국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와 본 연구의 차별성
3. 연구구성

제2장 중국의 제조업 혁신 네트워크 구축
1. 「중국제조 2025」 추진과 제조업 혁신센터 사업
2. 중국과 미국의 정책사업 비교
3. 소결

제3장 전기차 배터리 사례
1. 중국의 전기차 배터리 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 전기차 배터리 혁신센터: 베이징(北京)시
3. 소결

제4장 반도체 사례
1. 중국의 반도체 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 반도체 혁신센터: 상하이(上海)시
3. 소결

제5장 디스플레이 사례
1. 중국의 디스플레이 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 디스플레이 혁신센터: 광둥성
3. 소결

제6장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   U.S.-China trade friction is one of the major variables causing external economic uncertainty in Korea. The competition for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China has been pointed out as lying at the essence of the trade friction between the U.S. and China, prompted by China’s rise in technological prowess. As the most representative industrial development policy by the Chinese government to respond to this rise in the nation’s technological prowess, the Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) plan deserves detailed analysis and evaluation, based on which we can debate proper response measures. In this regard, this study analyzed and evaluated the progress of measures to establish a manufacturing innovation network currently ongoing within China, one of the key policy tasks of MIC 2025.
   We perform a comparative analysis of policy operations in China and the U.S., the latter being the benchmark for China, in order to analyze in depth the manufacturing innovation centers that form the core of China’s manufacturing innovation network. We also studied specific cases at manufacturing innovation centers in the sectors of electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays ? core areas in which China has succeeded in localization and is competing with Korea ? to understand the specific characteristics, achievements and limitations of these innovation centers. To allow a comprehensive examination of the demand for development in participating entities and industries, we analyzed the rise of local businesses in related areas, incubation policies promoted by the Chinese government, and the trend of localization, together with a review of operations at the innovation centers.
   This study has drawn the following conclusions and suggestions. China may benchmark U.S. policy, but is fine-tuning its own policies, which is having the effect of limiting its progress toward the goals initially set.
   First, China’s manufacturing innovation centers are operating upon a dual scheme of dividing national- and provincial-level centers. China’s provincial manufacturing innovation centers are established by local governments, after which they compete to be selected as national manufacturing innovation centers. This dual system incurs leads to the possibility of overlapping areas and investments in similar R&D projects.
   Second, manufacturing innovation centers in China feature a self-sustaining profit structure like private businesses. Some in China point out that it is contradictory to apply a corporate management system to manufacturing innovation centers established to play a role for the common interest of the industry. In addition, given the level of development of Chinese companies, it may not be sustainable to continue operations based on profit gained from commissioned research, technology transfer, technology certification testing, and the establishment and utilization of patent pools.
   Third, as seen in some cases of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries and displays, cooperation and networking between companies can be difficult in sectors where a competitive structure already exists, neither do these seem to have a significant impact on related industries. The United States requires in principle the establishment of manufacturing innovation centers in areas remaining in a pre-competitive state for industrial technology. China, on the other hand, has prepared a list of areas to establish manufacturing innovation centers, based on areas specified within the MIC 2025, but does not make considerations for industrial technology features, such as is required in the U.S.
   Fourth, according to our case analysis, innovation centers for semiconductors and displays are significantly linked to the industrial development strategies of the local government, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center lack in connectivity with local industries. This indicates it is likely that semiconductor and display innovation centers will be able to create synergistic effects in conjunction with intra-regional industrial clusters, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center will have less impact on related industries within Beijing.
   Although some operational results have been achieved in the case of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays, the limitations described above have led to internal criticism and a call for policy coordination as doubt is cast on whether China’s innovation centers can eventually lead to the establishment of a nationwide network of manufacturing innovation centers, the original goal of this plan. Our expert interviews indicate a consensus for the need of policy coordination is emerging among China’s government agencies, academia and industries.
   Our case studies identify the following opportunities and threats created by the operation of manufacturing innovation centers in China, and industry policies in this area. China originally intended to establish manufacturing innovation centers for the core industrial sectors specified within the MIC 2025 plan, aiming to form a network of innovative players in each industrial sector. But so far, as suggested above, it appears that China’s manufacturing innovation center project will be insufficient to carry out this role in the actual application of policies, both in institutional and system terms. This trial and error in China’s policy operations serves as a positive factor for Korea to maintain the current technological gap with China. However, internal criticism of these policies and the discussion of alternatives in China can be seen as a threat in their potential for improvement, reflecting trial and error.
   In addition, since China holds a comparative advantage over Korea in certain areas within the value chain of the semiconductor industry, it will be necessary to remain cautious of the semiconductor innovation center establishing innovative networks and the current technology gap shrinking in foundry sectors. There is also the concern that Korea’s research and development know-how will be exposed during the process of collaboration between Chinese companies and multinational businesses, such as seen in the case of the display innovation center.
 

Executive Summary
 
1. Introduction

2. Literature Review 

3. International Comparison 
3-1. Marginal Company 
3-2. Share of Marginal Companies
3-3. Relationship between Marginal Share (10+) and Monetary Policy-Related Interest Rate

4. Determinant for Marginal Companies in Korea: 2013-2018
4-1. Data 
4-2. Empirical Methodology 
4-3. Empirical Results 

5. Conclusion 

References

  Since the global financial crisis, low interest rates have continued throughout the world. However, financial imbalance has deepened as much of the expanded investment during low interest rates did not lead to increased productivity. This study focused on the increase of marginal firms as a result of the adverse effects of financial imbalances on firms. The marginal firms were identified based on the company's financial statement, and the share of marginal firms by country was compared and analyzed using Worldscope data. As a detailed analysis on the marginal firms, the impact of borrowing interest rate on the possibility of becoming a marginal company was analyzed in the case of Korea with KED data. According to the international comparison, East Asia including Korea, China and Japan has shown a lower share of marginal companies than Europe, South Asia and Latin America. Empirical results through Panel Logit with Sector Fixed Effect Model show that the borrowing rate has a negative correlation with the probability the company will become a marginal company in the case of Korea. However, the impact of an increase in borrowing rates on the likelihood of becoming a marginal company depends on the degree of financial vulnerability. Specifically, an increase in the borrowing rate has a greater impact on the possibility to become ICR<1 in the companies with higher financial vulnerability indexes.
 

Executive Summary 

1. Introduction 

2. The Exclusion Request 

3. Data and Estimation 
3-1. Data 
3-2. Model Specification and Estimation 

4. Estimation Results 
4-1. Main Results 
4-2. Additional Analysis

5. Concluding Remarks

References 

   On March 2018, the Trump administration introduced 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent tariffs on aluminum imports. To minimize the adverse effects of these tariffs to downstream US producers who import these products, the exclusion request that grants tariff exemptions has been also established. In this paper we examined the determinants of the authority’s decisions on the exclusion requests. Our analysis focuses on the political factors. Specifically, we ask whether companies operating business in states where Trump won the majority vote (Trump state) in the 2016 presidential election were more likely to get tariff exemptions. Our estimation result suggests that firms located in Trump states were more likely to be granted exemptions. Especially it appears that the decisions were made based on a dual standard. While firms with lower sales to employment ratios were more likely to be approved for the exclusion requests in Trump states, it was the opposite for firms in non-Trump states.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 연구의 범위와 구성

제2장 중국 기업의 다각화와 경쟁력
1. 서론
2. 선행연구
3. 데이터의 구성과 성격
4. 다각화 현황
5. 소결

제3장 중국 국내외 특허와 산업 경쟁력 분석
1. 서론
2. 중국 혁신주체의 특허 출원 보유 증가와 산업경쟁력
3. 중국 ICT 산업 기업의 특허전략과 세계시장에서의 경쟁력
4. 소결

제4장 중국의 과학 역량 분석
1. 서론
2. 연구설계와 방법론
3. 중국의 과학대국화
4. 국제 과학 연구 협력 네트워크 속 중국의 위상
5. 미중연계 현황과 스트레스 테스트
6. 소결

제5장 중국 혁신형 산업클러스터의 지속가능성 평가
1. 서론
2. 중국의 산업 클러스터 정책
3. 혁신형 산업클러스터의 지속가능성 평가
4. 소결

제6장 중국특색의 당국가 체제와 기업가정신
1. 서론
2. 중국 특색 기업가 정신의 발전
3. 중국 특색 기업가 정신의 평가
4. 소결

제7장 결론 및 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   In the middle of the Sino-US trade and technology war, one important question is raised about whether China's technological power has risen to threaten the U.S. or not. In order to find an answer to this question, this report aims to evaluate the current status of China's technological catch-up or convergence to the global top level by using the data-based statistics and materials. In particular, this report starts from the authors' tireless effort to analyze China's industrial competitiveness by employing various microeconomic data. As well acknowledged, the most difficult task in the microeconomic analysis is to acquire relevant microeconomic data, which is not much available vis-a-vis macroeconomic data. In this report, each chapter is basically independent and self-complete as a research paper. Each author's main research questions and major findings are summarized below.
   The second chapter is written by Pilsoo Choi. He analyzes how the diversification strategy pursued by Chinese enterprises improve or worsen their competitiveness. He focuses on how different that diversification strategy of Chinese enterprises happened over time among different groups by the ownership, what sectors are the most actively diversified, and finally how much the diversification strategy affected corporate profitability. To answer these questions, he used Chinese corporate data. The diversification issue is nothing novel in the management science. In the corporation's evolution process, some corporations pursue the diversification strategy, while others not. That is solely the corporation's own choice, depending upon the market environment which the corporation belongs to. Many Chinese enterprises have also utilized the diversification strategy to cope with marketization and globalization of the Chinese economy through various forms - related or unrelated diversification. It may be said that the diversification strategy has nothing to do with technological improvement itself. However, that is closely related to strengthening enterprises' overall competitiveness.
   The author does not draw the conclusion that the Chinese enterprises' diversification strategy necessarily had led to the overall improvement of competitiveness. State-owned enterprises and private enterprises showed different patterns over time. On interesting finding is that high-profit services and high-tech enterprises most actively pursued diversification. By first developing core business platform and later linking many related businesses to this core platform, they could make much greater profits.
   The chapter 3 is written by Sungho Roh. He explores how Chinese enterprises' technologcial power has changed over time by analyzing their foreign and domestic patent application map. In particular, he focuses on the question of whether recent surge in the Chinese enterprises' patent applications have contributed to industrial competitiveness or not. He also diagnoses how major Chinese ITC companies' patent strategy has affected their competitiveness position in the global markets. For example, Huawei has been unique and unmatched in numbers of patent applications, but it is still qualitatively behind the U.S. tech companies such as Intel and Qualcom. Nevertheless, as the quantity expansion lasts long over time, a qualitative change will ensue.
   He finds that local patent applications increased more rapidly than the average of innovative companies in China. This result implies that patent activities among the local innovative companies are more or less overheated due to various policy measures supported and encouraged by the local governments. But the contribution of these patent activities to the improvement of productivity is inconclusive, depending on the sectors. Furthermore, the active patent applications do not necessarily lead to technology diffusion. In sum, evidently Chinese enterprises' R&D capacity tends to improve in some sectors. For example, Chinese innovative agents more actively pursue joint R&D cooperation with foreign tech companies in order to acquire R&D-related knowledge and technology and at the same time, more aggressively acquires patents and advanced technology through international mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
   The chapter 4 is written by Jong-Hak Eun. He analyzes China's scientific research capabilities by employing the research approach of bibliometrics, which is a empirical methodology to use very extensive date set. This approach is recently often used in economics as well. He collects most recent data up to 2018, in comparison with other researches. In 2018 alone, 1,470,000 research papers were published in the category of SCIE(Science Citation Index Expanded). In 2018 Chinese researchers' publication in the SCIE surpassed that of the United States in terms of number. He moves one step further to find out whether China's scientific research can be self-complete without any linkage or cooperation with the United States or not. He finds some possibilities. He indicates that the evidence of stronger China's scientific research capabilities may lead to the U.S.' recent move to contain China's technological rising. In that regard, he anticipates the possibility of U.S.' much stronger pressure and containment in the field of scientific research collaboration between China and the U.S. Recently, Chinese scientists are often excluded in the U.S.-centered global research collaboration networks. In addition, Chinese students are banned in the high-tech fields by the U.S. universities.
   The chapter 5 is written by Ikjoon Moon. He analyzes the competitiveness of the innovative industrial clusters which has been newly rising since 2013. He considers two types of externalities - Marshall-Arrow-Romer effect and Jacobs-Porter effects. He also carries out two case studies based on the next-generation internet technology cluster in Shenzhen and mobile internet cluster in Zhonggwanchun Beijing. By comparing these two cases, he concludes two different types of innovative clusters are competing to become a national champion. One is mostly driven by private companies, while the other is initiated by the public sector.
   He concludes that these new innovative clusters are not really different from the existing high-tech industrial development zones. And until now, it is difficult to find out the evidence of any visible progress. But, China's new experiment for upgrading industrial clusters will be a challenge to South Korea's do-nothing attitude. Geographical spillover effects can be maximized in the Marshall-Arrow-Romer model, while some positive externalities will happen across the sectors in the type of Jacobs-Porter model. These chinese experiments will be a good benchmark for South Korea in developing the upgraded long-term strategy for designing industry-academy-research clusters, nourishing start-ups and SME(small and medium-sized enterprises), and local innovation movements.
   Finally, the chapter 6 is written by Daewon Oh. He studies how China's entrepreneurship has evolved over time since 1978 (market reform and opening). First, he finds that diverse models in different regions such as collective ownership, private ownership, and foreign ownership model have changed from the early bud to more sophisticated ones. Particularly after the appearance of digital economy, new private start-ups and unicorn companies in China manifest Chinese style entrepreneurship. In his case study on Alibaba, he has shown how the Chinese start-up ecosystem has been organically working. He concludes that there is no one-size-fits-all model for the Chinese entrepreneurship. Too many models are competing in the Chinese-style socialist market economy.
   Nevertheless, Oh finds three characteristics of Chinese-style entrepreneurship. First, it is based on the negative-list approach which allows reform in advance without any institutionalization. This is Chinese-style experimentalism and pragmatism. Without any regulation, entrepreneurs can realize more easily their own vision and potential. Second, it is based on the private-public cooperative state capitalism, particularly in the competitive environment among the local governments. That means there is no single nation-wide model. But, diverse local models have been created based on the regional characteristics. Sometimes, Chinese-style human networking, so called Guanxi, plays an important role in coordinating diverse interests into a common goal, but it also often results in cronyism and corruption. Third, more recently, the central government has executed extensive policy support for mobilizing top brains - such as one thousand man plan and ten thousand man plan. In order to attract those top brains, the local governments provide many pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives.
   This report has some shortcomings. First of all, we do not develop our research into some comparative analysis on industrial competitiveness between China and South Korea. Our research only focuses on China. However, we try to draw some implications for South Korea. Hopefully, we are looking forward to seeing future research by carrying out comparative analysis on these five research subjects. As mentioned above, the five subjects are not organically combined. Each chapter focuses on the independent subject respectively, while a common keyword in this report is industrial competitiveness. Five factors in this report - diversification strategy, patent, basic scientific research, innovation cluster, entrepreneurship - are closely interconnected. We are looking forward to having another future research about how these five factors are interacting each other and forming overall industrial competitiveness.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적 및 구성

제2장 국영기업 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 배경
2. 현행 WTO협정의 국영기업 규율
3. 지역무역협정을 통한 국영기업 규범의 발전
4. WTO 개정 논의 전망 및 시사점

제3장 공급과잉을 유발하는 ‘유해보조금’ 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 논의의 배경
2. 상류보조금
3. 금지보조금 목록 확대 및 선별적 구제 신설
4. 유해보조금에 대한 심각한 손상 간주 규정 재도입
5. 혜택 산정기준의 구체화
6. 국영기업에 적용되는 특정성 판단기준 구체화

제4장 보조금 통보 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 논의의 배경
2. 미국·유럽연합·일본의 WTO협정 개정 논의
3. WTO회원국 제출 개정안 검토
4. 평가

제5장 결론
1. 향후 전망
2. WTO보조금협정 개정에 대한 한국의 대외적 입장 정립

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The present study deals with the issue of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), industrial subsidies, and subsidy notifications in the context of “WTO Reform”; examines relevant provisions of WTO agreements in comparison with those under a select number of recent regional trade agreements; and predicts directions for future WTO amendment proposals to be made by the United States, European Union, and Japan (hereinafter referred to as “US-EU-Japan”). Further, in preparation for a situation where these three Members reach out to obtain Korea's support for the amendments, this study seeks to provide policy implications that the Korean government could take into account in defining its strategic positioning in WTO Reform negotiations.
   Chapter 2 discusses possible WTO amendments related to industrial subsidization “for” and/or “by” China’s SOEs. To this end the present study firstly sheds light on the current situation with China’s SOEs, its industrial subsidization policy, and possible market distortion arising therefrom. Secondly it discusses practical and normative limits of the current WTO agreements in addressing this trade issue. Article XVII of the GATT has long been criticized for a lack of a definition of “state-trading enterprises (STEs)” and for Members’ insufficient implementation of STEs transparency obligations under the same provision. Further, under the WTO Subsidies Agreement there has been a long-standing disagreement between the United States and China on whether China's SOEs can be viewed as a “public body”, i.e., the granting authorities of subsidies. The United States has consistently objected to the “government authority” and “significant control” standards and criticized that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the term “public body” would place too much burden on the investigating authorities in proving China’s SOE under investigation constitute a public body. Against this background a few recent RTAs including the CPTPP and the USMCA contain more concrete definition of SOEs based on ownership and control. On a similar note it is probable that US-EU-Japan would propose under WTO agreements to (ⅰ) introduce detailed criteria in determining a public body in cases where SOE subsidization is concerned; (ⅱ) adopt a set of rules which apply to entities which are not public bodies but still under influence of the government; and (ⅲ) add additional obligations and rules which apply specifically to SOE subsidization. For a more detailed analysis, this study examines similarities and differences in relevant provisions of the current WTO Subsidies Agreement, the CPTPP, and the USMCA.
   Chapter 3 analyzes a possible WTO Subsidies Agreement revision with respect to industrial subsidies leading to overcapacity or “harmful subsidies.” A future proposal by US-EU-Japan is most likely to provide for (ⅰ) introduction of explicit rules on benefit pass-through, given that GATT/WTO jurisprudence has consistently required a high degree of burden of proof to the investigating authorities in establishing that benefits provided to upstream industries have “passed through” to downstream industries. Additionally the following elements may be proposed: (ⅱ) expansion of boundary of the “prohibited subsidies” beyond export subsidies and import substitution subsidies to include harmful subsidies; (ⅲ) reintroduction of rebuttable presumption of adverse effects (as in now-defunct Article 6.1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement); (ⅳ) introduction of more detailed rules for out-of-country benchmark for countervailing duty calculation under Article 14 of the same Agreement ; and (ⅴ) adoption of additional fast-track rules specifically for disputed SOE subsidization between WTO Members.
   Chapter 4 discusses possible WTO amendments as regards subsidy notifications. While the compliance rate with notification obligations has generally been very low for most WTO Members, the main criticism has been directed at China. It has been repeatedly pointed out at the WTO that while China is actively involved in domestic subsidization both at the central and local government level, it still has not completed notification on all of its domestic subsidies. On this matter, primarily two proposals are being discussed: (ⅰ) introduction of “administrative measures” to be applied to WTO Members who failed to comply with their notification obligations, and (ⅱ) utilization of Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) in monitoring such non-compliance.
   In Chapter 5 this study suggests that WTO Members should adopt a “stepped” approach by prioritizing among multiple revision elements. Further it draws policy implications for the Korean government to take into account in future WTO negotiations, with regard to introduction of (ⅰ) new definition of “public bodies” where SOEs are concerned; (ⅱ) additional obligations and rules for SOE subsidization; (ⅲ) explicit benefit pass-through provision for upstream subsidies, (ⅳ) prohibited industrial subsidies leading to overcapacity; (ⅴ) criteria for determining the Non-market-oriented conditions and/or Non-Market Economies (NMEs) under WTO agreements; and (ⅵ) rules to strengthen transparency and enhance Members’ subsidy notifications including administrative measures. Lastly, this study stresses that the Korean government closely monitor the ongoing discussion between US-EU-Japan for a thorough legal and economic analysis on any further developments, and prepare multiple scenarios for all possible outcomes in setting its positioning and negotiation strategies with respect to each revision element.
 

서언 

국문요약 

제1장  서론 
1. 보호무역주의 확산 추세
2. WTO 분쟁 회부 건수의 증가
3. DSU의 중요성에 대한 공감대 확산
4. DSU 개정 관련 최근 동향 반영 

제2장 DSU 개정 협상 현황 
1. 기존 DSU의 문제점 및 한계
2. 2006~11년 협상 주요 쟁점 
3. 기존 DSU 개정 논의에 대한 우리나라의 입장 
4. 미국의 주요 요구사항과 주요국 반응 
5. 미국 요구사항에 대한 주요국 반응 
6. 우리나라의 입장 

제3장 WTO 개혁 맥락 DSU 개정 검토 항목 
1. DSU 개정 문제 조망을 위한 전반적 골격 
2. 구체적 쟁점에 대한 검토

제4장 우리나라에 대한 함의 및 대응 방안 
1. WTO 개혁 논의에 대한 대응 방안 
2. 분쟁해결절차 개선 작업 향후 대응 방안 
3. 우리나라에 대한 파급효과와 이에 따른 고려사항 
4. 주요 이슈별 우리나라의 기본 입장  

제5장 결론 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

   Amid faltering multilateralism and growing frustration of trading states, “WTO Reform” has become a focal point of the global discussion. The future of the global trading regime seems to depend upon how this reform discussion unfolds for the next couple of years. The global leaders who gathered at the G-20 summit held in Osaka in June 2019 agreed that they should strive for early agreement on the WTO Reform. As of December 2019, efforts are being mobilized in many different forums to come up with tangible outcome, so that a final (or something near final) package for the reform can be attained at the upcoming 12th Ministerial Conference of June 2020.
   A variety of topics are being discussed in the context of the WTO Reform. One of such topics is an adjustment of the dispute settlement system of the WTO and attendant amendment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Discussion of this particular topic has been prompted by a specific demand of a particular state ? namely, the United States that has expressed continuing frustration of the current dispute settlement regime. Other states do not necessarily share the view of the United States, but they find it inevitable to accommodate U.S. demands given how strong U.S. opposition is.
   In that regard, there are elements in the proposals being discussed at the moment that would undermine the principle of ‘rule of law’ in the dispute settlement system ? something that has been praised as the most noteworthy achievement of the present WTO regime. And yet, there are also elements in the present discussions and related proposals that may help states put the dispute settlement system into perspective and contemplate a more practical and workable dispute settlement system under the circumstances. Topics being discussed in this regard include curtailment of the authority of the Appellate Body, confinement of the scope of review of panels and the Appellate Body, and enhancement of the Members’ control over panel and the Appellate Body proceedings, to name a few. As always, the question is how to strike a right balance in future negotiations.
   Korea is advised to participate in this process more actively. Korea is the 7th largest trading state and 10th most frequent user of the dispute settlement system among 164 Members of the WTO. As such, any change of the WTO’s dispute settlement system stands to affect Korea directly. While some issues offer very little ground for Korea to maneuver, others do provide opportunities for its meaningful participation and contribution. Korea should more actively take advantage of these opportunities, so that dispute settlement proceeding is amended in right direction and in a way that reflects interest of the global community including Korea.
   Even if general direction of the current negotiation is already fixed and hard to change, there are still details and fine-tunings that require further inputs and guidance from Members. This is the area where Korea can contribute. By way of example, facilitation of non-binding dispute settlement proceedings, strengthening of peer review through TPRM, specification of the interpretative authority of Members, and adoption of a remand can be contemplated in this respect. Korea is advised to prepare and submit specific proposals or join other states in such proposals in the next couple of years through various forums where this important topic is to be discussed.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 필요성
2. 연구 목적과 주요 연구 내용
3. 기존 연구의 검토 및 본 연구의 기여

제2장 WTO 농업보조 규범과 우리나라의 농업보조 실적
1. WTO 농업보조 규범과 의미
2. 우리나라 농업보조 실적과 특징

제3장 우리나라 농업보조 검토
1. 2018년 농림축산식품부 예산사업 검토
2. 2018년 농림축산식품부 기금사업 검토

제4장 주요국의 농업보조 현황과 특징
1. 주요 선진국의 농업보조 현황 및 특징
2. 주요 개도국의 농업보조 현황 및 특징
3. 선진국과 개도국 농업보조 비교

제5장 WTO 개도국지위 문제와 개도국 세분화
1. WTO 개도국지위 논의 동향
2. 우리나라의 개도국지위 검토와 영향
3. 개도국 세분화 분석과 결과

제6장 정책 제언
1. WTO 농업보조 통보강화 대책
2. WTO 개도국지위 관련 대책

참고문헌

[부록] 선진국 포함 시 군집분석 결과

Executive Summary

   The global trading system - with the WTO at its heart - is facing a ‘make or break’ moment. All three of the WTO’s functions are under pressure and in need of reform: administering multilateral trade rules, serving as a forum for trade negotiations and providing a mechanism to settle trade disputes. But despite this gloomy outlook, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. Among many important issues related to reforming the WTO trading system, this study focuses on following two issues; reinforcing WTO notifications and differentiating developing countries since the two issues are core and key interest of both developed and developing members.
   Agricultural support can divided into three types: (i) trade or border measures such as tariffs or quotas that provide market price support (MPS); (ii) coupled subsidies (CS) provided by governments as direct subsidies on output or as subsidies on inputs (such as fertilizers or seeds) that create incentives to increase output; and (iii) decoupled subsidies (DS) that avoid altering incentives to change output levels but provide direct income support to farmers.
   The traditional pattern of agricultural support involved substantial support to farmers in the rich countries, while poor countries, on balance, used to tax agriculture. This pattern has changed substantially over the past decades. In wealthy nations, average rates have fallen and there has been a move away from trade measures and towards decoupled protection that seeks to avoid pushing for higher agricultural production and reducing the market access opportunities of other countries. In developing countries, agricultural support has shifted from net taxation to net assistance on average.
   A key question is which interest groups might engage on reform of agricultural subsidies in the future. Reformers need to develop a reform narrative that frames the issues in a way that makes the benefits of reform clear and mobilizes a range of actors in support of a specific approach to reform. Discourse coalitions can help build such a shared understanding and identify narratives that will convey its essence to broader groups of stakeholders. While the road to such reform is likely to be long and hard there is, at last, a great deal of attention focused on how this might be done.
   The Trump administration, in another sign of its tough approach to trade, moved in March 2019 to exclude India and Turkey from a program that has long granted the two countries preferential duty-free access to US markets. The administration’s action came after Brazil and Australia lodged parallel claims that India’s sugar subsidy regime has depressed world prices. Earlier this year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) took a similar step, ruling against China’s rice and wheat subsidies.
   These actions underscore an important issue, bringing the role of larger developing countries in the trading system to the front burner. Developing countries’ exports have grown to represent almost half of total world exports, with the largest 15 developing economies accounting for some three-quarters of that share. When the players?advanced or emerging?are large, their actions can have sizeable economic effects in international markets. There is thus a strong rationale to have them play by the same rules.
   The central issue at hand is the long-standing practice in the WTO?and its predecessor, the GATT?that each country may “self-declare” as developing to benefit from special and differential treatment (S&DT). Least developed countries (LDCs) qualify automatically, however, once certain thresholds are met. While the exact meaning of S&DT is defined in the context of each negotiation?preferential market access, exceptions to commitments, technical assistance, etc.?the concept departs from the key principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination that underlie the multilateral trading system.
   One way to improve the system would be to limit the practice of developing-country self-declaration. The United States recently proposed that in current and future negotiations, members or acceding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may not invoke the self-declaration option. The same would apply to members of the Group of 20 (G-20), “high income” countries as per the World Bank definition, or countries that account for 0.5 percent or more of global merchandise trade. Over 30 countries would fall in at least one of these categories.
   Agreeing on a formal categorization of developing countries in the WTO context can become a byzantine negotiating exercise, with little likelihood of agreement because of the diverse nature of countries in this category. In reality, however, differentiation does occur. The WTO Trade Facilitation (TFA) allows countries to self-determine the timeline for implementation of commitments, in some cases linked to technical assistance. The “developed-developing” dichotomy does not serve the WTO membership well. Rather than debating definitional criteria, however, WTO members should consider the following steps to help integrate developing countries in global trade:
   Countries can decide to follow Taiwan’s example and not claim differentiated treatment, without the need to declare themselves “developed.”
   Countries could opt not to claim differentiated treatment in a specific negotiation, as with the implementation of TFA commitments. The ongoing negotiations on fisheries subsidies disciplines provide a good opportunity to put this measure into practice.
   Flexible negotiating formats, in particular plurilateral agreements open to participation by all countries, are a useful alternative for designing rules in areas of interest to groups of members. Finding a way to bring them to the WTO would benefit the broader WTO membership, increasing transparency. Countries not wanting to join a negotiation would not be required to do so or be allowed to block it.
   Active engagement by larger developing countries in trade negotiations could strengthen their bargaining position to set a balanced negotiating agenda, encompassing the interests of countries at different levels of development, including, for example, in agriculture.
   Negotiations should provide for differentiated treatment taking into account the policymaking challenges in developing countries without establishing permanent exemptions. These provisions should either be time-bound or have clear threshold and phase out criteria, as in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
   Technical assistance and capacity-building support for development and reform in developing economies can be essential to success and are thus in the interest of both those that provide such assistance and those that receive it.

국문요약 

제1장 서론

제2장 아세안 사회문화공동체 경과와 2025 분석
1. 아세안의 출범과 발전
2. 아세안 공동체(ASEAN Community)
3. 아세안 사회문화공동체(ASCC) 주요 협력 분야 제시

제3장 사회 인프라: 보건의료 및 교육을 중심으로
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 분야별 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제4장 문화예술
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 대아세안 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제5장 지속가능한 환경
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 분야별 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제6장 한ㆍ아세안 협력방안
1. 기본방향
2. 분야별 정책과제

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary
 

   Since the inauguration of the new government in 2017, Korea has been striving to deepen its cooperative relationship with ASEAN to the level of the four traditional major partners to the Korean Peninsula through the New Southern Policy. This requires strengthening cooperation not only in the economy but also in various fields. In 2015, the ASEAN created three communities ? the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) ? also providing a blueprint for each community. In this context, this study aims to suggest our comprehensive strategies and sectoral policies to cooperate with ASEAN member countries, with a particular focus on the ASCC.
   In line with ASEAN’s people-oriented commitment to improve quality of life, the ASCC can play an important role in achieving ASEAN social integration and promoting sustainable development in the region. In this context, the ASCC includes a wide variety of social issues such as culture and arts, education, public health, environment and disaster management and these issues are closely related to the political and economic integration efforts of ASEAN. When considering ASEAN’s needs for cooperation, relevant global agenda and Korea’s recent policy toward ASEAN, the research areas in this report cover social infrastructure culture and arts and sustainable environment.
   In Chapter 3, we analyzed the current status of the social infrastructure in the ASEAN region and their cooperative activities with other countries, especially focusing on the area of health care, including water and sanitation and education. These issues are not only main agenda of governmental meetings under the ASCC, but also major areas of cooperation between Korea and ASEAN member countries. ASEAN is committed to building and improving its regional social infrastructure while seeking sustainable and inclusive growth according to the ASCC blueprint. However, we found that there are still development gaps in health care and education sectors among member countries, with each income group showing different weaknesses. These gaps and weaknesses are likely to coincide with demands in ASEAN to cooperate with other countries. With diverse experiences and expertise in the social infrastructure, developed countries and institutions such as Japan, the U.S., Germany and the EU have been working with ASEAN to align their national/regional interests and strengths with ASEAN’s needs. This includes various collaborative projects at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. For Korea, on the other hand, the health care and education sectors are key areas of cooperation with ASEAN member countries, but it is mainly promoting bilateral cooperation projects without much consideration for their income levels and development needs at the ASEAN level. We also need to pay attention to the issues that ASEAN is currently discussing, such as aging society, higher education cooperation between member countries, policies for vulnerable groups and so on.
   The main goals of Chapter 4 are to analyze ASEAN-level development strategies and basic conditions in the field of culture and arts, and to identify promising directions for future cooperation strategies through a comparison between Korea’s cooperation with other countries and with ASEAN. Detailed development plans of the ASEAN in the field of culture and art are presented through the Strategic Plan for Culture and Arts, the Strategic Plan for Information and Media, and the ASEAN ICT Master Plan. According to the main contents of these strategic plans, ASEAN seems to give high policy value to securing equal opportunities for cultural activities, supporting cultural diversity, preserving cultural heritage, and enhancing the competitiveness of the cultural industry.
   On the other hand, with the recent emphasis placed on the importance of public or cultural diplomacy in international relations, many countries are using the culture and arts sector as a major means of their foreign exchange and support policies. ASEAN is attracting attention as a regional cooperation partner in various aspects such as the economy, politics, and security. Therefore, in addition to Japan and China, Korea also has established overseas base organizations and promoted cultural cooperation policy to expand its influence. In the case of Europe, especially France and Germany, various cultural exchanges and language dissemination projects are carried out to increase their influence within the ASEAN region through cultural ODA and the establishment of cultural centers.
   The results of comparing Korea's ASEAN culture and art cooperation policy with main leading countries can be summarized as follows. First, overseas networks for cooperation in the field of culture and arts still remain insufficient in terms of quantity and quality compared to the major leading countries. Second, achievements in terms of establishing differentiated support channels and related policies in the field of culture and arts with ASEAN are still insufficient. Third, compared to various cooperation and support policies with individual ASEAN countries, efforts to develop multilateral cooperation agenda and projects for the ASEAN community are showing a relative lack of outcomes. Fourth, there are grounds for concerns about the lack of cohesion and inefficiency in cooperation channels, caused by the current situation in which exchange and cooperation projects in the field of culture and arts are conducted by various organizations.
   In Chapter 5, ASEAN’s intra- and inter-regional efforts to realize a sustainable environment through disaster management, emission mitigation, biodiversity conservation and plastic waste management are reviewed. When considering the rapid economic and population growth, urbanization and the geographical characteristics of the ASEAN region, the goals of realizing environmentally sustainable development and establishing a community which is resilient in the face of natural disasters can be seen as urgent priorities to further ASCC progress. Japan, Germany and EU, major aid donors for environment protection and climate change in ASEAN, regularly communicate with ASEAN to identify cooperation potentials and opportunities through policy dialogue specifically dedicated to environment issues. Also, these donors closely partner with various bilateral and multilateral donors in the field of culture and arts with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation programs. Korea should develop strategic policy and priorities for cooperation with ASEAN in environment and climate change issues with an understanding of the environmental needs in ASEAN, recent global agenda and Korea’s competitive advantages.
   Chapter 6 presents the basic directions and strategies of ASEAN-Korea cooperation in connection with the ASCC initiative. Since the formal consultation channels of ASEAN-Korea so far have focused on the diplomatic and economic fields, a formal dialogue channel on the lines of an “ASEAN-Social and Cultural Policy Dialogue” (tentative name) needs to be established. Through these dialogue channels, it will be necessary to lead discussions on the development of cooperation fields, strategy and action plan establishment, and discussions at the ministry level to establish the goal of ASEAN-ROK joint prosperity by establishing working groups for each major field.
   Among the major sectors, cooperation strategies to achieve goals in the social infrastructure sector can be presented as follows. First, it is necessary to re-examine ASEAN’s cooperation needs by each income group based on research results on policy, project promotion process and obstacles in recipient countries. Second, we need to develop various cooperation models that reflect ASEAN policy needs. This could be explored by reviewing current policies such as the ASEAN Post-2015 Health Development Agenda and discussing our suggestions with ASEAN. Third, it is necessary to promote projects to improve ASEAN’s health care system and services including supporting ASEAN to manage and treat infectious diseases effectively, and also to pursue a collaborative response to the issue of aging societies. Fourth, there is a need to strengthen the mutual cooperation system to promote exchange of human resources among ASEAN member countries as well as between Korea and ASEAN in the field of higher education through linkages between current projects.
   Next, in the field of culture and arts, we derived the following cooperative strategies to utilize Korea’s comparative advantages and to effectively respond to ASEAN's support needs. First, it is necessary to revitalize mutual beneficial exchange and cooperation in the field of culture and arts between ASEAN and Korea such as supporting projects for enhancing the competitiveness of the ASEAN culture industry. Second, it will be necessary to develop exchange and cooperation projects at the ASEAN community level, not bilateral cooperation with individual countries, such as developing an online platform to record and share ASEAN cultural heritage information. Third, stronger support must be provided for preservation and restoration of cultural heritage in ASEAN through cultural ODA. Fourth, it will be necessary to prepare support policies to effectively utilize human resources such as overseas Korean networks within the ASEAN region. 
   Lastly, in the case of sustainable environment, we derived the following policy strategies to achieve specific goals within the sector. First, it will be necessary to establish higher strategies for environmental cooperation and to identify priority areas for cooperation with ASEAN. Since each ASEAN member country possesses different environmental and policy conditions, the target countries should be classified into different groups and projects developed by each agenda of environmental cooperation. Second, in order to strengthen environmental cooperation with ASEAN, it is necessary to understand international discussion trends and reflect them in cooperation strategy. Third, private participation should be encouraged to expand and mobilize financial resources related to ASEAN environmental cooperation. Fourth, it will be necessary to find various ways of cooperation aside from financial support, such as policy consulting, professional training and partnership in the green finance sector.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 목적
2. 연구 범위 및 구성
3. 선행연구 검토

제2장 주요국의 혁신성장 패러다임
1. 미국: 디지털 이노베이션(Digital Innovation)
2. 독일: 인더스트리 4.0(Industrie 4.0)
3. 일본: 커넥티드 인더스트리즈(Connected Industries)
4. 소결

제3장 주요국의 제조업 혁신정책: 스마트팩토리를 중심으로
1. 독일
2. 일본
3. 소결

제4장 주요국의 스타트업 정책
1. 미국
2. 일본
3. 프랑스
4. 소결

제5장 주요국의 핀테크 정책
1. 미국
2. 일본
3. 영국
4. 소결

제6장 정책 시사점
1. 혁신성장 패러다임
2. 제조업 혁신정책: 스마트팩토리를 중심으로
3. 스타트업 정책
4. 핀테크 정책

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to analyze innovation growth policies in the United States, Europe, and Japan, and to draw policy implications for Korea. Accordingly, the report analyzes the characteristics of innovation growth paradigms and three important sectors of the 4th Industrial Revolution (smart factories, start-up ecosystems, and fintech).
   Chapter 2 first analyzes the US government policies on advanced manufacturing, IoT, AI, and Big Data. In addition to support from the federal government, private companies and laboratories are cooperating actively through consortiums such as the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC), which operates several testbeds. The results of our analysis indicate that the link between government policies and private companies’ strategies is the core of US innovation growth. Second, the innovative growth paradigm in Germany has been changed from the “High-Tech Strategy” to the concept of “Industrie 4.0” and “AI Strategy.” The key to innovative growth in Germany is government-industry-academia cooperation realized through the introduction of use cases and the provision of testbeds. Third, the Japanese government is pursuing the vision of “Society 5.0” for the future of its society, a vision of a society that collects data through IoT technology and utilizes this big data through AI and robots. Japan is also implementing a policy called “Connected Industries” to secure competitiveness in the manufacturing industry by utilizing industrial data. Above all, the Japanese government has been putting efforts into improving the environment for big data utilization by modifying laws and supporting related projects.
   Chapter 3 describes the current status and policies related to smart factories in Germany and Japan. We explain the connection mechanisms and standards applied to smart factories in Germany such as the Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) and umati, or universal machine tool interface, and present the exemplary cases of Siemens, Bosch and SAP. Furthermore, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) of Germany is utilizing Mittelstand 4.0 Competency Centers to support the digital transformation underlying smart factory projects in Germany. Japan is not yet at the stage of operating virtual factories, and is instead focusing on innovations in manufacturing processes. This innovation of manufacturing processes in Japan is characterized by digitalization, standardization, visualization, and automation, and industrial IoT platforms such as Mitsubishi Electric's Edgecross and Fanuc's FIELD systems have emerged for inter-factory and sectoral connectivity. Meanwhile, the Japanese government provides customized support by implementing public relations activities, dispatching experts, providing IoT tools, IoT taxation, and funding for IoT investment.
   In Chapter 4, we review current startup ecosystems and related policies in the United States, Japan and France. The startup ecosystem in the United States is characterized by synergistic effects of human capital, technological innovation, and venture capital. In terms of policy, the Obama administration supported the development of innovative technologies through the Startup America Initiative and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act. However, supporting policy has lost its momentum under the Trump administration, and regulations are expected to be tightened for companies in Silicon Valley. Recent features of the Japanese startup ecosystem can be summarized as the expansion of CVC investment and the increase of young entrepreneurs. Along with the J-Startup policy, the representative startup supporting policy in Japan to foster role model companies, the Japanese government is releasing data and guidelines to promote open innovation between large corporations, universities, research institutes and startups. In France, which is gaining recognition as a growing hub for tech startups, the government and the private sector are interacting actively through “La French Tech,” a government support plan, and Station F, a private startup campus. In 2019, the French government introduced a plan to enhance the competitiveness of the startup ecosystem by diversifying its policies, for instance by strengthening incentives and public relations support.
   Chapter 5 describes fintech trends and policies in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. The US government adopts a negative regulatory approach, and financial authorities examine legitimacy and provide guidelines to remove uncertainties in fintech services. Japan is encouraging the emergence of new fintech companies and services by introducing and amending relevant laws (the Banking Act, the Money Payment Act, and the Financial Instruments Transactions Act). The Financial Services Agency (FSA) is providing regulatory consultations through its Fintech Support Desk and Fintech Experimental Hub. Moreover, in terms of blockchain technology, Japan is strengthening its cooperation network by conducting joint research and round tables with overseas organizations. The UK, which is highly competitive in the financial industry, is actively supporting fintech by deferring regulations through a regulatory sandbox. The UK government is also establishing a fintech-friendly regulatory environment by hiring people with wide experience in the banking and fintech industries. Level 39, a fintech cluster, provides not only office space but also opportunities to network with investors and accelerators. In addition, the fact that successful fintech companies in the UK can easily enter overseas markets makes the UK more attractive for fintech companies.
   Following an analysis of the Korean government’s paradigm for innovative growth and policies related to smart factories, the startup ecosystem, and fintech, we compare these with major economies to draw the following policy implications. First, Korea should expand government R&D investment in 5G infrastructure and AI technology to build a hyper-connected intelligent society. It will also be critical to establish a whole-of-government agency to promote government-industry-academia cooperation and to provide test beds for innovative technologies. Second, we need to establish a clear and unified concept of smart factories and to build industrial IoT platforms. In addition, customized support that meets the needs of SMEs is required for SMEs to become smart factories. Third, with regard to the startup ecosystem, we could consider applying a comprehensive negative regulation system and promoting open innovation. Also, it is necessary to build an integrated support team for startups like the French Tech National Team in France. Fourth, deregulation should be carried out to foster the fintech industry in Korea. In addition, further efforts should be made to analyze successful overseas fintech business models and to review the adverse effects related to fintech. Meanwhile, it would be beneficial to review the legal system and pay more attention to strengthening domestic and international networks in order to revitalize fintech with a proper management system. Lastly, government authorities should adopt innovative approaches to improve financial regulation, as well as provide active and customized support including support for overseas expansion.
 

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구목적
2. 연구의 내용과 차별성

제2장 혁신성장 관련 데이터 법ㆍ제도
1. 혁신성장과 데이터
2. 혁신성장 관련 개인정보 보호와 활용
3. 데이터세트의 확보
4. 데이터와 경쟁법
5. 국경간 데이터 이전과 조화

제3장 혁신성장 관련 지식재산권
1. 혁신성장과 지식재산권
2. 인공지능 관련 지식재산권 쟁점
3. 우리나라 혁신성장 관련 지식재산권 보호

제4장 혁신성장과 표준
1. 혁신성장과 표준전략
2. 4차 산업혁명 시대와 시스템ㆍ플랫폼 표준의 역할 부상
3. 국가표준 거버넌스 및 주요국의 표준정책과 제도
4. 우리나라의 표준화 현황
5. APEC의 표준 관련 논의 동향

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 혁신성장과 데이터 관련 법ㆍ제도
2. 혁신성장과 지식재산권
3. 혁신성장과 표준

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to analyze institutional changes implemented by the regulatory bodies in developed countries-such as the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan-in response to the 4th Industrial Revolution, and draw policy implications for Korea. More specifically, this research examines the institutional and legal changes taken by major countries and Korea on the three major topics of Big Data, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and standards.
   Chapter 2 deals with major issues in the field of data regulation, and examines institutional and legal changes implemented by major countries. In the first section, this chapter first identifies the key challenges in today’s “data era” as: 1) finding the right balance between data protection and data usage, 2) securing access to datasets, 3) regulating data monopoly, and 4) regulating cross-border data transfer and achieving global harmonization. Section 2 analyzes data regulations in the US, the EU, Japan, and Korea, focusing on each country’s regulations on opt-in (requiring express consent from the individual in order to process their data) or opt-out methods, data purpose limitation, data minimization, and the pseudonymization/anonymization of data. Section 3 examines regulations related to Midata and public data-both of which can help secure datasets available to data utilizers-in major countries. In Section 4, we examine the relations between Big Data and competition law, which is a relatively new issue in the field. Section 5 wraps up the chapter with a discussion on regulating cross-border data transfer and achieving global harmonization. 
   Chapter 3 examines IPR issues in relation to the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI). After reviewing the status and development trends of AI in this era of innovative growth, this chapter outlines two major issues in the IPR area that have emerged with the advancement of AI technology. The first is the issue of IP protection for AI systems. Many countries recognize that the development of algorithms or software is a crucial driving force for AI development, and thus endeavor to encourage development of algorithms and software by enhancing their legal protection framework. Some countries-like the US, the EU and Japan-are considering not only copyright but also patent and trade secret protection, in protecting AI-related IP. This study looks into the cases of the US, the EU, and Japan to identify trends in legal protection for AI-related technology. The second issue regards the patentability of inventions created by AIs, and whether AI innovations (in which AI holds the patent) necessitate legal protection. The US and Japan so far have taken negative stands on granting patents to AI systems, but at the same time their governments are keeping an eye on changes in trend.
   Chapter 4 observes the growing importance of standards, and how major countries including the US, China, Germany, and Japan are responding to the trend. As the society advances into the 4th Industrial Revolution era characterized by “hyper-connectivity,” the importance of standards-as a key instrument in connecting different devices together-is all the more emphasized. This chapter focuses on major countries’ development of standards systems, standards policy, and the recent trends in standards R&D. In particular, it focuses on the problem of linkage between R&D and standards, and between standards and regulations, and each country’s efforts in harmonization. It also introduces the recent discussions on standards policy and conformity assessment in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) and Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL WG).
   Lastly, Chapter 5 analyzes the measures to improve Korea’s institution and legal system in relation to data regulation, IPRs, and standards. In the data regulation sphere, it is necessary to revise the current data law in order to allow for more data utilization, while providing a practical level of protection. The revision should also be in line with the level of protection required by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in order to pass the adequacy test. To expand the dataset and prohibit data monopoly, it is also necessary to establish legal grounds for data transfer. Regarding IPRs, the discussion on computer-related inventions should focus on determining the criteria for “creative concepts” or technical features. Also, regulations that address the problem of repeatability, which is common in AI-related inventions, should be newly established. It will also be advisable to apply more limited protection to creations by AI. Finally, in the area of standards, the government must strive for the adoption of Korea’s national standards by international standards bodies. It should also make efforts to reduce costs by: 1) shortening the standard-setting period, and 2) utilizing government-funded R&D projects by extracting national standards from the projects and promoting these to become international standards. In addition, it will be necessary to minimize the time and cost required to establish technical regulations by harmonizing technical regulations with national standards.