To achieve carbon neutrality and increase energy security, the international community is accelerating the energy transition to reduce fossil fuels and increase renewable energy. Solar power, in particular, has emerged as a fast-growing renewable energy source, as its generation costs have fallen to the level of fossil fuels and it is relatively easy to install. Demand is growing rapidly and is expected to exceed the cumulative installed capacity of coal by 2027. In addition, demand for energy storage systems (ESS) is growing in line with the expansion of renewable energy generation. Since the production of electricity from solar and wind power fluctuates depending on the amount of sunlight available and wind speeds, it is necessary to build an ESS to store the generated electricity and release it when it is needed. Among ESS, the demand for battery energy storage systems (BESS) based on lithium-ion batteries (LiB) is growing rapidly, as it is less constrained by location and can be easily dismantled and moved compared to pumped storage hydroelectricity, in which power is generated by utilizing altitude differences in locations such as reservoirs.

The problem is that China accounts for 74.7-96.8% of capacity at each stage of the global solar supply chain, and about 70% of capacity in the upstream and midstream of the LiB-based BESS supply chain.  

South Korea has technological competitiveness in LiB used for solar power generation and BESS. However, the domestic solar industry remains overly dependent on imports of solar products from the People’s Republic of China and struggles to compete with price-competitive Chinese products. In addition, Korea lost its leading position in the global market share of LiB for BESS to China in 2021.

This article analyzes how the US and Europe, the main markets for solar and LiB-based BESS, are responding to China’s dominance in the supply chain. We examine the Chinese government’s policies and company strategies behind the monopolization of each industry, and consider a comprehensive response that governments and companies can adopt.

Chapter 2 analyzes the US and European responses to China’s dominance in the solar industry, including import restrictions and policies to strengthen domestic supply chains, and identifies Chinese government policies to promote the solar industry and Chinese company strategies.

First, the United States began imposing high anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese solar products in 2012, significantly reducing its dependence on imports from the People’s Republic of China. However, Chinese companies set up production facilities in Southeast Asia to redirect their exports, increasing US reliance on imports of solar products from Southeast Asia to 70-90% in 2022. In response, the US government launched an investigation into circumvention exports via Southeast Asia and identified five Chinese companies in violation, but these only amounted to a portion of the major cell and module companies in China. While the US has ostensibly reduced its reliance on imports of solar products from the People’s Republic of China, it continues to make decisions that leave room for Chinese products. The US is also pursuing a policy of building its domestic solar supply chain by offering an IRA-based investment tax credit (ITC, AEPC) and per-unit production credits (AMPC) for each stage of supply. The US solar supply chain currently lacks wafer or cell production capacity, and module production capacity is insufficient to meet Biden’s carbon neutrality target. The US is therefore trying to attract competitive companies to internalize the supply chain and expand production capacity. The US’ strategy can be summarized as: the establishment of a complete supply chain for crystalline silicon solar wafers domestically, led by South Korea’s Hanwha Solution, which is currently building the largest solar farm in North America; and the ramping up of thin-film solar cell production, led by First Solar. Through this, the US will likely succeed in internalizing the solar supply chain as it intends, however it will be difficult to wholly exclude China from the supply chain.

Europe has also imposed anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese solar products since 2013, but unlike the US, it discontinued the tariffs in 2018. Since then, Europe’s dependence on imports of solar modules from the People’s Republic of China has risen to more than 80 per cent in 2021. Instead of reducing its dependence on the PRC for solar products, Europe seems to be focusing more on securing renewable energy, mainly solar, by importing large quantities of cheap Chinese products. The EU Commission’s declaration in 2019 to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, coupled with Russia’s reduction of fossil energy supplies to Europe in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, has put Europe in a position where it needs to secure more renewable energy faster. In response, the EU Commission published the Carbon Neutral Industry Act, identifying solar power generation as one of eight carbon-neutral strategic technologies and setting a target of producing 40 per cent of the EU’s needs locally by 2030, based on the promotion of strategic projects. The EU also announced that it would extend subsidies through the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF) to attract private capital investment in the sector, which requires significant funding. However, the European solar industry is already struggling in the face of low-cost Chinese products and cannot afford to increase investment.

Since the early 2000s, China has provided active support to promote exports in the solar industry, support for domestic and overseas stock market listings, and investment subsidies to localize the production of equipment and technology. However, as major markets such as the US and Europe began to impose import restrictions, China began to develop its domestic market based on the Gold Sun pilot program (50 per cent of total investment in solar PV projects subsidized) and feed-in tariff (FIT) policies. Since 2017, when the industry entered into a mature stage, subsidies have been gradually reduced and the approach to strengthening R&D capacity has shifted from unconditional subsidies to selective incentives for companies with technological prowess. As a result, China’s solar industry has been reorganized around leading players, with companies lacking core competitiveness being eliminated. In August 2021, the Chinese government abolished the FIT scheme for the solar industry, entering the phase of marketization from subsidy-led growth. In addition, the policy direction for the solar industry through 2025 is expected to focus on expanding solar power application areas such as BIPV, developing next-generation solar technologies around perovskite, and protecting indigenous technologies (e.g. adding wafer technologies to the list of prohibited and restricted technologies).

The Chinese solar industry is currently oversupplied and internal competition is fierce. Chinese companies have already gained in-house production capacity and technology, and are now strengthening their competitiveness by securing unique flagship technologies and setting industry standards that other companies cannot match. In addition, Chinese solar companies are responding to US import restrictions by expanding production bases in Southeast Asia to redirect exports, and to the US IRA by building solar production facilities in the US.

Chapter 3 analyzes the Chinese-led LiB-based BESS industry, the US and European responses described in Chapter 2, and Chinese government policies and corporate strategies.

Although the US has imposed a 7.5 per cent tariff on Chinese LiBs under Section 301 from 2019, in addition to the existing 3.5 per cent tariff, the share of US imports of LiBs from the PRC has continued to grow, reaching a 10-year high of 70 per cent in 2022. This is because, with the exception of the key mineral mining and refining stages of the US LiB-based BESS supply chain, the four core materials and cell stages already have formed domestic supply chains, but production capacity is far from sufficient to meet demand. In addition, refined products (such as lithium compounds) and cathode materials (graphite) for core materials are dominated by China. Therefore, the US seems to have adopted a realistic strategy of strengthening domestic production capacity at each stage of the supply chain, based on the IRA, and not imposing discriminatory rules on LiB for BESS. The IRA provides an investment tax credit (ITC) for BESS investment costs and a manufacturing tax credit (AMPC) for LiB cells and modules, core materials and minerals. This is a win-win situation as LiBs for BESS are almost entirely produced by Chinese and Korean companies, but the AMPC incentives will favor Chinese companies as they already have a competitive price and technology advantage over Chinese-made lithium-ion batteries (LFPs).

Europe’s LiB-based BESS supply chain is also facing a supply shortage in the region relative to demand at the upstream and midstream levels. Unlike the US, Europe has not adopted regulatory measures such as anti-subsidies for LiB in China. As a result, the share of LiB imports from China has increased proportionally, reaching 45 per cent in 2022, in line with the growing demand in the European market. The low price and volume of Chinese LiB in Europe is under increasing pressure. Along with solar, the EU Commission has included battery and storage technology as one of the eight strategic technologies in its Carbon Neutral Industry Act and aims to produce at least 40% of the annual demand for battery and storage devices in the region by 2030. It also announced the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), under which China aims to achieve 10% local mining, 40% local refining (processing and treatment) and 25% local production of recycled raw materials in terms of annual consumption by 2030, and to diversify its raw material imports to avoid relying on any single source for more than 65%. In addition, a battery law will come into force in 2024, imposing high environmental standards on the battery supply chain and preventing non-compliant batteries from entering the market. Taken together, Europe’s strategy reflects concerns about over-reliance on China, as seen in the solar power section. The focus is on diversifying sources, particularly upstream in the LiB supply chain, to spread risk. However, there appears to be no movement to exclude China from the supply chain. Of course, the implementation of the EU battery legislation will make it more difficult for foreign battery companies to enter the European market by giving LiB a higher exchange rate, but this is not a discriminatory measure as European companies will also have to comply.

On the other hand, by 2020, China’s new ESS (BESS, compressed air energy storage, flywheel energy storage, etc.) will have moved from the R&D demonstration stage to the early commercialization stage. In addition, internally, BESS and compressed air ESS technologies, led by LiB, have reached world-leading levels. The Chinese government sees 2021 as the pioneering year of the new ESS industry and aims to develop it to the scale-up stage, as stated within the 14th Five-Year Plan for 2021-25. For LiB in particular, the focus is on improving productivity through technology upgrades and reducing operating costs, as well as strengthening cohesion in the domestic supply chain. The government will focus on encouraging upstream and downstream companies in the LiB supply chain to develop closer cooperation, including signing long-term contracts and clarifying quantities and prices at each stage of the supply chain to ensure stable supply.

Internally, Chinese LiB companies have formed their own alliances between upstream and downstream companies to stabilize their supply chains. In response to the US IRA, they are also building local production bases in the US, cooperating with US FTAs, expanding into Europe, and increasing investment in LiB recycling in anticipation of the European Battery Directive.

In Chapter 4, based on the above analysis, we suggest responses for the Korean government and companies. First, it is time to develop a comprehensive solar industry policy for Korea. Specifically, it is necessary to: (1) expand solar applications and subsidize production to revitalize the domestic market; (2) provide government support for exports and financing; (3) provide funding for solar companies that are expected to expand into the North American market through the US IRA; and (4) provide government R&D support to maintain the super-gap technology of perovskite solar cells and pre-emptively promote commercialization. Second, it is necessary to consider developing LiB recycling technology and increasing investment to respond to the European battery legislation and to secure key minerals. Third, Chinese upstream companies and Korean midstream and downstream companies in both the solar and LiB-based BESS industries should urgently sign long-term supply contracts in the short term, and focus on securing proprietary technologies in the long term. 

Since 2011, Timor-Leste has prioritized ASEAN membership as its highest diplomatic agenda. Although Timor-Leste had obtained the ‘in-principle’ membership and observer status, the time for the full membership has not yet been confirmed. This report analyzes the conditions and capabilities for the Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN and examines the support strategies and cases of major donor countries. Based on these analyses, this report aims to suggest the Korea’s plans for the development cooperation and support plans for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN.

In chapter 2, the conditions for development cooperation of Timor-Leste on various perspectives including politics, diplomacy and society, are examined. We also analyzed the Timor-Leste’s general capacity such as economic conditions, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implement status, etc. Timor-Leste has the unique political systems, such as dual executive system and four separations power (president, executive, legislative and judiciary). In the field of diplomacy, Timor-Leste has a identity of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and has been adapting an active diplomacy in the form of “Comprehensive and Collective Engagement” with ASEAN and Pacific island countries. Based on these, Timor-Leste has been strategically utilized the geopolitical importance and adopted the accession to ASEAN as its top diplomatic priority. Timor-Leste has a pyramidal population structure typical of developing countries, with Tetum and Portuguese as official languages, and Indonesian and English as working languages. Timor-Leste is a least developed country with a nominal GDP of $2.2 billion a per capita of $2,491 as of 2022. Due to the weak agriculture and manufacturing industries, it has been highly dependent on the Petroleum Wealth generated by the Bayu-Undan oil field. Recently, the economic growth rate has been gradually recovering from the impact of Covid-pandemic, but there is a concern about the loss of growth momentum due to the end of Bayu-Undan oil field development. Oil and gas takes more than the 90% share of the total export. Excluding the oil and gas, coffee can be considered as the only export commodity which accounts about 7% share of the total export. There is an urgent need to attract FDI for industrial development. However, little FDI is taking placed other than investment on oil-field development due to the weak manufacturing base and domestic demand. The working-age population of Timor-Leste is approximately 800,000 with a low labor force participation rate of 30.5%, and the education level is only about the 48.8% with primary education or less. Bayu-Undan oil field is considered as a representative natural resource. As the reserves are nearing depletion, the development of Greater Sunrise oil field as an alternative is urgently needed. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation status has remained at “challenges”, “significant challenges” and “major challenges” in various sectors.

The chapter 3 analyzes the Timor-Leste’s readiness and capacity to join ASEAN, especially the membership requirement stated in the ASEAN Charter and the level comparison with ASEAN member countries using key indicators. Regarding the fulfillment of the requirement of the ASEAN Charter Article 6, Timor-Leste has been considered positively. However, there are concerns about “ability” such as the weak economic development and financial situation, lack of physical infrastructure and low diplomatic capacity. Regarding the obligation of ASEAN Charter Article 5 paragraph 2 (Domestic legislation), we have monitored the legislation status to meet the obligations of ASEAN communities and other sectoral agreements based on Timor-Leste ASEAN Mobilization Plan (TLAMP) and Critical Elements for Accession (CEA). However, it is not easy to confirm whether Timor-Leste meets the requirements for ASEAN membership due to the difficulty of quantitative evaluation by the difference and wide range of membership requirements for each ASEAN communities and ‘Non-disclosure approach’ of ASEAN and Timor-Leste. Regarding the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2025 Blueprint, Timor-Leste could not meet a series of requirements such as legal regulations and global trade order excluding a few trade and people movement related requirement. In comparative analysis on the capacity with ASEAN countries by key indicators, such as income level, human development index, finance, communication, urbanization, literacy rate, Timor-Leste has scored the similar level to ASEAN latecomer countries. However, in democracy index which measures democracy development, Timor-Leste has ranked on 44th among 167 countries, higher than most of the ASEAN countries. This high ranking is believed to be due to the stable establishment and operation of democratic regime without any military coup or dictatorship after the independence in 2002.

The chapter 4 analyzes the ODA and support for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN from major donor countries and institutions. For the ODA analysis of Timor-Leste, we used the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). We also adapted the case studies of the major donor countries and institutions regarding supports for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN. The bilateral ODA had taken the major share of ODA for Timor-Leste from international community. By donors, Australia (31.3%), and Portugal (13.2%) have taken the largest share, and socialinfrastructure (60.9%) and economic-infrastructure (13.1%) have accounted for a large portion by sectors. For the case studies of the support for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, we adapted the cases of Japan and Australia for country cases, also ADB’s support for the institutional case. Japan has been supporting Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN by the Country Assistance Policy for Timor-Leste (2017) and by the supports through institutions such as JICA and ADB. Australia, the largest donor country of Timor-Leste, has been operating a series of mid to long-term development cooperation programs on various fields such as human development, village development, public administration, bio, agriculture & rural development, police-capacity building, etc. Australia had established a funding package (6.6 Mil AUD) in a period of 2022-2026, which supports Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN by capacity and infrastructure building projects such as government & private capacity building project, workshop for the partnership with ASEAN secretariat and member countries, etc. ADB has been supporting Timor-Leste by the 5-year mid-term strategy, Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) since 1999. During the period of Timor-Leste’s independence, ADB had it's focus on recovery & maintenance of infrastructure, but the support area has gradually expanded to pandemic, climate change, SDGs, etc. ADB’s supporting strategy for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN has its main focus on the capacity building projects by Capacity Development Technical Assistance (CDTA). The results of analysis of supporting case studies of major donor countries and institutions implies that Korea also needs to actively prepare the support plans in the area of capacity building for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, national system building, infrastructure, etc.

The chapter 5 provides the forecast of Timor-Leste’s full membership to ASEAN, and policy recommendations for Korea’s supporting plans. Although Timor-Leste has been granted the ‘in-principle’ accession and observer status at the ASEAN summit in November 2022, the formal accession to ASEAN has been delayed due to reasons including the concerns about Timor-Leste’s lack of preparations and capacity, disagreement among ASEAN member countries, etc. The majority of the ASEAN countries have a positive stance on Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, but there is uncertainty that the situation may change depending on a certain moment or political situation. For Timor-Leste, accession to ASEAN has great significance, including economic benefit, participation to regional economic integration, establishment of security and collective identity, national growth and advancement, geopolitical interest as well as ‘the second founding of the nation’. From ASEAN’s perspective, Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN has implications such as ASEAN’s expansion, peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and containment of China’s influence. To support Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, Korea needs to establish strategies focused on capacity building to implement the roadmap, the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI), and its strengths and competitiveness, as follows. First, Korea needs to support Timor-Leste in enhancing the foreign trade capacity and trade law experts. Second, human resource development and training, and third, support for the construction of digital infrastructure is required. To expand development cooperation with Timor-Leste, Korea should expand its ODA focused on the industrial restructuring & diversification, rural development, economic infrastructure development, etc.

Korea should prioritize the foreign trade capacity and trade law expert of Timor-Leste, and promote the its support for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN and development cooperation plans as outlined in Chapter 5. At the same time, Korean government needs to stipulate the supports for Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN in the Country Support Plan (CP) for Timur-Leste. In addition, there is a need to consider tripartite cooperation with Indonesia, Vietnam and ASEAN Secretariat, ways to link with the approaches to WTO accession, and select & focus strategy based on the Korea’s competitiveness. 

Recently, China has signed and applied for membership in several trade agreements, including RCEP, CPTPP, and DEPA, which are expected to promote the reform and opening up of China’s trade sector. Specifically in the area of services trade, China needs to prepare itself for transitioning from the current positive list approach to the negative list method within three years after the implementation of RCEP in 2022, while also adopting an internationally recognized methodology. Several policies are being implemented. This study analyzed the Hainan Free Trade Port policy, which prioritizes the introduction of regulatory reform and trade liberalization measures in China’s services sector. It aimed to explore ways for Korea and China to cooperate in the service industry while also assessing the potential for decentralizing the functions of the Hong Kong Free Trade Port.

The conclusions and implications of this study are as follows. First, China is initially promoting the reform and opening up of Hainan’s service industry through the implementation of market access relaxation measures and negative lists, which constitutes a fundamental aspect of the Hainan’s Free Trade Port policy. China is anticipated to elevate trade standards by conducting openness assessments, amending domestic laws and regulations, and simultaneously applying a negative list and market access relaxation measures for the Hainan Free Trade Port, renowned for its highest level of openness.

Second, although the product trade liberalization and the operation of the tax system at the Hainan Free Trade Port are expected to be partially aligned with those of Hong Kong, there still remains a need for further progress in promoting capital movement liberalization. Consequently, in the medium to long term, Hainan is expected to offer foreign investors entry conditions comparable to Hong Kong’s tax system. However, unless significant progess is made in opening up the services sector and liberalizing capital movements, Hainan’s potential role as a free trade port may be limited.

Third, changes in Hainan’s trade, investment, and duty-free shopping need to be interpreted in light of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, there has been a noticeable increase in imports affected by Hainan’s duty-free allowance adjustments and duty-free import measures. Additionally, the services trade has recently shifted from a deficit to a surplus, primarily due to the escalation of transit trade. In terms of investment, domestic investment by Chinese companies has notably surged, particularly in industries with preferential corporate income tax rates and those with corporate income tax exemptions on offshore earnings. At present, the investment surge is primarily driven by domestic companies, but the foreign investment is poised to rise, depending on the outcomes of Hainan’s policy implementations The impact of these policies on duty-free shopping is expected to be felt after 2023. If Chinese citizens’ overseas duty-free shopping decreases in the future, it is expected to have a significant impact on our country.

From our country’s perspective, the first step is to carefully analyze Hainan’s upcoming irregular announcements regarding reforms and opening up in the service sector, and use them as a reference to prepare a negotiation plan that is advantageous for our country in the future Korea-China FTA service and investment negotiations. By leveraging insights from Hainan’s policies, we can assess China’s reform and opening strategies in terms of priority areas, direction, and pace. Additionally, we can explore methods to streamline market access and implement national treatment at the regional level.

Second, given Hainan’s burgeoning growth prospects, there is an urgent need to expand cooperation, with particular emphasis on the cosmetics and medical sectors. While Hainan has risen to become the second-largest region for cosmetics imports in China, Korea’s response pales in comparison to rival nations. Simultaneously, China is utilizing Hainan as a testing ground for institutional reforms within the medical sector, thereby bolstering Hainan’s role as a gateway for foreign companies seeking to penetrate the Chinese medical market.

Third, it is necessary to prepare for enhancing the long-term competitiveness of Hainan’s service industry. Hainan aims to enhance its competitiveness by adopting international service standards similar to those in Hong Kong. This will be achieved by implementing mutual recognition of professional qualifications and providing preferential treatment. If the overseas consumption of services by Chinese citizens shifts to domestic demand, this could potentially impact Korea’s service exports to China. This shift might directly affect duty-free shopping for tourists and medical tourism. Therefore, it is imperative for us to explore ways to enhance the competitiveness of our country’s service industry while providing products and services in Hainan.