Введение 

Глава 1. Государственная политика РФ в области развития цифровых финансов 
1. Основные направления, цели, программа и приоритеты государственной политики цифровизации в финансовой сфере 
2. Система государственных мер по развитию цифровых финансов и обеспечению их безопасности 
3. Развитие электронного документооборота и облачных сервисов при взаимодействии государства и бизнеса 
4. Перспективы развития государственного регулирования в области цифровых финансов в России 
5. Обеспечение безопасности при развитии финансовых технологий
6. Перспективы развития цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 

Глава 2. Цифровизация общественных финансов 
1. Архитектура и функционирование Государственной интегрированной информационной системы управления общественными финансами «Электронный бюджет»
2. Цифровые финансы государственных внебюджетных фондов 
3. Перспективы развития цифровых общественных финансов 

Глава 3. Роль Банка России в развитии цифровых финансов 
1. Политика Банка России в области цифровых технологий 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в деятельности Банка России 
3. Регулирование цифровой финансовой инфраструктуры 
4. Перспективы внедрения новых инициатив Банка России в области цифровых технологий  
5. Цифровые платформы Банка России (быстрые платежи, удаленной идентификации, маркетплейс, облачных сервисов) 

Глава 4. Рынок цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора 
1. Виды цифровых технологий для финансово-банковских организаций, представленные на рынке России и их основные поставщики 
2. Собственные разработки ИТ-подразделений крупнейших банков 
3. Опыт цифровизации деятельности в крупных банках 
4. Опыт цифровизации в мелких и средних банках 
5. Перспективы развития банковского цифрового бизнеса и развития рынка цифровых технологий для финансово-банковского сектора

Глава 5. Цифровизация национальной платежной системы 
1. Архитектура, функционирование и управление рисками в Национальной платежной системе 
2. Развитие системы платежных карт «МИР» 
3. Развитие системы быстрых платежей 
4. Перспективы развития Национальной платежной системы России 

Глава 6. Цифровизация страховой деятельности 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия  участников страхового рынка 
2. Современное состояние цифровых технологий в российских страховых компаниях 
3. Перспективы развития цифрового страхового бизнеса 

Глава 7. Цифровизация рынка ценных бумаг 
1. Механизмы электронного взаимодействия на финансовом рынке  
2. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности торговых площадок 
3. Современное состояние и перспективы развития цифровизации деятельности профессиональных участников рынка ценны бумаг 

Глава 8. Домохозяйства в цифровой финансовой среде 
1. Формы и степень вовлеченности населения в цифровую финансовую среду 
2. Перспективы развития цифровых финансовых услуг для населения 
3. Состояние и перспективы развития цифровых небанковских платформ частного финансирования 

Глава 9. Перспективы развития финансовой цифровизации в  России 
1. Развитие цифровых платежных сервисов 
2. Развитие программ цифрового финансирования 
3. Развитие систем управления капиталом 
4. Развитие цифровых платформ на основе технологии распределенных реестров

Глава 10. Направления международного сотрудничества России в области цифровизации финансов 
1. Примеры международных проектов с участием России в области финансовой цифровизации 
2. Перспективы развития международных проектов России и Республики Корея по цифровизации финансов 

Заключение 

Использованная 

Список сокращений 

   Среди всех секторов экономики России наиболее быстрые темпы процессов цифровизации наблюдаются в финансовом секторе, представители которого ведут активную работу по внедрению цифровых технологий во все бизнес- процессы.
   Цель проведенного исследования - определение ключевых трендов цифровой трансформации финансовой системы России. В монографии представлена характеристика текущего состояния цифровизации финансов в России, а также обозначены перспективные траектории для дальнейшего углубления международной кооперации в данной области.
   В ходе исследования был сделан вывод о значимой роли государства и Банка России в сфере разработки и имплементации финансовых технологий. Государство активно переводит в цифровой формат собственные услуги, способствуя интеграции в этот сегмент цифровых финансовых решений, а Банк России выступает инициатором и координатором внедрения цифровых технологий на финансовых рынках, активно развивая цифровые платформы для усиления конкуренции и повышения доступности финансовых услуг. Все эти инновации потребовали приведения существующей нормативно- правовой базы в соответствие с вызовами цифровой экономики. Ход этих процессов всесторонне исследован в работе.
   Анализ процессов цифровизации банковской сферы показал, что крупные российские банки инвестируют значительные средства в цифровые технологии для того, чтобы удовлетворять растущие потребности клиентов и выдерживать высокий уровень конкуренции. Отмечено, что один из лидеров цифровизации в России - ПАО «Сбербанк» уже реализует ряд инициатив совместно с технологическими компаниями Республики Корея и нацелен на расширение взаимодействия с корейской стороной в целях разработки и совершенствования финансовых технологий. Данная успешная модель сотрудничества может быть взята на вооружение другими российскими кредитными организациями.
   В России успешно функционируют инновационные fintech- и insurtech- стартапы, некоторые из них могут быть интересны представителям Республики Корея. Кроме этого, целесообразным представляется также создание совместных площадок и акселерационных программ, объединяющих корейские и российские стартапы в сфере цифровых технологий и способствующих их взаимопроникновению на рынки обеих стран.
   Взаимодействие на уровне национальных финансовых регуляторов России и Республики Корея имеет первостепенное значение для проработки и обсуждения вопросов регулирования в сфере финтеха, а также противодействия угрозам в области информационной безопасности. Совместная работа Банка России и Комиссии по финансовым услугам (FSC) может быть организована в рамках «регуляторных песочниц» путем создания рабочих и консультационных групп.
   Авторы уверены, что объединение потенциала российской науки в области научных исследований и практического опыта южнокорейского бизнеса может также послужить дополнительным импульсом для ускорения процессов цифровизации в страховом секторе, прежде всего, за счет развития телемедицины и совместных стартапов.
   Среди других приоритетных направлений сотрудничества России и Кореи в монографии выделено также установление партнерства в сфере розничной торговли и онлайн-платежей. По мнению авторов, создание трансграничных торговых платформ, а также их интеграция с платежными сервисами позволит существенно увеличить товарооборот стран.
   Авторы изучили тенденции, характеризующиеся распространением финансовых технологий среди населения. Анализ ключевых индикаторов свидетельствует, что Россия по-прежнему уступает странам–лидерам в области цифровизации по степени вовлеченности домохозяйств в цифровую финансовую среду. В связи с этим для России важным направлением сотрудничества с Кореей является работа по совершенствованию инфраструктуры связи и распространению высокоскоростного интернета 5G по всей территории страны.
   Перспективно формирование единого международного финансового рынка, поддерживающего устойчивый информационный обмен, сопряжение регулирующих практик и финансовую безопасность. Выход иностранных эмитентов на российские биржевые площадки привел к настоящему буму среди частных инвесторов, проявивших значительный интерес к зарубежным ценным бумагам. Быстро развиваются и проекты допуска российских инвесторов к торговле криптовалютами на иностранных площадках.
   По итогам исследования авторы пришли к выводу, что потенциал расширения кооперации между Республикой Кореей и Российской Федерацией в сфере цифровизации финансовой системы весьма широк. Сближение накопленного опыта науки и практики России и Республики Корея является взаимовыгодным и, несомненно, будет способствовать ускорению и повышению эффективности цифровой трансформации в обеих странах.

Executive Summary   Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Data and Methodology 2.1. Data to Use 2.2. Landscape of APEC RTA from the database 2.3. Methodology: Text similarity as a measurement of RTA convergence Ⅲ. Analytical Findings 3.1. Overall trend of convergence 3.2. Who leads the convergence: Clustering aspects 3.3. Who leads the convergence: Development aspects Ⅳ. Further Analysis: convergence by chapters Ⅴ. Robustness Checks Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks References Appendix A. Lists of Key Variable Name B. Convergence of APEC RTAs by Chapters

In this paper, I suggest that text mining analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) can be a suitable methodology to develop a tangible measure of convergence between RTAs. By utilizing well-established text similarity concepts in related literatures, I attempt to investigate how much RTAs in APEC are converging in terms of how much similar RTA texts are. Furthermore, which areas of RTA converge more or less will be examined. The main results of the study are as follows. The RTAs signed by APEC members are gradually converging over time, and they converged (in terms of 5-gram Jaccard similarity) at an annual average of 8% for all RTAs (both inter- and intra-regional) while 9.7% for intra-regional RTAs only. The areas that converged the most are service and transparency chapters, which show 2.2 times and 1.6 times higher level of convergence than the average, respectively. The objective and intuitive indicators of regional norm convergence are expected to provide a common understanding for setting goals and strategies for regional economic integration in the future.

Executive Summary Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Measuring Industry Participation and Position in GVCs 2.1. Industry Participation in Vertical Specialization Linkage: Backward and Forward Participation Rates 2.2. Industry Position in Production Line: Upstreamness and Downstreamness Indices Ⅲ. Industry Participation and Position in GVCs: Statistical Observations from APEC Member Economies 3.1. Forward and Backward Participation Rates 3.2. Upstreamness Index Ⅳ. The Value-added Creation Effect of GVC Participation: An Empirical Investigation for APEC Member Economies 4.1. Model Specification 4.2. Data and Summary Statistics 4.3. Empirical Results 4.4. Policy Implications Ⅴ. Summary and Concluding Remarks References Appendix

We analyze the value-added creation effect of GVC participation by applying a standard fixed effects regression model analysis with economy-wide country-industry data. We use OECD Inter-country Input-Output Tables covering 64 countries (21 APEC members and 43 non-APEC members) and 35 industries (1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing, 3 Mining, 16 Manufacturing, and 15 Service) between 2005 and 2015. We find that APEC member economies’ participation in GVC activities is not distinct from non-APEC member economies but the causal relationship between GVC participation and created domestic value-added is much stronger in APEC member economies. More specifically, from the qualitative evaluation on statistical data, we find that backward linkage has been stronger than forward linkage and both have been recently decreasing. The APEC industries’ upstream positions in production line have been slightly more distinguished than non-APEC industries. From the econometric regression analysis, we find that forward participation in GVCs is more desirable than backward participation in terms of creating domestic value-added. We also find that the industry position in middle stages of production line in contrast to earlier and later stages creates higher domestic value-added per output unit. This implies that the firm-specific conventional U-shaped “Smile Curve Hypothesis” is not applicable at the economy-wide country-industry level, especially in APEC member economies. This finding supports that manufacturing industries are still a major driving force for less developed APEC member economies to move up the development ladder. Considering that gains from GVC participation are diversified across industries and upgrading country-industry positions in GVCs is competitive among the interconnected countries, we strongly recommend for APEC member economies to construct effective domestic value chains and coordinate with other members during their process of upgrading GVC participation.

  This report reviews the preliminary judgments of the CJEU on the interpretation of the EU GDPR and compares them with Korean laws and precedents in order to derive implications related to the validity of passive consent, the basis for the transfer of personal data abroad, and the content and scope of application of the right to be forgotten. The CJEU have ruled that passive consent, such as preselected check boxes, is not a valid agreement. In addition, the ombudsperson mechanism which cannot make any decisions binding on intelligence agencies is not effective judicial redress. That is why the Privacy Shield, which was the basis for the transfer of personal data between the EU and the United States, is invalid. Finally, the deletion from search engines based on the right to be forgotten is restricted to the EU region, not the entire world.
  By comparing those precedents of the CJEU with Korean laws and precedents, the report provides the following implications. First, the passive consent was interpreted as invalid even if it was in accordance with Korean laws. Besides, the precedent is also in the same position, which shows important criterion was whether the data subject could objectively confirm the intention of the data subject. However, since Korean laws are less specific than the EU GDPR, it seemed necessary to supplement them. Second, the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organizations was allowed only when the data subject agreed. Otherwise, the EU GDPR recognized various other reasons besides the consent of the data subject. It is time that the supervisory authorities of Korean law should consider whether to allow other basis for the transfer of personal data or not. Last, there was a ruling that the right to be forgotten has not yet been introduced into Korean law. The right to correct and delete in Korean law is recognized only if the information is incorrect after the exercise of the right to read, and there is a difference from the right to be forgotten. Discussions on whether to introduce the right to be forgotten are needed.

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구의 목적과 필요성
2. 연구의 구성과 내용

제2장 디지털세에 관한 국제 논의 동향 
1. 논의 배경 
2. OECD/G20의 BEPS 논의 
3. European Commission 제안

제3장 다국적기업의 조세회피에 관한 경제학의 선행연구 
1. 세원잠식과 소득이전(BEPS) 
2. 다국적기업 조세회피의 경제적 영향

제4장 디지털세에 관한 최근 연구 
1. 디지털 플랫폼 시장: 양면시장 
2. 양면시장의 최적조세효과: 종가세 vs. 종량세
3. 사용자 데이터를 활용하는 디지털 플랫폼과 조세효과
4. 과세권 배분 기준에 따른 조세효과 
5. 디지털 서비스세의 경제적 효과 

제5장 결론 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

   As the digital economy progresses, there is growing concern regarding the issue of tax avoidance by multinationals. Since firms rely heavily on intangibles and yield profits without permanent establishments in the digital economy, the so-called Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) phenomenon is likely to grow worse as such tax avoidance by multinationals becomes more prevalent and elaborate. Working within the OCED/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, over 135 countries are collaborating to reach an agreement by the end of 2020, and many economies including European countries have been introducing digital services tax.
   This paper surveys the literature on the economic impact of tax avoidance by multinationals, reviews international discussions on the BEPS project and digital services tax, and provides, by suggesting directions for future research, references for government to prepare countermeasures for the introduction of the BEPS project and digital services tax by other countries. Chapter 2 covers recent discussions on the OECD/G20 BEPS project, the European Commission’s corporate tax reform, and introduction of digital services tax by many countries. The key points of the “Two-pillar approach” discussed at the OCED/G20 are profit allocation using a predetermined formula and ensuring a minimum level of effective taxation. Since the cessation of discussions on corporate tax reform at the European Commission, many European countries have been independently introducing digital services tax targeting digital enterprises with high profits. Chapter 3 surveys the literature on the magnitude and economic impact of BEPS. Previous papers find that an increase in corporate tax rates differentials between home and a tax haven would raise subsidiaries’ profits, but the magnitudes become lower as the quality of data and methodology improve. They also report the evidence of manipulation of transfer price and relocation of intellectual property to a tax haven based on tax rates differentials between home and a tax haven. According to papers that analyzed the impact of tax avoidance on price, output, and consumer welfare, welfare increases with tax avoidance in countries with a high tax rate, while it tends to decrease in countries with a low tax rate. An increase in corporate tax rate, however, generally has a negative effect on firms’ productivity, investment, and innovation. Chapter 4 reviews recent studies on digital tax and online platforms in two-sided markets. In two-sided markets, platforms react to taxation by taking account the indirect network effect, which refers to interaction between incentives of users on each side to participate in the platform. A platform would respond to tax by reducing price on one side if the market has large indirect network effect. Recent studies show that the impact on platform’s pricing and fiscal revenue of taxing a two-sided platform varies depending on the magnitude of indirect network effect. Based on this extensive literature review, this paper concludes with suggestions for future research direction. It will be worthwhile to explore avenues like tax incidence, investment effects of digital tax, impact analysis at industry level, trade conflicts arising from introducing digital services, and changes in international standards for the digital economy.
 

KIEP는 세계경제 현안 및 동향에 즉각적으로 대응하기 위한 이슈페이퍼를 발간하고 있습니다.
   이슈페이퍼는 관련 정부 부처에 제공되어 대외경제정책 운영을 위한 기초자료로 활용되고 있습니다.
   본 모음집은 2020년도 상반기에 발간된 현안대응자료를 요약 수록한 것으로서 각 자료별 특성은 아래와 같습니다.

  ① 오늘의 세계경제: 국제경제 주요현안 분석자료

  ② KIEP 기초자료: 주요 지역경제 및 정책 관련 정보제공자료

  ③ KIEP 세계경제 포커스: 세계경제 단기 현안이슈자료
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구 배경 
2. 연구 내용 

제2장 일본 산학협력정책의 추진 현황과 과제
1. 산학협력정책의 추진 배경과 현황 
2. 산학협력의 발전 현황 
3. 소결

제3장 산학협력 모델 사례분석 
1. 서론 
2. 도쿄대학
3. 교토대학
4. 오사카대학
5. 큐슈대학
6. 소결 

제4장 결론 
1. 일본 산학협력의 성과
2. 일본 산학협력의 한계
3. 한국 산학협력에 주는 시사점

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

  In this study we examine the current state of industry-academic cooperation conducted at Japan’s national universities and government policies to support these cooperation programs, also analyzing cases of industry-academic cooperation by major national university foundations (the University of Tokyo, Osaka University, Kyoto University, and Kyushu University). Cooperation between businesses and universities is on the rise within Japan, centered on joint research projects and venture incubator programs at universities. According to data released by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, a total of 2,278 new venture companies were formed on university campuses in the year of 2018 alone. How can we explain the recent rise in active cooperation between businesses and universities in Japan? To formulate a comprehensive answer to this question, this study examines policy efforts by the Japanese government, measures taken to reorganize industry-academic cooperation systems at universities, and changes in innovative strategies adopted by businesses.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와 본 연구의 차별성
3. 연구구성

제2장 중국의 제조업 혁신 네트워크 구축
1. 「중국제조 2025」 추진과 제조업 혁신센터 사업
2. 중국과 미국의 정책사업 비교
3. 소결

제3장 전기차 배터리 사례
1. 중국의 전기차 배터리 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 전기차 배터리 혁신센터: 베이징(北京)시
3. 소결

제4장 반도체 사례
1. 중국의 반도체 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 반도체 혁신센터: 상하이(上海)시
3. 소결

제5장 디스플레이 사례
1. 중국의 디스플레이 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 디스플레이 혁신센터: 광둥성
3. 소결

제6장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   U.S.-China trade friction is one of the major variables causing external economic uncertainty in Korea. The competition for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China has been pointed out as lying at the essence of the trade friction between the U.S. and China, prompted by China’s rise in technological prowess. As the most representative industrial development policy by the Chinese government to respond to this rise in the nation’s technological prowess, the Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) plan deserves detailed analysis and evaluation, based on which we can debate proper response measures. In this regard, this study analyzed and evaluated the progress of measures to establish a manufacturing innovation network currently ongoing within China, one of the key policy tasks of MIC 2025.
   We perform a comparative analysis of policy operations in China and the U.S., the latter being the benchmark for China, in order to analyze in depth the manufacturing innovation centers that form the core of China’s manufacturing innovation network. We also studied specific cases at manufacturing innovation centers in the sectors of electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays ? core areas in which China has succeeded in localization and is competing with Korea ? to understand the specific characteristics, achievements and limitations of these innovation centers. To allow a comprehensive examination of the demand for development in participating entities and industries, we analyzed the rise of local businesses in related areas, incubation policies promoted by the Chinese government, and the trend of localization, together with a review of operations at the innovation centers.
   This study has drawn the following conclusions and suggestions. China may benchmark U.S. policy, but is fine-tuning its own policies, which is having the effect of limiting its progress toward the goals initially set.
   First, China’s manufacturing innovation centers are operating upon a dual scheme of dividing national- and provincial-level centers. China’s provincial manufacturing innovation centers are established by local governments, after which they compete to be selected as national manufacturing innovation centers. This dual system incurs leads to the possibility of overlapping areas and investments in similar R&D projects.
   Second, manufacturing innovation centers in China feature a self-sustaining profit structure like private businesses. Some in China point out that it is contradictory to apply a corporate management system to manufacturing innovation centers established to play a role for the common interest of the industry. In addition, given the level of development of Chinese companies, it may not be sustainable to continue operations based on profit gained from commissioned research, technology transfer, technology certification testing, and the establishment and utilization of patent pools.
   Third, as seen in some cases of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries and displays, cooperation and networking between companies can be difficult in sectors where a competitive structure already exists, neither do these seem to have a significant impact on related industries. The United States requires in principle the establishment of manufacturing innovation centers in areas remaining in a pre-competitive state for industrial technology. China, on the other hand, has prepared a list of areas to establish manufacturing innovation centers, based on areas specified within the MIC 2025, but does not make considerations for industrial technology features, such as is required in the U.S.
   Fourth, according to our case analysis, innovation centers for semiconductors and displays are significantly linked to the industrial development strategies of the local government, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center lack in connectivity with local industries. This indicates it is likely that semiconductor and display innovation centers will be able to create synergistic effects in conjunction with intra-regional industrial clusters, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center will have less impact on related industries within Beijing.
   Although some operational results have been achieved in the case of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays, the limitations described above have led to internal criticism and a call for policy coordination as doubt is cast on whether China’s innovation centers can eventually lead to the establishment of a nationwide network of manufacturing innovation centers, the original goal of this plan. Our expert interviews indicate a consensus for the need of policy coordination is emerging among China’s government agencies, academia and industries.
   Our case studies identify the following opportunities and threats created by the operation of manufacturing innovation centers in China, and industry policies in this area. China originally intended to establish manufacturing innovation centers for the core industrial sectors specified within the MIC 2025 plan, aiming to form a network of innovative players in each industrial sector. But so far, as suggested above, it appears that China’s manufacturing innovation center project will be insufficient to carry out this role in the actual application of policies, both in institutional and system terms. This trial and error in China’s policy operations serves as a positive factor for Korea to maintain the current technological gap with China. However, internal criticism of these policies and the discussion of alternatives in China can be seen as a threat in their potential for improvement, reflecting trial and error.
   In addition, since China holds a comparative advantage over Korea in certain areas within the value chain of the semiconductor industry, it will be necessary to remain cautious of the semiconductor innovation center establishing innovative networks and the current technology gap shrinking in foundry sectors. There is also the concern that Korea’s research and development know-how will be exposed during the process of collaboration between Chinese companies and multinational businesses, such as seen in the case of the display innovation center.