In an era where global climate change responses increasingly manifest as unilateral trade measures by major countries, cooperation continues to evolve into novel forms. This research defines Green Economy Agreements (GEAs) as innovative cooperative frameworks that seek to achieve a balanced realization of environmental protection and economic growth, centered on carbon neutrality. These agreements aim to generate new economic opportunities through cross-border trade and investment in green economies while establishing stable climate-trade cooperative relationships through regulatory harmonization for climate change response.

Currently, GEAs are being implemented in various forms, including non-binding MOUs with partnerships, FTAs that integrate climate change and environmental policies with trade policies, and independent climate-trade treaties. These agreements can be broadly categorized into two types: comprehensive green economy transition agreements pursuing environmental transformation of economic structures, and cooperation agreements focusing on specific climate change response measures such as carbon reduction collaboration.

Notable examples of trade agreements for green economy transition include the IPEF Clean Economy Agreement, the sustainable development chapter of the EU-New Zealand FTA, and the Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement. Korea is pursuing this comprehensive approach through environmental chapters in existing FTAs and partnerships such as the Korea-Australia Green Economy Partnership and the Korea-EU Green Partnership. Meanwhile, cooperation agreements specialized in climate change response focus on specific mechanisms like cross-border carbon credit transfer, exemplified by Switzerland's Paris Agreement Implementation Agreement and Japan's Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) bilateral memoranda. As of 2024, Korea has established basic climate change cooperation agreements with seven countries and is conducting additional negotiations with over 20 nations.

Global and Korean GEAs are structured around five core domains: energy transition, environmental goods and services, technological cooperation, market mechanisms, and implementation support. The energy transition domain encompasses clean energy development and utilization centered on renewable energy and hydrogen, along with sector-specific decarbonization challenges in transportation, industry, and agriculture. The environmental goods and services domain addresses trade facilitation through list compilation, non-tariff barrier reduction, government procurement expansion, and the establishment of standards and certification systems. The technological cooperation domain focuses on R&D and commercialization of core technologies such as CCUS, while the market mechanism domain includes participation in international carbon markets, establishment of MRV systems, and promotion of ESG investment. The implementation support domain defines governance systems including capacity building for just transition, stakeholder engagement, and dispute resolution.

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As GEAs pursue climate change response and sustainable economic growth, the scope of related goods and services continues to expand. A comparative analysis of recently concluded GEAs reveals varying scopes of environmental goods: the Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement designates 372 items at the HS6 level, the UK-New Zealand FTA includes 293 items, and the EU-New Zealand FTA lists 48 items. While the Australia-Singapore agreement encompasses the most items, the quantity alone cannot determine the agreement's sophistication, as the nature and scope of environmental goods differ significantly across agreements.

At the enterprise level, approximately 30,000 firms annually export environmental goods as defined in the UK-New Zealand and EU-New Zealand FTAs. Despite entry and exit dynamics, the number of exporting firms remains relatively stable. These environmental goods exporters demonstrate notably higher total sales, sales per employee, and R&D expenditure, indicating the capital-intensive and innovation-driven nature of the sector. Given that different countries define environmental goods according to their interests, strategic approaches aligned with Korea's industrial conditions are essential for future GEA negotiations.

The economic impact analysis employs general equilibrium mode, especially GTAP E-Power model, to simulate various cooperation scenarios. Results reveal differentiated effects across partner country groups. From Korea's perspective, technological cooperation proves most effective with nations that have completed carbon neutrality legislation, while carbon credit linkage also shows high effectiveness compared to other country combinations. Market opening and tariff reduction mechanisms demonstrate greater impact with countries in the policy development phase. For partner countries, those without NDC submissions show the highest expected benefits from technological cooperation with Korea.

Regarding Korea’s strategic positioning, Chapter 4 analyzes Korea’s green economy cooperation policies through four critical domains - technology, supply chains, investment, and international mitigation - that implement the key GEA components outlined in Chapter 2. The analysis evaluates current policies against recent GEA trends to develop actionable recommendations for an effective roadmap and implementation strategy. The country's climate technology capabilities currently stand at approximately 80% of advanced nations’ levels, with notable gaps in hydrogen, fuel cells, and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies. The government is actively pursuing international collaboration with technology leaders such as the United States, Germany, and Japan to secure foundational technologies, participate in large-scale demonstration projects, and establish international technical standards. However, challenges persist, including shortages of specialized personnel, financial constraints, and difficulties in market localization.

Korea’s green supply chain cooperation policy aims to secure stable supplies of critical resources for future industries such as hydrogen, batteries, and essential minerals while strengthening supply chain resilience. Given the country's high dependence on imports for crucial resources like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, diversifying import sources and developing green supply chain infrastructure are paramount. The government has established domestic legal and policy frameworks while fostering strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries through MOUs focusing on resource development and processing cooperation.

In terms of international investment cooperation, Korea's approach combines government-led bilateral agreements, ODA linkages, and collaboration with international organizations, alongside public-private partnerships involving various councils, project development, and financial support measures. Recent GEAs demonstrate a trend toward linking climate and environmental sectors with trade and investment, emphasizing cooperation in clean energy investment expansion and promoting sustainable finance mechanisms. The private sector's international cooperation is expanding, primarily through voluntary cooperation groups such as the Hydrogen Business Council.

Korea's international mitigation cooperation policy encompasses international reduction projects based on climate change cooperation agreements, mitigation cooperation through FTAs, and initiatives linked with ODA. A notable feature of recent GEAs is their provision for cooperation in developing, operating, and participating in carbon markets. Some agreements extend beyond GHG reduction outcomes to include objectives for investment expansion and export of green technologies or products.

The research proposes a modular agreement structure centered on four pillars: trade, technology, investment, and emissions reduction. This is accompanied by a phased implementation strategy: developing a Korea-specific model in the short term (by 2028), implementing an integrated K-Green Solution Package for technology, human resources, and financial support in the medium term (by 2035), and ultimately establishing a comprehensive Asia-Pacific climate trade governance framework in the long term. This research provides strategic insights for policymakers navigating challenges of intensifying nationalism and diminishing reduction commitments, offering practical strategies for effective international climate cooperation while securing economic growth opportunities. The findings underscore the importance of tailored approaches to international partnerships, strategic resource allocation, and innovative policy mechanisms in advancing global climate objectives while maintaining economic competitiveness.

Infrastructure is an important area for expanding Korea- India cooperation. With the Indian government continuing to expand its investment in infrastructure, India’s market potential is high. Infrastructure development is an important factor in supporting Korean companies as a partner to foster India’s manufacturing industries, which is what India needs most at the moment. Moreover, the participation of Korea in infrastructure projects is an effective way to enhance its national image in India. As the Korean government is expected to make a bilateral EDCF framework agreement with India, this study aims to contribute to expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation, especially with a focus on EDCF.

Chapter 2 analyses the infrastructure development plans of the Indian government. The Indian government recognises infrastructure as a key driver of economic growth and is promoting a comprehensive infrastructure policy centred on the National Industrial Corridor Development Programme. Infrastructure development in India is important for promoting the growth of manufacturing, securing national connectivity, stabilising water resources, and diversifying energy sources, ultimately leading to an improvement in national income and a reduction in income inequality.

The third Modi adminstration maintains policy continuity by allocating 11 trillion rupees, equivalent to 3.4% of GDP, to the infrastructure sector in the 2024/25 budget. The Indian government is actively promoting private and foreign investment through a trinity structure consisting of PM Gati Shakti, the National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP), and the National Monetisation Plan (NMP). This is evident in the state-level infrastructure development plans, with roads, railways, ports, energy transition, power supply, and water resources/management at the core of their development plans.

In Chapter 3, the current activities and plans (demand) for infrastructure development in India are analysed on a project basis. As of July 2024, a total of 14,923 investment projects are underway, with 10,357 projects in major infrastructure sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, electricity, industrial complex public infrastructure, and water resources. By sector, the largest number of projects, 5,560, are concentrated in the transportation sector, followed by 3,110 in the water sector, 1,117 in the power sector, and 531 projects in the industrial complex.

In India, there are currently about 1,000 major infrastructure projects in the planning stage. Uttar Pradesh has many projects in the railway sector, while Maharashtra is planning projects centered in railway and logistics infrastructure, and water and environmental management. Gujarat is now focusing on water and environmental management. In West Bengal, 149 projects are in the planning stage for the road sector alone, and there are many plans in the railway, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water and environmental management sectors. Rajasthan is focusing upon railway and power projects, and Haryana has many railway projects. In Tamil Nadu, there are projects planned, especially in the aviation, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water management sectors. In Andhra Pradesh, many projects are planned in the sectors of roads, railways, urban public transport, industrial complexes, and water resources. Karnataka has major projects in the sectors of roads and water resources management.

Chapter 4 analyses the ODA strategies and cases of Japan, Germany, France, and EU for infrastructure in India. They have established ODA strategies focusing upon the infrastructure sector. More than 90% of their ODA are concessional loans. They prioritise untied loans, but also adopt tied loans. For example, Japan is providing tied loans in railways. These countries focus their support on areas that align with their own ODA strategies. Japan takes programme-oriented approaches rather than participates in individual projects, while Germany and France tend to focus on individual projects through ODA policies that are segmented by field.

Institutional and policy cooperation is an important part of infrastructure ODA. For example, Japan is working with the union and state governments of India to supplement the overall systems and policies. It also work closely with their own companies in infrastructure development projects to identify challenges in the project, collect opinions, and design the project so that its own companies can benefit. A common problem in infrastructure ODA projects in India are the delay of the project period.

Chapter 5 identifies the potential for Korean companies in India through surveys and interviews. Korean companies have shown strong performance in industrial facilities such as thermal power plants, oil refineries, and chemical plants. They positively evaluate India’s high growth potential and show strong potential for high-value projects such as high-speed railways, sea bridges, and port development, etc. Korean companies cited India’s complex administrative procedures and strong competition as major constraints. They are keenly aware of the need to mitigate administrative risks and secure financing in India.

Chapter 6 presents policy recommendations for expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation. As a latecomer in development cooperation with India, Korea’s ODA for India’s infrastructure needs to be carried out in consideration of India’s strategic importance as a market as well as production base. In particular, the EDCF should be prioritised to promote Korea’s investment in India. However, rather than pursuing infrastructure projects in India from the perspective of short-term profits, Korea should make diverse project portfolios that meets the needs of India so that build a relationship of trust between the two countries.

When identifying infrastructure projects in India, it is necessary to find some states to cooperate with and to closely contact them. The areas that have been prominent in India’s recent infrastructure development plans are roads, railways (including metros), ports, energy conversion and power supply, and water resources/water management; they are reflected in infrastructure projects that are underway or planned. It is necessary to proactively present to India the areas where Korea has a technological advantage, centering on areas above mentioned.

In addition to the financial scale, the ‘plus’ factors such as knowledge sharing and technical cooperation are important in the ODA for India. In other words, it is necessary to discover a package project that covers consulting for development, programme loans for policy development, construction projects, technical cooperation, etc. To promote such comprehensive projects, Korean government need to combine the ODA tools of each ministry in a single project.

Korea has to enhance India’s understanding of Korea’s technological competitiveness in the infrastructure sector. It is necessary to invite India’s top-level decision makers such as the state prime minister and high-level officials to conduct workshops and field trips. In addition, partnerships should be promoted between Indian union or state-level institutions and Korean institutions in key areas, which will help understand India’s needs and secure local partners.

Efforts should be made to participate in projects from the planning stage. This will reduce the risk of the project and contribute to the discovery of projects in which the interests of both countries match. In addition, the dispatch of sector experts should be expanded to identify the development intentions of India’s state government, and to match Korean companies that have relevant technologies. In this process, these experts can play a leading role in arranging meetings between Indian government offcials and Korean institutions and companies.

The Korean government and related organisations’ support for companies operating in India is also needed. Government- wide cooperation is essential to discuss the demand for infrastructure cooperation between Korea and India. This is because infrastructure cooperation demand is often linked to industrial cooperation, and there are differences in the areas of authority of the two governments. Also, Relevant institutions or organisations need to systematically and continuously provide companies with information on India’s legal system, taxation, financing, etc. and train of local market experts. Korean companies are raising the need to establish local support centres, which is the idea that stress local networks that can help with possible administrative and legal issues.

This study aims to outline the direction of South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar by examining the current political and economic situation in Myanmar and reviewing the Myanmar-related policies of major countries. Myanmar, having shown hope for political transformation after political reforms in 2011 and the establishment of a civilian government in 2015, has returned to its past trajectory as the military reasserted control through a coup in 2021. The country now finds itself in a state of turmoil, with the military struggling to fully consolidate its hold on power. The current situation in Myanmar shows no clear hope for democratization.

The international community broadly condemned the Myanmar military’s coup. The United States and Europe, in particular, have imposed strong economic sanctions on Myanmar, which is now once again under military rule. Countries sensitive to democracy and human rights issues, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as ASEAN and some of its member states have also joined in these sanctions. However, the degree of participation varies according to each country’s circumstances, though they generally resort to a sanctions-based response towards Myanmar, ranging from selective to comprehensive sanctions.

In contrast, China and Russia have taken a more flexible stance on Myanmar’s military coup, displaying a more engaging approach. They have politically supported the Myanmar military, undermining UN sanctions and condemnations led by Western nations. While they advocate for a quick stabilization of Myanmar’s current political situation, they regard the coup as an internal affair and refrain from interference. Economically, they continue to expand cooperation with Myanmar. Russia, in particular, has significantly increased its military support for the Myanmar military since the coup. Thus, these two countries adopt an engagement approach, which varies from selective to comprehensive engagement based on the degree of involvement.

For South Korea, Myanmar was seen as the last “land of opportunity” in Southeast Asia following its political liberalization in 2011. Official development assistance and investments in Myanmar increased significantly. However, since the military coup in 2021, the South Korean government has suspended almost all political and economic relations with Myanmar, aside from humanitarian aid. While this cannot be considered comprehensive sanctions, it represents a fairly high level of selective sanctions. At the same time, there are various incentives to restore relations with Myanmar, such as South Korea’s ties with ASEAN, economic security considerations, supply chain issues, and investment opportunities in Myanmar. This presents a dilemma between the reality of military rule in Myanmar and the economic benefits that could be gained from the country.

Nonetheless, given the core direction of South Korea’s foreign policy, it is premature to pursue economic opportunities in Myanmar at this time. In the short term, it is unlikely that South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar will change before the 2025 elections, which will be held by the military. The question then arises: what approach should South Korea adopt depending on the political scenarios that may unfold in Myanmar after the 2025 election? If the post-election government is essentially a continuation of military rule, South Korea’s policy and stance towards Myanmar should remain unchanged in the short term. If, however, pro-democracy forces manage to take control and initiate reforms either before or after the election, South Korea’s policy could be adjusted to align more quickly with the new political landscape. Lastly, if Myanmar descends into a state of civil war or becomes a failed state, South Korea’s policy will need a complete shift, focusing primarily on refugee assistance, peacekeeping in response to the conflict, and protecting South Korean nationals in Myanmar.

South Korea’s Myanmar policy in each of these scenarios will inevitably intersect with the policies of other major countries engaged with Myanmar. Depending on the scenario, the policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to move in similar directions. Although there may be differences in pace, South Korea may find it essential to collaborate with these countries in rebuilding Myanmar should it resume a path towards democratization or in countering China’s growing influence under military rule. China and Russia may find prolonged military rule advantageous and are likely to expand their influence as much as possible. Finally, ASEAN’s approach is expected to be largely aligned with South Korea’s, allowing for potential synergy. However, ASEAN may show greater tolerance towards Myanmar’s military government, and, if military rule stabilizes over time, ASEAN may eventually recognize and cooperate with such a regime. In this context, South Korea will need a rationale to reconcile the contradiction between the “severed ROK-Myanmar relations” and “cooperation with Myanmar as a part of ROK-ASEAN cooperation.”

To address the complex challenges in international development, the role of social enterprises, particularly social ventures, is increasingly vital. These enterprises employ innovative and sustainable approaches to tackle multifaceted issues, by blending social objectives with economic gain and bridging corporate structures and nonprofit organizations. They offer effective solutions to development challenges through innovative approaches and technological integration, fostering a close collaboration with marginalized communities and local groups in developing countries. Nevertheless, activities and studies on the role of social enterprises in international development, especially in terms of individual corporate activities, remain limited due to institutional constraints and scarcity of information available. This study focuses on the features of social enterprises to illustrate their roles and contributions within the context of international development cooperation. By focusing on social ventures as the main form of social enterprise in international development, this study attempts to move beyond previous limitations and yield practical insights on facilitating the participation of social enterprises in international development, and to increase their impact.

Following an introduction of the study, Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for understanding some essential characteristics of social enterprises. Our research highlights the lack of a universal definition for social enterprises and the varying scope of these organizations across different countries. In Chapter 2, we examine discussions at the OECD and UN, along with the background and status of social enterprises in major countries.

Our review found that the countries have formed distinctive social enterprise institutions according to their macro policy background. We also discovered that they apply flexibility on the definition and scope over time. Notably, the UK, France, and Denmark, which saw the development of social enterprise institutions starting in the late 1990s, promoted social enterprise as a means to complement government welfare. Therefore, these nations emphasize the main feature of social enterprises as businesses that prioritize social value. In contrast, the development of social enterprises came into prominence in the Netherlands during the 2000s. In the Netherlands, social enterprises flourished as skilled personnel from civil society organizations entered the private sector. Unlike other countries, the Netherlands maintains a flexible perspective on determining social enterprises, foregoing any legal limitations on the forms of social enterprises. Well-known for its vibrant tradition in civil society engagement, the United States recognizes social enterprises through various legal frameworks. Flexibility is allowed in the social values pursued by each enterprise. Likewise, international organizations such as the OECD and the UN also provide flexible definitions of social enterprises. The organizations position social enterprises as key players in addressing evolving and intricate development issues.

In South Korea, institutions for social enterprises were developed during the 1990s with a strong focus on job creation. As a result, a narrower official stance toward “social enterprises” was formed, compared to the other countries discussed in this chapter. In a broader perspective, other forms of social enterprises also exist in Korea, such as self-supporting enterprises, cooperatives, village enterprises, and social ventures. This study focuses particularly on social ventures, which are defined most inclusively and have the institutional capacity to engage in international activities.

Chapter 3 compares and analyzes approaches and support programs in the UK, Netherlands, and the United States. These countries actively promote private sector participation in international development. For example, the UK has been supporting social enterprises since the 2000s, mainly through capacity-building. Since 2015, there is a shift towards indirect impact investment – through development finance institution, from direct capacity support.

The Netherlands has traditionally underscored the pursuit of national interests by encouraging private sector participation in international development. It is currently pursuing social value by requiring corporate social responsibility in all business-engaged international development activities. In addition to technical support (consulting, networking), the Netherlands also provides financial support, often employing indirect support for local companies in developing countries through development finance institutions.

The United States maintains robust private sector involvement in international development. The U.S. promotes the participation of socially innovative enterprises in line with USAID’s Private Sector Engagement (PSE) policy. Enterprises are supported through financial aid, advisory support, networking, and research collaboration. The U.S. distinguishes itself from other donors by providing direct funding to social ventures through development finance institutions (DFIs), therefore, leveraging additional private investment.

In contrast, Korea ‘s support programs for social ventures remain at a nascent stage. KOICA’s Creative Technology Solution (CTS) supports the initial business development of startups and ventures with innovative technology. Under the KOICA Innovative Business Solutions (IBS) project, there have been co-financing with domestic social impact investors to discover, nurture, and support local startups in developing countries.

The following chapter provides a review of Korean social ventures, including those participating in KOICA’s CTS program, as well as case studies of companies active in international development cooperation. Findings indicate that most KOICA CTS participants are registered as ventures, not as social ventures or (preliminary) social enterprises. They are predominantly classified as impact ventures or conventional ventures with some commitment to social value. On the other hand, companies interviewed for the case study identified themselves as social ventures, highlighting a gap between institutional classification and self-perception.

Examples of social ventures engaged in international development cooperation include Enuma Korea (education), Vuno (healthcare), Wiplet (water), Cornerstone T&M, Greengoods (rural development), Verywords, Envelops, and Pharos Marine (technology, environment, energy). These enterprises were initiated or adapted their business goals to prioritize social value creation in developing countries. Many leverage innovative technologies or mature business models to establish profitable structures, while utilizing public support to enhance their business model and to secure investments. In addition, many of them work closely with local stakeholders, ranging from the government to NGOs and community residents.

Lastly, Chapter 5 analyzes and presents the findings to identify key constraints in stimulating social venture participation in international development cooperation: (1) the gap between institutional frameworks and on-the-ground realities, (2) the lack of opportunities, and (3) the scarcity of entrepreneurs in development cooperation. To address these challenges we suggest a revision of policies related to social enterprises. In Korea, the Social Enterprise Promotion Act, enacted in 2007, has remained largely unchanged, failing to adequately reflect today’s social challenges and corporate realities. Drawing on the UN’s experience of amending social enterprise roles to address evolving demands, as well as OECD Guidelines on social enterprise institutions, adjustments to the social enterprise framework are essential. This should include revisions in the certification system and an expanded scope for social enterprises to reflect contemporary challenges, such as aging population, inequality, and environmental issues. Furthermore, it is imperative to enhance the efficacy of the institutional framework by providing tangible benefits to businesses. Many companies participating in the KOICA CTS are registered under the venture enterprise system, which offers substantial benefits such as tax exemption, low interest rate loans, R&D support, and so on. This stems from how registration as social or social venture enterprises provides no tangible benefits to these businesses, which in turn highlights the need for incentives within the social enterprise framework, as seen in the U.S., which provides practical incentives to enterprises with social missions.

Secondly, there is a need to expand programs that potential entrepreneurs can access. This will lead to fostering social enterprises involved in international development cooperation as well as revitalizing the private sector ecosystem in international development. Taking on from the lessons learned, current programs such as the KOICA CTS and IBS can play an even more pivotal role in attracting and fostering potential entrepreneurs in international development. In the long-term, it would be beneficial to explore impact investment for enterprises tackling development issues through development finance institutions, as in the cases of the UK, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Lastly, there is a need to cultivate entrepreneurs who possess a strong understanding of and interest in international development. The social ventures reviewed in this study can be broadly categorized into two types: those that focus on developing innovative solutions aimed primarily at developing countries ("social purpose-driven" ventures) and those that aim to apply innovative solutions to the local challenges in developing countries through entrepreneurial spirit (“innovation-driven" ventures). Strengthening the developmental impact of innovation-driven enterprises while enhancing the business models of social purpose-driven enterprises will improve the sustainability of their solutions and operations. The Dutch example could serve as a useful reference in reinforcing development objectives within existing programs. At the same time, it is also crucial to identify and nurture potential entrepreneurs who are willing to modify their business activities to fit developing countries.

This study aimed to gain comprehensive understanding of the form and characteristics of social enterprises in Korea to increase their participation in international development. The study seeks to assess the effectiveness of support programs and identify challenges from the perspective of the businesses. Furthermore, as a policy study, it compares Korea’s social enterprise systems and programs with those in other countries to identify areas for improvement. This research provides an overview of social enterprise development in international organizations, various countries, and Korea. It also documents the experiences of companies involved in these activities. Subsequent policy researches are expected to bridge the gap between policy and business activities. We also hope that the business cases analyzed in the report will serve as valuable references for increased participation of social entrepreneurs in international development cooperation.

In the 2020s, the Korean and Japanese governments faced a crisis involving supply chain disruptions of critical mineral resources alongside the reorganization of global supply chains due to efforts to promote digital transformation (DX) and green transformation (GX) within their domestic industrial bases. To address these issues, both the Korean and Japanese governments have concentrated their policy capabilities on stabilizing the supply chain for critical minerals through various strategies, policies, and legislation related to critical minerals. The Korean government began designating the five EV battery metals and rare earths as critical minerals through the Critical Minerals Securing Strategy in February 2023, and enacted the National Resources Security Special Act in February 2024. Japan also enacted the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, somewhat earlier than Korea, and designated critical minerals as “particularly important materials” in December 2022. By March 2024, Japan further added gallium, germanium, and uranium to its list of particularly important materials as a response to China's rate metal export controls.

This study examined the Japanese government’s policies for securing metal resources, noting Japan’s extensive experience in establishing and implementing strategies for overseas metal resource acquisition. It then assessed the performance of major Japanese policies and evaluated supply chain risks for critical minerals in both Korea and Japan. The metal resources analyzed in this study were limited to non-ferrous metals, rare metals, rare earths, and precious metals, with each chapter’s scope varying according to the Japanese government’s evolving policy since 2000. The Japanese government's metal resource policies differ by period and by mineral type, with various policies employed in each period. Therefore, this study analyzes various policies according to specific periods and issues.

Based on these findings, this study suggests several areas for potential cooperation between the governments of Korea and Japan. First, the Korean government has been actively utilizing the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) framework to secure overseas mineral resources, with Japan also actively participating in various MSP programs. Our suggestion made here was for the Korean and Japanese governments to jointly pursue projects (such as mine exploration and development) in third countries by leveraging partnerships with resource-rich nations participating in the MSP Forum, which offers a key advantage to MSP members. Second, regarding joint development efforts by Korean and Japanese companies for overseas mineral resources, this study proposes supporting overseas mine development by Korean private companies through the KOMIR and exploring cooperation measures with Japan's JOGMEC. Third, for collaboration in recycling critical minerals, this study recommends incorporating policy cooperation as a key agenda in policy dialogue between the Korean and Japanese governments. Specifically, it is suggested that Korea and Japan identify potential cooperation areas, such as performance evaluation, safety management, and institutional and infrastructure in the recycling process of critical minerals. Lastly, this study proposes the establishment of a joint government subsidy program to facilitate the collection of overseas recycled EV battery products as a joint response to the EU's recycling regulations.

The 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests over the Hong Kong extradition bill, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, and the hardline response of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments to the protests have had a significant impact on the international community. In the case of Korea, the diplomatic friction that occurred over the issue of THAAD deployment in 2017 greatly worsened Koreans’ perception of China, and the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests deepened this perception. In other countries and regions, it has also had a significant impact on perceptions of China.

However, the negative perception of China and Hong Kong society that has increased due to the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests is having an impact on the economic sphere. Based on the capitalist market economic system that was formed during the British colonial period and its geographical advantages in transit trade, Hong Kong has played the role of a global financial hub and center for transit trade, a window to the outside world and external financing for the Chinese economy, and a conduit for the internationalization of the yuan. However, after the large-scale protests in 2019, there have been concerns that Hong Kong’s society is fundamentally changing, leading to skepticism over the economic functions and roles that Hong Kong has played so far. This skepticism has grown stronger as economic entities leave Hong Kong due to changes in the business environment, and as Western countries seek to counter China and Hong Kong amid structural changes in the international order, such as the US-China strategic competition.

The problem is that these economic and social changes in Hong Kong can also affect the Korean economy through various channels. Hong Kong has been playing an important role in trade between Korea and mainland China, and many Korean companies and financial institutions have advanced into the region, and are engaging the region with active human exchanges such as tourism. Therefore, an in-depth and systematic analysis of the economic and social changes in Hong Kong is necessary for establishing and promoting Korea’s foreign economic policy.

Accordingly, this study aimed to empirically analyze the economic and social changes in Hong Kong based on various data accumulated over the past five years since the 2019 Hong Kong protests. In particular, it evaluated the changes over the past five years in economic fields such as the international financial hub and transit trade center, the external window and fund procurement function of the Chinese economy, the internationalization of the yuan, and the development strategy of the Greater Bay Area (粤港澳 大灣區, GBA). Based on this, the study aims to derive future prospects and implications for the Korean economy.

China, which has adopted a socialist system, and Hong Kong society under the one country, two systems (一國兩制) framework, are very organically linked to each other in the politics, economy, and society sectors. Although the primary aim of this study was to derive implications for the economic sector, it also comprehensively examined Hong Kong’s politics, economy, and society from a convergence perspective, analyzing the organic influence relationship between these sectors.

The following summarizes this analysis of the economic sectors on both sides.

First, Hong Kong continues to play a financing role for mainland China, which is expected to continue at least for the time being. There were concerns over prospective negative effects, such as a dampening of investment sentiment due to the enactment and implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, but Hong Kong’s FDI in China continued to increase, and Hong Kong’s share of China’s FDI from 2020 to 2022 remained higher than before COVID-19. In addition, Chinese companies are actively listing on the Hong Kong stock market and expanding their yuan-related businesses, attracting foreign investors who want to enter China through Hong Kong.

Second, the influence of mainland China in Hong Kong’s financial market is gradually strengthening, and this trend has become more evident since the 2019 extradition bill protests. The financial markets in mainland China, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, have developed significantly as China’s economy has grown in scale, but they are following a different development path from the global financial market. This points to the crucial need for Hong Kong to play the role of connecting China to the rest of the world.

In the midst of this, the Chinese government is using Hong Kong to control the inflow and outflow of the yuan to promote the internationalization of the currency, leveraging Hong Kong’s status as both a part of its territory and an international financial hub. The Hong Kong government is also revealing its intent to strengthen Hong Kong’s position in the internationalization of the yuan and maintain its status as an international financial hub, and is expected to actively prepare measures to improve the convenience of financial transactions conducted in the yuan in the future.

Third, there have been some changes in how Hong Kong functions as a trade hub since the 2019 extradition bill protests. Hong Kong has been using mainland China as a manufacturing base supporting it, to which it has served as a trade hub that connects trade between mainland China and other countries. In this process, the proportion of mainland China among countries from which Hong Kong procures re-exported goods grew overwhelmingly high, but has been continuously decreasing, while the proportion of the United States has been rapidly increasing. However, this trend has become more pronounced since the 2019 extradition bill protests. While the proportion of procurement from mainland China has decreased rapidly over the past four years, the proportion of procurement from the United States has increased more than twice as fast over the previous period. In addition, the proportion of China as the target country (export destination) of Hong Kong’s re-exported goods has increased significantly since immediately after 2019.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s share of the world’s port container handling volume has been steadily declining since 2010, with no significant changes found since 2019. However, the share of mainland China’s port container handling volume has been rapidly increasing over the same period. In the world’s port rankings, Hong Kong was pushed out of the top 10 for the first time in 2023, while in contrast, six mainland Chinese ports, including Shanghai, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Qingdao, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, were included in the world’s top 10 ports.

Fourth, it was analyzed that the integration between mainland China and Hong Kong is progressing step by step through the GBA, which refers to nine cities with high levels of economic development in Guangdong Province, Hong Kong and Macao. This regional integration policy was fully implemented in 2017 when the agreement was signed between mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao. In this process, China is emphasizing the role of Hong Kong for development of the service industry in the construction of the GBA’s modern industrial system. It aims to build an international financial and logistics service hub centered on Hong Kong, and promote mutual development and cooperation in logistics, tourism services, culture and creativity, human resource brokerage services, convention industry, accounting and law, and other professional services centered on Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and Macao. However, since this development strategy is still in the early stages of implementation, it is difficult to predict its effects, but we can expect for partial and limited market integration to be carried out centered on specific professional fields such as R&D and technological innovation, law, finance, architecture, and medicine.

This study predicted the future of Hong Kong by linking the results of this analysis on the economic field with the results of the analysis on the political and social fields, as follows. In particular, the content analyzed was reorganized around six factors: mainland China’s will, mainland China’s capacity, the characteristics of Hong Kong’s ruling class, public sentiment within Hong Kong, US-China strategic competition, and public opinion in the international community.

In summary, the major trend of Hong Kong’s “sinicization,” or integration of Hong Kong and mainland China, is likely to continue in the future, but there may be subtle adjustments in the speed of this process, depending on the direction of the US-China strategic competition, China’s economic situation, and changes in public opinion within Hong Kong. In addition, within this long-term major trend, Hong Kong’s economy is expected to continue to function as an international financial hub, play a leading role in the internationalization of the yuan, and function as a fundraising agent for the Chinese economy for a considerable period of time, but its presence is expected to gradually weaken as the Chinese economy develops. In addition, Hong Kong’s economic status is likely to be adjusted to that of a regional economic center in China, that is, the center of GBA, one of China’s regional development strategies, rather than its role in the overall Chinese economy.

In this way, since the 2019 extradition bill protests, Hong Kong’s politics and society have been showing signs of becoming more sinicized relatively quickly, while some changes have also been detected in the economic sphere, but Hong Kong still appears to be maintaining its various economic functions. Over time, Hong Kong is likely to transition into a role as a regional economic center within the Chinese economy, influenced by the long-term growth of China. Accordingly, we need to seek to strengthen cooperation with Hong Kong as a part of regional economic cooperation between Korea and China, and in the process, we need to strengthen cooperation with Hong Kong, focusing on industries in which Hong Kong is competitive or which it plans to strategically foster in the future. In addition, since Hong Kong’s economic function as an international financial hub is expected to continue for a considerable period of time, it seems reasonable to choose a policy direction that strengthens Korea’s financial competitiveness through financial cooperation with Hong Kong, rather than pursuing an impractical policy of seeking to replace Hong Kong.

India has pursued a unique, government-led model of digital transformation that stands in contrast to the market-driven approaches of many advanced economies. While other countries have relied on large tech firms to build their digital infrastructure, India has taken the lead in designing and operating its digital ecosystem through state-developed Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). This model has become central to the country’s broader economic and social modernization.

At the heart of India’s digital strategy is the India Stack, a layered platform combining digital ID, financial inclusion via bank account access, and mobile connectivity. This architecture has significantly expanded access to public services and financial tools, including digital payments through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI). DPI has not only improved administrative efficiency but has also served as a public good, creating opportunities for innovation in the private sector. Furthermore, India is now promoting its DPI model as part of its international cooperation strategy.

This report provides a comprehensive review of India’s digital transformation policies and assesses their impact on both the economy and society. At the industry level, India lags behind in digital adoption compared to other major economies, especially in manufacturing. Key obstacles include limited digital infrastructure, financing constraints for small businesses, and a shortage of skilled workers. In response, the government has introduced various support measures to accelerate digital adoption in industry.

At the individual level, digital access has improved through the expansion of internet and mobile services. However, significant barriers remain—especially for women, rural populations, and those with low digital literacy—raising concerns about the persistence of a digital divide. Language diversity and educational gaps further complicate efforts to ensure inclusive participation in the digital economy.

Despite these challenges, the digital transformation has led to meaningful progress in financial inclusion. India has become a global leader in digital payment adoption, and digital ID systems have enhanced access to welfare services, particularly among marginalized communities.

In conclusion, India’s experience illustrates how government-led digital infrastructure can drive innovation, expand inclusion, and serve as a model for other developing economies. Continued efforts will be needed to overcome remaining gaps in industrial digitization and digital equity, but India’s strategy provides valuable lessons for shaping an inclusive digital future.

Coming into a period of major global transitions, China has been pushing for change in its economic growth paradigm. Due to changes in both internal and external economic environments—such as the deepening strategic competition between the US and China, fragmentation of supply chains, expansion of the concept of economic security, the rise of protectionism, slowing economic growth, an aging population, and the emerging risks in the financial sector—China’s economy is facing a variety of factors constraining its growth. In response to these limitations, China has announced promotion of the “new development pattern” through the “dual circulation” strategy, which emphasizes both domestic and international circulations. The Xi Jinping government sees the construction of the new development pattern as a next-generation economic growth strategy that can encompass the dialectical relationship between autonomy and openness, development and security, essential for realizing Chinese-style modernization and high-quality economic development.

Alongside this shift in China’s economic growth paradigm, reforms in the financial sector are also taking place. However, China’s financial development strategy under the new development pattern does not simply follow the financial development theories of Western countries, in which advanced financial markets are already established. The Chinese government aims to follow a strategy of “financial development with Chinese characteristics” and redefine financial practices that suit China’s national conditions. This report examines China’s emerging financial development strategies, analyzes the opportunities and risks posed by changes in China’s financial systems, and draws implications for future economic cooperation between South Korea and China.

Chapter 2 explores the relationship between China’s next-generation economic growth strategy, the new development pattern, and its financial development strategy, as well as the Chinese- characteristic financial development strategy proposed by the Chinese government. China’s financial reforms are centered on stronger regulatory systems, concentrated financial support for key sectors, and the creation of an all-encompassing financial procurement market. These characteristics are also evident in its distinctive financial development strategy. China aims to concentrate financial resources on real economy sectors that need investment to realize its ultimate goal of modernization, and the building of a powerful nation under the new development pattern. Simultaneously, under the leadership of the Communist Party, China seeks to enhance the level of financial supervision to manage and resolve economic risks and address the long-standing imbalances in the financial sector.

Chapter 3 reviews changes in China’s financial supervisory system and the background, current status, and policy direction of the three major financial risk management areas—real estate risk, local government debt risk, and small and medium-sized financial institution risk—one of the primary objectives of strengthening financial supervision. China’s financial supervision system has evolved from establishing a basic supervisory framework alongside the development of the financial market, proceeding through the stages of specialization, collaboration, and integration. In 2023, the “Party and State Institution Reform Plan” was announced, establishing a “one bank, one administration and one commission” supervisory system and institutionalizing the Party’s involvement in the financial industry, thus strengthening the central government’s role. The Chinese government aims to eliminate potential blind spots in supervision to address financial risks that constrain the growth of the real economy through stronger financial supervision. While this approach may effectively manage risks in the financial supervision sector, it could also lead to inefficiencies by causing imbalances in the allocation of financial resources. Furthermore, in the second half of 2024, China announced a variety of measures to stimulate the economy, including various financial measures to address the three major risks, including revitalizing the real estate market and reducing local government debt. These three risks are organically interconnected, and the expansion of one sector’s risks can spread to other areas. Therefore, comprehensive risk supervision and management are needed, rather than focusing on a single sector. Chapter 3 discusses and evaluates the main content of China’s financial risk management, considering these points.

Chapter 4 focuses on measures to reform China’s financial market and strengthen support for the real economy, analyzing the role of the central bank, improvements in monetary policy, supply-side financial reforms, and financial support for strategic industries. China is proposing improvements in the monetary policy transmission mechanism to address challenges such as difficulties in funding for small and medium-sized enterprises and credit tightness in the real economy. China prioritizes economic growth and contributions to the real economy as the main goals of its monetary policy. To reduce the gap between monetary policy goals and actual contributions to the real economy, the necessity of a shift in monetary policy tools is also suggested. However, the persistence of planned economy practices, such as providing interest rate benefits to state-owned sectors, is seen as limiting the effectiveness of China’s monetary policy reforms, which remains an issue in improving the monetary policy transmission mechanism.

In terms of financial support for strategic industries, China has sought to strengthen the capital procurement capabilities of strategic industries through government-led funds. Paradoxically, however, these government-led funds have become a means for the Chinese government to control the financial sector. Furthermore, the misallocation of funds due to a lack of adherence to market principles has led to indiscriminate investments, causing a decline in returns. There is also concern that the focus on strategic industries, such as semiconductors, has led to market distortions.

Chapter 5 begins with the question of whether China’s financial development is driving economic growth, and examines the impact of financial development on economic growth using the IMF’s financial development index. The study found that, from 1980 to 2020, the financial development index maintained a positive relationship with China’s economic growth over the long term, and the relationship was statistically significant. More specifically, the financial development indices such as financial institution depth (FID), financial institution accessibility (FIA), financial institution efficiency (FIE), financial market depth (FMD), and financial market efficiency (FME), but with the exception of financial market accessibility (FMA), maintained a positive relationship with economic growth. The conclusion is that, in the long run, China’s financial development has a positive impact on economic growth.

Based on stronger Party leadership, China’s financial development strategy in expanding support for the real economy, financial supply-side reforms, and financial risk management is interpreted as an attempt to expand the Party Central Committee’s authority for more effective and concentrated use of financial resources, and as a means to successfully implement the transition of China’s economic growth paradigm. However, stronger influence by the Party suggests that China’s financial industry may function more as an important tool for the national development strategy rather than an open and market-oriented reform. This could potentially expand the influence of state-owned securities companies in the capital market, which is currently relatively open, enhance the Party Central Committee’s influence in financial risk management, and concentrate financial resources on state-owned enterprises and strategic national industries. In other words, China’s financial market and system may become more characterized by planned economy traits rather than an open, market-based financial system. Therefore, South Korea must closely analyze the methods and intentions behind China’s strategy to become a financially strong country and formulate counter-strategies.

Chapter 6 presents the following implications for South Korea, based on the findings of Chapters 2 to 5:
First, South Korea must develop effective strategy from an economic security perspective in response to China’s expanding financial support for strategic industries. China’s current financial development strategy is characterized by the reform of state institutions rather than micro-level market institutional improvements. This shows that China places significant emphasis on development and safety in the financial sector, linking this with national economic security. If China continues to increase long-term financial investment in national strategic industries through these reforms, it could enhance its competitiveness in advanced industries. As the Party’s influence over financial resources becomes stronger, the distinction between state-owned and private enterprises in China’s market is becoming increasingly blurred, and Party organizations may influence internal corporate decisions. Thus, South Korea must formulate meticulous strategy to respond to stronger influence by the state on China’s industrial sectors.

Second, South Korean financial institutions need to reassess their response strategies in light of changes in China’s financial market structure and institutions. Going forward, China’s financial market will be influenced by a combination of open systems and regulated market environments. The emergence of super-regulatory agencies, such as the National Financial Regulatory Administration, could lead to exclusive support for specific industries. To avoid potential harm to South Korean businesses and financial institutions in China, the South Korean government must maintain close consultations with Chinese authorities.

Third, there is a need for in-depth diagnosis of the effects of financial reform and proactive risk management. Despite China’s strong commitment to managing financial risks, recent measures may not fundamentally address the risks themselves. Therefore, South Korea needs to conduct an in-depth diagnosis of China’s financial risk management measures and identify potential risks to the South Korean economy, preparing proactive response measures.

As North Korea continues to blockade its borders, it is difficult to study the North Korean economy. The purpose of this study is to analyze North Korea’s market activities by using satellite data in a new way and to identify the characteristics of market development over time. This study is different from previous studies in that it is the first to attempt a quantitative analysis of North Korea’s markets and logistics using satellite data. To complement the analysis of the market and logistics, this study also analyzes the changes in import, wholesale, and retail prices in North Korea, which is also different from previous studies in that it analyzes wholesale and retail margins for the first time to identify the role of wholesale and retail merchants.

The satellite data used in the study are SAR sensor data from the Sentinel 1 satellite and visible band data from the Sentinel 2 satellite, measured from 2017-23, and North Korean inflation data from November 2022 to July 2024. Other sources include North Korea-China trade statistics from China Customs and North Korean literature.

In Chapter 2, we interpret the North Korean authorities’ recent expansion of the socialist mercantile system and increased involvement in the market as an attempt to: absorb the market as a form of state mercantile system and socialist commerce; strengthen the state’s control and involvement in the market through the development of state-owned commerce; increase state revenues by attributing profits from private retailers to the state; and ensure the supply of goods to the North Korean people.

Chapter 3 develops logistics indicators (rail logistics indicators and road logistics indicators) using satellite data. This is the first study to develop logistics indicators for railroads and roads in North Korea. Trade statistics were utilized to verify the developed satellite indicators. The logistics indicators are expected to be useful in estimating the amount of consumer goods supplied to the market.The railroad logistics indicator declined from 2017 to 22 and then rose slightly in 23. Unlike the sharp drop in consumer goods imports due to the border closure immediately after the outbreak of the coronavirus, the train logistics indicator has gradually declined as North Korea’s consumer goods inventories have been gradually cleared. The road logistics indicator showed a contradictory change from the train logistics indicator, and it is unclear whether this is due to the substitution between rail and road or the unique characteristics of trucks. Using consumer goods imports and the market price index to analyze the relationship between logistics indicators and consumer goods supply, we conclude that the rail logistics indicator is a better proxy for consumer goods supply to the market than the road logistics indicator. Road logistics indicators need to be further studied and improved.

In Chapter 4, we develop an indicator of market activity using satellite data. This is the first study to quantitatively analyze market activity. The indicators show that North Koreans’ use of markets is seasonal throughout the year. Market activity decreases during the agricultural season in May and June, when North Koreans are sent out to work, and increases in the summer and fall. On an annual basis, North Korea’s markets appear to have been consistently active from 2017-2019, declining in 2020-2021, and then rebounding during 2022-23. To assess the reliability of the market activity indicator, we compared it to the Bank of Korea’s GDP estimates for North Korea’s service sector. The comparison shows that the market activity indicator and the service sector GDP in the transportation and telecommunications sectors in the ROK are very similar, suggesting that the market activity indicator is an appropriate indicator for monitoring market activity.

Chapter 5 analyzes import, wholesale, and retail prices to calculate wholesale and retail margins. While previous studies only analyzed retail prices, this study analyzed wholesale and retail margins separately to analyze the qualitative growth of the market. The results of the analysis showed that the market price was mainly influenced by import prices, i.e., the original price of goods. The wholesale margins were larger than the retail margins, so the influence of wholesalers on the market was greater than that of retailers. In addition, as the market environment deteriorated, wholesalers further expanded their margins, especially for agricultural products, further exacerbating price instability in the market. From this, we can infer that the better the supply of goods to the North Korean market, the more active the market, the lower the prices, and the lower the wholesale and retail margins. Conversely, as supply to the market decreased, the market slowed down, prices increased, and retail margins increased.

To summarize the above discussion, first, the North Korean market is active and growing in the medium to long term. The coronavirus quarantine and border closures have led to a temporary contraction and shrinkage of the market, but have not halted its growth and expansion. Second, the North Korean market has been characterized by an increase in the supply of goods, i.e., logistics supply, which leads to a decrease in market prices and an increase in market activity. Therefore, the North Korean authorities’ expansion of the state merchant system, i.e., strengthening management and involvement in the market, rather than shrinking/closing the market, seems to be an attempt to increase state revenues and ensure a stable supply of goods to the people by strengthening management and involvement in the active market and replacing some of the roles played by the private sector with the state-owned store network.

The contribution of this study is the novel use of satellite data. This study is unique in that it is the second study to explore the possibility of using satellite data other than nighttime illumination to provide a new view of the North Korean economy. However, the study of the North Korean economy using satellite data is still in its early stages and needs further validation and reliability through follow-up studies. We hope that many researchers will be interested in satellite data and conduct research.

India is a digital market with huge potential and influence. India is actively building a data governance system; Of all the digital policies currently in place or being established in India, about 25% (53 policies) are related to data governance. Against this backgroud, we study the data governance policies and regulations in India, as well as the cooperation between India and major countries, and cases of companies.

Chapter 2 analyses India’s top-level data policy framework that forms the foundation of the data economy and the data regulations that govern its implementation. India is considering a long-term, comprehensive data governance framework such as the ‘National Data Governance Policy (draft)’. It is also building a government-led data accumulation and utilisation system, India Stack. The establishment of a government-led data ecosystem is a key feature of India's digital transformation policy and has the potential to spread as an alternative to other latecomers to digital transformation.

India's data regulations are in line with global standards while seeking its own path. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 is business-friendly and avoids excessive restrictions. It is characterised by the introduction of a negative approach that allows cross-border data transfer in principle. However, sector-specific data localisation regulations are applied, and there are some parts that need to be specified in application. The Non-Personal Data Governance Framework (draft) announced in 2020 expresses the government's intention to create data platforms and data marketplaces, but further discussions are needed regarding the possibility of excessive restrictions. The Digital India Act (draft, 2023) is a comprehensive legal framework that responds to the rapid growth of new technologies and large technology companies represented by platforms. Through this, the regulatory environment for large technology companies in India will be newly established. It is likely that data regulations will be introduced for new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as transparency standards for data processing based on types of platforms.

In Chapter 3, we analysed the aspects of data governance in India expressed through digital trade policy. India has maintained a protectionist stance on data openness in WTO negotiations and bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and the EU. The US government has been raising the issue of data barriers with India, but given India's strategic importance, it is unlikely that the US government will exert bilateral trade pressure. However, it is likely that US companies will continue to raise issues and exert influence on India's data policy.

The EU and India are placing more emphasis on discussions about data governance in general rather than regulations, and it is expected that bilateral discussions will focus on areas where the interests of the two sides, such as artificial intelligence, coincide. It is noteworthy that the EU is responding to India's initiative to spread digital public infrastructure(DPI).

It is unlikely that Australia will be able to implement the liberalisation of cross-border data transfer and the restriction of data localisation measures in the CECA negotiations with India. However, Australia has been able to induce India to open up in the AI-ECTA service trade and financial services negotiations. Australia seeks to expand digital trade and data trasnfer with India and pursue institutional compatibility under the framework of strategic cooperation such as the QUAD.

Despite India's high economic dependence on China, it is likely to remain wary of China in the digital sector. In particular, Chinese companies’ investments in areas directly related to data security are expected to be treated with great sensitivity.

India is presenting Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a key agenda at major international forums such as the G20 and the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly (WTSA-24), as well as multilateral forums such as QUAD, and is stepping up its efforts to make its DPI model an international standard. This is believed to be an attempt to expand India’s influence in the process of building digital infrastructure, especially in global south.

Chapter 4 synthesises the above research and presents policy implications. First, it is necessary to respond to the issues that may arise in the process of introducing data norms in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) provides separate regulatory grounds for large-scale data processing companies and does not clearly state the legal basis for data processing, which may cause uncertainty in corporate activities. The Korean government needs to pay attention to the list of countries that the Indian government plans to announce as data transfer restriction countries. The Digital India Act (draft) currently under discussion is expected to have a major impact on corporate activities by strengthening the transparency of data processing, with platform companies as the main target.

Second, we can consider indirect measures to make the activities of data-related companies freer through negotiations with India. Like AI-ECTA, efforts should be made to increase the level of openness of computer and related services, engineering and integrated engineering services, provision and transfer of financial information, and software provided by financial data processing. If the data related articles are included, it is possible to include a temporary clause as an intermediate step in the liberalisation of data transfer and data localisation, and to review it after the establishment of the India’s data system. Meanwhile, Korea needs to pay attention to strengthening cooperation between like-minded countries. Korea is already participating in the Korea-US- India iCET, and it is necessary to actively respond to the QUAD countries’ agenda for cybersecurity and DPI cooperation.

Third, digital cooperation with India requires the building of trust capital, and key area is DPI. India's DPI is a government-led model with no precedent, and is likely to attract the attention of developing countries. It is necessary for Korea to consider responding to the DPI cooperation agenda in the G20, ITU, UNDP, and QUAD. Korea should also pay attention to cooperation for the development, interoperability, and inclusiveness of DPI in developing countries. It would also be possible for Korea to cooperate with India in projects such as capacity building and expert exchanges for developing countries.

Fourth, Korea should seek cooperation in the digitalisation of the public sector in India using ODA. It is believed that cooperation can be found in tasks such as standardising data management, data security, building data platforms, and expanding public data accessibility, etc. In particular, the digitalisation of government services in the process of urban development in India is a field with high potential for cooperation.

Fifth, it is necessary to establish continuous bilateral contact platforms so that Korean and Indian policy makers can share the changing aspects of data governance. It is necessary to set current issues such as data and DPI as an ongoing agenda in channels such as the ministerial-level industrial cooperation committee between the two countries, which is scheduled to be established, and the established Korea-India Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Council. Going further, the two countries could consider forming partnerships between relevant ministries and operating regular forums to exchange issues related to data governance. In addition, the difficulties faced by Korean companies entering India should be actively communicated through the Korea-India government-to-government dialogue channels, such as the Korea-India Fast Track Mechanism, Invest India, etc. Cooperation with a third country can also be promoted. Rather than the United States, which already has its own influence in India, cooperation with Japan may be more effective.