This report analyzes migration and labor market in the European Union (EU henceforth). First, the EU’s and major European countries’ regulations and institutions on migration are analyzed, and some stylized-facts are established. Comparing these stylized-facts with the Korea counterparts, it offers policy implications for Korea. Also, main features of the states of migration in the EU are described, to deepen the understanding of the situation. A major interest regarding immigration, in Korea as well as in the EU, would be its impact on labor market in destination countries. To help better understanding on this, the impact of immigration on the recipient labor market is estimated, using the data from the EU. By doing a comprehensive analysis, this report aims to deepen the understanding on migration and labor market in the EU, derive policy implications for Korea, and offer a reference to assess the impact of an increase of immigration on the Korean labor market.

   Given its geostrategic position and growing importance in the world economy, the Indo-Pacific region has attracted many major powers to actively engage with the region. With the unveiling of the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017, Korea has also sought to upgrade its relations with ASEAN and India by boosting economic ties, socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation in the area of peace and security. While an earlier version of the NSP focused on bilateral cooperation with targeted countries, it gradually began to explore opportunities to collaborate with other players in addressing the needs of ASEAN and India. In particular, as the United States seeks cooperation with its key allies in forging the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), there has been growing interest in the search for convergence between the FOIP and the NSP. Initially, the Korean government took an ambiguous stance toward the U.S.’s new policy, but in 2019 the two governments agreed to work together by building synergies between the NSP and the FOIP. Nevertheless, given the strategic nature of the FOIP as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the attendant concerns in Southeast Asia about being embroiled in U.S.-China rivalry, close collaboration with the FOIP poses some challenges for the NSP, whose primary objective is to win the heart of targeted countries and steer toward stronger cooperation with them. Against this backdrop, this report presents suggestions on how the NSP could cooperate with the FOIP in ways that suit the interests of ASEAN and India. The policy recommendation is based on analyzing how the FOIP is received by NSP-targeted countries and the cooperation needs of this region.
   Before exploring ASEAN/India’s stance on the FOIP, Chapter 2 reviews the details of the FOIP focusing on its three pillars: security, economic and governance. By comparing the FOIP and the NSP, we explore the chance of convergence between the two policies. The results of our analysis suggest that while both policies have different objectives and approaches, particularly in the “security” pillar, there are sufficient opportunities for cooperation between the two in the fields of economic cooperation and non-traditional security.
   To clarify the position of targeted countries, Chapter 3 examines how Southeast Asia and India have responded to the U.S.’s FOIP. To counterbalance China’s growing regional power, most Southeast Asian nations welcome the active presence of the U.S. in the region, but ASEAN’s long-standing tradition to preserve its neutrality leads them to take a discreet approach to the FOIP. While most ASEAN member states are reluctant to clarify their position, they are likely to participate in FOIP-related initiatives that suit their national interests. On the security side, maritime states, particularly Vietnam, are eager to seek U.S. support for enhancing their maritime capacity to better respond to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and other maritime challenges. However, although these countries will step up security cooperation with the U.S., where their interests lie, no Southeast Asian nations ‒ including two treaty allies and a close security partner, namely Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore ‒ are likely to align themselves with the FOIP that promotes anti-China narratives. On the economic front, in general, most ASEAN member states are expected to welcome economic initiatives under the FOIP. Desiring to diversify their trade/investment partners, even China-leaning countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are not in a position to say no to new sources of finance and projects to develop their economies. One major drawback, though, is that ASEAN is unsure about the U.S.’s commitment to play a more active role in the regional economy, given the small scale of FOIP-related programs compared to those associated with China’s BRI project. Good governance principles advocated by the FOIP also create additional barriers for the majority of Southeast Asian countries that are unlikely to meet the high standards required by the U.S. Meanwhile, based on shared strategic interests to counter the rise of China, India has accelerated defense and economic cooperation with the U.S. although it is yet to fully commit itself to the U.S.’s FOIP. Like ASEAN countries, India does not agree with the China containment policy embedded in the FOIP, but given the escalated tension with China after the border row in 2020, it appears to be working more closely with the U.S. to counterbalance China. What is notable is that both ASEAN and India promote an inclusive vision of ndo-Pacific cooperation. By adopting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) at the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019, ASEAN showed its determination to play a key role in making the Indo-Pacific a region of cooperation and prosperity for all. India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific also envisions a free, open and inclusive region where all players enjoy shared security and prosperity. More importantly, ASEAN attempts to alleviate tensions caused by great power rivalry in the region by calling for development-driven cooperation with particular emphasis on economic cooperation, connectivity, SDGs and non-traditional security issues. ASEAN and India’s stance at the evolving    Indo-Pacific cooperation is closely in line with the vision of Korea’s NSP, which envisages a “people-centered community of peace and prosperity.” This suggests that Korea’s collaboration with the U.S. in the region is better to be focused upon inclusive economic cooperation and people-centered non-traditional security areas.
   Taking this into account, Chapter 4 analyzes the needs of targeted countries in selected areas where synergy is expected in promoting ROK-US cooperation: digital, energy, infrastructure development and several sub-fields of non-traditional security. In addition to policy reviews of major cooperation partners – Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and India – in each sector, quantitative analysis was conducted to calculate the cooperation demand by sector in these countries, and to evaluate the competitiveness of Korea and the U.S. in supporting development in each sector of the countries. When it comes to non-traditional security issues, ASEAN’s needs are explored focusing on the areas of environmental protection, disaster relief, health and maritime cooperation.
   Drawing upon the analysis addressed in the previous chapter, Chapter 5 discusses possible directions in which ROK-US cooperation can play out in the Indo-Pacific region. Most importantly, to step up economic cooperation, a working-level commission could be established where relevant authorities of the two countries can discuss overlapping interests and identify feasible joint projects where they see synergy. As for cooperation by sector, one major high-profile area in the digital sector is ICT infrastructure development, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and India, where demand is high. In addition, given the growing digital economy in the region, the two countries should pursue collaboration to improve digital systems and standards in ASEAN. They may regularly hold workshops for knowledge exchange and provide training programs designed to enhance the digital and cybersecurity capacity of potential partners in ASEAN. In the energy sector, one salient area for ROK-US partnership is the promotion of energy efficiency in the region. Korea and the U.S. can launch a joint energy efficiency initiative and set up a working group to initiate programs for reforming energy regulation and supporting the growth of renewable energy industries in potential partners. Pertaining to infrastructure development, Seoul and Washington have vast opportunities of cooperation in road connectivity, water system and electricity infrastructure. In particular, they can work together to enhance road connectivity in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam and upgrade water facilities in the lower Mekong area. The two countries also need to pursue a joint initiative for improving electricity infrastructure in the region, including institutional support to woo private investment. Given the high demands for electricity facilities in Myanmar and India, a bilateral working group can be formed to address the need of these countries and provide consultation for their governments and private sector. As for the non-traditional security area, it will be better to start by exploring overlapping areas between existing programs conducted by Korea and the U.S. in ASEAN. To this end, Seoul and Washington need to create a regular dialogue channel between working-level authorities of competent agencies on both sides, for instance the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In the areas where their interests overlap, they can launch ROK-US cooperation funds designed to support specific projects in need. In the area of environmental protection, priority areas will be climate change adaptation in ASEAN member states and biodiversity conservation in the lower Mekong wetlands. Regarding disaster prevention and relief, they should work together to improve flood forecasting/warning systems in vulnerable countries by sharing information gained by satellite observations as well as reinforcing preventive facilities against floods and landslides. Korea and the U.S. also need to jointly support capacity-building for disaster response and management in ASEAN member states, including support for emergency rescue operations. In the health sector, the utmost priority should be given to fight against covid-19 in ASEAN member states, and in the long term the joint assistance should be extended to enhance the capacity of ASEAN countries in preventing and responding to new infectious disease outbreaks. Lastly, Korea and the U.S. should promote their partnership in maritime capacity-building of ASEAN states. Maritime cooperation not only meets the high demand of targeted countries, but also has a great potential to further upgrade ASEAN-Korea peace cooperation. In this sense, Korea needs to be more active in collaborating with the U.S to strengthen ASEAN’s capability in Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) and law enforcement against transnational crimes at sea.
   In conclusion, Chapter 6 provides policy suggestions for Korea’s NSP in collaborating with the FOIP. First, Korea should consider targeted countries’ sensitivity to the FOIP and therefore promote cooperation with the U.S. in areas where shared interests overlap, rather than aligning the NSP with the FOIP. More importantly, the needs of targeted countries should be foregrounded when exploring the convergence between the two policies. Second, recognizing the criticism that the NSP prioritizes ASEAN over India, Korea should bolster cooperation with India. Promoting joint projects with the U.S. will provide a good opportunity to upgrade Korea’s cooperation with India. Our recommendation is to start from the areas where India’s demands are high such as smart city development, renewable energy and connectivity projects linking ASEAN and India. Last but not least, given the limitation of resources allocated to the NSP, Korea needs to narrow its focus and concentrate on where synergy is expected in navigating the convergence with the FOIP. Considering the strategic needs and competitiveness of both countries, our study suggests that digital transformation, smart city development, Mekong cooperation and non-traditional security should be prioritized in promoting the ROK-US cooperation.

   This study investigates changes in the trend regarding the IP protection level in RTA and how the IP protection through RTAs has affected the composition of aggregate trade flows of member countries in order to provide basic findings necessary to formulate the FTA policies regarding the protection of intellectual property (IP) in Korea.
   This study first quantifies the depth of IP protection in RTAs based on more than 300 RTAs all over the world, showing that recent RTAs contain more comprehensive and strong IP protection provisions. We find that only 6 out of 71 RTAs had a high level of IP protection before 2000, while 45 out of 105 RTAs have a high level of IP protection after 2010. Second, we find that establishing such RTAs with high level of IP protection has positive effects on trade. In particular, exports in IP-intensive industries have increased in member countries of RTAs with high level of IP protection compared to other countries. However, the impact that strengthening IP protection through RTA has on imports is complex; it is negative in IP-intensive industries but positive in other industries. In order to rationalize these findings, we develop a two country and multi sector model featuring North firms deciding between exports and FDI, while South firms decide between imitation and R&D. In the model the increased IP protection affects South firm’s R&D incentives and relative wages, followed by changes in North firm’s FDI incentives. These strategic interactions between North and South firms vary depending on IP intensity of the industry, partly explaining the empirical findings.

   The main goal of this study is to identify policy implications for investment cooperation between Korea and Russia in the 4th presidential period of Putin and to seek ways to increase mutual investment. In particular, case studies were conducted of various investment cooperation projects by Russia with other countries during the 4th Industrial Revolution, aiming to suggest a more practical way to increase Korean investment in Russia.
   Chapter 2 focuses on the main characteristics of Russia’s investment environment and overseas investment patterns during Putin’s 3rd (2012‒18) and 4th (2018‒) presidential period. The foreign direct investment to Russia decreased starting from the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (50.5 billion dollars in 2012, 69.2 billion dollars in 2013 to 6.8 billion dollars in 2015). When analyzing the same period by region, European countries are still top-investing countries, although the size of their investments decreased year by year. Other countries except for Europe have similar patterns. Russia’s overseas direct investment also declined after the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and in 2018, when Putin’s 4th presidential period started. Eventually, the total amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) decreased due to economic sanctions against Russia, low international raw material prices, and changes in the ruble value. However, when analyzing the investment trend by country, except for some Europe countries, the investment volume was maintained at a similar level.
   Chapter 3 examines the recent trends and main characteristics of Korea’s foreign direct investment, and Korea’s direct investment to Russia. Over the past five years, Korea’s foreign direct investment has increased the proportion of M&A and SMEs, market entry via third countries, SMEs’ export promotion and low-wage investment, and the proportion of finance and insurance. Direct investment to major emerging countries also showed similar trends. In the case of Russia, it proved difficult to obtain meaningful results due to the absolute reduction in investment size, but the share of investments for entering the market expanded. However, considering that the proportion of SMEs has slightly decreased, and the proportion of SMEs remains low among the major emerging countries, it will be necessary to advance the industrial ecosystem of existing manufacturing industries and create new markets in the fields of innovation and domestic distribution, consumer goods and services, in order to overcome the stagnation of Korean investment to Russia. SMEs must play a stronger role in this process.
   In Chapter 4 we conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of Korea’s FDI with Russia, determining why Korea’s FDI with Russia has been relatively poor and offering policy suggestions to improve the situation. According to the main results, in addition to economic variables, cultural and institutional variables acted as important determinants in Korea’s FDI to Russia during the analyzing period (2000-20). In addition, from an aggregate perspective, the negative impact of economic sanctions against Russia on Korea’s total FDI to Russia was less than expected. Also, the factors that determine FDI were very different depending on the investment motive, the type of business, and the size of the investment company. Based on these points, the following implications can be made. First, it is necessary to improve cultural and institutional conditions. Second, as the economic sanctions against Russia are likely to be prolonged, it is important to find ways to cooperate under these conditions. At the same time, it is necessary to identify more fundamental ways to expand FDI to Russia.
   Chapter 5 proposes policy implications for investment cooperation between Korea and Russia in the 4th presidential period of Putin, and suggests measures to revitalize investment focusing on high value-added industries. Korean investment in Russia is focused on automobiles, home appliances, and food (consumer goods). However, the biggest sector within Russia for investment by European and other foreign companies is natural resources such as energy and metals.
   To sum up, Korea and Russia have the potential to increase investment cooperation in the future. First, cooperation should be expanded in investment fields (energy, logistics, telecommunications, etc.) that Russian and foreign companies are traditionally interested in. Second, it will be necessary to cooperate in the emerging innovative industries. Third, active cooperation plans must be formulated in the strategic industries where Russia has global competitiveness. Fourth, it is necessary to allow management of the Export-Import Bank of Korea investment support program fund by investment rather than loans. Fifth, joint investment should be considered by Korea and Russia for entry into third-country markets. And sixth, it will be necessary to seek ways to bypass Western economic sanctions against Russia. The solution may be different for each individual investment and economic negotiation issue. Therefore, a permanent advisory body for support will be needed.