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A Study on the Analysis of Regulatory Innovation Strategies in the Fields of Science and Technology in Major Advanced Countries
As the competition for technological hegemony intensifies between the U.S. and China, major advanced countries around the world, including the U.S., are increasingly strengthening their strategies to protect and foster their techn..
Yong-Chan Choi and Kyungmoo Heo Date 2025.05.28
Economic security, Technical cooperationDownloadContentSummaryAs the competition for technological hegemony intensifies between the U.S. and China, major advanced countries around the world, including the U.S., are increasingly strengthening their strategies to protect and foster their technologies and industries in core science and technology fields. The governments of individual countries are expanding R&D investment, reorganizing legal and institutional foundations for technology protection and fostering, and aiming to strengthen national security and industrial ecosystems as well as securing technological competitiveness.
Major advanced economies, such as the U.S., the UK, and the EU, are formulating sophisticated policy frameworks aimed at promoting the growth of core science and technology fields. These frameworks involve easing unnecessary regulations while introducing new measures to safeguard critical technologies. Accordingly, it is essential to conduct a comparative analysis of these countries’ strategies for science and technology development, their approaches to fostering innovation ecosystems, and their industrial policy directions by examining the legal, institutional, and policy innovation strategies in major advanced countries.
Amid intensifying competition for technological hegemony between advanced countries, each country is focusing on securing technological independence and sustainability. The U.S. is intensively fostering high-tech industries such as semiconductors, AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology through its “America First” strategy, and is also restricting foreign investment and controlling technology transfer. The UK is strengthening its strategic choices to overcome the problem of low economic growth following Brexit and improve the UK’s global competitiveness in core technologies, while pursuing R&D investment and regulatory reform in fields such as AI and quantum technology. The EU is working to convert its technological innovation policy, which used to be centered on individual member states, into a more common strategy at the EU level, and is carrying out large-scale R&D investment and regulatory reform to secure the EU’s global competitiveness.
In addition, China has made science and technology independence its top priority in the face of U.S. countermeasures and is accelerating its own technology development in fields such as semiconductors, space-technology, biotechnology, and high-tech manufacturing. As such, major advanced countries are implementing strategic policies to strengthen their technological sovereignty and secure leadership in the global technology competition, underscoring the need for Korea to respond quickly and systematically. Korea also needs a strategic approach to respond to the intensifying global competition in technology, particularly by overcoming the limitations of existing systems and by innovating regulatory reforms tailored to the evolving technological landscape. There is a growing demand for the need to remove institutional barriers that hinder the development of science and technology and to establish a flexible regulatory framework that can accommodate new emerging technologies. In particular, as the perception that regulatory innovation is directly connected to national competitiveness spreads, now is the time for Korea to take active policy measures in response.
In the fields of science and technology, changes in the R&D, production, delivery, and transaction methods of new technologies are leading to conflicts with existing laws and systems, as well as the emergence of new regulatory issues. The phenomenon of “regulatory delay”—caused by the absence of appropriate laws or regulatory gaps—is becoming increasingly severe, posing obstacles to the commercialization of new technologies by companies and research institutions. To address this, major advanced countries are making continuous and focused efforts to promote regulatory innovation. Analyzing these strategies can help us better understand how regulatory innovation is being implemented in the fields of science and technology in major advanced countries.
By investigating and analyzing the implications, promotion strategies, detailed focus areas, and key characteristics of regulatory innovation strategies pursued by major advanced countries to achieve global technological leadership and foster innovative growth in related industries, this study aims to present effective response strategies for Korea to prepare the rapidly evolving future regulatory environment in the fields of science and technology, through a multifaceted analysis of regulatory innovation strategies by areas—that has not been fully addressed in existing research areas.
The first step in investigating and analyzing regulatory innovation strategies in the fields of science and technology in major advanced countries is to select three advanced countries to be studied. The U.S. was selected for its leadership in science, technology, and industrial ecosystems, as well as its global influence on national regulatory innovation strategies. The UK was chosen for its pioneering role in regulatory innovation strategies in the fields of science and technology, and the EU was selected for its role in driving innovative demand in new industrial sectors. These three entities were identified as the major advanced economies to be included in the study.
The next step is to select some fields to be investigated among the various fields of science and technology. In 2024, the Ministry of Science and ICT announced three major game changer technologies (AI-semiconductor, advanced bio, quantum), on the basis of which a total of four science and technology fields were selected: semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology.
The final step is to categorize various areas—such as institutions, governance, standards and certification, ethics, international cooperation, subsidies and tax incentives, experimental testing and scientific-technological capabilities, hostile response policies and strategies, and public/private protection (safety and security)—into three major groups; ① system and governance, ② Fostering and advancing the science and technology ecosystem and ③ technology security. Based on this classification, the study systematically analyzes the regulatory innovation strategies of major advanced countries in the fields of semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology the perspective of these three categories.
Subsequently, the findings of major studies that have investigated and analyzed regulatory innovation strategies in core science and technology fields - such as semiconductors, advanced biotechnology, AI, and quantum technology in the U.S., UK, and EU are summarized as follows.
In the field of semiconductor, the three major advanced economies are working to promote semiconductor production and innovation within their borders, execute export control regulations, and respond to a supply-crisis caused by semiconductor shortages in order to protect their respective technological advantages. Each country is promoting innovative policies that include subsidies, tax incentives, and R&D policy funds in its innovative regulatory framework. The UK is strengthening its strategic choices to maintain and expand its strategic advantage in this sector based on its strengths in semiconductor design and intellectual property, compound semiconductors, and the world’s best research and innovation systems, with a relatively smaller amount of support than the U.S. and EU. In Korea, the so-called “K Chips Act” (amended by the Restriction of Special Taxation Act) was passed at the National Assembly plenary session in February 2025 to strengthen tax incentives for investment, such as the expansion of semiconductor companies’ factories. In addition, special laws for strengthening the competitiveness of the semiconductor industry and innovative growth are being discussed by the relevant committees of the National Assembly.
In the field of advanced biotechnology, the U.S. has been continuously implementing innovation policies to improve the regulatory environment through the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation, the federal government’s basic guidelines for regulating biotechnology products. The UK is pushing for the government’s smart regulatory program to remove regulatory barriers and prepare for the future of regulatory frameworks by explaining regulatory issues related to engineering biology through RHC(Regulatory Horizons Council). In addition, the regulatory sandbox for engineering biology is being promoted through the EBRN. The EU is focusing on simplifying regulatory pathways through a series of measures to promote biotechnology and bio manufacturing in the EU, and is implementing measures to further promote the establishment of regulatory sandboxes to quickly launch them in the market. Korea has enacted and is currently implementing the Biotechnology Promotion Act, which aims to efficiently foster and develop biotechnology by establishing a solid research foundation and promoting the industrialization of biotechnological advancements. In January 2025, the National Bio Commission was launched, and the government unveiled the “Korea Bio Great Transformation National Strategy,” which aims to position Korea among the world’s top five biotechnology leaders by 2035 through sweeping transformations in infrastructure, R&D, and the bioindustry.
In the field of AI, although the US has long led the world in AI technology and scientific advancement, its AI regulatory framework only began to take full shape in 2024. That year, President Joe Biden issued a new executive order titled the “AI Executive Order on Safe AI.” This executive order establishes new standards for the safety and security of AI, protects privacy, promotes civil rights, fosters innovation, and introduces stronger regulations to prevent the misuse of AI.
The UK, through its National AI Strategy, has proposed short-, medium-, and long-term measures aimed at achieving three core priorities: investment in the AI ecosystem, ensuring that the benefits of AI are distributed across all sectors and regions, and establishing effective AI governance. Furthermore, to lead responsible innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and maintain public trust in the technology, the UK became the first country in the world to publish an AI regulatory white paper titled A Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation, which provides guidance on the use of AI. The UK government subsequently published a Government Response that compiled and addressed questions from various relevant institutions regarding the white paper, thereby presenting a foundational regulatory framework for AI. In addition, the UK is building its AI governance structure by establishing the world’s first government- supported AI Safety Institute and forming a Regulator Ecosystem composed of multiple regulatory bodies. The EU finally approved the “AI Act,” the world’s first comprehensive AI technology regulation, on May 21, 2024. The EU AI governance system has been established as a separate AI Board consisting of the EU Commission, its AI Office, and delegations from EU member states.
Recently, Korea became the second country in the world, following the European Union, to enact an “AI Basic Act,” which is scheduled to take effect in January 2026.
Korea’s AI Basic Act includes provisions for the establishment and implementation of a national AI master plan every three years, the formation of a national-level AI governance structure and support for the innovative development of the AI ecosystem through measures such as securing professional talent, designating AI industrial clusters, building AI testbeds, promoting AI data center policies, and facilitating international cooperation. The Act also addresses AI technology standardization, the establishment of ethical principles, the expansion of financial resources for AI industry promotion, and the prevention of AI-related risks, including administrative fines. It defines “high-impact AI” as a target for regulation and outlines obligations for transparency, safety assurance, and provider responsibility. However, generative AI is largely exempt from the major regulatory provisions.
The US has adopted a strategic and agile approach to AI governance by issuing sector-specific guidelines and recommendations, executive orders, and fostering collaboration with companies and research institutions. This allows for a rapid and flexible response to the fast-evolving AI landscape. Similarly, the UK is pursuing a pro-innovation and flexible regulatory approach, introducing measures to address the misuse of AI and establishing regulations tailored to specific AI use cases. In contrast, the European Union has implemented a risk-based regulatory framework that classifies AI systems into categories such as “unacceptable risk/high risk/limited risk/minimal risk.” It imposes explicit regulatory obligations on AI systems falling under the “unacceptable/high-risk” categories, and includes provisions for general-purpose AI models. Korea, for its part, defines “high-impact AI” and outlines obligations related to transparency, safety, and provider responsibility. However, generative AI remains largely outside the scope of major regulatory provisions.
In the field of quantum technology, the U.S. has developed a comprehensive and broad-based regulatory framework to maintain and develop global leadership. In particular, the U.S. seeks to enhance national security and economic competitiveness through a strategic regulatory framework for quantum research, development, and science and technology. The UK has outlined 13 Priority Actions under its National Quantum Strategy and established the Office for Quantum within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), which regularly reports to the National Science and Technology Council chaired by the Prime Minister.
In February 2024, DSIT’s RHC released a report recommending a regulatory policy for nurturing the UK’s innovation-friendly quantum ecosystem. The report is based on four core principles—proportionality, adaptability, accountability, and balance—and was prompted by the growing need for proactive discussions on the timing, scope, and form of regulations to ensure stable investment and development in quantum technology. The RHC made 14 recommendations emphasizing the need to establish strong governance, including the development of a quantum technology regulatory framework and the need for a regulatory framework based on standards, guidelines, and responsible innovation practices. DSIT is working on ways to identify regulatory requirements in the future, such as conducting horizon scanning for future regulatory requirements and adjusting proportional regulatory initiatives.
The EU launched its Quantum Technology Flagship in 2018, following the issuance of its Quantum Manifesto in May 2016. This flagship initiative brings together research institutions, industry players, and public funding bodies to consolidate and expand Europe’s scientific leadership and excellence in quantum technologies.
In the Strategic Research and Industry Agenda (SRIA) 2030 roadmap, the EU emphasizes the need to develop independent capabilities in quantum technology development and production to secure global leadership, protect strategic interests, ensure autonomy, and strengthen security—while avoiding dependence on third countries. The EU aims to establish the world’s leading ecosystem that translates lab-scale research into mass production across various scientific and industrial applications. Moreover, the EU highlights the importance of leveraging the economic and societal potential of quantum technologies to strengthen its position as a global player in this transformative field, ultimately positioning Europe as the world’s “Quantum Valley.” Korea’s Quantum Technology Industry Act, along with the National Quantum Strategy and various quantum initiatives, represents a set of innovative policy measures aimed at establishing a research foundation for quantum’s science-technology and systematically fostering the quantum industry. These efforts reflect the pursuit of multi-faceted innovation strategies across the key domains identified in this study. However, concrete strategic initiatives focused on identifying regulatory challenges in the quantum science and technology sector and anticipating future regulatory environments remain limited.
As a strategic response to such regulatory innovation policies in advanced major countries, the following approaches can be considered.
First, it is necessary to establish governance that support innovation across the broader economy while providing recommendations on the prioritization of regulatory reform in alignment with the regulatory environment in the fields of science and technology. Next, it is essential to proactively establish systems and strategies for scanning anticipatively regulatory environments and requirements in the fields of science and technology, and to strengthen integrated regulatory approaches starting from the R&D stage. Next, it is important to establish robust regulatory frameworks for core fields of science and technology and to advance innovation strategies—such as large-scale financial support—in order to secure technological leadership and foster a resilient and competitive ecosystem.
Furthermore, there is an increasing need to enhance global cooperation strategies aimed at ensuring alignment and harmonization with international regulations, grounded in active participation in the development of global technical standards and regulatory frameworks. Additionally, enhancing regulatory sandbox systems in core fields of science and technology will be essential for promoting timely and flexible responses to technological innovation.
As a final consideration, the rapid advancement of technology is increasing the need to redesign anticipative regulatory innovation roadmaps in established fields, and the cycle of these rolling plans is expected to become shorter. It is also a time to initiate discussions on setting the cycle of these rolling plans, establishing clear procedures, and defining the legal basis for their implementation. -
The Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on Korea’s Trade and Its Implications for Diversifying Logistics Corridors
In December 2023, the Houthi rebels in Yemen launched attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, escalating the Israel-Hamas conflict into a broader geopolitical risk encompassing the Red Sea region. This development disrupted ..
Munsu Kang and Jieun Lee Date 2025.05.27
Economic cooperation, International tradeDownloadContentSummaryIn December 2023, the Houthi rebels in Yemen launched attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, escalating the Israel-Hamas conflict into a broader geopolitical risk encompassing the Red Sea region. This development disrupted the logistics supply chain between Asia and Europe, which had previously relied heavily on the Suez Canal. As maritime routes shifted from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, countries worldwide, including South Korea, faced increased shipping and insurance costs. This situation posed the dual challenges of weakened export competitiveness and rising inflation.Simultaneously, the Red Sea crisis underscored the need for alternative land and maritime logistics networks to ensure supply chain stability. This led to heightened international interest in establishing new logistics hubs. Notably, discussions surrounding the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, and the Development Road project, actively promoted by Turkiye and Iraq, gained traction following the Red Sea crisis. For South Korea, an export-driven economy, the continued geopolitical uncertainty around the Red Sea presents significant threats. Rising logistics costs and decreased reliability in maritime shipping could undermine export competitiveness. Consequently, there is an urgent need to explore alternatives beyond the Cape of Good Hope, including expanding overland logistics via China’s transcontinental high-speed rail.
This study aims to address two key questions: (1) What impact has the Red Sea crisis had on South Korea’s logistics network and trade? (2) What implications do the economic corridors, actively pursued by Western countries, India, the Middle East, and Turkiye, hold for South Korea in terms of supply chain connectivity and logistics hub development?
Chapter 2 focuses on the background of the Red Sea crisis and its impact on maritime logistics. The crisis began after the Houthi rebels declared solidarity with Hamas, launching attacks on key commercial vessels using a range of weapons. In response, major shipping companies diverted routes from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to increased transit times and costs. This shift has expected to contribute to global inflationary pressures. The crisis significantly reduced vessel traffic and cargo volumes through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Notably, shipping companies continue to prefer the Cape of Good Hope route, raising concerns that maritime trade through these chokepoints may not recover in the mid-to-long term. Major global ports also experienced temporary declines in vessel traffic and cargo volumes, with reductions lasting up to six months compared to the same period in the previous year. Focusing on South Korea’s external trade, the volume of trade with Europe declined from January to September 2024 compared to the previous year. In contrast, trade volumes with the U.S. remained relatively stable, indicating that the Red Sea crisis negatively impacted Korea-Europe trade beyond mere logistical delays. Key export items, including automobiles, electronics, chemicals, steel, and mineral fuels, all showed declines in the European market. Conversely, exports to North America and Asia increased, suggesting that South Korean companies may have diversified their export markets, considering the U.S., Oceania, and Asia as alternative destinations. While overall exports to the Middle East decreased, imports of mineral fuels, such as petroleum, rose, leading to an increase in trade volume. Considering the impact of the crisis on ports beyond Jeddah, such as Jebel Ali and Salalah near the Strait of Hormuz, the decline in exports to the Middle East appears to result more from changes in maritime logistics networks than from risk- averse corporate behavior.
Chapter 3 explores South Korea’s potential for logistics diversification, focusing on the Development Road and IMEC as alternative routes. Both corridors aim to reduce dependency on the Suez Canal. The Development Road project focuses on connecting Al-Faw Port in southern Iraq to Europe via Turkiye through highways and railways, driven primarily by the geopolitical interests of Iraq and Turkiye. In contrast, IMEC consists of an eastern corridor linking India with Gulf countries and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf with Europe. IMEC reflects broader global objectives, including countering China, maintaining the Arab-Israeli detente momentum, and facilitating the energy transition. A SWOT analysis of both corridors reveals that weaknesses and threats outweigh strengths and opportunities, suggesting low feasibility in the short term. External factors, such as interference from China, Iran, and ISIS, pose significant risks to both projects. Despite limited immediate incentives for South Korean participation, it is advisable for the government and businesses to actively consider engagement in these corridors. Diversifying logistics routes is crucial for managing geopolitical risks, especially given the potential for escalating instability in the Middle East. Furthermore, with the inauguration of a second Trump administration in the U.S., there may be increased pressure for South Korea to expand into new markets such as India and the Middle East. Participating in emerging economic corridors in the Middle East could also deepen Korea-Middle East economic relations by extending cooperation into manufacturing and logistics sectors.
Chapter 4 summarizes the research findings and proposes short- and long-term policy recommendations to enhance the resilience of South Korea’s maritime logistics industry. In the short term, the government should: (1) Develop public-private partnerships (PPP) and investment-driven projects for port construction and operations, and (2) Establish logistics cost support funds for small and medium-sized shippers to build new logistics networks and manage crises effectively. In the long term, participation strategies should differ based on each corridor’s characteristics. For IMEC, cooperation should focus on PPP models based on existing intergovernmental MOUs. In contrast, South Korea should pursue multinational consortiums and Official Development Assistance (ODA) initiatives for the Development Road project.
This study analyzed the impact of the Red Sea crisis on the global economy, South Korea’s maritime logistics, and trade from December 2023 to October 2024. The analysis primarily covered broad categories of goods and regions, lacking detailed assessments. Additionally, as the Development Road and IMEC are still in preliminary stages, their specific impacts on global and domestic logistics systems remain unassessed. Future in-depth studies are needed to address these limitations. -
The Effect of Humanitarian Aid on Economic Growth in Developing Countries: 2015 Nepal Earthquake
This study analyzes the impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake on economic growth and evaluates the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in mitigating the damage caused by the disaster. In the aftermath of natural disasters, emergency r..
Weonhyeok Chung and Yerim Lee Date 2024.12.31
Economic development, Economic growth, Foreign aidDownloadContentSummaryThis study analyzes the impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake on economic growth and evaluates the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in mitigating the damage caused by the disaster. In the aftermath of natural disasters, emergency relief funds are quickly allocated to support victims, particularly in developing countries that face challenges in responding to such crises. These funds help with immediate survival and recovery efforts while also contributing to societal stability and long-term reconstruction. As the frequency of environmental disasters increases due to climate change, the demand for humanitarian aid has grown significantly.
The economic impact of natural disasters varies depending on the affected country’s capacity and the scale of financial assistance it receives. Developing nations, with limited disaster response capabilities compared to developed countries, tend to experience more severe consequences. Emergency relief funds are designed to address this disparity, and their effect on economic growth can vary based on the scale of the funding provided. This study investigates the effects of the 2015 Nepal earthquake and assesses the role of emergency relief funds in mitigating the damage.
Chapter 2 of this study examines the concept and definition of emergency relief funds, provides examples of their application, and outlines their operational mechanisms. Emergency relief funds are established to provide rapid humanitarian assistance during emergencies such as natural disasters, wars, and accidents. These funds, sourced from contributions by international organizations, governments, and NGOs, are used for the provision of emergency supplies, recovery efforts, and medical assistance, ensuring the protection of lives and safety. One key example is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). This fund mobilizes resources during crises and issues Flash Appeals to the international community. Allocation plans are determined through discussions within the UN OCHA’s cluster system, where sector-specific agencies collaborate, exchange information, and make decisions.
Chapter 3 explores the economic impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, investigates potential resource allocation distortions, and analyzes the role of emergency relief funds. The study begins by identifying the earthquake’s impact on economic growth. According to the literature on natural disasters and economic growth, four hypotheses exist: the “trend recovery hypothesis,” where the economy temporarily declines but eventually returns to its original trajectory; the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” where the economy fails to recover; the “sustainable recovery beyond the trend hypothesis,” where the economy grows beyond its original trajectory due to disaster-induced reforms; and the “creative destruction hypothesis,” where the destruction of outdated capital leads to increased productivity. The findings of this study align with the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” as the affected regions in Nepal failed to return to their original economic trajectory, showing a relative decline compared to unaffected regions.
The economic impact of the earthquake was more severe in areas with a lower proportion of upper-caste populations compared to regions with higher proportions. Possible explanations for this discrepancy include imbalances in resource allocation or differences in disaster recovery capabilities. Upper-caste populations are more likely to have connections with groups responsible for resource distribution. However, this study finds no significant differences in the amount of emergency relief funds allocated between regions with higher and lower upper-caste populations. This suggests that the internal processes of UN OCHA, which assess sector-specific funding needs and priorities, minimize the potential for caste-based bias in resource distribution.
The disparity in disaster recovery capabilities could account for the differences in economic impact. In Nepal, caste-based differences in income levels, asset ownership, and access to information contribute to varying recovery capacities. The study further examines the effects of emergency relief funds, revealing that in regions with lower upper-caste populations, emergency relief funds positively affected economic growth, unlike in areas with higher upper-caste populations. This is attributed to diminishing returns on resources in regions with relatively lower human and physical capital. By focusing support on regions with lower upper-caste populations, more efficient and equitable outcomes can be achieved. -
Cybersecurity Policies of Major Nations and Implications for South Korea
Cybersecurity can be defined as a state where national and citizen safety is guaranteed by defending against cyber attacks or threats, thereby ensuring proper functioning of cyberspace. Cyberspace is composed of ‘information syst..
Jun Hyun Eom and Boram Lee Date 2024.12.30
Economic security, DigitalizationDownloadContentSummaryCybersecurity can be defined as a state where national and citizen safety is guaranteed by defending against cyber attacks or threats, thereby ensuring proper functioning of cyberspace. Cyberspace is composed of ‘information systems’ and the ‘information’ stored within them.
International discussions on cybersecurity norms have continued, showing a standoff between Western liberal democratic countries led by the United States versus Russia and China. The United States and other Western nations recognize cyberspace as a separate domain and argue that international law can be directly applied to it. Non-Western countries like Russia and China contend that cyberspace is not a separate domain, and that domestic laws of the location of systems or information should apply.
The United States adopted an active defense strategy and strengthened collaboration with the private sector, considering that a significant portion of infrastructure is owned or operated privately. The EU implemented various voluntary certification systems and mandated labeling. Japan’s active cyber defense strategy is similar to the United States’, and it established a voluntary conformity assessment system for IoT products. South Korea also adopted an offensive cyber defense strategy in 2024. However, unlike major countries, we do not have a unified cybersecurity law.
The potential application of international trade law to cybersecurity measures is as follows. Even when arguing that cybersecurity measures do not apply to like products, such actions will likely be found by the panel as violations of WTO agreements. All WTO precedents addressing national security exceptions relate to wartime or emergency situations in international relations. There is a view that for measures during peacetime to be recognized under national security exceptions, there must be subjective evidence of understanding the purpose at the time of the measure and evidence of indirect supply to military facilities. Panels can assess whether parties have made good faith judgments about measures necessary to protect their essential security interests. A similar conclusion was reached in the international investment arbitration case of Seda v. Colombia.
Implications for South Korea’s cybersecurity policy are as follows. First, self-defense cannot be exercised for cyber misuse or cyber attacks that do not reach the level of armed cyber attacks. Second, offensive defense strategies must be pursued cautiously. While there is a view that preemptive self-defense targeting imminent armed attacks is permitted under international customary law, there are controversies regarding specific criteria for determining imminence. Third, the legal principle of state responsibility for domain management or due diligence in cyberspace can be usefully applied in responding to cyber threats from North South Korea. Fourth, there is a need to establish a unified cybersecurity law.
Implications for South Korea’s trade policy are as follows. First, South Korea Government must continuously observe cybersecurity measures introduced by major countries to minimize negative impacts on our export companies. Second, the government should support our companies to gain a competitive advantage regarding cybersecurity labels and certifications when competing with third countries in markets like the United States or EU. Third, when implementing cybersecurity measures, precise institutional design and operation are necessary to avoid conflicting with trade norms. Fourth, even when a country claims national security exceptions in trade agreements, review will be conducted in accordance with the principle of good faith. -
Analysis of China’s Advanced Semiconductor Innovation Capabilities: Focusing on High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) and 3rd Generation Semiconductors
This study aimed to comprehensively analyze China’s advanced semiconductor innovation capabilities, focusing on policy support systems, High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), and third-generation semiconductors, and suggest response strate..
Seoin Baek and Yali Zhao Date 2024.12.30
Economic security, Technical cooperation ChinaDownloadContentSummaryThis study aimed to comprehensively analyze China’s advanced semiconductor innovation capabilities, focusing on policy support systems, High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), and third-generation semiconductors, and suggest response strategies for South Korea.
The analysis revealed the following characteristics of China’s advanced semiconductor innovation. First, China’s research in high-bandwidth memory has shown rapid growth since 2015, with strong research groups centered around Huazhong University of Science and Technology and Tsinghua University. Research topics have expanded from application technologies like GPU computing and system performance optimization to fundamental technologies such as hardware acceleration and architecture design.
Second, China’s HBM research has been developing through systematic research networks. Co-author network analysis revealed close collaboration systems between major universities, companies, and research institutes. Notably, Chinese researchers affiliated with overseas institutions, particularly in the United States, are actively conducting joint research with domestic researchers, transferring global-level research capabilities.
Third, in terms of future fundamental technology research, systematic support is being provided through the National Natural Science Foundation. Between 2019-2022, 474 semiconductor-related projects were supported, with general projects and young scientist fund projects accounting for about 45%, indicating a focus on nurturing next-generation research personnel. Additionally, according to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission’s analysis of state-owned enterprise performance, among 49 advanced semiconductor-related products, core electronic components were the most numerous with 18 items, and 14 products were evaluated to have reached international leading levels.
Fourth, in the third-generation semiconductor field, systematic technology independence is being pursued through the National Semiconductor Technology Innovation Center and China Advanced Semiconductor Industry Innovation Strategic Alliance (CASA). Through the ‘1+N+X’ open joint construction and collaborative innovation operating model, they are promoting organic linkages between basic research, applied research, and industrialization, while focusing support on the localization of core materials such as SiC and GaN and linkages with demand industries like electric vehicles and renewable energy.
In response to these Chinese innovation trends, Korea needs the following strategies. First, to maintain its current competitive advantage in the HBM field, there needs to be a shift from manufacturing-centric to design-manufacturing integrated innovation. As shown in the research network analysis, while Korea is concentrated on hardware manufacturing technology, China shows a comprehensive approach at the system level, making it urgent to secure comprehensive technological capabilities through strengthening design capabilities. Second, diversification of global research networks is necessary. Co-author network analysis showed that while Korea actively researches with traditional partners like the US and Japan, collaboration with emerging research entities like India and Singapore is limited. New innovation opportunities need to be created through diversifying research collaboration partners.
Third, in the third-generation semiconductor field, a comprehensive strategy encompassing fundamental technology development, applied technology acquisition, and market expansion is needed. Particularly, as China provides many incentives for the spread of products based on domestic technology in addition to technical support, Korea also needs to introduce policies supporting market demand creation and technology diffusion along with technology advancement.
Finally, to enhance the effectiveness of these strategies, systematic government support including industry development stage-specific support policies, strategic R&D investment considering technological characteristics and timeliness, and talent development is necessary. In particular, policy focus should be placed on building an innovation ecosystem connecting basic research to commercialization and strengthening global cooperation networks. -
Economic Factors Affecting Birth Rates in APEC Economies
In the last ten years, fertility rates for advanced and developing economies have been falling faster than expected. Korea has been leading the decline, but almost all advanced and developing economies have experienced accelerated..
Junsok Yang Date 2024.12.13
APEC, Economic growthDownloadContentExecutive Summary
I. Introduction: Motivation
II. Possible Reasons for Falling Birth Rates
III. Data and Methodology
IV. Per Capita GDP and Fertility
V. Labor Market Considerations
VI. Did APEC Contribute to Falling Fertility?
VII. Policy Implications and Conclusion
References
AppendixSummaryIn the last ten years, fertility rates for advanced and developing economies have been falling faster than expected. Korea has been leading the decline, but almost all advanced and developing economies have experienced accelerated decline in birth rates. Some researchers now expect the world to start experiencing falling global population as quickly as in 2030s.
Even more surprising is that fertility rates for APEC economies have been falling even faster. APEC economies with the highest fertility rates are only slightly above the replacement rate of 2.1; with most economies, even developing members, in the 1% range. This paper is intended to be an exploratory dip into looking at correlations between birth rates and various economic data. We try to examine some of the popular reasons behind the falling birth rates, to see whether they have validity based on data, and see whether APEC economies are special in the sense that the birth rates are falling faster for APEC economies. The paper looks at economic data using panel data regressions to see why birth rates are falling overall, and why they are falling faster for APEC economies. We will concentrate more on trying to find correlations between variables in the data than coming up with theoretical reasons, which will require a much richer data set.
In Section II, the paper lists some of the popular reasons often cited for declining birth rates; Section III is a short general discussion on the data used. Sections IV and V examines whether the data backs some of these popular reasons for the decline. Section IV looks at the relationship between some basic economic growth variables and fertility rates, and serves as a base for further analysis. Section V looks at the relationship between employment data and fertility rates, Given the faster fertility decline for APEC economies, Section VI looks at whether the formation of APEC had a role in the faster decline of fertility rates. Appendix A looks at the relationship between gender education disparities and fertility rates, and Appendix B is a short exploration on whether there is a case to be made that gender disparities in housework is a factor in lower fertility rates.
In this paper, we used panel data of more than 180 economies to examine some factors affecting fertility rates. The factors examined included economic growth factors such as per capita GDP and GDP growth rates; gender based labor and employment factors such as male and female labor participation rate, and the ratio of male and female workers working in various industries. We also considered how some gender based disparities in education, and time spent doing housework for men and women affected fertility rates, though the results are less definite for these cases due to irregular nature of data available. We ran regressions on the global data set, and then for some regressions, only on data for APEC member economies.
Where we used global panel data, we re-confirmed some results that researchers had found before – namely, the higher the per-capita GDP, the lower the fertility rate; the higher the growth rate, the lower the fertility rate. So more income is not always the answer for fostering fertility rates. However, we did find that current growth variables predicted fertility rates better than past growth rate variables, showing perhaps that the trend of falling fertility rates is a more powerful force than a good economic environment fostering more births. These regressions also showed that APEC economies are qualitatively similar to the global group, but with a faster decline. Given similar situations, APEC economies experience a lower fertility rate than global group as a whole.
Using the economic growth variables as controls, we added labor market data to the regressions, and we found that, for the global group, increases in male and female labor participation increased fertility rates. However, perhaps somewhat against expectations, the effect of male labor participation rate had greater effect than female labor participation. Again, given similar situations APEC economies had lower fertility rates. When we used only APEC economy data, female labor force participation had no significant effect on fertility rates. Only the male labor force participation mattered, and higher the male participation rate, higher the fertility rate.
Then we used the shares of male and female labor force on agriculture, industry (manufacturing) and service industries. For the global data set regressions, as expected, a rise of the share working in agriculture would raise the fertility rate, and a rise of the share working in industry would lower fertility rate, as expected. Service industry participation came in between – the effect on fertility rate higher than industry and likely a positive effect, but lower than the effect from agricultural industry participation. The results were same for males and females.
However, when we used only APEC economy data, the qualitative results were significantly different. Male labor force industry share behaved the same as the global group, but for females, share of workers in services had a higher positive effect on fertility rate than agriculture. Industry, as expected had the lowest and negative effect. The effect of female workers participation in different industries on fertility rates seems to be significantly different for APEC economies compared to global group as a whole. Which may be the reason why APEC economy fertility rates fell faster than the global group, but it may also imply that if APEC economies give more flexibility to female workers in service industries, fertility rates may pick up. Further and deeper studies should be taken to see whether the pattern of female employment in APEC economies differ significantly compared to other economies, especially the possible differences between developing APEC economies and other developing economies.
Analysis looking at gender disparities in education for primary and secondary education showed that it is the disparities in secondary education which may be the key to differences in fertility rates, but the results should be taken carefully, since the data for gender disparity in education was available irregularly, so an unbalanced panel data was used, and gender disparities for primary and secondary education seems to be highly correlated. Also, the time disparity between men and women doing housework was also examined, but there were no results that led us to believe that the disparity in doing housework affected fertility rates, contrary to many popular media reports in Korea and elsewhere. But again, data was only available irregularly, so an unbalanced panel data was used, so results may not be as credible as regressions using labor force variables. For these regressions, a separate APEC economy regressions were not attempted due to paucity of data.
These regression results show that declining fertility rate is a strong trend based on rising wealth and growth rates; but the trend may be partially reversed if appropriate labor market adjustments can occur. For APEC economies, encouraging women to go into the services sector which perhaps offer an urban living coupled with flexible labor time schedule may partially offset the declining fertility rates.
Drawing some policy implications from the analyses, while Korea and other APEC economies may be able to keep fertility rates from falling “too low,” it will not be able to raise the rates to the replacement rate of 2.1. Thus, when designing welfare policies, the policymakers must keep the declining population and demographic implications in mind. Over-promising benefits for post-retirement public pension will become a critical problem, and governments should encourage private measures to the public to get them ready for post-retirement.
Second, for would-be mothers, encouraging employment in the service sector may alleviate some of the rapid decline in the fertility rates. Encouraging employment in the services sector, making services job for women available in small and large cities may do better in raising fertility for APEC economies. Women who work for the public sector tend to have more children, in part due to more flexible schedules and consideration for pregnant mothers.
Also, for fertility rates, male employment seems to be as important or perhaps more important than female employment. So, while more flexible time scheduling may be warranted for the would-be mother, any income implications should be approached from the point of view of the entire household.
While the Korean media often cites complaints that men do not do enough housework, as a contributor to low fertility, using global data, this study did not find any particular evidence for that explanation. While the complaint may be valid for Korea, there seems to be little reason to believe that it is a major reason globally, but because of data deficiency, the results may not be clear cut.
Of course, more research is needed. During the modernization and development process, the economic position of husband and wife in the family seems to change from being complementary to more of substitutes – where in the olden days, women specialized in housework aspect of the household and men specialized in wage earning or outside work, now men and women have similar work characteristics, and the global group regressions in this study did not consider such changes in characteristics about husband and wives; but the results that we have derived may be showing the effects of such changes. -
Critical Minerals Agreement: Implications for Korea’s Trade Policy
Critical minerals are essential for advanced industries like semiconductors, electric vehicles, and batteries, as well as for clean energy infrastructure. Major countries are actively pursuing trade agreements to ensure stable sup..
Soo Hyun Oh Date 2024.11.08
Economic security, Trade policyDownloadContentSummaryCritical minerals are essential for advanced industries like semiconductors, electric vehicles, and batteries, as well as for clean energy infrastructure. Major countries are actively pursuing trade agreements to ensure stable supplies of these minerals. This study analyzes key countries’ trade agreements related to critical minerals and derives insights for Korea’s policies and trade negotiations. The study narrows its focus to binding trade agreements between countries.
Traditionally, mineral and energy regulations in trade agreements were declarative, but recent agreements by the U.S., EU, and Japan have introduced specific obligations and linked these to environmental and labor standards. The EU includes energy and raw materials (ERM) chapters in its trade agreements, while the U.S. tends to establish stand-alone agreements on critical minerals. The EU’s proactive engagement with resource-rich countries aims to reduce price volatility and promote fair trade, while U.S. agreements, such as with Japan, are primarily driven by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) electric vehicle subsidies and focus on establishing supply chains with allied nations. The U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement, for example, emphasizes the management of environmental and social risks within supply chains through well-defined environmental and labor provisions.
Based on these international trends, this study proposes the inclusion of a Raw Materials Chapter in Korea’s future Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), bench-marking the critical minerals agreements of the EU and the U.S. Specifically, this proposal aligns with the “Critical Minerals Security Strategy” announced by the Korean government in 2023, which advocates for expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation and enhanced collaboration on critical mineral supply chains in FTA negotiations. When pursuing critical minerals agreements, Korea must carefully consider various elements such as the selection of partner countries, contents and types of agreement to pursue, and the order in which to conduct negotiations, as these factors are intricately interconnected and can influence the outcomes of other aspects.
In negotiating critical minerals agreements, several key provisions should be considered, including the definition of minerals, trade facilitation, exploration and production permits, environmental protection, labor rights, and cooperation clauses. For example, trade facilitation provisions might include prohibitions on export quotas, export tariffs, and price caps to mitigate financial risks and price volatility for companies.
The environmental and labor provisions evident in the EU-Chile FTA and the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement are essential to aligning with the global trend of enhancing supply chain ESG standards and emphasizing responsible sourcing. It is necessary that Korea incorporates these provisions into its agreements, thereby ensuring mineral procurement is conducted in accordance with international standards. However, the adherence to international environmental and labor standards and the associated monitoring may impose additional costs on companies. Thus, a balanced approach is necessary, in hand with dialogue and coordination between the government and businesses to achieve consensus before negotiations. -
The Disparate Impact of Digitalization on Tax Revenues: An Illustration from Developing APEC Economies
While prior research has highlighted digitalization as a potential avenue for enhancing domestic revenue mobilization—a crucial component for the long-term economic and political development of economies—the relationship between d..
Seungho Lee Date 2024.10.31
APECDownloadContentExecutive Summary
I. Introduction
II. Theory and Hypotheses
III. Data and Methodology
IV. Empirical Results
V. Policy Implications
ReferencesSummaryWhile prior research has highlighted digitalization as a potential avenue for enhancing domestic revenue mobilization—a crucial component for the long-term economic and political development of economies—the relationship between digitalization and domestic revenue mobilization remains underexplored. This working paper contributes to the existing literature by examining how the interplay between digitalization and the government’s capacity to tax is influenced by governance quality, an aspect largely overlooked in previous studies. Empirical findings based on a time-series cross-sectional dataset including up to 159 economies from 2004 to 2021 show that a higher level of digitalization alone does not necessarily translate into a higher non-resource tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. However, when digitalization is coupled with sound governance—specifically in terms of voice and accountability or regulatory quality—it significantly boosts domestic revenue mobilization. The study also finds that the interaction effects between digitalization and these governance variables vary according to the levels of digitalization and development across economies. The findings and case studies presented in this paper underscore the importance of strengthening institutional frameworks alongside digitalization efforts to ensure enduring success in mobilizing domestic revenue, offering valuable insights especially for developing APEC economies where the potential for improvement is most pronounced. -
Evolving Agendas in APEC Ministerial Meetings: Tracing the Changing Focus of Economic Cooperation in Asia-Pacific Region
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the thematic evolution within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meetings from its inception in 1989 to the present, examining over 460 meeting documents. The r..
Jeongmeen Suh Date 2024.10.02
APEC, Economic growthDownloadContentExecutive Summary
I. Introduction
II. Background and Methodology
2.1. Historical Context and Evolution of APEC Ministerial Meetings
2.2. Data Sources and Analytical Methods
III. Changes in Sectoral Composition
3.1. Sectoral Ministerial Meeting Frequency and Trends
3.2. Evolution and Trends in High-level Meetings
3.3. Analysis of Meeting Outcomes and Depth
IV. Thematic Changes in Major Ministerial Meetings
4.1. Evolution of Themes in Annual Ministerial Meetings
4.2. Thematic Shifts in Major Sectoral Meetings
4.3. Changes in Thematic Consistency Over Time
4.4. Interrelationships and Thematic Integration Across Meetings
V. Conclusions
References
Appendix 1. List of Venues for APEC Annual Ministerial Meetings
2. Sector Abbreviations and Full Names
3. Top-terms in Joint Statements by Major Ministerial Meetings
4. Dendrogram of Document Similarity (1994~2023)SummaryThis study provides a comprehensive analysis of the thematic evolution within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meetings from its inception in 1989 to the present, examining over 460 meeting documents. The research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods, including text mining techniques, to uncover primary themes and shifts in policy focus over time. The study is organized into three main areas: first, it investigates the distribution and evolution of agendas across different levels and sectors of APEC meetings. Second, it tracks thematic changes within sector-specific meetings, with a particular emphasis on trade, finance, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Third, it explores the interconnections among these meetings to reveal the dynamic relationships within APEC’s framework. The findings indicate a significant increase in the number and diversity of APEC meetings, reflecting an expanded agenda addressing more complex and emerging issues such as the digital economy, sustainable development, and inclusive growth. The study also identifies a shift from foundational economic arrangements to more diversified topics, demonstrating APEC’s adaptability to contemporary global challenges. Additionally, the research highlights the evolving hierarchical structure among meetings, with a growing focus on digital economy and sustainability. This work offers valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders involved in regional economic integration and cooperation, showcasing APEC’s role in addressing both traditional and emerging economic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. -
A Case Study and Strategic Insights for the GlobalExpansion of Chinese Electric Vehicle Battery Companies
Chinese EV battery companies, which dominate the Chinese domestic market, are recently entering global market in earnest. The demand for Chinese batteries is also rising as the demand for batteries increases due to the rapid pace ..
Jae Hee Choi Date 2024.03.27
Economic security, Energy industryDownloadContentSummaryChinese EV battery companies, which dominate the Chinese domestic market, are recently entering global market in earnest. The demand for Chinese batteries is also rising as the demand for batteries increases due to the rapid pace of EV conversion in major automobile markets such as Europe and the United States. As the global market share of Chinese companies rises rapidly, the market share of Korean battery companies, which previously dominated the global battery market, is falling. As competition between Korea and China is expected to intensify in the global market in the future, it can be said that identifying the types and characteristics of Chinese companies’ global expansion and analyzing the strategies and competitiveness of major companies is essential to enhancing and maintaining the global competitiveness of the Korean battery industry.Accordingly, this study aims to examine the current status of the Chinese market and the global competitiveness of Chinese batteries, and to understand the characteristics of each type of global expansion of Chinese companies. In addition, I selected China’s leading EV battery companies to analyze their strategies and competitiveness, and consider comprehensive countermeasures that the Korean government and companies can utilize.In Chapter 2, to examine the development of the Chinese EV battery industry, I examines the Chinese market in terms of supply and demand, and identified the recent oversupply phenomenon that has emerged in the Chinese market. I also compared the level of competitiveness of the Chinese battery industry with that of Korea.First of all, in terms of demand, China is already the world’s largest EV battery market, and battery demand is expected to grow continuously until 2025, reaching more than 1TWh. In the Chinese EV battery market, the demand for LFP batteries compared to ternary batteries is increasing rapidly, and LFP batteries are used in 67% of Chinese EVs in 2023. On the supply side, CATL secures a majority of the market share in the ternary battery sector, and BYD and CATL occupy more than 70% of the market in the LFP battery sector. In addition, as the production capacity of batteries in China increases rapidly, the oversupply phenomenon in the Chinese market is intensifying. As a result, companies’ inventory pressure is increasing, plant utilization rates have dropped sharply, and some companies are experiencing deteriorating management, such as declining profit margins.I then looked at the competitiveness of the Chinese battery industry in terms of price and technology. Chinese-made batteries have a higher price competitiveness than the batteries produced by Korean companies, and the decisive factor is upstream competitiveness. In line with this, many Chinese EV battery companies have succeeded in achieving strong price competitiveness by vertically integrating them from upstream units, the Chinese government has come forward early on. China’s pursuit of technology competitiveness is also fierce. While Korea has not yet perfected LFP battery and cell-to-pack technology, China has a significant technology level in this field, and Korea no longer has super-gap technology in the ternary battery field. Chinese companies have aggressively invested in next-generation batteries such as all-solid-state and hold a large number of patents.In Chapter 3, the examples and characteristics of Chinese companies’ global expansion were examined. First, the types of Chinese companies accelerating their global expansion were classified into three categories: △ export expansion f exports in response to the increase in global EV battery demand △ local investment production in response to the battery supply chain internalization policy of major countries/regions △ transnational management using M&A.I have examined the characteristics of each type in the text, and first of all, found that the export expansion type is the most preferred way for most Chinese companies to respond to the demand in overseas markets so far by 2023. In particular, CATL ranks second in the global market outside of China through exports, and continues to narrow the gap with LGES, the No. 1 player. In the case of BYD, as exports of EVs expand, the usage of self-manufactured batteries installed in the vehicle body is increasing, and from October 2023, only batteries, not EVs, began to be exported alone. However, in the US market, it is expected that global expansion through exports will be limited due to discriminatory regulations such as IRA in the future. Next is the type of local investment production that has been promoted by a number of companies recently. Due to the rapid increase in demand for EVs in major automobile markets such as Europe and the United States, local production by automakers is in earnest, and in the process, automakers want to obtain a stable supply of batteries from a short distance. In addition, incentives for overseas production by Chinese battery companies are increasing as Europe and the United States are pushing for policies to internalize EV supply chains to induce batteries to be produced locally. Europe does not impose particularly discriminatory regulations on investment by offshore companies, including China, and EU member states such as Hungary are actively attracting offshore companies. As a result, many Chinese companies are actively planning to invest in Europe, and their total capacity plans in Europe exceed 300GWh in total. Like Europe, the United States wants to internalize the EV and battery supply chain , but the difference is that the U.S. wants to build its own capacity while excluding China as much as possible. The United States has defined all battery companies in China as FEOC. Despite these risks and costs in the U.S. market, Chinese battery companies have not completely abandoned their U.S. business, due to huge demand in the U.S. market and huge amounts of battery production subsidies supported by the IRA. Some Chinese companies, such as CATL and Guo Xuan Hi-Tech, are actively seeking alternative routes to enter the U.S. market. The third type is a method byin which some Chinese companies attemp transnational management by diluting China’s nationality through M&As. Guo Xuan Hi-Tech and Envision AESC are representative examples, and they seek to dilute a company’s nationality by trading shares with global automakers, and to expand global business by actively using the infrastructure, know-how, and networks that global companies already have. The two companies are the most active in investment production in the U.S. and Europe among Chinese companies, and global automakers are playing an important role in promoting overseas business.In Chapter 4, representative Chinese companies engaged in global expansion were selected and their specific strategies and competitiveness were analyzed. In order to select a company, I compared the indicators for global expansion, such as the global market share of Chinese companies, overseas sales volume, production plan in the US/Europe/ ASEAN, and whether global automakers participate in the investment. As a result, CATL and Guo Xuan Hi-Tech were selected as representative companies. CATL, China’s largest and best battery company, is expanding its business to global markets such as Europe, the United States, and ASEAN through exports and overseas investment production, regardless of battery types such as ternary and LFP. CATL has secured price competitiveness through vertical integration of the entire supply chain, especially from raw materials to recycling, and is rapidly expanding its global battery business with a powerful weapon called "bang for the buck" by improving technological competitiveness with the full support from the Chinese government and generous investment in R&D.Although Guo Xuan Hi-Tech does not have a large global market share outside of China, it is worth noting that it is the fastest-growing overseas business among Chinese companies, backed by its major shareholder, Volkswagen. Guo Xuan Hi-Tech has been researching and developing LFP batteries for a long time and is expanding its overseas business focusing on LFP. The company’s LFP battery competitiveness can be seen as the best in the industry in terms of energy density, and it was found that LMFP battery technology, called the next-generation version of LFP, has made significant progress. The ternary battery sector is currently being researched and developed with Volkswagen, so it is necessary to observe its achievements. Guo Xuan Hi-Tech is securing price competitiveness by self-procuring core materials, and is planning to build production capacity of cathode and anode materials as well as battery cell production in foreign countries such as the United States. In particular, the company has received substantial support from a number of local governments in China, and is actively cooperating with the government in the R&D field as well as tax cuts and subsidies.Based on these analysis results, the following implications were presented to the Korean government and companies.First, it is the implications for the Korean government. it is necessary to strengthen support for overseas businesses. In the future, the global expansion of Chinese companies is likely to be focused on overseas production rather than the existing mainstream export method. Korea also needs to expand its local production capacity, and since large-scale expansion requires huge funds, more active financial support from the Korean government is needed. In addition, it is necessary to devise measures such as strengthening lobbying activities so that Korean companies can continuously reflect the support benefits related to IRA manufacturing, one of the core interests of the U.S. business.Second, the Korean government should be more active in strengthening upstream competitiveness because private sector capabilities are not enough. To this end, it is necessary to reorganize the relevant legal system to foster the Used battery industry in the short term, and to accelerate the establishment of an integrated management system for Used batteries that is currently being promoted. Additionally, from a mid- to long-term perspective, it is possible to increase diplomatic efforts with resource-bearing countries and actively utilize multilateral channels such as IPEF to strengthen the ability to respond to supply chain crises.Third, as a basic way to prepare for competition with China, support for securing design and material technology should be strengthened. In particular, since securing precursor-related technology and manufacturing base is an urgent task to be carried out, the government can establish a specialized precursor education institution, and the government can also establish a precursor company to support development, production. In the mid- to long-term, investment in basic science research should be expanded to secure core patents. It is necessary to actively utilize multilateral channels such as IPEF to strengthen cooperation with international standards and regulations related to batteries so that our technology can be expanded and applied worldwide.Fourth, if our company is subject to discriminatory regulations abroad, we should also be able to take corresponding measures against companies in that country in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, and furthermore, we need to actively protect and foster our battery companies and industries within the scope of international regulations. In situations where regions/countries such as the United States, Europe, India, and ASEAN are promoting internalization of supply chains, there is a possibility that our company will be disadvantaged at any time. Our government also needs a map for emergencies, and we need to consider policy development based on the principle of reciprocity and ways to protect our companies.Next, it presented implications for our company. First, it is necessary to actively utilize the IRA’s FEOC guidelines announced in December 2023 as leverage for public cooperation. In a situation where Korean battery companies are highly dependent on China in the upstream sector, gradual diversification of supply chains is more realistic than a sudden ‘De-Sinicization’. In the short term, the ‘less than 25% of China’ clause can be used to establish joint ventures with Chinese companies in Korea, which is expected to greatly contribute to the stabilization and internalization of the supply chain of Korean companies in the midium to long term.Second, it is necessary to prepare countermeasures related to environmental regulations in Europe. As we have seen in the text, Europe is strengthening environmental regulations through the Battery Act. In order to cope with the regulations on carbon footprints, it is necessary to establish a system that can manage carbon emission-related calculation information, measurement standards, verification and monitoring in the upstream sector that depends on China. In particular, since most of the carbon emissions in the entire battery manufacturing process (LCA) occur in the upstream sectors such as raw material mining and refining, and the proportion reaches 50-70%, it is urgent to prepare countermeasures.Third, it is urgent to secure technology and manpower in vulnerable fields such as LFP. Since Korean companies have not yet mass-produce LFPs and it is unclear whether they can be more competitive than Chinese-made products, it is necessary to shorten the time by importing manpower, equipment, and materials from China and stabilizing and internalizing technology rather than developing everything related to LFPs on their own. additionally, since China is considered to be ahead of Korea in the fields of precursor manufacturing and battery recycling, it is also possible to consider ways to import key talents and know-how.

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