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Policy Reference

Publications

  • 신남방지역 온라인 플랫폼 시장 분석과 시사점
    Analysis on the Online Platform Markets and Policies in India and ASEAN

       Recently, there has been prominent growth in the digital platform market in Southeast Asian countries and India. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms a..

    Jeong Gon Kim et al. Date 2020.12.30

    ICT economy, Trade policy Southeast Asia Ocean India and South Asia

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       Recently, there has been prominent growth in the digital platform market in Southeast Asian countries and India. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms are expected to rise further. This report presents implications for cooperation between Korea and Southeast Asian countries and India by studying the development level and growing areas of the digital platform market in these countries, related laws and regulations, policies, and lastly, strategies of countries such as the United States, China and Australia toward Southeast Asian countries and India.
       While the Southeast Asian platform market is led by growth in e-commerce, ride-sharing and delivery services, the content platform market represented by over-the-top (OTT) media services is also growing rapidly with Covid-19, and there is a high perspective of growth in digital education and healthcare as well. India is accelerating its digital transformation across various areas due to the establishment of its Aadhaar-based digital financial ecosystem, increased demands on untact activities, and improved income levels. Amid the rapid growth of the online platform market, policies and institutional environments related to digital platforms in Southeast Asia and India are also rapidly changing. Southeast Asian countries are in the process of establishing an institutional basis for digital platforms: regulations on foreign investment, private information protection, e-commerce, etc. India is also in the process of overhauling its digital platform- related institutions and regulations.
       Competition among countries is also intensifying, with the rapidly growing digital platform market in these countries. China’s influence in the Southeast Asian platform market has been expanding over a considerable period of time. While the U.S. maintains its basic strategy of liberalizing global digital trade norms, it has recently concentrated on strengthening its role as a cooperative partner for growth of the digital economy in Southeast Asia. As a check on China’s influence in Southeast Asia, Australia aims to exercise its influence in the process of establishing institutional bases for the digital economy in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, U.S. companies hold an overwhelming presence in the Indian platform market. Amid the estrangement of political and economic relations between U.S. and China, India is becoming more important for the U.S. both as a market and a strategic ally. Australia is pushing for cooperation with India, focusing on areas where it enjoys a competitive advantage and where prospects are high for the Indian market. Australia is also focusing on cooperation with ASEAN and India in terms of building the foundation of the digital economy, such as technology, institutions, standards, and R&D.
       With the implementation of the New Southern Policy (NSP), Korea is gaining momentum to diversify economic cooperation with Southeast Asia and India into the realm of the digital economy. Open data, convergence of 5G and artificial intelligence across all industries, and fostering digital education and medical care, as presented by the Digital New Deal initiative of Korea, can all be considered as future cooperation agendas between Korea and Southeast Asian countries or India. In particular, Korea needs to pay attention to areas such as digital finance, healthcare, education, and content where NSP region’s demands are surging.
       Korea needs to push for digital economy and trade agreements with countries in the NSP region. In Southeast Asia, besides Singapore, the promotion of agreements with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines can be considered. In particular, it is necessary to find cooperative projects that reflect common interests, such as harmonizing personal information protection laws, utilizing public data, developing cooperative projects related to digital standards, finance, healthcare, and education. In the case of India, Korea needs to secure cooperative channels by establishing digital economic and trade agreements. It is important to share trends of rising businesses, institutions, and policy trends between the two countries and identify cooperation agenda.
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  • 무역구조의 변화가 국내 고용구조에 미친 영향과 정책 시사점
    The Effects of the Increase in Korea’s Trade with China and Vietnam on Korean Labor Market and Policy Implications

       Korea’s trade with China and Vietnam has increased remarkably for the last decades and this trend is one of the most notable changes in the Korean trade structure since the 2000s. This study analyzes the impact of ch..

    Kyong Hyun Koo and Hyuk-Hwang Kim Date 2020.12.30

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       Korea’s trade with China and Vietnam has increased remarkably for the last decades and this trend is one of the most notable changes in the Korean trade structure since the 2000s. This study analyzes the impact of changes in the Korean trade structure caused by the rise of China and Vietnam on the changes in the domestic employment structure at the industry and occupation level, and examines how the changes affected workers’ earnings and employment security over a longer period. 
       This study finds that the increase in imports from/exports to China and Vietnam from 2003 through 2018 has caused significant changes in Korea’s manufacturing employment by industry and occupation. Specifically, the employment declined in industries that are more exposed to import competition from China and Vietnam (e.g., textiles, clothing, shoes, computers and video equipment, etc.), while the employment increased in industries with large export growth to China and Vietnam(e.g., machinery and equipment, precision equipment, semiconductors, ferroalloys, etc.). The fact that not only imports from but also exports to China and Vietnam rose sharply in Korea partly explains why Korean manufacturing employment rebounded from the mid-2000s, unlike other advanced countries.
       In addition, the new employment for occupations that were exposed to high import competition from China and Vietnam (e.g., textile and clothing-related jobs, materials and construction-related jobs, etc.) tended to go down, while that for occupations exposed to increased exports to China and Vietnam (e.g., chemical and electrical engineering technicians, professional occupations related to natural science and life science, etc.) tended to go up, and the occupation- specific trade exposure effects was estimated to be greater than the industry-specific ones.
       Also, we find a general tendency throughout the manufacturing industry that the share of management-related office jobs and low-tech production jobs increased whereas and the share of middle- skilled production jobs decreased. The fact that this tendency is found in import-competing industries as well as export-increasing ones suggests that the former not only reduces overall employment but changes the composition of workers’ occupations qualitatively in response to the increased import competition from China and Vietnam.
       The changes in the employment structure caused by the trade shock from China and Vietnam further widened the gap of earnings and employment security among manufacturing workers in Korea. Specifically, the earnings of workers in industries that benefited from the increase in exports to China and Vietnam were found to rise significantly over 10 years, while the workers in import-competing industries experienced a lower growth rate in earnings and higher possibility of involuntary job displacement for the same period.
       In addition, the decrease in earnings due to exposure to import competition from China and Vietnam was more pronounced for the low-educated workers than the high-educated ones. For older workers, in turn, the positive earnings effects due to the increase in industrial exports to China and Vietnam did not appear unlike younger ones. The earnings of workers whose occupation exposed to import (export) shocks from China and Vietnam also tended to grow less (more). The effects of occupational trade exposure on workers’ earnings appeared faster and larger than those of industrial trade exposure.

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  • 이민이 EU의 노동시장에 미친 영향과 정책 시사점
    Impact of Migration on the Labor Market of the EU and Its Implications for Korea

    This report analyzes migration and labor market in the European Union (EU henceforth). First, the EU’s and major European countries’ regulations and institutions on migration are analyzed, and some stylized-facts are established..

    Dong-Hee Joe et al. Date 2020.12.30

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    This report analyzes migration and labor market in the European Union (EU henceforth). First, the EU’s and major European countries’ regulations and institutions on migration are analyzed, and some stylized-facts are established. Comparing these stylized-facts with the Korea counterparts, it offers policy implications for Korea. Also, main features of the states of migration in the EU are described, to deepen the understanding of the situation. A major interest regarding immigration, in Korea as well as in the EU, would be its impact on labor market in destination countries. To help better understanding on this, the impact of immigration on the recipient labor market is estimated, using the data from the EU. By doing a comprehensive analysis, this report aims to deepen the understanding on migration and labor market in the EU, derive policy implications for Korea, and offer a reference to assess the impact of an increase of immigration on the Korean labor market.
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  • 인도태평양 전략과 신남방정책의 협력 방향
    Exploring Convergence between the New Southern Policy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: From Korea’s Perspective

       Given its geostrategic position and growing importance in the world economy, the Indo-Pacific region has attracted many major powers to actively engage with the region. With the unveiling of the New Southern Policy (N..

    Ina Choi et al. Date 2020.12.30

    Economic cooperation, International politics India and South Asia

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       Given its geostrategic position and growing importance in the world economy, the Indo-Pacific region has attracted many major powers to actively engage with the region. With the unveiling of the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017, Korea has also sought to upgrade its relations with ASEAN and India by boosting economic ties, socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation in the area of peace and security. While an earlier version of the NSP focused on bilateral cooperation with targeted countries, it gradually began to explore opportunities to collaborate with other players in addressing the needs of ASEAN and India. In particular, as the United States seeks cooperation with its key allies in forging the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), there has been growing interest in the search for convergence between the FOIP and the NSP. Initially, the Korean government took an ambiguous stance toward the U.S.’s new policy, but in 2019 the two governments agreed to work together by building synergies between the NSP and the FOIP. Nevertheless, given the strategic nature of the FOIP as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the attendant concerns in Southeast Asia about being embroiled in U.S.-China rivalry, close collaboration with the FOIP poses some challenges for the NSP, whose primary objective is to win the heart of targeted countries and steer toward stronger cooperation with them. Against this backdrop, this report presents suggestions on how the NSP could cooperate with the FOIP in ways that suit the interests of ASEAN and India. The policy recommendation is based on analyzing how the FOIP is received by NSP-targeted countries and the cooperation needs of this region.
       Before exploring ASEAN/India’s stance on the FOIP, Chapter 2 reviews the details of the FOIP focusing on its three pillars: security, economic and governance. By comparing the FOIP and the NSP, we explore the chance of convergence between the two policies. The results of our analysis suggest that while both policies have different objectives and approaches, particularly in the “security” pillar, there are sufficient opportunities for cooperation between the two in the fields of economic cooperation and non-traditional security.
       To clarify the position of targeted countries, Chapter 3 examines how Southeast Asia and India have responded to the U.S.’s FOIP. To counterbalance China’s growing regional power, most Southeast Asian nations welcome the active presence of the U.S. in the region, but ASEAN’s long-standing tradition to preserve its neutrality leads them to take a discreet approach to the FOIP. While most ASEAN member states are reluctant to clarify their position, they are likely to participate in FOIP-related initiatives that suit their national interests. On the security side, maritime states, particularly Vietnam, are eager to seek U.S. support for enhancing their maritime capacity to better respond to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and other maritime challenges. However, although these countries will step up security cooperation with the U.S., where their interests lie, no Southeast Asian nations ‒ including two treaty allies and a close security partner, namely Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore ‒ are likely to align themselves with the FOIP that promotes anti-China narratives. On the economic front, in general, most ASEAN member states are expected to welcome economic initiatives under the FOIP. Desiring to diversify their trade/investment partners, even China-leaning countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are not in a position to say no to new sources of finance and projects to develop their economies. One major drawback, though, is that ASEAN is unsure about the U.S.’s commitment to play a more active role in the regional economy, given the small scale of FOIP-related programs compared to those associated with China’s BRI project. Good governance principles advocated by the FOIP also create additional barriers for the majority of Southeast Asian countries that are unlikely to meet the high standards required by the U.S. Meanwhile, based on shared strategic interests to counter the rise of China, India has accelerated defense and economic cooperation with the U.S. although it is yet to fully commit itself to the U.S.’s FOIP. Like ASEAN countries, India does not agree with the China containment policy embedded in the FOIP, but given the escalated tension with China after the border row in 2020, it appears to be working more closely with the U.S. to counterbalance China. What is notable is that both ASEAN and India promote an inclusive vision of ndo-Pacific cooperation. By adopting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) at the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019, ASEAN showed its determination to play a key role in making the Indo-Pacific a region of cooperation and prosperity for all. India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific also envisions a free, open and inclusive region where all players enjoy shared security and prosperity. More importantly, ASEAN attempts to alleviate tensions caused by great power rivalry in the region by calling for development-driven cooperation with particular emphasis on economic cooperation, connectivity, SDGs and non-traditional security issues. ASEAN and India’s stance at the evolving    Indo-Pacific cooperation is closely in line with the vision of Korea’s NSP, which envisages a “people-centered community of peace and prosperity.” This suggests that Korea’s collaboration with the U.S. in the region is better to be focused upon inclusive economic cooperation and people-centered non-traditional security areas.
       Taking this into account, Chapter 4 analyzes the needs of targeted countries in selected areas where synergy is expected in promoting ROK-US cooperation: digital, energy, infrastructure development and several sub-fields of non-traditional security. In addition to policy reviews of major cooperation partners – Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and India – in each sector, quantitative analysis was conducted to calculate the cooperation demand by sector in these countries, and to evaluate the competitiveness of Korea and the U.S. in supporting development in each sector of the countries. When it comes to non-traditional security issues, ASEAN’s needs are explored focusing on the areas of environmental protection, disaster relief, health and maritime cooperation.
       Drawing upon the analysis addressed in the previous chapter, Chapter 5 discusses possible directions in which ROK-US cooperation can play out in the Indo-Pacific region. Most importantly, to step up economic cooperation, a working-level commission could be established where relevant authorities of the two countries can discuss overlapping interests and identify feasible joint projects where they see synergy. As for cooperation by sector, one major high-profile area in the digital sector is ICT infrastructure development, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and India, where demand is high. In addition, given the growing digital economy in the region, the two countries should pursue collaboration to improve digital systems and standards in ASEAN. They may regularly hold workshops for knowledge exchange and provide training programs designed to enhance the digital and cybersecurity capacity of potential partners in ASEAN. In the energy sector, one salient area for ROK-US partnership is the promotion of energy efficiency in the region. Korea and the U.S. can launch a joint energy efficiency initiative and set up a working group to initiate programs for reforming energy regulation and supporting the growth of renewable energy industries in potential partners. Pertaining to infrastructure development, Seoul and Washington have vast opportunities of cooperation in road connectivity, water system and electricity infrastructure. In particular, they can work together to enhance road connectivity in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam and upgrade water facilities in the lower Mekong area. The two countries also need to pursue a joint initiative for improving electricity infrastructure in the region, including institutional support to woo private investment. Given the high demands for electricity facilities in Myanmar and India, a bilateral working group can be formed to address the need of these countries and provide consultation for their governments and private sector. As for the non-traditional security area, it will be better to start by exploring overlapping areas between existing programs conducted by Korea and the U.S. in ASEAN. To this end, Seoul and Washington need to create a regular dialogue channel between working-level authorities of competent agencies on both sides, for instance the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In the areas where their interests overlap, they can launch ROK-US cooperation funds designed to support specific projects in need. In the area of environmental protection, priority areas will be climate change adaptation in ASEAN member states and biodiversity conservation in the lower Mekong wetlands. Regarding disaster prevention and relief, they should work together to improve flood forecasting/warning systems in vulnerable countries by sharing information gained by satellite observations as well as reinforcing preventive facilities against floods and landslides. Korea and the U.S. also need to jointly support capacity-building for disaster response and management in ASEAN member states, including support for emergency rescue operations. In the health sector, the utmost priority should be given to fight against covid-19 in ASEAN member states, and in the long term the joint assistance should be extended to enhance the capacity of ASEAN countries in preventing and responding to new infectious disease outbreaks. Lastly, Korea and the U.S. should promote their partnership in maritime capacity-building of ASEAN states. Maritime cooperation not only meets the high demand of targeted countries, but also has a great potential to further upgrade ASEAN-Korea peace cooperation. In this sense, Korea needs to be more active in collaborating with the U.S to strengthen ASEAN’s capability in Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) and law enforcement against transnational crimes at sea.
       In conclusion, Chapter 6 provides policy suggestions for Korea’s NSP in collaborating with the FOIP. First, Korea should consider targeted countries’ sensitivity to the FOIP and therefore promote cooperation with the U.S. in areas where shared interests overlap, rather than aligning the NSP with the FOIP. More importantly, the needs of targeted countries should be foregrounded when exploring the convergence between the two policies. Second, recognizing the criticism that the NSP prioritizes ASEAN over India, Korea should bolster cooperation with India. Promoting joint projects with the U.S. will provide a good opportunity to upgrade Korea’s cooperation with India. Our recommendation is to start from the areas where India’s demands are high such as smart city development, renewable energy and connectivity projects linking ASEAN and India. Last but not least, given the limitation of resources allocated to the NSP, Korea needs to narrow its focus and concentrate on where synergy is expected in navigating the convergence with the FOIP. Considering the strategic needs and competitiveness of both countries, our study suggests that digital transformation, smart city development, Mekong cooperation and non-traditional security should be prioritized in promoting the ROK-US cooperation.
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  • 2020년 중국종합연구 총서 정책연구과제 요약집

    Date 2020.12.30

    China

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  • 중국의 미세먼지 저감 에너지 정책의 시사점 연구

    Date 2020.12.30

    China

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  • 중국의 농식품 무역과 통상분쟁 연구

    Date 2020.12.30

    Industrial structure, Industrial policy

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  • 중국의 계절관리제 관련 사업장 대기오염물질 배출 관리 정책 분석 및 한중 협력 방안..

    Date 2020.12.30

    Industrial policy, Environmental policy China

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  • 중국의 일국양제 20년 평가와 전망

    ❙국문요약 ❙제1장 서론 1. 연구 배경 2. 일국양제의 개념 3. 선행연구 및 연구 목적 4. 주요 연구 내용 및 방법 ❙제2장 홍콩·마카오의 일국양제 실시 20년1. 상이한 정치제도의 공존 가능성과 모순 2. 일국양제하 경제적 성과와 과제 3. 사회적 통..

    Date 2020.12.30

    China

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    ❙국문요약

    ❙제1장 서론
    1. 연구 배경
    2. 일국양제의 개념
    3. 선행연구 및 연구 목적
    4. 주요 연구 내용 및 방법

    ❙제2장 홍콩·마카오의 일국양제 실시 20년
    1. 상이한 정치제도의 공존 가능성과 모순
    2. 일국양제하 경제적 성과와 과제
    3. 사회적 통합과 저항
    4. 홍콩·마카오와 국제사회

    ❙제3장 양안관계와 일국양제
    1. 양안관계에 대한 타이완의 인식
    2. 양안 경제교류의 성과와 과제
    3. 양안 사회문화교류의 성과와 과제
    4. 타이완과 국제사회

    ❙제4장 일국양제에 대한  영향 요인과 전망
    1. 중국 국가전략의 변화
    2. 미·중 전략경쟁의 심화
    3. 홍콩·마카오·타이완의 정치 변동
    4. 일국양제 전망

    ❙제5장 함의 및 시사점
    1. 남북관계에 대한 함의 및 시사점
    2. 한·중관계에 대한 함의 및 시사점
    3. 국제사회에 대한 함의 및 시사점

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  • 중국의 초국경 경제협력구 조성협력 및 활용방안 연구

    Date 2020.12.30

    China

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