국문요약

제1장 서론 

1. 연구의 목적과 배경 
2. 연구의 내용 
3. 선행 연구와의 차별성

제2장 한ㆍ중ㆍ일의 스마트시티 정책 분석 

1. 글로벌 스마트시티 시장의 발전과 향후 전망  
    가. 글로벌 스마트시티의 발전 과정 
    나. 주요국의 스마트시티 발전 정책 및 전략
    다. 향후 전망 
2. 한ㆍ중ㆍ일의 스마트시티 정책 추진 현황과 평가 
    가. 한국 
    나. 중국 
    다. 일본 

제3장 한ㆍ중ㆍ일의 해외 스마트시티 시장 진출전략 분석 

1. 한국의 해외 스마트시티 시장 진출 정책과 주요 사례 
    가. 스마트시티 해외시장 진출을 위한 독자적인 정책 추진
    나. 주요 진출 사례 
    다. 평가 및 향후 전망 
2. 중국의 해외 스마트시티 시장 진출 정책과 주요 사례
    가. BRI 연계 추진 
    나. 주요 진출 사례 
    다. 평가 및 향후 전망 
3. 일본의 해외 스마트시티 시장 진출 정책과 주요 사례
    가. 인프라시스템 수출 연계 추진 
    나. 주요 진출 사례 
    다. 평가 및 향후 전망
 
제4장 결론 

1. 요약 및 비교 평가 
2. 정책 시사점
 
참고문헌 

Executive Summary 
 

   This study aims to propose policy implications by comparing and analyzing the smart city policies, overseas strategies and major cases of China and Japan, Korea’s competitors in the overseas smart city market.
   Upon careful comparison of the policies and cases for overseas smart city market in Korea, China, and Japan (CJK), the following conclusions were found.
   First, when it comes to promoting the overseas smart city market, Korea directly supports companies by providing activation policies in overseas smart markets, while China supports the overseas advancement of smart city projects through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Japan promotes its policy of exporting infrastructure systems. Second, in terms of government policy support, all three countries are actively promoting inter-governmental cooperative projects and strengthening financial support for investment and ODA linkages for firms advancing into the sector, etc. In particular, Japan provides an important lesson by linking ODA use to the discovery of smart city projects, not just financial support. Third, with regard to the major cases of overseas expansion, the governments are actively promoting G2G cooperation projects, and one notable strategy is that China and Japan are jointly entering the smart city market of third countries. As we can expect for Korea, China and Japan to continue their active advancement into the smart city market, focused on developing economies such as ASEAN, competition among the three countries will continue to elevate within the region. Therefore, it could prove an important countermeasure for CJK to jointly enter into third countries by taking advantage of their respective competitive advantages.
   Our corporate case studies indicate that all three countries are making inroads into developing countries, including Asia, and smart solutions are the major areas. In addition, while China and Japan are making inroads into overseas smart city markets, mainly led by large companies, Korea is relatively active in the advancement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in addition to its large corporations. In this regard, it is necessary to further expand overseas entry of Korean SMEs with technological capabilities through the discovery of various business models for mutual entry of large and medium enterprises. The case of Chinese Alibaba’s entry into Malaysia is based on its high technological competitiveness secured by participating in various domestic smart city projects. This suggests the importance of creating innovative ecosystems such as developing smart cities in Korea and identifying sustainable profit business models. Lastly, Japanese companies Matsushita and Hitachi recently established a joint venture with Chinese companies to enter into the Xiongan New Area  smart city, a project designated by the Chinese government as a key project. Korean companies should also pay attention to the Xiongan New Area project, as it has the potential to affect all future Chinese city projects.
   The policy implications of this study are to suggest the following policy tasks for the promotion of overseas smart city advancement and the development of smart city projects within Korea. First, in order to activate Korean companies’ overseas expansion into smart cities, it will be necessary to build a Korean-type smart city model that generates visible results. Second, it will be imperative to collect detailed and comprehensive information on overseas smart cities. Third, it is necessary to consider joint entry into the smart city market of third countries through cooperation with China and Japan. Fourth, the government and enterprises should make efforts to create and expand business models for domestic smart cities in order to promote overseas expansion. Fifth, smart city-related legislation should be revised to supplement policies related to changes in the stage of development of smart cities in Korea. Sixth, it is necessary to prepare the institutional grounds to utilize and distribute data in the field and to train data analysis experts.

국문요약 

제1장 서론 및 문제 제기
1. 문제 제기
2. 연구의 필요성과 시의성
3. 정책대안 제시 및 정책 기여 가능성

제2장 한국에서 부의 불평등 추이와 거시경제적 영향
1. 한국의 소득 불평등: 현황과 추이(주요 지표)
2. 한국의 자산 불평등: 현황과 추이
3. 부의 불평등이 거시경제적 변수에 미치는 영향
4. 소결 및 정책적 시사점

제3장 자산가격 변화가 소득 불평등에 미치는 영향 실증분석
1. 자산가격과 소득 불평등
2. 실증분석 모형 및 자료
3. 실증분석 결과
4. 소결

제4장 소득 불평등이 대외경제 변수에 미치는 영향 실증분석
1. 소득 불평등과 경상수지의 관계
2. 자료 및 모형 설정
3. 실증분석 결과
4. 소결

제5장 요약과 정책적 시사점
1. 주요내용 요약
2. 정책적 시사점
3. 결론

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The world economy has experienced rapid polarization and concentration of wealth that has progressed rapidly over the past 30 years. Wealth inequality has caused a variety of socio-economic changes, and economic inequality remains unresolved. Wealth inequality impacts not only economic growth, but also various socio-economic phenomena. It can also affect external economic variables in addition to domestic macroeconomic variables. Therefore, in regard to economic inequality, it becomes an important task to grasp the current status of Korea and analyze its determinants and effects.
   Korea’s Gini coefficient showed a downward trend after 2011 but has remained stagnant since 2016. Even when compared internationally, Korea’s Gini coefficient appears relatively high, with Korea ranking 31st among the 35 OECD member countries in 2017. Assets are known to be more concentrated on the upper level than income. In Korea, the top 1% occupies 11.3% of net assets and the top 5% occupies 28.8% of net assets. The top 10% owns 42.1% of net assets.
   Traditional economic growth theory has shown that inequality can stimulate growth by motivating innovation and investment. In recent years, however, New Keynesian economists have raised the view that inequality can negatively affect education or human capital investment, which can undermine economic growth. The relationship between Korea’s Gini coefficient and the rate of economic growth also seems to be close to the latter, meaning inequality is likely to hinder economic growth. In the relationship between inequality and consumption, it is known that the expansion of inequality according to Keynes’ theory of consumption shrinks consumption. To confirm this, marginal consumption propensity was estimated by income quintile, and it was confirmed that marginal consumption propensity decreases as income increases. These results suggest that as wealth inequality intensifies, this will have a negative effect on the increase in gross domestic product and a decrease in gross domestic consumption will have a negative effect on economic growth again.
   Next, an empirical analysis was conducted on how the effect of changes in asset prices on income inequality varies depending on the degree of progressiveness of fiscal policy. As a result of the estimation, in countries with relatively weak progress in fiscal policy, rising housing prices and rising unemployment contributed to worsening income inequality, but in countries with strong progression, most factors did not affect income inequality. Korea maintains a fiscal policy that is less progressive than the average level of OECD countries. Therefore, Korea’s deteriorating income inequality could be attributed to the rapid rise in real estate prices.
   Finally, the effect of income inequality on current account was analyzed. Increasing income inequality has been a factor in reducing the current account balance. However, it was found that the current account improves when the threshold is exceeded. In other words, as income inequality intensifies, the current account has a U-shape. In addition to the Gini coefficient, the increases in child support, net foreign assets, real effective exchange rate, and domestic credit, as well as recession, were all shown to reduce the current account.
   The results of this study suggest that intensifying wealth inequality in Korea can hinder economic growth, meaning it is necessary to create a favorable economic environment for growth through active redistribution policies. In addition, the inequality of wealth in Korea is shrinking domestic consumption and contributing to instability in the consumption of low-income groups, making it necessary to seek policy measures to stabilize consumption in the quintile income group.
   In addition, in order to improve income inequality in Korea, it will be necessary to strengthen tax progressiveness on sources of financial income such as real estate. In addition to the government’s income redistribution policy, such as strengthening social expenditures for low-income people, it can be said that the price stability of the real estate market is important.
   Lastly, if the aging of the population and other changes in the demographic structure continue to increase income inequality, Korea could record a current account deficit sooner than forecasted in previous studies based only on the demographic structure.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적
3. 선행연구
4. 보고서 개요

제2장 한국, 미국, 영국의 근로장려세제 
1. 근로장려세제 개요 
2. 한국 
3. 미국 
4. 영국 

제3장 분석방법 및 모수 설정 
1. TaxBEN 개괄 
2. 개념정의 
3. 모수 설정: 공통 사항
4. 모수 설정: 한국 
5. 모수 설정: 미국 
6. 모수 설정: 영국 

제4장 분석 결과 
1. 소득지원효과 
2. 근로유인효과 

제5장 결론 및 시사점 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

   This study analyzes the in-work benefit systems of Korea in comparison with the U.S. and the U.K., where similar systems have the longest history. Considering the purpose of the vast expansion of the systems in the Moon Jae-In administration, this study focuses on its impact on income support and incentives to work for low-income households.
   Countries with in-work benefit systems also implement various other benefits in cash for low-income households. To analyze the impact of in-work benefits in relation with other benefits in cash, this study uses simulation based on the OECD Tax-Benefit Model (Taxben hereinafter). Because benefits and taxes vary, even for the same gross income, according to household characteristics, this study considers 4 household types that are representative of the recipients of the in-work benefits in Korea: single household; couple with 1 labor force without children; lone-parent with 1 child; couple with 1 labor force with 1 child. For the same reason, ages are fixed at 40 for adult and 6 for child; and rent is fixed at 20% of the average income of the country. Also, for simplicity, the household is assumed to receive social assistance instead of contribution- based unemployment benefits when income is sufficiently close to 0. The Working Tax Credit (WTC hereinafter), the U.K.’s in-work benefit, has minimum working hours requirements; and the hourly wage needs to be sufficiently low for a household to satisfy both the working hours requirement and means test. For this reason, this study considers those cases corresponding to the minimum hourly wage, which is about 41% of the average income, for the U.K. Income support is measured by the share of net income, and incentive to work is measured by the impacts on (i) the amount of increase of net income when an inactive household starts earning wages and (ii) the Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR hereinafter) when a working household’s wage increases.
   One noticeable feature of the U.S. system is inflation-indexing, which assures that benefit amounts in real terms do not decrease over time. Also, some U.S. local governments add their own in-work benefits proportional to the federal benefits, which can be of interest of Korean local governments. However, working hours requirements, the most peculiar characteristic of the U.K. system, risks causing distortions in redistribution and work incentives in certain income ranges.
   In Korea, when income is little, social assistance and housing benefits account for most of net income, and the share of in-work benefits is very low. As income level rises, the social assistance’s share rapidly decreases while the share of in-work benefits increases. For the same level of gross income, the magnitude of income support by in-work benefits for the 4 household types can be ordered as following: couple with 1 labor force with 1 child>lone-parent with 1 child> couple with 1 labor force without child>single household. The 2018 tax reform boosts the income-supporting effect of in-work benefits, especially for households with children. As a function of gross income, housing benefits take the form of a step function, which is constant below the income threshold and jumps down to 0 afterwards. This feature distorts redistribution of income around the threshold. This distortion is mitigated by the 2018 tax reform.
   In the U.S., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP hereinafter), which is a form of social assistance, takes most of net income of households without children. For comparable households without children, the share of in-work benefits is lower than in Korea. For households with children, SNAP and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF hereinafter) account for most of net income when gross income is little. As gross income rises, their share decreases, and the share of in-work benefits increases. Not only the Child Tax Care (CTC hereinafter) but also the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC hereinafter) take a larger share of net income when the household has a child.
   For the low-income households in the U.K., net income mostly consists of housing benefits, the income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA hereinafter; a form of social assistance) and the CTC when working hours are below the threshold of the WTC. When receiving the WTC, its share is the largest for lone-parents with 1 child. The share of the CTC is larger and more stable than in Korea and the U.S. Also, the distortion in income redistribution around the threshold of housing benefits is weaker than in Korea.
   For inactive households in Korea, in-work benefits clearly increase their material incentives to work. For the working low-income households, however, in-work benefits reduce material incentives to work in the plateau and phase-out range. This negative effect is aggravated by the fact that the gross-income threshold for housing benefits is located in the plateau or phase-out range. That is, the distortion in low-income households’ labor supply decision created by the discontinuity of housing benefits could be aggravated in the plateau and phase-out ranges of in-work benefits. This problem is mitigated, albeit weakly, by the 2018 tax reform. After the reform, the METR for households with children is negative when income is low enough. This is because the recipient households of social assistance are eligible for the CTC at the same time only after the reform. Roughly speaking, the reform reduces the METR for very low income levels; but, because the reform reduces the starting income level of plateau, it increases the METR for the income range between the two starting income levels of plateau before and after the reform.
   For the recipients of SNAP in the U.S., an increase in gross income does not lead to an equivalent reduction of SNAP, unlike the social assistance in Korea, and thus the SNAP recipients have an incentive to work even in the absence of in-work benefits. This is contrary to Korea, where the recipients of social assistance have no incentive to work without in-work benefits. The impact of in-work benefits on the METR is bigger for the households with children, not only because they are eligible for the CTC, but also because the EITC is more generous to them.
   Due to the working-hour requirements and 30-hour element, the U.K.’s WTC offers, to inactive households, no incentive to work little but a large incentive to work full-time. For the working households, the METR drops rapidly around the gross income levels corresponding to the working-hour requirement and 30 hours per week. This clearly shows that the impact of the U.K.’s WTC on the incentives to work is concentrated in certain income ranges.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 필요성
2. 연구 내용과 차별성

제2장 신남방지역의 디지털경제 발전 수준
1. 디지털경제 여건
2. 디지털 발전 지수
3. 요약 및 평가

제3장 신남방 주요국의 디지털경제 정책
1. 인도네시아
2. 베트남
3. 태국
4. 인도

5. 요약과 평가

제4장 신남방 주요국의 협력수요 사례 분석
1. 인도네시아
2. 베트남
3. 태국
4. 인도
5. 요약

제5장 결론 및 정책 시사점
1. 신남방지역 디지털경제 협력의 의의와 특성
2. 신남방지역 디지털경제 협력의 잠재력
3. 신남방지역 디지털경제 협력 방향 및 지원방안
4. 향후 연구과제

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The digital economy is emerging as a trend of the world economy. The digital economy is narrowly defined as online platforms and activities through them. In other words, the whole values, for instance, created by e-commerce and sharing economy platforms indicate the digital economy. However, in a broader sense, the digital economy goes beyond the realm of certain industries and enterprises. Digital technology is a general-purpose technology, like the internal combustion engine, that brings into force industry, economy, and society-wide innovation.
   The reason why industries and policy makers pay attention to the digital economy is more related the broad concept of the digital economy. That is, as new products and services backed by the Internet, data, and artificial intelligence technology are spreading, the expectation for the whole economy and industry-level innovation becomes higher. For Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, mainly composed of developing countries, the broader concept of the digital economy seems to be even more important because they seek for the leapfrogging of the economy and society as a whole.
   The digital economy proves its potential as a source of economic and social ‘leapfrogging’. For instance, car hailing services such as Grab and Gojek are wide spread in Southeast Asia; OYO, the hotel booking services, is a big success in India. These cases are important in terms of realization of innovative businesses as well as response to the social demand response and improvement of quality of life quality. They also play a crucial role in creating jobs.
   Southeast and South Asian countries have a great potential in the digital economy: They generally maintain high economic growth rates, have large markets, young population, and decent ICT utilization levels, etc. The conditions for trade investment are also being improved. Though there are deviations between countries, they have strong incentives to promote digital innovation in order to achieve the qualitative advancement of industries and economy as a whole. Moreover, some countries already have a great competitiveness in digital innovation.
   The digital economy-related demands are expected to grow in Southeast and South Asian countries. For example, they experience rapid urbanization and demand for improving electricity supply, logistics, finances, etc. with the combination of digitalization. Some countries faces lack of digital skills and technologies, and look for cooperation with external partners.
   Under these conditions, Korea is potentially an intimate partner that can contribute to substantial leapfrogging of Southeast and South Asian countries. Korea, in term of both businesses and government policy (the New Southern Policy), is now trying to diversify the areas of cooperation with those countries beyond manufacturing sectors. Geographic and cultural proximity, as well as already constructed bilateral economic relationship, is the foundation for cooperation in the digital economy. Because the digital economy is relevant with society and culture as well as the economic and industrial areas, cooperation in the field of the digital economy can supplement the typical pattern of Korea and South East and South Asia relationship, mainly centered in manufacturing production network.
   Korea and Southeast and South Asian countries need to establish a comprehensive cooperation platform. Through this, they inform partners their digital economy-related agenda/interests and discuss ways for cooperation. Especially, it will provide chances for participants to identify mutual cooperation needs efficiently and specifically. Because cooperation needs in the digital economy are often discovered is unexpected niche areas, a regular dialogue channel is crucial to find specific demands and cooperation potentials. The dialogue platform should include private enterprises as well as policy makers.
   Innovative small businesses and start-ups should be the focus of cooperation. Korean start-ups’ interests in Southeast Asia are now growing. Korean start-ups and venture companies enter Southeast Asian markets in diverse areas such as manufacturing, audiovisual, broadcasting and communication services, professional, scientific and technical services, healthcare, and cultural services. Southeast and South Asian countries are active in introducing foreign start-ups and professionals that possess innovative digital technologies and business models. Singapore, Indonesia and India have the world level start-up ecosystem and are active in investing in foreign start-ups. Meanwhile, as start-up ecosystems of Southeast and South Asia is relatively less known in Korea compared to the United States, Europe and China, needs for the information and connection with local support organizations is high.
   Korea has to actively participate in multilateral cooperation initiatives covering Southeast and South Asia. The digital economy is an essential element for the sustainable growth of this region, and a major task of external cooperation. For example, in 2017 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) adopted ‘APEC Internet and Digital Economy Roadmap’ in the Annual Ministerial Meeting(AMM) for the purpose of sharing basic principles among member countries to respond to changes brought by the Internet and the digital economy. The roadmap proposed 11 cooperation areas. Korea is expected to play a large role in many areas such as ‘Development of digital infrastructure’ and ‘Promoting innovation and adoption of enabling technologies and services’.
   International cooperation in the digital economy seems quite different from that in traditional manufacturing sectors. We cannot apply the traditional compartments of industries to the digital economy. Based upon thorough understanding on the partner country’s social context and characteristics, cooperation focusing on local society’s demands is of great importance.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적 및 구성

제2장 한국 FTA의 네트워크 구축 성과
1. 전 세계 FTA 현황
2. 사회연결망 분석

제3장 한국 FTA의 상품시장 개방 성과
1. 국가 수준 분석
2. 산업 수준 분석
3. 기업 수준 분석

제4장 한국 FTA의 해외직접투자 성과
1. FTA 상대국에 대한 해외직접투자 유출입 현황
2. 우리나라 FTA가 해외직접투자 유출입에 미친 영향

제5장 한국 FTA의 제도적 성과
1. 국내법 개정 개관
2. 유형별 대표사례 분석

제6장 결론
1. 요약
2. 정책 제언

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary
 

   Since signing an FTA with Chile in 2004, South Korea has established 16 FTAs with 57 economies including the EFTA, ASEAN, EU, US, etc. in the last 15 years. This study examined whether Korea’s FTAs have achieved their original objectives in the following four aspects: FTA network, product market openness, foreign direct investment, and institutional improvement.
   Our FTA network analysis shows that Germany and the US have the highest level of degree centrality, followed by Korea, China, and Canada with the similar level of degree centrality. In the area of betweenness centrality, Korea showed a high level of centrality during 2010-2016, but weakened slightly since then. In eigenvector centrality, both the United States and Canada show high levels of centrality, and Korea is increasing modestly.
   Korea’s exports and imports with FTA countries are steadily increasing with a higher rate of growth than those with non-FTA countries. The empirical analysis at the national level shows that the FTAs have had a positive effect on the increase in both exports and imports. We also observed positive effects on the number of export products and import products. In addition, we find that deeper FTAs have a positive effect on the number of export products and import products as well as the volume of exports and imports.
   In the industry level analysis, we find the FTAs have a positive effect on Korea’s exports in the agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food industry. FTAs also have a positive effect on Korea’s imports when they include competition provisions and standard provisions. In the textiles, clothing and leather industry, we find that FTAs have a positive effect on both exports and imports. In the coke and petroleum refining industry, FTAs have a positive effect on exports, but not on the number of export products. In the chemicals and chemical products industry, FTAs have a significant effect on both exports and imports. In the electronics industry, FTAs do not appear to have a significant effect on either exports or imports. In the machinery industry, FTAs have a positive effect on exports and imports. In the auto industry, FTAs have a positive effect on imports. In the firm level analysis, we find that export tariff reductions increase firms’ profits, while import tariff reductions are associated with declining firms’ profit.
   We also find that FTAs have a positive effect on FDI. In addition, FTAs increased OFDI (outbound foreign direct investment) to both developed and developing countries, but increased IFDI (inbound foreign direct investment) only from developed countries. In the institutional aspects, the Korean economy has achieved the harmonization of regulations, the simplification of institutions, improved management transparency of SOEs, improved access to high value-added service markets, and strengthened protection of intellectual property rights through FTAs.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와의 차별성
3. 연구 범위 및 구성

제2장 국제사회의 취약국 논의 동향
1. 취약국 지원 현황
2. 취약국 원조효과성에 대한 논의 동향

제3장 주요 공여국의 취약국 지원 현황과 특징
1. 독일
2. 호주
3. 덴마크
4. 일본

제4장 취약국 개발협력의 성과분석
1. 연구 배경
2. 분석모형과 데이터
3. 실증분석 결과
4. 취약국 지원성과에 대한 평가 및 과제

제5장 우리나라의 취약국 지원 현황과 개선과제
1. 우리나라의 취약국 지원 현황
2. 주요 기관별 지원 현황과 특징
3. 국별 지원사례 비교
4. 취약국 개발협력의 개선과제

제6장 결론 및 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary
 

   The international community has recently suffered from conflicts, disasters, and terrorism, from which fragile states suffer the most. With the increasing number of refugees and migrants from fragile states emerging as a major regional and global problem, the international society has begun to perceive that fragile states could pose a threat to international security. Furthermore, most of the fragile states face not only poverty but also human rights and security-related issues that prompt global concerns over fragile states hindering the international society from achieving development goals. Therefore, considering the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) adopted at the UN General Assembly in 2015, the international community began promoting strategic plans to resolve peace and human rights-related issues under SDG 16 “peace, justice, and strong institutions.” Emphasized at the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus(HDP Nexus) suggests new directions to support fragile states by connecting humanitarian aid, development, and peacebuilding practices and funding.
   As of 2017, aid to fragile states continues to increase as the importance of fragile states gains more recognition as a part of international development cooperation. However, the development outcomes of such engagements remain unclear and insufficient, while more than 40% of the world’s poorest still live in conflict-affected or fragile states. In this regard, the international society has taken efforts to enhance development effectiveness to address the negative impacts of fragility in achieving the SDGs, international security, and peacebuilding. The world overhauls related policies and devises strategic plans that go beyond humanitarian purposes and affect the achievement of sustainable development, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding to provide effective aid for fragile states.
   The study aims to suggest policy suggestions to improve the effectiveness of Korea’s development cooperation in fragile states. To achieve this goal, the study first presents the statistical trends of development cooperation towards fragile states, introducing contextual backgrounds and international dialogues regarding aid to fragile states. Secondly, the research compares and analyzes the current status, policies, and characteristics of aid to fragile states in major case study donors. Thirdly, the study constructs empirical models to analyze the impact of aid to fragile states using indicators for development, peace and economic growth. The study attempts to disaggregate and measure the impacts of aid by sector and modality. This is followed by an analysis of Korea’s development cooperation to fragile states.
   Chapter 2 outlines an analysis of trends in development cooperation in fragile states and discussions on the effectiveness of aid, as well as major issues at the international level. The international community is increasingly becoming aware of the importance of enhancing aid effectiveness and securing peace in fragile states with the adoption of the SDGs. Therefore, the UN and the World Bank have suggested new ways of working by linking peacebuilding activities to existing humanitarian aid and development cooperation projects, known as the HDP nexus. There is a strong assumption that the HDP nexus will substantially contribute to the enhancement of development effectiveness in fragile states. The study emphasizes how the HDP nexus is based on the perception that development assistance to fragile states should be pursued in the multi-year planning to support building resilience to future crises and minimize the impact of current risks, and to respond to fundamental fragilities. 
   Chapter 3 illustrates the current status, policies, and characteristics of development cooperation to fragile states in major donor countries, such as Germany, Australia, Denmark, and Japan, which have significant implications for the establishment of Korea’s policies considering the volume and implementation tools of aid to fragile states. Germany is the third largest donor to fragile states following the United States and the United Kingdom, and it promotes effective development cooperation plans through whole- of-government approaches by operating intergovernmental networks, guidelines of project planning, and performance management in severe conflict areas. Using the Peace and Conflict Assessment(PCA) tool, fragility is systematically considered during every stage of the project cycle. In the Denmark case, it emphasizes “ex-ante common analysis on cause of conflict” should precede project implementation in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Also, the Danish government is responding to the development needs of fragile states quickly and flexibly by operating a Peace and Stabilization Fund(PSF). Australia concentrates its development aid to support Small Island Developing Countries(SIDS) with high economic, environmental, and social fragility over conflict-prone ones. Due to the Australian government’s particular concerns over the negative impacts on its national security, it supports fragile states with an aim to manage immigration and the spread of infectious disease. Japan responds to the development needs of fragile states with a comprehensive approach to achieving human security and provides a high proportion of concessional loan to build large-scale infrastructures. To support the fragile state more effectively, the Japanese government established a guideline to build the capacity of governments and local communities simultaneously.
   Chapter 4 demonstrates an empirical analysis of the impact of foreign aid to fragile states on indicators for development, peace, and economic growth. Because the existing literature analyzes the impact of overall aid on restricted indicators including economic growth, it is limited when it comes to showing the causal relationship between aid to fragile states and development. To overcome this limitation of the existing literature, the study estimates the causal relationship between development cooperation to fragile states and various indicators for development, peace, and economic growth. Furthermore, the study focuses on showing the linkages between aid to fragile states and development by type of aid, and sectoral aid allocation by adding post-conflict effects. The analysis shows that project aid to fragile states has a positive impact on economic growth and improvements in the Water Supply and Sanitation sector under conflict situations. In contrast, program aid and technical assistance have negative or no impacts on development. Under post-conflict situations, the analysis finds, budget support has a negative influence on economic growth, while technical assistance or food aid have positive impacts. The results support the existing literature that budget support could negatively affect economic development due to weak governance.
   Chapter 5 identifies the current status and characteristics of Korea’s aid to fragile states and draw up some policy implications for future improvement in development effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected situations based upon earlier analyses. Korea lacks a systematic approach to consider each fragile state’s characteristics when it provides aid to fragile states. Although the majority of Korea’s top partner countries are fragile states and account for about half of its total ODA, only a small amount of aid is provided to conflict-affected countries, such as Syria and Iraq, except Afghanistan. While Korea established its Assistance Strategy for Fragile States in 2017, it has yet to build an effective system to consult with relevant ministries other than those in charge of development cooperation. Furthermore, in the project cycle, Korea struggles with difficulties in project implementation and results management in fragile states due to weak fragility analysis. In order to tackle these issues, Korea should strengthen cooperation with the international community, including other donors and international organizations, establish robust coordination mechanisms between relevant ministries using the whole-of-government approach, and build capacity to provide effective aid to fragile states based upon comprehensive fragility analysis.
   Accordingly, this study recommends the following policy implications for enhancing the effectiveness of Korea’s aid to fragile states.
   First, the whole-of-government approach to support fragile states is requisite. The approach is crucial for the international community to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Specifically, fragile states face various development challenges, including climate change and refugee issues other than poverty, peace, and security. Policy coherence should be reinforced based upon strong coordination between stakeholders, to tackle these development challenges, and achieve collective outcomes through the HDP nexus and the SDGs in fragile states. However, Korea’s aid to fragile states is ex-post facto, weak to build bridges between responses of various development challenges, and it does not guarantee policy coherence among development aid projects. Thus, for advanced development cooperation in fragile states in the medium to long term, Korea should consolidate a whole-of-government approach and strong reciprocal coordination mechanism.
   Second, when Korea designs the Mid-term Strategy for Development Cooperation or Country Partnership Strategy(CPS), it should reflect characteristics of fragility and the particular development needs faced by each fragile and conflict-affected country. Currently, the Korean government is putting together the 3rd Mid-term Strategy for Development Cooperation and the CPS for 2021-2025, a mid-term ODA plans for the next five years. Thus the government needs to present an integrated support strategy and guidelines for aid to fragile states. Moreover, in the case of fragile states among priority partner countries, the  Korean government should identify each country’s specific dimensions of fragility and development needs accurately, which should then be integrated into the CPS. Based upon the CPS, which reflects the multiple dimensions of fragility and following development needs, stronger efforts should be made to establish a continuous and effective support system needed for various development challenges in fragile states.
   Third, consideration needs to be given to types of aid and sectoral aid allocation to enhance the development effectiveness of aid to fragile states. Considering the recent growing importance of the HDP nexus, Korea should expand its effectiveness of aid to fragile states by interlinking various types of aid and project cycles. However, as proven in the empirical analysis in Chapter 4, the budget support program needs to be approached with more care. Moreover, while it is inevitable to expand multi-bi aids in support of conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, it will also be necessary to create synergy effects by linking its existing individual project-based approach with multi-bi aid programs from the early phase.
   Lastly, there is a need to establish project management schemes in fragile and conflict-affected situations to implement development projects effectively. Before the project is implemented, a risk management mechanism should be provided as well as policy measures to control fragility. More emphasis is needed to support the capacity building of the government and local communities in fragile countries. To conclude, it is time for a new shift in assistance methods for fragile states to ensure do-no-harm principles to minimize unintended negative impacts of aid projects, to build systems for preventing disputes or violent conflicts, and to contribute to creating sustainable and resilient environments to overcome and manage fragility through capacity building.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와의 차별성 및 연구방법
3. 연구 구성

제2장 정부조달과 중소기업
1. 조달시장 개방에 관한 국제적 논의
2. 신흥국의 정부조달시장 규모와 개방
3. 정부조달과 중소기업
4. 신흥국의 해외조달 수요 현황

제3장 중국
1. 정부조달시장 개요
2. WTO 정부조달협정 가입협상 경과와 전망
3. 중소기업의 진출 사례와 가능성

제4장 동남아ㆍ인도
1. 베트남
2. 인도네시아
3. 인도
4. 중소기업의 진출여건 평가

제5장 유라시아
1. 러시아
2. 우즈베키스탄
3. 카자흐스탄
4. 중소기업의 진출여건 평가

제6장 중동
1. 사우디아라비아
2. UAE
3. 중소기업의 진출여건 평가

제7장 중동부 유럽
1. 중동부 유럽의 정부조달시장 개요 및 특징
2. 주요국 정부조달시장 분석 및 향후 개방 전망
3. 중소기업의 진출여건 평가

제8장 중남미
1. 멕시코
2. 콜롬비아
3. 칠레
4. 페루
5. 중소기업의 진출여건 평가

제9장 결론 및 시사점
1. 신흥국 정부조달시장 개방실태 종합평가
2. 중소기업 진출방안
3. 정책 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to derive implications for SMEs through analyzing the openness of the government procurement market in emerging countries the prospects of these markets opening up in the future, and the overall possibility and plans of Korean SMEs to enter these markets. The procurement markets of international organizations and advanced countries are already saturated with competition, and it is difficult to expand in the procurement market of advanced countries such as the United States, Canada and the EU as they are strengthening their preferential purchasing system in line with protectionist trade policies. Therefore, this study aimed to find a market for competitive companies in Korea by comprehensively grasping the current situation, openness, growth potential, and potential market demand of emerging markets. In particular, we focused on analyzing the possibility of Korean SMEs advancing into the government procurement market of emerging countries, and to offer suggestions on the direction of procurement policies and trade policies in order to effectively advance into these emerging markets. This study analyzed six emerging regions which are either considering WTO-GPA membership or negotiating FTA agreements with Korea: China, Southeast Asia and India, Eurasia, the Middle East, Middle Eastern Europe and Latin America.
   The results of a comprehensive analysis of the openness of the government procurement markets and entry conditions of SMEs in each region are as follows. First of all, Southeast Asia and India have a large trade volume with Korea and present favorable conditions in terms of proximity and cooperative relations, but the procurement systems in the region show a rather low level of internationalization. The barriers are still significant in terms of language and procurement procedures, making these a more difficult market for SMEs to enter. Eurasia has high barriers to entry in the procurement market, as evidenced by its priorities, certification barriers, SMEs preferential treatment and exclusive practices. Most Latin American countries have open procurement markets in the region and have established RTAs with offshore countries, thus making their procurement systems and procurement market environment very open. However, it is difficult for Korean firms to secure price competitiveness in these markets due to logistics costs arising from long distances and high language barriers. In China, the indicators of openness are very low and procurement barriers are very high despite the high demand. The prospects for entering the Chinese procurement market are not bright as China is not a GPA member and operates a very closed procurement system. Central and East Europe is opening its procurement markets through GPA/FTAs, and the procurement system follows the EU procurement guidelines. The procurement system is also very advanced, and prospects are fair for suppliers who understand the market and have effectively expanded their network. The Middle East shows similar indicators in terms of openness and barriers. The region’s procurement market is open in some aspects, but it is a difficult market for SMEs to enter into on their own because of certification issues, domestic priority purchases etc.
   The major emerging economies in this study are all non-WTO-GPA members, except for Poland, Czech Republic, Romania and Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, only China and Russia are in negotiations. Accordingly, it was found that Korean SMEs in the region were not active, as the level of opening in the government procurement market was limited to foreign companies. In particular, cases of advancing into the government procurement market of Eurasian countries – including Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan – where the remaining elements of its previous socialist system and closed economic policies persist, were relatively more rare. The Middle East government procurement market, which is considered to offer ample opportunities, has only been entered in the form of partnerships with large business construction projects, and only a small number of SMEs have entered the Latin American government procurement market. In Southeast Asia, there were some cases of Korean firms entering the government procurement market in the construction sector. However entry by SMEs is not active when considering the market potential, mostly due to the conservative nature of government procurement markets and low level of openness. China is currently negotiating access to the WTO-GPA, and the prospects of these talks remain uncertain. Korean SMEs were very rare in China because of the high barriers for foreign companies to enter the government procurement market. Emerging economies in the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania) are all members of the GPA, and Korean SMEs are relatively more successful than other regions but independent advancement into the market is quite rare. In order to overcome these practical limitations and take into account the opening conditions and prospects of major emerging economies’ government procurement markets, it is necessary to look into the future strategies of Korean SMEs to enter into these markets.
   The policy implications of this study are as follows. First, one-stop services are needed to support entry into the overseas procurement market. In particular, it is necessary to provide one-stop services led by the Ministry of SMEs and Startups or offer additional information easily accessible from the website of each support organization. Second, there is a need to coordinate overlapping projects among various supporting agencies. Institutions are conducting overlapping research on each country’s market environment, selecting support companies, supporting certification, establishing overseas private networks, and developing market pioneers independently. This needs to be adapted to the strengths and characteristics of each institution. Third, coordination between government administration department is necessary along with such overlapping tasks. Basically, a one-stop system should be set up and government ministries should coordinate their duties to support firms’ advancement into overseas procurement markets. Fourth, we should focus on expanding the openness of government procurement markets in emerging countries by actively utilizing our FTA policy with emerging countries. In other words, in FTA negotiations with emerging economies, we need to establish strategies for entry into emerging markets and specialized foreign economic policies that can enhance accessibility of government procurement markets. Fifth, there is a need for a sustainable SMEs support policy that accurately reflects the realities in the market. Korea provides the greatest amount of support in terms of the number and types of support systems and policies it provides for its SMEs. However, while most SMEs in Korea are involved in the production of intermediate goods rather than final consumer goods, almost all SME support policies are aimed at SMEs producing final consumer goods. Therefore, policies for SMEs in Korea should be designed in a direction to match these firms with new global cooperative partners who can ensure more efficiency and secure competitiveness for these SMEs participating in various GVCs at home or abroad. Sixth, the factors that lead these SMEs to successfully entering the government procurement market is, in the end, quality competitiveness and the ability to respond agilely to the procurement process. Government support for the procurement process (local information, preparation of bidding documents, guarantees, funding, etc.) has already been fully made. The fundamental support system should be transformed into a Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions (PPI) system that enhances the competitiveness of SMEs and products and enables SMEs to participate in domestic and overseas procurement markets. PPI is a system in which the government supports and induces technological innovations from suppliers and acts as a leading buyer of products developed by SMEs. Seventh, with regard to government procurement-related trade policies, the government must make efforts to increase market access to the government procurement market in emerging economies with trade strategies differentiated by emerging countries. For example, the Chinese government procurement market has great market potential, and the Korean government should actively participate in international discussions to encourage China to join the GPA as soon as possible. In preparation for future opening of China’s procurement market, we should support continued research on institutions and markets. On the other hand, Latin American countries are already opening up government procurement markets among countries in the region. Therefore, in order to enter these procurement networks, it is necessary to actively use procurement cooperation channels negotiated by joining the PA member states and effectively utilizing the procurement cooperation channels established when signing FTAs with these economies.
   Recently we are seeing various international discussions on the role of SMEs in government procurement. Korea should actively participate in research on government procurement and small businesses conducted by the OECD or the Small and Medium Business Work Program at the WTO. These international discussions mainly share best practices and advanced systems related to SMEs, thus allowing Korea to benchmark developed countries’ practices and systems and actively participate in international discussions to obtain information on global procurement trends and promising items.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구 
3. 주요 연구 내용 및 방법

제2장 중국의 대외경제협력 전략 및 정책 
1. 시기별 대외개방 및 경제협력 전략
2. 지방정부의 대외개방 및 대외경제협력 정책

제3장 주요 지역의 대외경제협력 사례 분석 
1. 광둥성-홍콩 간 협력: 제도협력형
2. 랴오닝성-독일 간 협력: 산업고도화형
3. 충칭-싱가포르 간 협력: 일대일로 연계형

제4장 한국-중국 지방정부 간 주요 경제협력사업 
1. 한국-중국 간 무역·투자 현황
2. 한국-중국 정부 간 주요 경제협의체 및 경제협력 합의
3. 한국 중앙정부-중국 지방정부 간 주요 경제협력사업
4. 평가

제5장 한·중 경제협력 활성화에 대한 시사점 
1. 정부간 협력을 논의할 수 있는 제도적 협력체의 구축
2. 제조업 중심의 협력에서 탈피해 서비스업 분야에서의 협력 강화
3. 제3국 시장 공동진출 등 국가간 정책을 연계한 지방정부와의 협력 추진
4. 인적교류 확대
5. 미래 신산업 분야에서의 협력 확대 
6. 지역발전 전략을 활용한 협력 추진

참고문헌

Executive Summary
 

   As the Chinese economy becomes more advanced and the internal and external economic environment surrounding China changes, so too is China’s strategy for external openness and economic cooperation. Accordingly, specific policies are diversifying from the past focus on manufacturing and foreign direct investment to services, overseas investment, bilateral and multilateral FTAs, and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
   As the central government’s policy stance changes, China’s local governments are also promoting external openness and cooperation based on regional development stages, industrial structure, and regional development policies, reflecting the central government’s strategy. In particular, after the 19th Party Congress, the central government showed a strategic stance expanding external openness. In response, local governments have moved away from the traditional method of cooperation in the manufacturing sector centered on industrial complexes, and in recent years various cooperative methods have been promoted, including regional economic integration, service and investment, the use of FTAs, and innovations in institutions to expand external openness.
   Along with the shift in China’s foreign economic strategy, the economic cooperation environment surrounding Korea and China is changing as well, including the strengthening of protectionism, structural changes in the Chinese economy, the Korea-China FTA coming into effect, and the launch of follow-up negotiations. Therefore Korea needs to find new strategies and measures for economic cooperation with China, making it time to find new ways to expand cooperation with China’s central and local governments.
   Against this backdrop, this study aims to analyze the strategies, detailed policies and major cases of China’s central and local governments’ external openness and economic cooperation, and to draw policy implications for strengthening economic cooperation between Korea and China in the future.
   First, Chapter 2 analyzes the external openness and economic cooperation strategies implemented by the central government in each period.
   Since 2001, when China joined the WTO, China’s opening and economic cooperation strategies have been gradually expanded to various fields by expanding external openness (10th Five-Year Plan), implementing an open strategy of mutual benefit (11th Five-Year Plan), enhancing the level of mutual openness (12th Five-Year Plan), and establishing a new phase of full openness (13th Five-Year Plan). In particular, the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) suggested active external cooperation strategies such as full implementation of the national treatment plus a negative list management system, opening of the service industry, establishment of a high-level global FTA network, and promotion of the Belt and Road Initiatives.
   In accordance with the strategy and policy stance suggested by the central government, each local government in China is implementing various and specific international economic cooperation projects or external opening policies to reflect regional economic conditions.
   Categorized according to policy and project purpose, a wide range of international economic cooperation measures are being promoted, in the form of: traditional industrial complexes or development zones to promote foreign investment, cooperation for industrial upgrading and urbanization, institutional reform and the establishment of demonstration zones to expand external openness, pilot projects based on FTAs, institutional cooperation for regional economic integration, and cooperation projects to shape the Belt and Road Initiative, among others.
   In Chapter 3, we analyzed three cases of cooperation that are considered successful among China’s foreign economic cooperation projects. First is the case of cooperation between Guangdong and Hong Kong. This can be seen as an institutional cooperation model based on the framework of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between the two sides. In the past, economic cooperation with Hong Kong was led by the private sector, but since the conclusion of the CEPA, discussions on economic cooperation with Hong Kong have been more based on policies and institutions led by central and local governments. Guangdong has played a leading role in cooperation with Hong Kong, serving as a test bed for pilot basis measures implemented in accordance with the CEPA between mainland China and Hong Kong. In 2015, Zhuhai Hengqin, Shenzhen Chenhai, and Guangzhou Nansha – special areas established as economic cooperation platforms between Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau – were integrated into the Guangdong Free Trade Zone. Since the launch of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in 2019, cooperation between Hong Kong and Guangdong in the economic and social sectors has been discussed within the context of constructing the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and the CEPA is still used to institutionalize issues discussed in the economic sector.
   Second is the case of cooperation between Liaoning and Germany. Liaoning Province, the representative industrial zone of China, promoted the strategy of revitalizing the old industrial base in Northeast China in the early 2000s. In addition, various preferential policies were implemented at the national and local levels. As a result, Germany’s BMW and a number of related companies have entered the region. Afterwards, as China’s central government and Germany’s government actively promoted industrial cooperation, in 2015, the China-Germany (Shenyang) High-end Equipment Manufacturing Industrial Park was established in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. Under policy support from BMW in Germany and the central and local governments of China, the industrial complex maintains double-digit growth rate every year, and plans to expand the scope of industrial cooperation from the internal combustion engine automobile industry to new energy automobile and bio industries.
   Third is the case of cooperation between Chongqing and Singapore. Launched in 2015, the Chongqing-Singapore Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity is the flagship case of the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation between China and Singapore, and the first national-level cooperation project in the services industry between the two countries. The project selects financial, aviation services, information and communication, transportation and logistics services as the four areas of cooperation, and implements various pilot projects through discussions between the two governments. Based on these achievements, the two governments are expanding the scope of cooperation not only to Chongqing but also to the whole of western China and even ASEAN.
   Chapter 4 analyzes economic cooperation projects between Korea and China’s local governments. Until the early 2000s, economic cooperation between South Korea and China’s local governments was mainly based on private companies entering Korean industrial complexes created by the Chinese local governments to attract investment. Since 2010, cooperation between the Korean government and local Chinese governments, led by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, has begun to take off. With the Korea-China FTA taking effect in 2015, cooperation with China’s local governments has been further strengthened by the establishment of Korea-China industrial complexes or the pilot project for local economic cooperation between the cities of Incheon and Weihai. However, most of the economic councils between the central government of Korea and local governments in China often end as one-off consultation events. Therefore, there is a need to improve the effectiveness of cooperation by developing these into regular consultation channels.
   In addition, most of the cooperation models between the Korean central government and China’s local governments – such as the project to establish a separate medical complex for Korean health providers within the Hunan Provincial Health Industrial Park or industrial parks in Korea and China based on the Korea-China FTA – are mostly based on operation models used for Korea-China industrial parks in the 1990s. The typical operation model was to invite labor-intensive manufacturing companies in Korea to invest in Korea-China industrial parks in China to set up factories, while the local Chinese government would grant preferential benefits in terms of land and corporate taxes. Current cooperative projects operate upon a more or less similar model. There is an urgent need to respond to changes in the economic cooperation environment surrounding the two countries by developing a more advanced and sustainable cooperation model.
   In Chapter 5, based on the results analyzed in Chapters 2-4, we suggest ways to promote Korea-China economic cooperation, especially cooperation with local governments in China.
   More specifically, we identify the following policy needs to: establish a consultative body to discuss cooperation between governments; advance beyond the current focus on manufacturing- oriented cooperation and strengthen cooperation in the service sector; promote cooperation with local governments by linking policies at the national level, for instance to jointly advance into third countries; expand human exchange; expand cooperation in future new industries; and promote cooperation using regional development strategies.
   In particular, to strengthen cooperation with local governments in China, it is important to operate a council that encompasses industry, academia, research, and government actors to develop strategic cooperation rather than only producing one-time exchanges between governments. It will also be necessary to prepare an overall roadmap for economic cooperation with local governments and a cooperation model that can actually lead to specific cooperation projects or pilot projects.

Executive Summary

​

1. Introduction

2. Analysis

2-1. Identification Strategy

2-2. Data

3. Results

3-1. Import-restricting Measures

3-2. Antidumping Measure as an FDI Determinant

3-3. Robustness Check

4. Concluding Remarks

References

Appendix

In this study, we investigate the question whether importing countries’ implementation of protective trade measures, such as antidumping duties, leads to changes in foreign direct investment from trading partners. That is, we examine the prevalence of “ADP-jumping FDI” across countries. We use more recent and organized non-tariff measure data provided by the WTO I-TIP and Ghodsi et al. (2017), which can be matched with other trade-related variables. Using econometrically sensible identification strategies, the Tobit and the Heckman two-stage selection models, we find out that ADP-jumping FDI to importing countries prevails rather consistently around the world. These results are also consistent with those using Poisson and linear fixed effects models.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 목적
2. 선행연구 검토
3. 연구의 방법
4. 연구의 주요 내용과 기대효과

제2장 이론적 검토
1. 대외경제협력 거버넌스
2. 대외경제협력 거버넌스와 경제협력의 관계
3. 요약 및 함의

제3장 러시아 대외경제협력 거버넌스의 특징과 함의
1. 러시아 대외경제협력 거버넌스의 개요
2. 러시아 대외경제협력 거버넌스의 특징
3. 요약 및 함의

제4장 주요국의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스 사례 분석
1. 중국의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스
2. 일본의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스
3. 독일의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스
4. 베트남의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스
5. 요약 및 함의

제5장 한국의 대러 경제협력 정책과 거버넌스 평가
1. 한국의 대러 경제협력 정책과 거버넌스
2. 한국의 대러 경제협력 거버넌스 평가

제6장 결론
1. 연구 내용 요약 및 함의
2. 정책 제언

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   Preparing for the next 30 years of relations between Korea and Russia is a true starting point for Korea's future national strategy of building a “bridging nation that connects the continent with the sea.” In order to achieve this national strategy, the Korean government should focus on establishing economic cooperation governance that can effectively promote a sustainable economic cooperation strategy with Russia. As in Russia the government plays a particularly influential role, creating strong ties through intergovernmental working groups meetings and establishing an institutional foundation at the private level can be a useful approach to promoting economic cooperation between the two countries.
   Chapter 2 presents our theoretical model based on the conceptual definition and key role of economic cooperation governance. In particular, while paying attention to transaction costs as an important factor in determining the level of external economic cooperation, we attempted to make theoretical definitions of search and monitoring costs, which are the sources of transaction costs. Ultimately, good external economic cooperation could be defined as a series of institutional systems that effectively lower transaction costs.
   In Chapter 3, an in-depth study of Russia's external economic cooperation governance was conducted. First we present the directions and tasks for establishing economic cooperation governance based on the Russian government's foreign economic strategy, and discuss promising directions for promoting foreign economic cooperation with major countries (Korea, Germany, Japan, China, and Vietnam). The Russian government has sought to expand its platform for economic cooperation by strengthening bilateral relations with major partner countries. In cooperation with major countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Korea, China, and Japan), which are rapidly emerging in the global economy, Russia has diversified its trade structure by strengthening cooperation to execute development programs in the Far East and Siberia. Russia has also given priority to reactivating its investment cooperation with Vietnam, which it has enjoyed a special relationship with since the Soviet Union era, and Germany, with which it established close relations during the post-Cold War unification process.
   In Chapter 4 we analyze various cases of economic governance in four major countries (Germany, Japan, China and Vietnam). Each of these countries are common in that they share regional and strategic interests with Russia. While Germany and Japan are participating in economic sanctions against Russia, China and Vietnam are not. China and Germany have established a strong economic governance platform as Russia's first and second largest trading and import partners in the area of energy resources. In addition, Vietnam has been cooperating with Russia since the Soviet Union era and has maintained close ties with Russia to present day based on solid mutual trust. While Japan remains a participant in economic sanctions against Russia and is undergoing territorial disputes with Russia, nevertheless it has been one of Russia's major partner countries for Far East development and Arctic energy cooperation projects.
   Chapter 5 provides an overall review of Korea's economic cooperation policy and governance. In September 2017, through a keynote speech delivered at the 3rd Eastern Economic Forum General Assembly held in Vladivostok, the Korean government officialized its New Northern Policy. The Moon Jae-in administration has set economic cooperation with Russia as the primary goal of the New Northern Policy, also adopting the 9-Bridge Strategy to promote cooperative tasks in nine sectors. However, as we prepare for the 30th year of diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia in 2020, it will be essential to strive for more substance in economic cooperation between the two countries. As such, it is time for more fundamental concerns about Korea's economic cooperation governance with Russia.
   In relation to these concerns, the opinions of domestic and foreign experts on Korea's economic cooperation governance offer the following potential conclusions. First, in relation to the economic cooperative bodies established between the two countries, we point out several entities that should be abolished or integrated, and identify the most efficient and necessary bodies, as well as institutions that should be newly established. Second, in the area of public-private and private economic cooperation bodies, we identify institutions that should be abolished or integrated, institutions that should be reorganized and institutions that should be newly established. Third, in regard to the various support systems to promote Korea-Russia bilateral economic cooperation and Korea's economic cooperation with Russia, we identify those that should be abolished or integrated, or require fundamental improvement in their operations, and support systems that should be newly established.
   In Chapter 6, based on the above findings, we present six ways to improve Korea's external economic cooperation governance with Russia.