This study analyzes e-mobility policies of the European Union (EU) and its major member states. Through the analysis the study provides policy implications for the Korean government in promoting eco-friendly automobiles, and strategic insights for Korean companies aiming to access the EU market.    The automobile industry of the EU faces multiple challenges today. Aiming to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, the EU will have to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of cars by expanding the use of renewable energy, while maintaining the industry’s competitiveness. Currently, the EU remains comparatively weak in the market for eco-friendly automobiles. The share of European brands in the world’s eco-friendly car market is only 12%. Moreover, Europe is lagging behind Northeast Asian countries, including South Korea, in battery packs and hydrogen fuel cells technology and production. Upon this background, the EU is endeavoring to support the eco-friendly automobile industry to reduce overseas dependence on core components, and to expand the distribution of eco-friendly cars. On the EU level, the EU Commission is playing a pivotal role in laying the basis for the eco-friendly automobile industry. It has announced the European Green Deal and adopted the New Industrial Strategy for Europe. A roadmap has been presented for supporting the eco-friendly automotive industry through EU-level strategies in the areas of batteries, hydrogen, and e-mobility. Meanwhile, cooperative alliances are being formed in the battery sector, including the European Battery Alliance (EBA), BatteRIes Europe, a technology innovation platform, and the Battery 2030+ initiative. The European Clean Hydrogen Alliance has been formed to promote hydrogen fuel technology. In addition, the EU protects and supports the regional e-mobility industry using indirect methods of regulation, such as emission regulation, waste regulation, and the establishment of standards. Financial support for research innovation is being provided through the Horizon Europe and InnovFin initiatives, and through mobilization of the European Strategic Investment Fund (EFSI), while infrastructure investment is actively being carried out through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). On the EU member state level, Germany, France, Sweden, and the four Visegrad states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) were selected for case studies, on the basis of their importance in the EU’s automobile industry. Germany, France, and Sweden are all actively using subsidies and tax regimes to expand the distribution of eco-friendly cars. Germany has introduced a new e-mobility law to facilitate the administrative process of using eco-friendly cars. Germany's eco-friendly automobile industry support policy incorporates suggestions from the industrial sector, while providing support for research and production of battery cells, as well as R&D projects in hydrogen technology. In the case of France, it is notable that the government, as a major shareholder, is actively participating in the management of major manufacturers with a view to protecting jobs and fostering the eco-friendly automobile industry. Sweden has the highest sales volume of eco-friendly cars in Europe thanks to government policies to encourage consumption. The V4 countries are gaining importance as emerging powers of the European automobile industry, with a large number of global companies entering their markets, both as primary and secondary suppliers.    Through the analyses, the study draws three main implications. First, it is important to actively participate in the process of establishing standards through technical cooperation with Europe. For Korean companies it is important to work closely with EU companies and institutions to reflect their opinions when setting battery technology standards. In addition, Korean companies, academia, and the government should actively participate in discussions on expanding the use of hydrogen technology in Europe, so that well-advanced Korean hydrogen technology can penetrate into the newly-formed EU market.    Second, expanding the supply of eco-friendly cars in Korea through improvement of the subsidy system can be considered. Policy makers could consider expanding the scope of subsidies to include leased or used eco-friendly vehicles, to the extent of available budget levels. Another option to consider would be modifying the eligibility criteria to incentivize transition to eco-friendly cars, rather than focusing on scrappage programs. In addition, it is necessary to consider ways to incorporate CO2 emission into the calculation of automobile taxes. Finally, further cooperation with the V4 countries is necessary to improve access to the EU market. To make more efficient use of the advantageous position already formed in the V4, Korea needs to implement a step-by-step cooperative framework with the V4 for the development of future mobility. Possible directions would include establishing joint R&D centers for developing electric vehicles and batteries, or forming a global consortium in the field of hydrogen cars and charging facilities.

 

   As friction between the U.S. and China intensifies, this poses a huge burden on the Korean economy, which is highly dependent on China. Under these circumstances, questions are being raised about whether Korea can continue its strategy of aligning with the United States on security issues and with China in the economic sector. This study seeks to clarify what the main issues of friction between the U.S. and China are, and what positions and principles Korea should adhere to concerning each issue.
   The U.S.-China friction can be seen as arising from the clash between the U.S.’ vision of “America First” and the “China dream.” Xi Jinping’s leadership, which was launched in 2012, presented China’s dream of transitioning from an economic and military power to a great power. The U.S. administration recognizes this dream as a threat and challenge to the U.S. and is pressuring China. China perceives this pressure applied by the U.S. as an attempt to undermine its key interests and responds accordingly. The Trump administration defined the situation as a long-term strategic competition between the two systems and declared a “competitive approach” to China in a report titled “U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” released in May 2020. In another report, “The Elements of the Chinese Challenge,” released by the U.S. Department of State in November 2020, the U.S. and the world are described as facing a new era of “great power competition” caused by the Chinese Communist Party. A U.S. congressional report released in December 2020 also described this as a “strategic competition” between China and the United States. In response to U.S. pressure, China recognized the conflict between the U.S. and China as a challenge to its development rights and declared a long-term war, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. It has adopted a “dual circulation” strategy that puts large-scale domestic circulation first as the basic direction of long-term response and mutually drives both domestic and international circulation.
   In this study, the issues between the U.S. and China were divided into regulation of unfair practices on the part of China, China’s strategy to become a “strong country” with world-class forces amid the U.S.-China technology decoupling, and the U.S.-China strategic competition over ideology and values. First is the conflict over subsidies, intellectual property rights, developing country status, cyber security, and environmental issues raised by the United States. The second issue is China's strategy to become a strong country and decouple from U.S. technology, leading to the China Manufacturing 2025 initiative, Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, China Standard 2035 project and U.S.-China competition over network security. The third issue involves U.S. efforts to check the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), perceiving this as a strategy to expand Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. recognizes the Belt and Road Initiative as both an economic challenge for the U.S. and a security challenge, and keeps China’s influence in check by pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy. The fourth is pressure on China based on universal values. The U.S. is expanding its pressure on China by politicizing the issues of its party-state system, democracy, human rights, religion, and the South China Sea dispute.
   The U.S.-China friction can be both an opportunity and a threat to Korea, which is highly dependent on the U.S. and China. In the short term, China will be able to provide Korea with new opportunities if it improves external openness and transparency and takes a domestic- oriented growth strategy. However, in the process of U.S. pressure on China, Korean companies tied to the value chain will face immediate difficulties in exporting to China. It is also impossible to rule out the possibility of another “THAAD situation” unfolding as the U.S. and China pressure Korea to choose a stance on particular issues. In the mid- to-long term, should China respond by increasing its independent self- reliance in technology, this could pose a threat if China develops domestic alternatives to Korean imports. However, if China responds by opening up and expanding cooperation with neighboring countries in new industries, this could be a new opportunity for Korea. If the friction between the U.S. and China is prolonged, the relationship between Korea and China is expected to enter a new period of transition, where individual events develop into a phase and structural transformation begins. It will be necessary to assess the threats and opportunities accompanying the friction between the U.S. and China, and to prepare effective response strategies.
   Faced with pressure from the U.S. and China to choose one side, Korea will have to establish a set of principles to apply in situations where it proves impossible to maintain a stance of strategic ambiguity. This study presents new directions and tasks for Korea-China cooperation in the era of friction between the U.S. and China, namely in the areas of: adjusting Korea’s dependence relations with China, stabilizing the value chain in preparation of the U.S.-China decoupling, East Asian regional cooperation, and response measures to changes in China's strategy. In particular, in this study, an online survey of Chinese experts in Korea explored the direction of Korea’s response to U.S. and Chinese pressure to take one side. It is necessary to redefine China’s strategy by comprehensively judging China’s influence on the Korean economy, the future potential of the Chinese market, and the possibility of cooperation. First, Korea should redefine its position on each issue based on: the principle of securing national interest and minimizing damage, the principle of a fair market economy, respect for universal values, and the principle of multilateralism. Second, a new strategy is needed amid rapidly changing U.S.-China relations. Despite the friction between the U.S. and China, there is no significant change in China’s importance as a market and the importance of the U.S. as a crucial security ally. In this regard, the current structure of aligning Korea’s position with China in economic issues and with the U.S. on security issues will continue, but depending on the pending issues of friction between the U.S. and China, principles and response strategies need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

   In 1990, the socialist economic system of East Germany was incorporated into the “Social Market Economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft)” of West Germany, completing political, economic and social unification. The economic state of East Germany was in a more serious state than expected. With unification, East Germany’s GDP fell by more than 30%, and the unemployment rate rose sharply to over 15%, and in the late 1990s, the unemployment rate in East Germany drew near 20%. 
   During the time of unification in 1990, the economic gap between East and West was the biggest problem in the process of social and economic integration. Since the reunification, the German government has made various efforts to bridge the regional gap between East and West Germany. The income of East Germans has now reached 80% of West Germans, and the productivity of labor has steadily improved to 80% of the average of the West German workers. 30 years after reunification, Germany is now the largest economy in Europe and it has the world’s fourth highest nominal GDP.
   Despite these positive aspects, the income and productivity gaps between East and West are still widening, and the rate of economic convergence is falling significantly. Moreover, the bigger problem remains in that skilled or professional workers are moving to West Germany due to the fact that there are not enough attractive jobs in the East.
   The study aims to find whether the gap in economic power between the East and the West is decreasing and if the economies of East and West are converging in the process of economic integration. If the economies of the two regions have in fact converged, then it strives to discover the factors causing the convergence. It also intends to determine the remaining problems and challenges that exist to this day. In particular, by examining the factors that promoted the growth of the East German region and comparing them with the West German region, the study aims to provide policy implications for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. 

 Executive Summary

 

 I. Introduction

 

 II. Progress of Financial Inclusion
 1. Achievements of Financial Inclusion
 2. Limitations of Financial Inclusion and Advent of Digital Inclusive Finance

 

 III. Fintech and Digital Financial Inclusion
 1. Definition of Fintech and Digital Economy
 2. The Impact of Fintech Development on Personal and Corporate Finance
 3. The Benefits and Costs of Fintech and Digital Financial Inclusion

 

 IV. Promotion of Digital Financial Inclusion in Asia
 1. Digital Financial Inclusion in Asian Countries
 2. Tentative Empirical Results on the Effects of Financial Inclusion
 3. Main Implications

 

 V. Conclusion

 

 References

 

 Appendix

   Since the 2008 global financial crisis, including the recent COVID 19 pandemic, low interest rates and low economic growth have continued around the world. In spite of this low interest rate trend, as the economic downturn prolongs, there is a situation of concern called the “new normal” of low interest rates and low economic growth, and low prices. In this new normal economic structure, the rapid progress of aging is increasing the necessity and desire for asset accumulation. In addition, digital finance such as Fin-tech with the evolution of the underlying technologies and the emergence of new technologies has replaced or improved many functions of existing finance in the advent of the 4th industrial revolution era.
   These changes are expected to bring benefits to the individual and corporate finance sectors, which have been subject to financial inclusion. On the other hand, digital finance, which is changing at such a rapid pace, may further isolate some individuals who were in the blind spot of finance, such as the elderly, and a support system for this is an issue that should be included in the policy of financial inclusion in each country.
   In this paper we find that Asian countries like other regions have achieved tangible results in financial inclusion while achieving financial deepening. When looking through various financial inclusion indicators such as holding accounts and loans, ATMs, and bank branches, the Asian region has achieved similar or superior performance to other regions. Compared to the income level, the growth of financial inclusion in Asia was found to be attributable to better performance in middle-income countries than in other similar regions. High-income countries in Asia are performing somewhat lower than similar peer groups in other regions, but this seems to be due to stagnation of growth. More seriously, financial inclusion in low-income countries in Asia is not appearing faster than in other income groups.
   In Asian countries there appears to be a wide variation in regional financial inclusion. However, Asian countries are expanding around the younger generation in the use of ICT technology that is helpful in spreading financial inclusion so if digital inclusive finance centered on Fintech is properly applied, Asian countries will become a new model for digital financial inclusion. However, since the gap in the use of Fintech in the region is large, how to fill this gap is being raised as an important policy task for each country as well as the whole region.
   We also tentatively examined the effects of financial inclusion and digital financial inclusion in the Asian region using the Asian country panel data collected from WDI and Global Findex data. Looking at the implications of the empirical analysis results even though it is very cautious to interpret the results of this analysis due to the lack of data of inclusive finance in Asia., first, the expansion of financial inclusion(such as ATM) in Asia seems to have some relationship with the reduction of poverty rates and income inequality which is measured with Gini coefficient. And the expansion of internet usage in Asia seems to have some relationship with the reduction of poverty rates and income inequality although we use it as the proxy variables instead of the digital financial inclusion variables. Lastly, the higher share of rural population which is used as a proxy for digital divide, which may occur due to the expansion of digital inclusive finance in Asia, has the potential to erode some of these achievements, but there is still a possibility that the expansion of inclusive finance will be effective.
   Despite the likelihood of success in digital inclusive finance in the future, digital divide spreads due to various gaps such as between urban and rural areas, between young and old, between low and high income, and between men and women, occurring in Asian countries and may worsen the performance of inclusive finance. Thus the governments in the region need to actively intervene to resolve these gaps. In addition, it is necessary to close the digital gaps that is occurring between countries through policy cooperation among APEC members.
   Considering the situation that the degree of development of Fintech in each member is expanding financial inclusion, it is necessary for Korean financial companies to set up an advancement strategy that focuses on the financially marginalized class based on the advanced system strategy of credit rating based on big data.
   Our analysis results will give some implications for the New Southern Policy. Personal and SME finance are very important business areas when financial companies currently enter the ASEAN region, and accurate analysis of each member' current status for Fintech or digital finance and financial inclusion should be given priority in terms of business expansion.

 

 Keywords: Fintech, Digital Finance, Financial Inclusion, Comparative Studies of Countries
 JEL Classification: O33, G19, G20, I31, O57

Введение 

Глава 1. Государственная политика РФ в области развития цифровых финансов 
1. Основные направления, цели, программа и приоритеты государственной политики цифровизации в финансовой сфере 
2. Система государственных мер по развитию цифровых финансов и обеспечению их безопасности 
3. Развитие электронного документооборота и облачных сервисов при взаимодействии государства и бизнеса 
4. Перспективы развития государственного регулирования в области цифровых финансов в России 
5. Обеспечение безопасности при развитии финансовых технологий
6. Перспективы развития цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 

Глава 2. Цифровизация общественных финансов 
1. Архитектура и функционирование Государственной интегрированной информационной системы управления общественными финансами «Электронный бюджет»
2. Цифровые финансы государственных внебюджетных фондов 
3. Перспективы развития цифровых общественных финансов 

Глава 3. Роль Банка России в развитии цифровых финансов 
1. Политика Банка России в области цифровых технологий 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в деятельности Банка России 
3. Регулирование цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 
4. Перспективы внедрения новых инициатив Банка России в области цифровых технологий  
5. Цифровые платформы Банка России (быстрые платежи, удаленной идентификации, маркетплейс, облачных сервисов) 

Глава 4. Рынок цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора 
1. Виды цифровых технологий для финансово-банковских организаций, представленные на рынке России и их основные поставщики 
2. Собственные разработки ИТ-подразделений крупнейших банков 
3. Опыт цифровизации деятельности в крупных банках 
4. Опыт цифровизации в мелких и средних банках 
5. Перспективы развития банковского цифрового бизнеса и развития рынка цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора

Глава 5. Цифровизация национальной платежной системы 
1. Архитектура, функционирование и управление рисками в Национальной платежной системе 
2. Развитие системы платежных карт «МИР» 
3. Развитие системы быстрых платежей 
4. Перспективы развития Национальной платежной системы России 

Глава 6. Цифровизация страховой деятельности 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия  участников страхового рынка 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в российских страховых компаниях 
3. Перспективы развития цифрового страхового бизнеса 

Глава 7. Цифровизация рынка ценных бумаг 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия на финансовом рынке  
2. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности торговых площадок 
3. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности профессиональных участников рынка ценны бумаг 

Глава 8. Домохозяйства в цифровой финансовой среде 
1. Формы и степень вовлеченности населения в цифровую финансовую среду 
2. Перспективы развития цифровых финансовых услуг для населения 
3. Состояние и перспективы развития цифровых небанковских платформ частного финансирования 

Глава 9. Перспективы развития финансовой цифровизации в  России 
1. Развитие цифровых платежных сервисов 
2. Развитие программ цифрового финансирования 
3. Развитие систем управления капиталом 
4. Развитие цифровых платформ на основе технологии распределенных реестров

Глава 10. Направления международного сотрудничества России в области цифровизации финансов 
1. Примеры международных проектов с участием России в области финансовой цифровизации 
2. Перспективы развития международных проектов России и Республики Корея по цифровизации финансов 

Заключение 

Использованная 

Список сокращений 

   Среди всех секторов экономики России наиболее быстрые темпы процессов цифровизации наблюдаются в финансовом секторе, представители которого ведут активную работу по внедрению цифровых технологий во все бизнес- процессы.
   Цель проведенного исследования - определение ключевых трендов цифровой трансформации финансовой системы России. В монографии представлена характеристика текущего состояния цифровизации финансов в России, а также обозначены перспективные траектории для дальнейшего углубления международной кооперации в данной области.
   В ходе исследования был сделан вывод о значимой роли государства и Банка России в сфере разработки и имплементации финансовых технологий. Государство активно переводит в цифровой формат собственные услуги, способствуя интеграции в этот сегмент цифровых финансовых решений, а Банк России выступает инициатором и координатором внедрения цифровых технологий на финансовых рынках, активно развивая цифровые платформы для усиления конкуренции и повышения доступности финансовых услуг. Все эти инновации потребовали приведения существующей нормативно- правовой базы в соответствие с вызовами цифровой экономики. Ход этих процессов всесторонне исследован в работе.
   Анализ процессов цифровизации банковской сферы показал, что крупные российские банки инвестируют значительные средства в цифровые технологии для того, чтобы удовлетворять растущие потребности клиентов и выдерживать высокий уровень конкуренции. Отмечено, что один из лидеров цифровизации в России - ПАО «Сбербанк» уже реализует ряд инициатив совместно с технологическими компаниями Республики Корея и нацелен на расширение взаимодействия с корейской стороной в целях разработки и совершенствования финансовых технологий. Данная успешная модель сотрудничества может быть взята на вооружение другими российскими кредитными организациями.
   В России успешно функционируют инновационные fintech- и insurtech- стартапы, некоторые из них могут быть интересны представителям Республики Корея. Кроме этого, целесообразным представляется также создание совместных площадок и акселерационных программ, объединяющих корейские и российские стартапы в сфере цифровых технологий и способствующих их взаимопроникновению на рынки обеих стран.
   Взаимодействие на уровне национальных финансовых регуляторов России и Республики Корея имеет первостепенное значение для проработки и обсуждения вопросов регулирования в сфере финтеха, а также противодействия угрозам в области информационной безопасности. Совместная работа Банка России и Комиссии по финансовым услугам (FSC) может быть организована в рамках «регуляторных песочниц» путем создания рабочих и консультационных групп.
   Авторы уверены, что объединение потенциала российской науки в области научных исследований и практического опыта южнокорейского бизнеса может также послужить дополнительным импульсом для ускорения процессов цифровизации в страховом секторе, прежде всего, за счет развития телемедицины и совместных стартапов.
   Среди других приоритетных направлений сотрудничества России и Кореи в монографии выделено также установление партнерства в сфере розничной торговли и онлайн-платежей. По мнению авторов, создание трансграничных торговых платформ, а также их интеграция с платежными сервисами позволит существенно увеличить товарооборот стран.
   Авторы изучили тенденции, характеризующиеся распространением финансовых технологий среди населения. Анализ ключевых индикаторов свидетельствует, что Россия по-прежнему уступает странам–лидерам в области цифровизации по степени вовлеченности домохозяйств в цифровую финансовую среду. В связи с этим для России важным направлением сотрудничества с Кореей является работа по совершенствованию инфраструктуры связи и распространению высокоскоростного интернета 5G по всей территории страны.
   Перспективно формирование единого международного финансового рынка, поддерживающего устойчивый информационный обмен, сопряжение регулирующих практик и финансовую безопасность. Выход иностранных эмитентов на российские биржевые площадки привел к настоящему буму среди частных инвесторов, проявивших значительный интерес к зарубежным ценным бумагам. Быстро развиваются и проекты допуска российских инвесторов к торговле криптовалютами на иностранных площадках.
   По итогам исследования авторы пришли к выводу, что потенциал расширения кооперации между Республикой Кореей и Российской Федерацией в сфере цифровизации финансовой системы весьма широк. Сближение накопленного опыта науки и практики России и Республики Корея является взаимовыгодным и, несомненно, будет способствовать ускорению и повышению эффективности цифровой трансформации в обеих странах.

Executive Summary   Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Data and Methodology 2.1. Data to Use 2.2. Landscape of APEC RTA from the database 2.3. Methodology: Text similarity as a measurement of RTA convergence Ⅲ. Analytical Findings 3.1. Overall trend of convergence 3.2. Who leads the convergence: Clustering aspects 3.3. Who leads the convergence: Development aspects Ⅳ. Further Analysis: convergence by chapters Ⅴ. Robustness Checks Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks References Appendix A. Lists of Key Variable Name B. Convergence of APEC RTAs by Chapters

In this paper, I suggest that text mining analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) can be a suitable methodology to develop a tangible measure of convergence between RTAs. By utilizing well-established text similarity concepts in related literatures, I attempt to investigate how much RTAs in APEC are converging in terms of how much similar RTA texts are. Furthermore, which areas of RTA converge more or less will be examined. The main results of the study are as follows. The RTAs signed by APEC members are gradually converging over time, and they converged (in terms of 5-gram Jaccard similarity) at an annual average of 8% for all RTAs (both inter- and intra-regional) while 9.7% for intra-regional RTAs only. The areas that converged the most are service and transparency chapters, which show 2.2 times and 1.6 times higher level of convergence than the average, respectively. The objective and intuitive indicators of regional norm convergence are expected to provide a common understanding for setting goals and strategies for regional economic integration in the future.

Executive Summary Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Measuring Industry Participation and Position in GVCs 2.1. Industry Participation in Vertical Specialization Linkage: Backward and Forward Participation Rates 2.2. Industry Position in Production Line: Upstreamness and Downstreamness Indices Ⅲ. Industry Participation and Position in GVCs: Statistical Observations from APEC Member Economies 3.1. Forward and Backward Participation Rates 3.2. Upstreamness Index Ⅳ. The Value-added Creation Effect of GVC Participation: An Empirical Investigation for APEC Member Economies 4.1. Model Specification 4.2. Data and Summary Statistics 4.3. Empirical Results 4.4. Policy Implications Ⅴ. Summary and Concluding Remarks References Appendix

We analyze the value-added creation effect of GVC participation by applying a standard fixed effects regression model analysis with economy-wide country-industry data. We use OECD Inter-country Input-Output Tables covering 64 countries (21 APEC members and 43 non-APEC members) and 35 industries (1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing, 3 Mining, 16 Manufacturing, and 15 Service) between 2005 and 2015. We find that APEC member economies’ participation in GVC activities is not distinct from non-APEC member economies but the causal relationship between GVC participation and created domestic value-added is much stronger in APEC member economies. More specifically, from the qualitative evaluation on statistical data, we find that backward linkage has been stronger than forward linkage and both have been recently decreasing. The APEC industries’ upstream positions in production line have been slightly more distinguished than non-APEC industries. From the econometric regression analysis, we find that forward participation in GVCs is more desirable than backward participation in terms of creating domestic value-added. We also find that the industry position in middle stages of production line in contrast to earlier and later stages creates higher domestic value-added per output unit. This implies that the firm-specific conventional U-shaped “Smile Curve Hypothesis” is not applicable at the economy-wide country-industry level, especially in APEC member economies. This finding supports that manufacturing industries are still a major driving force for less developed APEC member economies to move up the development ladder. Considering that gains from GVC participation are diversified across industries and upgrading country-industry positions in GVCs is competitive among the interconnected countries, we strongly recommend for APEC member economies to construct effective domestic value chains and coordinate with other members during their process of upgrading GVC participation.

  This report reviews the preliminary judgments of the CJEU on the interpretation of the EU GDPR and compares them with Korean laws and precedents in order to derive implications related to the validity of passive consent, the basis for the transfer of personal data abroad, and the content and scope of application of the right to be forgotten. The CJEU have ruled that passive consent, such as preselected check boxes, is not a valid agreement. In addition, the ombudsperson mechanism which cannot make any decisions binding on intelligence agencies is not effective judicial redress. That is why the Privacy Shield, which was the basis for the transfer of personal data between the EU and the United States, is invalid. Finally, the deletion from search engines based on the right to be forgotten is restricted to the EU region, not the entire world.
  By comparing those precedents of the CJEU with Korean laws and precedents, the report provides the following implications. First, the passive consent was interpreted as invalid even if it was in accordance with Korean laws. Besides, the precedent is also in the same position, which shows important criterion was whether the data subject could objectively confirm the intention of the data subject. However, since Korean laws are less specific than the EU GDPR, it seemed necessary to supplement them. Second, the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organizations was allowed only when the data subject agreed. Otherwise, the EU GDPR recognized various other reasons besides the consent of the data subject. It is time that the supervisory authorities of Korean law should consider whether to allow other basis for the transfer of personal data or not. Last, there was a ruling that the right to be forgotten has not yet been introduced into Korean law. The right to correct and delete in Korean law is recognized only if the information is incorrect after the exercise of the right to read, and there is a difference from the right to be forgotten. Discussions on whether to introduce the right to be forgotten are needed.