possible administrative and legal issues.

This study aims to outline the direction of South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar by examining the current political and economic situation in Myanmar and reviewing the Myanmar-related policies of major countries. Myanmar, having shown hope for political transformation after political reforms in 2011 and the establishment of a civilian government in 2015, has returned to its past trajectory as the military reasserted control through a coup in 2021. The country now finds itself in a state of turmoil, with the military struggling to fully consolidate its hold on power. The current situation in Myanmar shows no clear hope for democratization.

The international community broadly condemned the Myanmar military’s coup. The United States and Europe, in particular, have imposed strong economic sanctions on Myanmar, which is now once again under military rule. Countries sensitive to democracy and human rights issues, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as ASEAN and some of its member states have also joined in these sanctions. However, the degree of participation varies according to each country’s circumstances, though they generally resort to a sanctions-based response towards Myanmar, ranging from selective to comprehensive sanctions.

In contrast, China and Russia have taken a more flexible stance on Myanmar’s military coup, displaying a more engaging approach. They have politically supported the Myanmar military, undermining UN sanctions and condemnations led by Western nations. While they advocate for a quick stabilization of Myanmar’s current political situation, they regard the coup as an internal affair and refrain from interference. Economically, they continue to expand cooperation with Myanmar. Russia, in particular, has significantly increased its military support for the Myanmar military since the coup. Thus, these two countries adopt an engagement approach, which varies from selective to comprehensive engagement based on the degree of involvement.

For South Korea, Myanmar was seen as the last “land of opportunity” in Southeast Asia following its political liberalization in 2011. Official development assistance and investments in Myanmar increased significantly. However, since the military coup in 2021, the South Korean government has suspended almost all political and economic relations with Myanmar, aside from humanitarian aid. While this cannot be considered comprehensive sanctions, it represents a fairly high level of selective sanctions. At the same time, there are various incentives to restore relations with Myanmar, such as South Korea’s ties with ASEAN, economic security considerations, supply chain issues, and investment opportunities in Myanmar. This presents a dilemma between the reality of military rule in Myanmar and the economic benefits that could be gained from the country.

Nonetheless, given the core direction of South Korea’s foreign policy, it is premature to pursue economic opportunities in Myanmar at this time. In the short term, it is unlikely that South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar will change before the 2025 elections, which will be held by the military. The question then arises: what approach should South Korea adopt depending on the political scenarios that may unfold in Myanmar after the 2025 election? If the post-election government is essentially a continuation of military rule, South Korea’s policy and stance towards Myanmar should remain unchanged in the short term. If, however, pro-democracy forces manage to take control and initiate reforms either before or after the election, South Korea’s policy could be adjusted to align more quickly with the new political landscape. Lastly, if Myanmar descends into a state of civil war or becomes a failed state, South Korea’s policy will need a complete shift, focusing primarily on refugee assistance, peacekeeping in response to the conflict, and protecting South Korean nationals in Myanmar.

South Korea’s Myanmar policy in each of these scenarios will inevitably intersect with the policies of other major countries engaged with Myanmar. Depending on the scenario, the policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to move in similar directions. Although there may be differences in pace, South Korea may find it essential to collaborate with these countries in rebuilding Myanmar should it resume a path towards democratization or in countering China’s growing influence under military rule. China and Russia may find prolonged military rule advantageous and are likely to expand their influence as much as possible. Finally, ASEAN’s approach is expected to be largely aligned with South Korea’s, allowing for potential synergy. However, ASEAN may show greater tolerance towards Myanmar’s military government, and, if military rule stabilizes over time, ASEAN may eventually recognize and cooperate with such a regime. In this context, South Korea will need a rationale to reconcile the contradiction between the “severed ROK-Myanmar relations” and “cooperation with Myanmar as a part of ROK-ASEAN cooperation.”