Since the inauguration of Trump’s second term, U.S. trade policy has triggered profound changes in the global trading order. The United States, prioritizing the prevention of illegal immigration and drug trafficking as matters of national security, has implemented stringent trade measures such as the imposition of high tariffs and the renegotiation of bilateral agreements. These policies have amplified uncertainty across the external environment of Latin America, including Mexico and Brazil. The recent U.S. decision to impose a 50 percent retaliatory tariff on Brazilian products starkly illustrates the vulnerability of Latin American trade to policy volatility. Against this backdrop, the upcoming USMCA renegotiation in July 2026 is likely to become another critical variable for the region’s external relations and supply chain configuration.

Despite the rising geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of Latin America, the region remains relatively marginal within Korea’s trade strategy. Yet, the ascent of the Global South, the restructuring of supply chains, and the diversification of trade partners underscore Latin America’s growing strategic value and the urgency for Korea to pursue proactive and long-term policy responses.

In this context, Japan’s experience in Latin America provides meaningful insights for Korea. Japan has consolidated its presence by focusing on traditional manufacturing sectors such as automobiles, machinery, and chemicals, establishing dual hubs in Mexico and Brazil while simultaneously diversifying into markets such as Argentina and Chile. Japanese firms have strengthened localization strategies by responding proactively to policy changes, including Brazil’s “Mover” program and Mexico’s environmental regulations. In the resource sector, Japan has sought stable access to critical minerals such as lithium and copper through close government–business collaboration, supported by financial and policy instruments that helped mitigate risks.

This study investigates Japan’s industry- and period-specific entry cases and government support policies to derive policy implications for Korea’s Latin America strategy. The key recommendations are as follows:
First, strengthen government–business linkages to institutionalize supply chain restructuring support.

Second, emphasize reference-building at the initial stage of entry to establish a foundation for long-term growth.

Third, respond proactively to environmental and regulatory changes to build trust with local governments and turn compliance into a source of competitive advantage.

Fourth, maintain a Brazil–Mexico-centered strategy while expanding into Argentina, Chile, and Colombia to diversify regional risks.

Fifth, explore opportunities for joint ventures with Japan, particularly in strategic sectors such as minerals.

In sum, Japan’s experience highlights essential lessons for Korea to achieve stable and sustainable outcomes in Latin America under conditions of global trade uncertainty. Rather than merely replicating Japan’s approach, Korea should design tailored strategies that reflect the specific characteristics of Korean firms and the diverse demands of Latin American economies.

Recognizing changes in the global economic order and its severe dependency on foreign resources and technology, Europe is greatly invested in strengthening its economic security and further developing its industries. Consecutively, European governments have introduced policies to enhance the competitiveness of their advanced industries. This study identifies the status, strengths and weaknesses of European advanced industries, by examining the present conditions of advanced industries in Europe in terms of trade, R&D expenditure, and human resources, and also comparing the competitiveness in advanced industries with the US and China. Furthermore, it identifies the policy direction of the EU and the UK for advanced industries from the perspectives of promoting innovation and bridging the technological gap, expanding investment, and fostering a level playing environment. This study also reviews the key support policies and regulations for specific sectors in advanced industries, i.e., batteries, semiconductors, AI & digital industry, health & biotech, clean technology, and aerospace.

The following points were confirmed through this research. First, both the EU and the UK recorded trade deficits in items classified as high-tech industries, indicating extensive dependence on foreign sources in these fields. The EU’s R&D expenditure rate also turned out to be less than that of the US and China. While the number of jobs in advanced industries are likely to increase, the EU’s low projection for working-age population in the future indicates that this vacancy is not expected to be filled, unlike in the US and China. These statistics reaffirm the necessity and legitimacy of European policies aimed at enhancing competitiveness in the advanced industry. Second, the EU and the UK are pursuing multifaceted policies to strengthen competitiveness in advanced industries under the overarching goal of climate neutrality. The EU aims to meet more than 40% of its demand for climate-neutral technologies internally by 2030, seeking to reinforce clean-tech production capacity. Initiatives such as Horizon Europe, the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and the EU Blue Card are being employed to address key challenges and labor and skill shortages. In accordance with its Modern Industrial Strategy (2025), the UK is planning to actively invest in key sectors - automobiles, aerospace, biotech, and clean energy - to stabilize supply chains. In terms of utilization of various funds, the EU is actively promoting Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) projects and investment guarantees via InvestEU, while the UK is significantly increasing investment to strengthen its industrial ecosystem. Furthermore, both the EU and the UK are working to foster fair competition and to expand international cooperation while building internal supply chains and pursuing supply chain diversification. Third, in key strategic industries, both the EU and the UK are simultaneously pursuing large-scale investments and regulatory reforms to drive green and digital transitions along with technological sovereignty. In the batteries sector, the EU is continuously investing in battery manufacturing within Europe, while advancing battery R&D and recycling systems. Meanwhile, the UK is focusing more on technological development and design cooperation. As for the semiconductors sector, the EU is aiming to engage across the entire value chain to address manufacturing vulnerabilities. Considering how the sector is so far dominated by Asian countries, establishing a strong position in batteries manufacturing remains challenging. However, the UK is maintaining a niche market strategy focusing on R&D, design, and IP. In the digital industries sector, such as AI and quantum technology, both the EU and the UK are pioneering regulatory and normative frameworks to challenge US-China technological leadership. Their policies target technological sovereignty and competitiveness through R&D and infrastructure development, with accompanying efforts to implement policies addressing carbon neutrality in the energy-intensive infrastructures. In the health and biotech sectors, the EU policy centers on supply chain stabilization, enhancing internal manufacturing capacities, regulatory streamlining, expanding clinical trial infrastructure, and strengthening the security of critical pharmaceutical supply chains. Clean energy technologies are being promoted through the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Clean Industrial Deal, aimed at strengthening local manufacturing capabilities for eight strategic technologies - including hydrogen, batteries, carbon capture and storage (CCS) - while reducing reliance on non-European countries. Large-scale joint investments and infrastructure development under the IPCEI initiative are actively in process in the hydrogen segment. Meanwhile, the EU maintains a strong position in the aerospace industry sector, mainly thanks to Airbus, while concurrently advancing research on sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) and improving aircraft efficiency. In space, major projects like Galileo and Copernicus are underway, and the EU Space Act has been proposed to secure global standard-setting leadership.

The key implications for Korea’s strategic engagement with the EU and the UK’s advanced industry policies can be summarized in three main points. First, in terms of investment, Korea should strengthen R&D and equipment investment in key sectors such as batteries, semiconductors, AI and quantum technology, while actively leveraging its associate membership in Horizon Europe to enhance networks and market access opportunities. Second, to improve the investment environment, Korea needs to introduce converged regulatory sandboxes and streamline approval procedures, as demonstrated by the EU’s One-Stop Shop model, to foster a competitive industrial ecosystem. Third, for broader cooperation, Korea may consider solidifying its global position in positive technology exposure and standardization processes by participating in public procurement projects and the Korea-EU digital, green, and security partnerships. It should also mitigate supply chain risks by easing upstream dependencies and strategically practicing mid- and downstream network collaboration. Furthermore, it is crucial to proactively respond to ESG regulations (such as the CSDDD) and solidify the foundation for long-term cooperation with Europe through talent exchange and joint research.

Carbon neutrality, as a long-term goal of the international community, can only be achieved through innovation in climate technologies. The scale of climate finance and clean energy investments has continued to grow, with new markets recently emerging through the convergence of climate technologies with other advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). In this context, this study focuses on the growth and global expansion of startups, which are key economic players capable of driving innovation in climate technologies. In the study, a climate tech startup is defined as an unlisted company established within the past 10 years that has innovative ideas or business models related to technologies contributing to greenhouse gas reduction or climate change adaptation. Based on this definition, the study examines not only the roles of government support in leading countries but also success stories of promising climate tech startups. It also analyzes the ecosystem for climate tech startups and the effectiveness of R&D support programs in Korea, ultimately deriving policy implications for Korea.

Chapter 2 analyzes the key strategies of major countries and promising climate tech startups. Across all the countries reviewed, governments are increasing financial support, encouraging private investment, and supporting networking hubs to connect climate tech startups with each other and other partner companies. In particular, Germany operates large-scale and long-term funds such as the DeepTech & Climate Fund (DTCF), targeting startups at the growth stage rather than those in the early phase. Japan offers incentives, including tax deductions, to encourage collaboration between startups and large corporations as well as investment from large corporations. On the other hand, the UK and the US, where the climate tech markets are largely driven by the private sector, operate specialized institutions for high-risk, high-reward technologies such as ARIA and ARPA-E. The UK promotes the commercialization of climate technologies through regional clusters and innovation networks, including Catapults and Living Labs. The US supports climate tech startups through initiatives like the Energy Program for Innovation Clusters (EPIC), which funds organizations within regional innovation ecosystems. Finland, where both the public and private sector are actively engaged, encourages startups to expand overseas from the early stages of their establishment.

Promising climate tech startups around the world are growing and expanding their businesses into global markets by leveraging various government support programs, attracting private investment, engaging in technology collaborations and partnerships, and capitalizing on the capabilities of their founders. For example, companies such as TBM and Sila Nanotechnologies have successfully utilized a range of government programs from the R&D stage to commercialization for their growth and international expansion. Climeworks and Ascend Elements have secured some of the largest investments in the industry by demonstrating operational success with facilities applying their own technologies and by leveraging government matching funds. Sunfire, Clean Planet, and Coolbrook have achieved successful demonstration and commercialization through strategic partnerships with corporations, universities, and research institutions. Meanwhile, Carbon Clean and 44.01 have developed distinctive business models driven by the leadership and technical expertise of their founders.

Chapter 3 explores the ecosystem and enabling environment for climate tech startups in Korea, along with an analysis of the effectiveness of government R&D programs. Climate tech startups in Korea account for only approximately 5% in terms of both number and total investment scale as of the 2015-2024 period. Over 70% of the total investment was concentrated in the early stages of investment (Series A and below), and the pace of investment attraction remains relatively slow. Notably, government support has led the growth of startups, while the investment shares of venture capital (VC) firms and corporate venture capital (CVC) entities remain comparatively low. Policies and institutional support for climate tech startups primarily focus on financial assistance and the development of a startup ecosystem. Through financial mechanisms such as the Climate Technology Fund, the government aims to stimulate private investment while strengthening the roles of technology demonstration platforms and regional innovation clusters including Green Convergence Clusters. In addition, programs supporting global expansion, such as an initiative to link the Creative Technology Solution (CTS) and Tech Incubator Program for Startup (TIPS), are recently being implemented.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Korean government’s support for climate technology development, the study analyzed the five-year outcomes of R&D support programs implemented between 2016 and 2018. The analysis focused on major climate technologies, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, and hydrogen and ammonia utilization technologies, selected based on their potential for emission reduction and trends in national R&D investment. An AI-based deep learning classification model was used to identify participants in major climate technology R&D support programs. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Differences (DID) methods were then used to estimate the impact. The results indicate that the R&D support programs had a positive effect on the financial performance of both startups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with a notably stronger and more sustained impact observed in startups compared to SMEs. However, innovation outcomes showed a temporary increase only among SMEs, whereas social outcomes such as job creation were not statistically significant.

Based on these findings, the study suggests policy directions necessary to effectively support climate tech startups in Korea. These include general strategic directions and stage-specific support strategies tailored to the R&D, demonstration, and growth/scale-up phases. Detailed implications for each are discussed below.

Above all, it is crucial to enhance the understanding of climate technologies while ensuring the continuity and consistency of policy frameworks. Achieving this objective requires adopting a balanced and comprehensive perspective on climate technologies. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the perceptions of firms and investors are likely to shift only when there is a credible assurance regarding the long-term sustainability of government policies. The positive impacts of major climate technology R&D programs identified in this study further underscore the importance of sustained support for climate tech startups.

By stage of technology development, the first priority in the R&D phase is to assess whether technology support adequately addresses the integration of different technologies and market demand, and to strengthen the role of universities. Evaluating whether existing policies sufficiently foster technological innovation through convergent approaches is crucial. From a market demand perspective, a detailed analysis should be conducted to identify which technologies are likely to attract significant investment incentives at specific points in time, and this information should be effectively utilized. In addition, measures to enhance incentives for university-based startup activities and collaborative research with external partners should be considered.

Second, in the demonstration phase, it is important to encourage early-stage startups to pursue global expansion and to support regional networks. Given that the Korean economy has high export dependency and a small climate technology market, overcoming these limitations requires strategies that promote consideration of overseas market entry from the initial stage of idea development, similar to the Finnish model. Furthermore, strengthening the role of regional living labs and facilitating the adoption of technologies validated within the region at relatively low cost should also be prioritized.

Finally, in the growth and scale-up phase, it is necessary to expand investment incentives for climate technologies and to support the strengthening of partnerships between firms. It is recommended that tax incentives for climate technology be introduced or enhanced to encourage participation from a diverse range of private investors. In addition, policy mechanisms should be developed to attract investment from well-capitalized firms and corporate venture capital (CVC) entities. For startups seeking global expansion, efforts to facilitate strategic partnerships with local companies in target markets should be further strengthened.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the foreign policy orientation of Northern European countries, including Sweden and Finland, as well as the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—has undergone significant changes. Sweden and Finland, which had historically maintained a position of neutrality, joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively. These developments, along with broader regional concerns regarding geopolitical instability and security, have contributed to the adoption of policies aimed at reducing political and economic dependence on Russia.

The Baltic States, in particular, are actively diversifying their external cooperation channels across key sectors such as energy, trade, and investment. This trend aligns with the European Union’s REPowerEU strategy, which since 2022 has encouraged member states to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels—especially pipeline natural gas—through the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and the development of alternative energy sources. In addition to the energy sector, cooperation with Russia has declined across a wide range of industries, including electronics, machinery, agriculture, food, logistics, and maritime shipping. Concurrently, economic and strategic partnerships with the EU and the United States are being actively expanded.

The defense and security sectors are also experiencing structural change. With Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO and increased security needs among the Baltic countries, cooperation in defense production, procurement, and exports is expanding. South Korea has already enhanced its defense industry presence in Central and Eastern Europe, most notably in Poland, and similar opportunities are emerging in Northern Europe and the Baltic region. These countries are also positioning themselves as key participants in Ukraine’s reconstruction process, with high-level policy discussions—including international conferences—actively ongoing.

In response to this shifting, the South Korean government is broadening its engagement through various initiatives, including increased grant assistance for Ukraine’s recovery, the strategic use of the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), and the reinforcement of institutional and local cooperation networks. The Baltic States, having undergone their own transitions from former Soviet republics to EU member states, provide valuable reference points for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and potential EU accession. This creates opportunities for enhanced Korea–Baltic cooperation in sectors such as defense, energy, digital technology, and logistics.

Recent shifts in Northern Europe and Baltic States policies toward Russia reflect a broader realignment in international partnerships. While each country varies in its approach—ranging from assertive responses by Finland and Lithuania to more moderate adjustments in Estonia and Latvia—public attitudes toward Russia have become increasingly critical since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and this has been reflected in concrete policy decisions in both the political and economic domains.

These policy shifts are not short-term reactions, but rather are evolving into long-term strategies for external cooperation. Nevertheless, the full replacement of previously existing cooperation networks remains an ongoing challenge, underscoring the need for new, stable partnerships. In this context, Europe—with its high purchasing power and policy alignment with democratic economies—offers considerable potential for Korean companies seeking to expand their presence.

This study examines the evolution of anti-Russia policies in Northern Europe and the Baltic States, analyzes changes in the regional demand for international economic cooperation, and identifies strategic implications for South Korea. In addition to a literature review, the study incorporates qualitative insights obtained through field research, expert consultations, and engagement with the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the Republic of Korea. Particular attention is given to the defense and infrastructure sectors, where future cooperation models may be developed. With the support of the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the Republic of Korea and the Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA), fieldwork was conducted in Riga from April 21 to 25, 2025, during which the research team carried out policy interviews and expert discussions to examine the trajectory of anti-Russia strategies in the Baltic States and explore the potential for expanding Korea–Baltic cooperation, including opportunities for Korean defense industries in local markets.

Based on this analysis, the study presents the following four policy recommendations: 1) Expand South Korea’s EU cooperation framework to include Northern Europe and the Baltic region; 2) Identify strategic industries aligned with regional characteristics and development priorities; 3) Pursue integrated projects that address cross-national needs across the five countries; and 4) Develop mechanisms for joint participation in large-scale European initiatives through strengthened bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

Together with the global expansion of projects to realize carbon neutrality, demand for key minerals—used as raw materials for renewable energy power generation such as solar panels and wind turbines, as well as for electric vehicles (batteries)—is rapidly increasing. One major concern is that China holds a dominant position across all stages of the global critical minerals supply chain, from mining (ore and concentrate) to refining and smelting (basic and processed metals), and recycling (scrap). In particular, China’s influence in the refining and smelting sector is overwhelming, and the nation also exerts significant control over the mining stage for certain minerals. In response, major countries including the United States, the EU, Japan, and the Korean government are strategically working to establish stable supply chains in this area, aiming to reduce reliance on China (de-Chinaization) and to transition energy structures towards decarbonization. Notably, although Korea is a major manufacturer in advanced industries such as electric vehicle batteries and semiconductors, its dependence on China for refined and processed products of critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel exceeds 70%, posing significant vulnerabilities in its supply chain.

China holds a dominant position as both a major supplier and consumer within the global critical minerals supply chain, but it exhibits various strengths and weaknesses at different stages. This study divides the supply chain into the stages of mining (ore and concentrate), refining and smelting (basic and processed metals), and recycling (scrap) to analyze China’s influence and vulnerabilities. It also examines strategies on the part of the Chinese government and enterprises to fortify their supply chains, drawing implications for Korea’s stable mineral procurement.

Chapter 2 of the study analyzes China’s control measures and vulnerabilities in the global critical minerals supply chain. While China firmly dominates the refining and smelting stages of the global critical minerals supply chain, it is relatively vulnerable in the mining stage. This is because, despite holding some advantages in ore deposits and production, China’s domestic industrial demand is not fully met, resulting in a high dependence on imported raw materials. Moreover, China has an industrial structure that imports basic raw materials for refining and smelting, meaning that as metal production increases, the demand for raw material imports also rises accordingly. Additionally, our analysis comprehensively considers mineral-specific (basic raw material) reserves, production volume, external dependence, and the Trade Specialization Index (TSI) to evaluate China’s strengths and weaknesses, linking these to the strategies China pursues. China mainly enforces export controls on Group 1 minerals—such as rare earth elements, gallium, and germanium—over which it holds an absolute advantage, using these controls as tools for economic pressure or strategic leverage. For instance, in response to US semiconductor equipment export controls against China, China banned exports of gallium and germanium to the US. For Group 2 minerals (those with advantages in reserves and production but insufficient to fully meet domestic demand), export control systems are also applied, but the focus here is more on domestic supply and demand management. For example, China has tightened export controls on antimony since 2019 to stabilize domestic supply amid internal shortages and growing demand for home appliances in 2024. Meanwhile, minerals classified as Group 3 (disadvantaged minerals) such as copper, aluminum (bauxite), lithium, cobalt, and nickel show high Chinese market shares at the refining stage but suffer from insufficient domestic reserves and production, leading to heavy reliance on overseas sources for raw materials. Copper and aluminum are widely used as base minerals, while lithium, cobalt, and nickel are essential for core industries like secondary battery cathode materials. Any disruption in the supply of these raw materials could impact China’s overall industrial sector. In response, China focuses on domestic resource development, securing overseas mines, and recycling to strengthen resource security and supply chain resilience.

Chapter 3 analyzes domestic mineral resource development and recycling strategies. In the area of domestic development, China strategically manages its mineral resources based on the Mineral Resources Law and the five-year National Mineral Resources Plan. In 2024, a comprehensive revision of the Mineral Resources Law was made to explicitly link resource security with national security, strengthening the legal foundation by introducing provisions for the stable acquisition of strategic minerals and supply chain stability. The National Mineral Resources Plan includes comprehensive strategies not only for domestic resource development but also for securing overseas resources, controlling protective minerals, and stockpiling. The plan (2016–2020) officially designated 24 strategic minerals. In particular, regarding domestic mineral resource exploration and development, various policies are in motion to promote exploration, innovate technologies, and foster mining industry clusters linked with related downstream industries. As of 2023, China’s investment in geological exploration and fixed assets in mining has increased for three consecutive years. Exploration investment has been focused on base minerals, but following policies to expand exploration of strategic minerals, new deposits of lithium, rare earths, and others have recently been discovered. Consequently, China’s global lithium reserves ranking rose from 6th to 2nd in the world. Additionally, China is expanding its influence in deep-sea resource development by securing exploration rights for gas hydrates in the South China Sea and polymetallic nodules in the international deep-sea CCZ (Clarion-Clipperton Zone) area.

In the area of resource circularity, China is actively promoting recycling policies to realize a circular economy and ensure the stable supply of critical minerals. The government plans to establish waste recycling systems (collection and sorting → pre-treatment → refining and recycling) in key sectors such as waste home appliances and spent batteries by 2025, and aims to standardize these systems by 2030. This nationwide system construction and standardization is led by the China Resources Recycling Group (CRRG). The CRRG provides comprehensive solutions by integrating functions such as acquiring and merging leading industry companies, waste collection, processing, distribution, and standard setting. As of April 2025, the CRRG has established nine subsidiaries focused on areas like spent battery recycling and non-ferrous metal recovery, integrating and standardizing the previously fragmented systems across these fields. In the recycling sector, spent electric vehicle batteries have emerged as a crucial means of securing key minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt. Although China has not yet fully built institutional frameworks and standardized markets for spent battery recycling, it has adopted advanced policies faster than any other country and continuously optimizes its regulations through trial and error. Major companies like CATL have already established a closed-loop recycling system and are expanding their influence across the entire supply chain through cooperation with domestic and international automakers. Accordingly, by 2050, China is projected to maintain unparalleled dominance based on the world’s largest spent battery processing capacity, raw material supply, and technological capabilities.

Chapter 4 addresses China’s strategies for securing mineral resources overseas. The Chinese government identified the overseas acquisition of mineral resources as a key policy direction in the National Mineral Resources Plan (2016-2020). It pledged to mobilize various policy tools, including mining cooperation based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exploring joint investment models linking mining and infrastructure, establishing multilateral and bilateral cooperation platforms, supporting Chinese companies’ overseas mineral investments, and participating in global mining governance. Looking at global mineral (metal resource) investment trends since China officially launched the BRI in 2013, several points stand out. First, investment by private enterprises in metal resources has expanded significantly. Second, the primary investment regions have diversified from a previous focus on Australia to include Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia. And third, while investments have continued to focus on base minerals, there has been a gradual increase in investments targeting critical metals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, uranium, and niobium. Based on comprehensive support from the Chinese government, both state-owned and private enterprises have focused on securing base minerals (iron, copper, aluminum) and critical metals (lithium, nickel, cobalt, uranium, niobium) primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia—key regions for China’s mineral supply. All the major minerals secured overseas by China belong to its group of disadvantaged minerals (i.e., those in which China is relatively weaker domestically). While every country secures its disadvantaged minerals through key supplying nations, China is particularly threatening because it invests aggressively enough to gain control over production within supplying countries. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo—where about 70% of the world’s cobalt ore production (with over 50% of global reserves) is concentrated—Chinese companies currently account for over 40% of cobalt ore production. Similarly, in Indonesia, which holds 42.3% of nickel ore reserves, 50% of mining production, and 42% of refining production, Chinese companies are estimated to control about 75% of nickel refining capacity. In other words, China has not only strengthened the raw material stages (ore mining and refining) of critical minerals such as cobalt and nickel—previously its weak links—but has substantially overcome these vulnerabilities. Examining the strategies behind these achievements, first, China has built multi-layered cooperation platforms (region-state, state-to-state) with key mineral-supplying countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia, creating long-term negotiation mechanisms with local governments and conducting regular consultations. Second, China established regional funds to provide large-scale financial support (indirect financing) for domestic state-owned and private companies investing locally. Third, it has developed mineral production and processing facilities within key countries to strengthen localization capabilities.

Chapter 5 analyzes China’s export control strategies. China established its legislative plan for the Export Control Law in 2016 and began its enforcement on December 1, 2020. Subsequently, in 2024, China enacted the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items and announced the List of Export and Import Administration for Dual-Use Items and Technologies, thereby strengthening its export control legal framework. We evaluate this as indicating China has established a complete legal foundation before the inauguration of the new US administration (Trump’s second term). Since the enforcement of the Export Control Law, China designated key mineral resources as dual-use items to reinforce resource security and, from 2023 onward, has actively used export controls on advantageous mineral resources as a strategic response card. In retaliation to US semiconductor equipment export controls, China restricted exports of major minerals such as gallium and germanium. On December 3, 2024, China implemented export bans specifically targeting the US on dual-use minerals including gallium, germanium, and antimony for the first time. Between 2023 and 2024, China implemented export controls citing the need to protect national security and interests. Some minerals, such as graphite and antimony, were controlled to address internal supply issues and to adjust the list of temporarily controlled items. However, after the inauguration of Trump’s second term in 2025, China escalated the weaponization of mineral resources more explicitly, enacting export control measures immediately upon announcement and clearly signaling these as pressure tactics against the US. For example, the export controls on seven types of Chinese rare earths directly pressured the US defense industry, a move publicly emphasized by Chinese media. Minerals designated as dual-use export control items by China generally correspond to strategic minerals in which China holds a reserve and production advantage, and many have already been designated or are expected to be listed. Coming into 2025, we see a tendency to convert minerals previously on the export licensing management list (e.g., titanium, molybdenum) into dual-use controlled items, or to expand the range of controlled items among existing controlled minerals (e.g., tungsten, rare earths). Controls have also been strengthened on minerals included in the dual-use control lists of other countries, such as indium, molybdenum, and bismuth. Going forward, additional minerals such as vanadium, fluorite (rare earth elements not yet controlled), magnesium (with an expanded control list), beryllium, and aluminum are highly likely to be added to the control list. Regarding the export trends of minerals designated as dual-use export control items between 2023 and 2024, such as graphite and antimony, China has sharply reduced exports of basic raw materials (ore and concentrate) while increasing exports of refined metals and processed metals with higher added value. This strategy is evaluated as an effort to maximize national benefits by shrinking exports of raw materials—whose end users and purposes are difficult to track due to multiple processing stages—and expanding exports of higher value-added finished products.

Chapter 6 proposes the following response measures for the Korean government and companies based on the aforementioned analysis: Since Korea lacks deep-sea mining technology and experience, cooperation with technologically advanced countries such as the United States is necessary. Korea should also actively participate in establishing rational mining regulations that consider environmental protection to secure deep-sea resources. Korea needs to secure competitiveness in the battery recycling industry through a private-sector-led ecosystem construction complemented by institutional support from the government. Cooperation with Chinese companies in refining and smelting within major mineral supplying countries is essential. Regarding minerals such as fluorite and magnesium, which China is likely to attempt to control exports of in the future, the Korean government and companies need to proactively prepare by adjusting stockpiles and diversifying import sources. As China is expected to expand export controls not only on minerals themselves but also on refining and smelting technologies, it is urgent to promote cooperation with countries that have similar demands in refining and smelting sectors.

Empowering women and achieving gender equality are not just moral imperatives-they are global development goals. As one of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 5), the issue of gender equality has long been a key priority on ASEAN’s agenda. Since the 1988 Declaration on the Advancement of Women, and more recently through the 2022 Declaration on Promoting Women Entrepreneurship and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, ASEAN has reaffirmed its commitment to women’s empowerment. Despite the growth in female labor force participation, women remain underrepresented in leadership roles in both business and politics across the region.

Interestingly, ASEAN has a relatively high share of female-led firms compared to other regions-but here is the paradox: their performance, measured in labor productivity, tends to fall below the overall average, and even more so compared to other regions. That raised a critical question: Can digital quotient, as a measure of firms’ familiarity with and engagement in digital technologies, help close this productivity gap?

This study offers both quantitative and qualitative evidence in response. In Chapter 2, we conduct descriptive and econometric analyses using World Bank data-including Gender Statistics; Women, Business and the Law; and the Enterprise Surveys-focused on Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam. The data reveal that male workers are generally more active and stable in economic participation. Male managers have greater access to digital and financial tools. Firms with digital engagement (i.e., having a website or using social media) report higher sales, while female-led firms show lower sales. Notably, female-led firms that are digitally active outperform their non-digital counterparts-offering a hint that digital quotient might be part of the solution. We go on to detail the empirical modeling using the World Bank Enterprise Survey to estimate labor productivity. A Cobb–Douglas production function is specified, with digital quotient and female leadership as key variables. OLS and quantile regressions show a significant negative association between female leadership and labor productivity, and a significant positive association between digital quotient and labor productivity. Importantly, the coefficient on digital quotient is large enough to offset the negative effect of female leadership in some contexts. However, the interaction term between digital quotient and female leadership is not statistically significant-suggesting that digital quotient may compensate for, but not amplify, labor productivity in female-led firms. Robustness checks using winsorized data, and propensity score matching confirm these results.

In Chapter 3, we turn to real-world voices-via expert consultations and interviews with business leaders-to understand how digital quotient affects female-led firms. Motivations for digitalization ranged from surviving the COVID-19 downturn to expanding sales and strengthening innovation. Many firms relied on support from governments, NGOs, and donor programs. Most leveraged social media and e-commerce platforms, reporting increased sales, wider product portfolios, and better customer engagement. However, digital quotient was also associated with certain challenges, including technical issues, cybersecurity risks, and even unintended shifts in business models.

Finally, this study offers policy implications tailored for ASEAN. Governments should promote digital literacy and quotient, support inclusive digital tools, and amplify success stories to inspire others. Regional efforts should aim to build localized digital quotient indicators and foster programs that reflect ASEAN’s unique entrepreneurial landscape.

As the competition for technological hegemony intensifies between the U.S. and China, major advanced countries around the world, including the U.S., are increasingly strengthening their strategies to protect and foster their technologies and industries in core science and technology fields. The governments of individual countries are expanding R&D investment, reorganizing legal and institutional foundations for technology protection and fostering, and aiming to strengthen national security and industrial ecosystems as well as securing technological competitiveness.

Major advanced economies, such as the U.S., the UK, and the EU, are formulating sophisticated policy frameworks aimed at promoting the growth of core science and technology fields. These frameworks involve easing unnecessary regulations while introducing new measures to safeguard critical technologies. Accordingly, it is essential to conduct a comparative analysis of these countries’ strategies for science and technology development, their approaches to fostering innovation ecosystems, and their industrial policy directions by examining the legal, institutional, and policy innovation strategies in major advanced countries.

Amid intensifying competition for technological hegemony between advanced countries, each country is focusing on securing technological independence and sustainability. The U.S. is intensively fostering high-tech industries such as semiconductors, AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology through its “America First” strategy, and is also restricting foreign investment and controlling technology transfer. The UK is strengthening its strategic choices to overcome the problem of low economic growth following Brexit and improve the UK’s global competitiveness in core technologies, while pursuing R&D investment and regulatory reform in fields such as AI and quantum technology. The EU is working to convert its technological innovation policy, which used to be centered on individual member states, into a more common strategy at the EU level, and is carrying out large-scale R&D investment and regulatory reform to secure the EU’s global competitiveness.

In addition, China has made science and technology independence its top priority in the face of U.S. countermeasures and is accelerating its own technology development in fields such as semiconductors, space-technology, biotechnology, and high-tech manufacturing. As such, major advanced countries are implementing strategic policies to strengthen their technological sovereignty and secure leadership in the global technology competition, underscoring the need for Korea to respond quickly and systematically. Korea also needs a strategic approach to respond to the intensifying global competition in technology, particularly by overcoming the limitations of existing systems and by innovating regulatory reforms tailored to the evolving technological landscape. There is a growing demand for the need to remove institutional barriers that hinder the development of science and technology and to establish a flexible regulatory framework that can accommodate new emerging technologies. In particular, as the perception that regulatory innovation is directly connected to national competitiveness spreads, now is the time for Korea to take active policy measures in response.

In the fields of science and technology, changes in the R&D, production, delivery, and transaction methods of new technologies are leading to conflicts with existing laws and systems, as well as the emergence of new regulatory issues. The phenomenon of “regulatory delay”—caused by the absence of appropriate laws or regulatory gaps—is becoming increasingly severe, posing obstacles to the commercialization of new technologies by companies and research institutions. To address this, major advanced countries are making continuous and focused efforts to promote regulatory innovation. Analyzing these strategies can help us better understand how regulatory innovation is being implemented in the fields of science and technology in major advanced countries.

By investigating and analyzing the implications, promotion strategies, detailed focus areas, and key characteristics of regulatory innovation strategies pursued by major advanced countries to achieve global technological leadership and foster innovative growth in related industries, this study aims to present effective response strategies for Korea to prepare the rapidly evolving future regulatory environment in the fields of science and technology, through a multifaceted analysis of regulatory innovation strategies by areas—that has not been fully addressed in existing research areas.

The first step in investigating and analyzing regulatory innovation strategies in the fields of science and technology in major advanced countries is to select three advanced countries to be studied. The U.S. was selected for its leadership in science, technology, and industrial ecosystems, as well as its global influence on national regulatory innovation strategies. The UK was chosen for its pioneering role in regulatory innovation strategies in the fields of science and technology, and the EU was selected for its role in driving innovative demand in new industrial sectors. These three entities were identified as the major advanced economies to be included in the study.

The next step is to select some fields to be investigated among the various fields of science and technology. In 2024, the Ministry of Science and ICT announced three major game changer technologies (AI-semiconductor, advanced bio, quantum), on the basis of which a total of four science and technology fields were selected: semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology.

The final step is to categorize various areas—such as institutions, governance, standards and certification, ethics, international cooperation, subsidies and tax incentives, experimental testing and scientific-technological capabilities, hostile response policies and strategies, and public/private protection (safety and security)—into three major groups; ① system and governance, ② Fostering and advancing the science and technology ecosystem and ③ technology security. Based on this classification, the study systematically analyzes the regulatory innovation strategies of major advanced countries in the fields of semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology the perspective of these three categories.

Subsequently, the findings of major studies that have investigated and analyzed regulatory innovation strategies in core science and technology fields - such as semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology in the U.S., UK, and EU are summarized as follows.

In the field of semiconductor, the three major advanced economies are working to promote semiconductor production and innovation within their borders, execute export control regulations, and respond to a supply-crisis caused by semiconductor shortages in order to protect their respective technological advantages. Each country is promoting innovative policies that include subsidies, tax incentives, and R&D policy funds in its innovative regulatory framework. The UK is strengthening its strategic choices to maintain and expand its strategic advantage in this sector based on its strengths in semiconductor design and intellectual property, compound semiconductors, and the world’s best research and innovation systems, with a relatively smaller amount of support than the U.S. and EU. In Korea, the so-called “K Chips Act” (amended by the Restriction of Special Taxation Act) was passed at the National Assembly plenary session in February 2025 to strengthen tax incentives for investment, such as the expansion of semiconductor companies’ factories. In addition, special laws for strengthening the competitiveness of the semiconductor industry and innovative growth are being discussed by the relevant committees of the National Assembly.

In the field of advanced biotechnology, the U.S. has been continuously implementing innovation policies to improve the regulatory environment through the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation, the federal government’s basic guidelines for regulating biotechnology products. The UK is pushing for the government’s smart regulatory program to remove regulatory barriers and prepare for the future of regulatory frameworks by explaining regulatory issues related to engineering biology through RHC(Regulatory Horizons Council). In addition, the regulatory sandbox for engineering biology is being promoted through the EBRN. The EU is focusing on simplifying regulatory pathways through a series of measures to promote biotechnology and bio manufacturing in the EU, and is implementing measures to further promote the establishment of regulatory sandboxes to quickly launch them in the market. Korea has enacted and is currently implementing the Biotechnology Promotion Act, which aims to efficiently foster and develop biotechnology by establishing a solid research foundation and promoting the industrialization of biotechnological advancements. In January 2025, the National Bio Commission was launched, and the government unveiled the “Korea Bio Great Transformation National Strategy,” which aims to position Korea among the world’s top five biotechnology leaders by 2035 through sweeping transformations in infrastructure, R&D, and the bioindustry.

In the field of AI, although the US has long led the world in AI technology and scientific advancement, its AI regulatory framework only began to take full shape in 2024. That year, President Joe Biden issued a new executive order titled the “AI Executive Order on Safe AI.” This executive order establishes new standards for the safety and security of AI, protects privacy, promotes civil rights, fosters innovation, and introduces stronger regulations to prevent the misuse of AI.

The UK, through its National AI Strategy, has proposed short-, medium-, and long-term measures aimed at achieving three core priorities: investment in the AI ecosystem, ensuring that the benefits of AI are distributed across all sectors and regions, and establishing effective AI governance. Furthermore, to lead responsible innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and maintain public trust in the technology, the UK became the first country in the world to publish an AI regulatory white paper titled A Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation, which provides guidance on the use of AI. The UK government subsequently published a Government Response that compiled and addressed questions from various relevant institutions regarding the white paper, thereby presenting a foundational regulatory framework for AI. In addition, the UK is building its AI governance structure by establishing the world’s first government- supported AI Safety Institute and forming a Regulator Ecosystem composed of multiple regulatory bodies. The EU finally approved the “AI Act,” the world’s first comprehensive AI technology regulation, on May 21, 2024. The EU AI governance system has been established as a separate AI Board consisting of the EU Commission, its AI Office, and delegations from EU member states.

Recently, Korea became the second country in the world, following the European Union, to enact an “AI Basic Act,” which is scheduled to take effect in January 2026.

Korea’s AI Basic Act includes provisions for the establishment and implementation of a national AI master plan every three years, the formation of a national-level AI governance structure and support for the innovative development of the AI ecosystem through measures such as securing professional talent, designating AI industrial clusters, building AI testbeds, promoting AI data center policies, and facilitating international cooperation. The Act also addresses AI technology standardization, the establishment of ethical principles, the expansion of financial resources for AI industry promotion, and the prevention of AI-related risks, including administrative fines. It defines “high-impact AI” as a target for regulation and outlines obligations for transparency, safety assurance, and provider responsibility. However, generative AI is largely exempt from the major regulatory provisions.

The US has adopted a strategic and agile approach to AI governance by issuing sector-specific guidelines and recommendations, executive orders, and fostering collaboration with companies and research institutions. This allows for a rapid and flexible response to the fast-evolving AI landscape. Similarly, the UK is pursuing a pro-innovation and flexible regulatory approach, introducing measures to address the misuse of AI and establishing regulations tailored to specific AI use cases. In contrast, the European Union has implemented a risk-based regulatory framework that classifies AI systems into categories such as “unacceptable risk/high risk/limited risk/minimal risk.” It imposes explicit regulatory obligations on AI systems falling under the “unacceptable/high-risk” categories, and includes provisions for general-purpose AI models. Korea, for its part, defines “high-impact AI” and outlines obligations related to transparency, safety, and provider responsibility. However, generative AI remains largely outside the scope of major regulatory provisions.

In the field of quantum technology, the U.S. has developed a comprehensive and broad-based regulatory framework to maintain and develop global leadership. In particular, the U.S. seeks to enhance national security and economic competitiveness through a strategic regulatory framework for quantum research, development, and science and technology. The UK has outlined 13 Priority Actions under its National Quantum Strategy and established the Office for Quantum within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), which regularly reports to the National Science and Technology Council chaired by the Prime Minister.

In February 2024, DSIT’s RHC released a report recommending a regulatory policy for nurturing the UK’s innovation-friendly quantum ecosystem. The report is based on four core principles—proportionality, adaptability, accountability, and balance—and was prompted by the growing need for proactive discussions on the timing, scope, and form of regulations to ensure stable investment and development in quantum technology. The RHC made 14 recommendations emphasizing the need to establish strong governance, including the development of a quantum technology regulatory framework and the need for a regulatory framework based on standards, guidelines, and responsible innovation practices. DSIT is working on ways to identify regulatory requirements in the future, such as conducting horizon scanning for future regulatory requirements and adjusting proportional regulatory initiatives.

The EU launched its Quantum Technology Flagship in 2018, following the issuance of its Quantum Manifesto in May 2016. This flagship initiative brings together research institutions, industry players, and public funding bodies to consolidate and expand Europe’s scientific leadership and excellence in quantum technologies.

In the Strategic Research and Industry Agenda (SRIA) 2030 roadmap, the EU emphasizes the need to develop independent capabilities in quantum technology development and production to secure global leadership, protect strategic interests, ensure autonomy, and strengthen security—while avoiding dependence on third countries. The EU aims to establish the world’s leading ecosystem that translates lab-scale research into mass production across various scientific and industrial applications. Moreover, the EU highlights the importance of leveraging the economic and societal potential of quantum technologies to strengthen its position as a global player in this transformative field, ultimately positioning Europe as the world’s “Quantum Valley.” Korea’s Quantum Technology Industry Act, along with the National Quantum Strategy and various quantum initiatives, represents a set of innovative policy measures aimed at establishing a research foundation for quantum’s science-technology and systematically fostering the quantum industry. These efforts reflect the pursuit of multi-faceted innovation strategies across the key domains identified in this study. However, concrete strategic initiatives focused on identifying regulatory challenges in the quantum science and technology sector and anticipating future regulatory environments remain limited.

As a strategic response to such regulatory innovation policies in advanced major countries, the following approaches can be considered.

First, it is necessary to establish governance that support innovation across the broader economy while providing recommendations on the prioritization of regulatory reform in alignment with the regulatory environment in the fields of science and technology. Next, it is essential to proactively establish systems and strategies for scanning anticipatively regulatory environments and requirements in the fields of science and technology, and to strengthen integrated regulatory approaches starting from the R&D stage. Next, it is important to establish robust regulatory frameworks for core fields of science and technology and to advance innovation strategies—such as large-scale financial support—in order to secure technological leadership and foster a resilient and competitive ecosystem.

Furthermore, there is an increasing need to enhance global cooperation strategies aimed at ensuring alignment and harmonization with international regulations, grounded in active participation in the development of global technical standards and regulatory frameworks. Additionally, enhancing regulatory sandbox systems in core fields of science and technology will be essential for promoting timely and flexible responses to technological innovation.

As a final consideration, the rapid advancement of technology is increasing the need to redesign anticipative regulatory innovation roadmaps in established fields, and the cycle of these rolling plans is expected to become shorter. It is also a time to initiate discussions on setting the cycle of these rolling plans, establishing clear procedures, and defining the legal basis for their implementation.

In December 2023, the Houthi rebels in Yemen launched attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, escalating the Israel-Hamas conflict into a broader geopolitical risk encompassing the Red Sea region. This development disrupted the logistics supply chain between Asia and Europe, which had previously relied heavily on the Suez Canal. As maritime routes shifted from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, countries worldwide, including South Korea, faced increased shipping and insurance costs. This situation posed the dual challenges of weakened export competitiveness and rising inflation.Simultaneously, the Red Sea crisis underscored the need for alternative land and maritime logistics networks to ensure supply chain stability. This led to heightened international interest in establishing new logistics hubs. Notably, discussions surrounding the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, and the Development Road project, actively promoted by Turkiye and Iraq, gained traction following the Red Sea crisis. For South Korea, an export-driven economy, the continued geopolitical uncertainty around the Red Sea presents significant threats. Rising logistics costs and decreased reliability in maritime shipping could undermine export competitiveness. Consequently, there is an urgent need to explore alternatives beyond the Cape of Good Hope, including expanding overland logistics via China’s transcontinental high-speed rail.

This study aims to address two key questions: (1) What impact has the Red Sea crisis had on South Korea’s logistics network and trade? (2) What implications do the economic corridors, actively pursued by Western countries, India, the Middle East, and Turkiye, hold for South Korea in terms of supply chain connectivity and logistics hub development?

Chapter 2 focuses on the background of the Red Sea crisis and its impact on maritime logistics. The crisis began after the Houthi rebels declared solidarity with Hamas, launching attacks on key commercial vessels using a range of weapons. In response, major shipping companies diverted routes from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to increased transit times and costs. This shift has expected to contribute to global inflationary pressures. The crisis significantly reduced vessel traffic and cargo volumes through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Notably, shipping companies continue to prefer the Cape of Good Hope route, raising concerns that maritime trade through these chokepoints may not recover in the mid-to-long term. Major global ports also experienced temporary declines in vessel traffic and cargo volumes, with reductions lasting up to six months compared to the same period in the previous year. Focusing on South Korea’s external trade, the volume of trade with Europe declined from January to September 2024 compared to the previous year. In contrast, trade volumes with the U.S. remained relatively stable, indicating that the Red Sea crisis negatively impacted Korea-Europe trade beyond mere logistical delays. Key export items, including automobiles, electronics, chemicals, steel, and mineral fuels, all showed declines in the European market. Conversely, exports to North America and Asia increased, suggesting that South Korean companies may have diversified their export markets, considering the U.S., Oceania, and Asia as alternative destinations. While overall exports to the Middle East decreased, imports of mineral fuels, such as petroleum, rose, leading to an increase in trade volume. Considering the impact of the crisis on ports beyond Jeddah, such as Jebel Ali and Salalah near the Strait of Hormuz, the decline in exports to the Middle East appears to result more from changes in maritime logistics networks than from risk- averse corporate behavior.

Chapter 3 explores South Korea’s potential for logistics diversification, focusing on the Development Road and IMEC as alternative routes. Both corridors aim to reduce dependency on the Suez Canal. The Development Road project focuses on connecting Al-Faw Port in southern Iraq to Europe via Turkiye through highways and railways, driven primarily by the geopolitical interests of Iraq and Turkiye. In contrast, IMEC consists of an eastern corridor linking India with Gulf countries and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf with Europe. IMEC reflects broader global objectives, including countering China, maintaining the Arab-Israeli detente momentum, and facilitating the energy transition. A SWOT analysis of both corridors reveals that weaknesses and threats outweigh strengths and opportunities, suggesting low feasibility in the short term. External factors, such as interference from China, Iran, and ISIS, pose significant risks to both projects. Despite limited immediate incentives for South Korean participation, it is advisable for the government and businesses to actively consider engagement in these corridors. Diversifying logistics routes is crucial for managing geopolitical risks, especially given the potential for escalating instability in the Middle East. Furthermore, with the inauguration of a second Trump administration in the U.S., there may be increased pressure for South Korea to expand into new markets such as India and the Middle East. Participating in emerging economic corridors in the Middle East could also deepen Korea-Middle East economic relations by extending cooperation into manufacturing and logistics sectors.

Chapter 4 summarizes the research findings and proposes short- and long-term policy recommendations to enhance the resilience of South Korea’s maritime logistics industry. In the short term, the government should: (1) Develop public-private partnerships (PPP) and investment-driven projects for port construction and operations, and (2) Establish logistics cost support funds for small and medium-sized shippers to build new logistics networks and manage crises effectively. In the long term, participation strategies should differ based on each corridor’s characteristics. For IMEC, cooperation should focus on PPP models based on existing intergovernmental MOUs. In contrast, South Korea should pursue multinational consortiums and Official Development Assistance (ODA) initiatives for the Development Road project.

This study analyzed the impact of the Red Sea crisis on the global economy, South Korea’s maritime logistics, and trade from December 2023 to October 2024. The analysis primarily covered broad categories of goods and regions, lacking detailed assessments. Additionally, as the Development Road and IMEC are still in preliminary stages, their specific impacts on global and domestic logistics systems remain unassessed. Future in-depth studies are needed to address these limitations.

This study analyzes the impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake on economic growth and evaluates the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in mitigating the damage caused by the disaster. In the aftermath of natural disasters, emergency relief funds are quickly allocated to support victims, particularly in developing countries that face challenges in responding to such crises. These funds help with immediate survival and recovery efforts while also contributing to societal stability and long-term reconstruction. As the frequency of environmental disasters increases due to climate change, the demand for humanitarian aid has grown significantly.

The economic impact of natural disasters varies depending on the affected country’s capacity and the scale of financial assistance it receives. Developing nations, with limited disaster response capabilities compared to developed countries, tend to experience more severe consequences. Emergency relief funds are designed to address this disparity, and their effect on economic growth can vary based on the scale of the funding provided. This study investigates the effects of the 2015 Nepal earthquake and assesses the role of emergency relief funds in mitigating the damage.

Chapter 2 of this study examines the concept and definition of emergency relief funds, provides examples of their application, and outlines their operational mechanisms. Emergency relief funds are established to provide rapid humanitarian assistance during emergencies such as natural disasters, wars, and accidents. These funds, sourced from contributions by international organizations, governments, and NGOs, are used for the provision of emergency supplies, recovery efforts, and medical assistance, ensuring the protection of lives and safety. One key example is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). This fund mobilizes resources during crises and issues Flash Appeals to the international community. Allocation plans are determined through discussions within the UN OCHA’s cluster system, where sector-specific agencies collaborate, exchange information, and make decisions.

Chapter 3 explores the economic impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, investigates potential resource allocation distortions, and analyzes the role of emergency relief funds. The study begins by identifying the earthquake’s impact on economic growth. According to the literature on natural disasters and economic growth, four hypotheses exist: the “trend recovery hypothesis,” where the economy temporarily declines but eventually returns to its original trajectory; the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” where the economy fails to recover; the “sustainable recovery beyond the trend hypothesis,” where the economy grows beyond its original trajectory due to disaster-induced reforms; and the “creative destruction hypothesis,” where the destruction of outdated capital leads to increased productivity. The findings of this study align with the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” as the affected regions in Nepal failed to return to their original economic trajectory, showing a relative decline compared to unaffected regions.

The economic impact of the earthquake was more severe in areas with a lower proportion of upper-caste populations compared to regions with higher proportions. Possible explanations for this discrepancy include imbalances in resource allocation or differences in disaster recovery capabilities. Upper-caste populations are more likely to have connections with groups responsible for resource distribution. However, this study finds no significant differences in the amount of emergency relief funds allocated between regions with higher and lower upper-caste populations. This suggests that the internal processes of UN OCHA, which assess sector-specific funding needs and priorities, minimize the potential for caste-based bias in resource distribution.

The disparity in disaster recovery capabilities could account for the differences in economic impact. In Nepal, caste-based differences in income levels, asset ownership, and access to information contribute to varying recovery capacities. The study further examines the effects of emergency relief funds, revealing that in regions with lower upper-caste populations, emergency relief funds positively affected economic growth, unlike in areas with higher upper-caste populations. This is attributed to diminishing returns on resources in regions with relatively lower human and physical capital. By focusing support on regions with lower upper-caste populations, more efficient and equitable outcomes can be achieved.

Cybersecurity can be defined as a state where national and citizen safety is guaranteed by defending against cyber attacks or threats, thereby ensuring proper functioning of cyberspace. Cyberspace is composed of ‘information systems’ and the ‘information’ stored within them.

International discussions on cybersecurity norms have continued, showing a standoff between Western liberal democratic countries led by the United States versus Russia and China. The United States and other Western nations recognize cyberspace as a separate domain and argue that international law can be directly applied to it. Non-Western countries like Russia and China contend that cyberspace is not a separate domain, and that domestic laws of the location of systems or information should apply.

The United States adopted an active defense strategy and strengthened collaboration with the private sector, considering that a significant portion of infrastructure is owned or operated privately. The EU implemented various voluntary certification systems and mandated labeling. Japan’s active cyber defense strategy is similar to the United States’, and it established a voluntary conformity assessment system for IoT products. South Korea also adopted an offensive cyber defense strategy in 2024. However, unlike major countries, we do not have a unified cybersecurity law.

The potential application of international trade law to cybersecurity measures is as follows. Even when arguing that cybersecurity measures do not apply to like products, such actions will likely be found by the panel as violations of WTO agreements. All WTO precedents addressing national security exceptions relate to wartime or emergency situations in international relations. There is a view that for measures during peacetime to be recognized under national security exceptions, there must be subjective evidence of understanding the purpose at the time of the measure and evidence of indirect supply to military facilities. Panels can assess whether parties have made good faith judgments about measures necessary to protect their essential security interests. A similar conclusion was reached in the international investment arbitration case of Seda v. Colombia.

Implications for South Korea’s cybersecurity policy are as follows. First, self-defense cannot be exercised for cyber misuse or cyber attacks that do not reach the level of armed cyber attacks. Second, offensive defense strategies must be pursued cautiously. While there is a view that preemptive self-defense targeting imminent armed attacks is permitted under international customary law, there are controversies regarding specific criteria for determining imminence. Third, the legal principle of state responsibility for domain management or due diligence in cyberspace can be usefully applied in responding to cyber threats from North South Korea. Fourth, there is a need to establish a unified cybersecurity law.

Implications for South Korea’s trade policy are as follows. First, South Korea Government must continuously observe cybersecurity measures introduced by major countries to minimize negative impacts on our export companies. Second, the government should support our companies to gain a competitive advantage regarding cybersecurity labels and certifications when competing with third countries in markets like the United States or EU. Third, when implementing cybersecurity measures, precise institutional design and operation are necessary to avoid conflicting with trade norms. Fourth, even when a country claims national security exceptions in trade agreements, review will be conducted in accordance with the principle of good faith.