국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 선행연구

제2장 중국의 사이버보안 전략
1. 중국의 대내외 사이버보안 전략
2. 사이버보안 국제 협력 동향

제3장 중국의 사이버보안 정책
1. 네트워크 보안
2. 정보 보안
3. 암호법

제4장 한국의 사이버보안 현황 및 한중 비교
1. 한국의 사이버보안 연혁 및 전략
2. 한국의 사이버보안 정책
3. 한중간 사이버보안 정책 비교

제5장 결론
1. 평가
2. 한국에 대한 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study examined the Chinese government's cyber security policies and compared and analyzed cyber security policies between Korea and China to draw implications for Korea, recognizing the increasing importance of cyber security worldwide and how the technology hegemony conflict between China and the U.S. continues to intensify.
   Firstly, we analyzed the Chinese government's cyber security policies at the national strategic level in Chapter 2. China has implemented information control over cyberspace at the national level to maintain social order. Especially, Xi’s administration has positioned cyberspace sovereignty as a part of national sovereignty, in line with which cyber security strategy is established. In the field of cyber security, international cooperation is required, but there are difficulties arising from the disparity between the regulatory scope and priority areas of cyber security by country. Therefore this study examined international cooperation with major countries in the area of cyber security currently pursued by the Chinese government to identify major issues in the nation’s cyber security strategy. China and the U.S. operate upon different concepts in their scope of cyber security. China is a centrally controlled country that sets the priority of cybersecurity as a matter of “national security,” whereas the U.S. regulates cyber security, focusing on "protecting privacy" based on individual rights and the freedom of expression. On the other hand, Russia operates upon a similar perception of cybersecurity to China in terms of strengthening its national sovereignty in cyberspace, controlling the country's information flow, and applying changes to the international cyber governance system. In the case of the EU, its position varies by individual case.
   Chapter 3 analyzed the main contents and features of the recently implemented Cyber Security Act to examine the Chinese government's cybersecurity policy from a legal system perspective. The Chinese government has been announcing follow-up measures to implement the Cyber Security Act since 2019 and strengthen its enforcement power. The Act mandates certification of network security management systems, security grade protection systems, and network security related products and services. In addition, a "safety review" has become mandatory and regulations related to the transfer of personal information and important data to foreign countries have been included in recently announced laws. In order to start information management in earnest, the Cryptographic Act was enacted in 2020, therefore further expanding the scope of regulations on cyber security.
   In Chapter 4, we look into the main contents of Korea's cyber security policy and compared and analyzed the cyber security policies between Korea and China. Currently, Korea lacks a cyber security law that covers both the public and private sectors, such as in effect within China. However, based on the national cyber security strategy announced in April 2019, the government announced the “National Cyber Security Basic Plan 2019-2022” in September 2019 and is gradually implementing 100 detailed tasks in areas such as strengthening cyber security, establishing legal systems, and international cooperation.
   Based on this analysis of the cyber security policies of China and Korea, we derive the following conclusions for Korea.
   It is important for Korean companies to continuously monitor and prepare related systems in order to adapt to changes in the business environment situation where China is strengthening cybersecurity measures to manage internal and external risks. The government should also seek areas that can be supported at the national level. First of all, China's implementation of the Cyber Security Act has made it mandatory for Korean companies to obtain security grades. In Korea, the network security level is a recommended standard, but in China this is compulsory. Hence, Korean companies must independently come up with their own countermeasures in related fields, and government support is also needed to minimize confusion during this process. Next, certification in the network equipment sector has become more complex, and new regulations on personal information and data security are being prepared to take effect. Consequently, related policies and regulations are expected to be announced in the near future. In response, the Korean government should hold regular briefing sessions on related policies for Korean companies operating in China. It is also necessary to consider the ongoing cooperation at the national level and make efforts to further strengthen communication channels.

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Mexican Social Security Reform in 1997

3. Data

4. Identification Strategy

5. Results

6. Conclusion

References

Appendix 

Countries adopting a defined benefit pay-as-you-go (DB PAYG) regime have two options to solve the issue of financial unsustainability: (1) a parametric reform, which alters policies within DB PAYG regime, and (2) a structural reform, which changes the regime from DB PAYG to a defined contribution funded (DC) system. In this study, focusing on the structural reform of Mexico in 1997, I investigate whether structural social security reform affects labor supply. The findings suggest that the change in the social security regime increased both labor force participation and work hours per week. However, in the case of the elderly, the intensive margin effect on labor supply was not statistically significant.

국문요약 

제1부 주요 산업의 한·중 경쟁력 종합 비교 분석 및 대응방안(종합편) 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구의 필요성 및 목적
2. 산업구조 고도화의 정의 및 연구 방향
3. 연구범위 및 방법 

제2장 중국 주요 산업의 구조고도화 추이 비교 분석 
1. 중국 주요 산업의 양적 성장과 수급구조 변화 추이 
2. 중국 주요 산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국의 산업정책과 산업구조고도화 전망 

제3장 주요 산업의 한·중 경쟁력 종합 비교 분석 
1. 주요 산업의 한·중 무역경쟁력 비교  
2. 한·중 정성적 경쟁력의 업종 간 비교 
3. 업종별 한·중 경쟁구조의 변화 추이 및 전망

제4장 우리 산업의 종합 대응전략 
1. 주요 산업의 한·중 경쟁구조 변화와 분업 전략
2. 우리 산업의 대중국 경쟁력 강화 전략
3. 중국 시장 진출전략 및 한·중 협력 방안

제2부 업종별의 한·중 경쟁력 종합 비교 분석 및 대응방안(업종편) 

제1장 자동차산업 
1. 중국 자동차산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 자동차산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 자동차산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 자동차산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 자동차산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제2장 조선산업 
1. 중국 조선산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 조선산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 중국산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 조선산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 조선산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제3장 일반기계산업 
1. 중국 일반기계산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 일반기계산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 일반기계 산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망
4. 일반기계산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 일반기계산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제4장 철강산업 
1. 중국 철강산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 철강산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 철강산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 철강산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 철강산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제5장 석유화학산업 
1. 중국 석유화학산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 석유화학산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 석유화학산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망
4. 석유화학산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 석유화학산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제6장 식품산업 
1. 중국 식품산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 식품산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 식품산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 식품산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 식품산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제7장 반도체산업 
1. 중국 반도체산업의 수급 추이와 특성 변화 
2. 중국 반도체산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 반도체산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 반도체산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 반도체산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제8장 디스플레이산업 
1. 중국 디스플레이산업의 수급 추이와 특성 변화
2. 중국 디스플레이산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이
3. 중국 디스플레이산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망
4. 디스플레이산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 디스플레이산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제9장 휴대폰산업 
1. 중국 휴대폰산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 휴대폰산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 휴대폰산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 휴대폰산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 휴대폰산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제10장 가전산업 
1. 중국 가전산업의 수급 추이와 특성변화 
2. 중국 가전산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이 
3. 중국 가전산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망 
4. 가전산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 가전산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제11장 인공지능산업 
1. 중국 인공지능산업의 발전 추이
2. 중국 인공지능산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이
3. 중국 인공지능산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망
4. 인공지능산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망
5. 인공지능산업의 대중국 대응전략 

제12장 게임 산업 
1. 중국 게임 산업의 발전 추이 
2. 중국 게임산업의 질적 구조고도화 추이
3. 중국 게임산업정책 변화와 구조고도화 전망
4. 게임산업의 한·중 경쟁력 추이와 전망 
5. 게임산업의 대중국 대응전략 

참고문헌 

국문요약 

제1장 서론 
1. 연구의 필요성과 목적
2. 연구 내용과 방법

제2장 중국공산당의 시대인식과 국가전략 변화 
1. 중국공산당의 시대인식 변화 - “강해지기”(?起來)의 시대 
2. 신시대론의 국가전략에 대한 영향 
3. 새로운 국가전략의 전망 ? 4개의 시나리오 

제3장 국가 거버넌스체제의 변화와 대응전략 
1. 중앙 차원의 거버넌스체제 변화 
2. 지방 차원의 거버넌스체제 변화  

제4장 중국 대외전략의 변화와 대응전략 - 미중관계를 중심으로 
1. 중국 대외전략의 변화와 미중관계 
2. 중미 무역분쟁이 한국경제에 미치는 영향 - 무역, 기술, 금융 분야를 중심으로

제5장 중국 국가전략 변화가 한국의 대중국전략에 주는 시사점 - 대중국전략의 연속과 변화  
1. 중국 국가전략 변화에 따른 도전 요인과 기회 요인
2. 대중국전략에 대한 시사점 

참고문헌 

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 선행연구의 검토
3. 연구의 범위와 구성

제2장 국제 에너지 시장의 공급측 변화
1. 비전통 에너지의 생산 증가
2. 에너지믹스 다변화
3. 주요 산유국의 지정학적 리스크 증가에 따른 석유 공급 변화

제3장 국제 에너지 시장의 수요측 변화
1. 석유의 수요 변화
2. 대체에너지의 수요 증가
3. 환경규제 강화

제4장 중동 지역의 에너지 정책 변화 배경 및 추진 방향
1. 중동 지역의 에너지 정책 변화 배경
2. 중동 지역의 에너지 정책 추진 방향
3. 소결

제5장 주요국의 대중동 에너지 협력 현황
1. 일본
2. 중국
3. 인도
4. 소결

제6장 중동 에너지 시장의 변화와 우리의 대응 전략
1. 석유 및 가스 관련 협력 방안
2. 에너지 효율화 정책 관련 협력 방안
3. 재생에너지 부문 협력 방안

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study proposes a diversification policy for Korea’s energy cooperation with the Middle East, based on the energy policy changes of oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Korea’s largest source of energy imports, in the midst of the recent structural changes in the global energy market. Since the dramatic drop in global oil prices in 2014, the global energy market has undergone structural changes. On the supply side, the market power of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led by Saudi Arabia has sharply weakened. In 2018, the U.S. emerged as the world's largest crude oil producer, overtaking Russia and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the U.S. and Russia, non-OPEC countries such as Brazil, Norway and Guyana have recently increased their oil production significantly. In contrast, oil prices remain at around $50－60 per parrel even with U.S. economic sanctions against OPEC members Venezuela and Iran, which have blocked crude oil exports from these countries, as well as OPEC's production cuts from 2016. Major oil-producing countries in the Middle East are also responding to the supply changes in the global energy market by expanding natural gas production and strengthening investment in the downstream of the oil sector. In terms of demand in the global energy market, structural changes have continued, including changes in energy demand in emerging countries such as China, the introduction of alternative energy sources, and tightening of environmental regulations. Uncertainties in the global economy, including China, the largest importer of oil from the Middle East, will have a negative impact on global oil demand. The energy-mix transition of many countries from fossil energy to solar, wind, nuclear, and hydrogen energy will also decrease the demand for oil in the long term. In addition, demand for cleaner energy sources is increasing as the environmental regulations (IMO 2020) of the international shipping industry are tightening and air pollution issues caused by fine dust particles, etc. continue to grow. In addition, recent geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East affect the global energy market significantly.
   These changes are important for Korea, which imports more than 70% of its oil from the Middle East. This study analyzes the energy policy changes of major oil-producing countries in the Middle East, which are most directly affected by the structural changes in the global energy market, and suggests diversification of Korea’s energy cooperation policy with the Middle East, focused on the oil and gas sector.
   Chapter 2 surveys changes in the supply side of the global energy market. Prior to the 2000s, energy companies had focused on developing conventional oil and gas, but interest in developing unconventional oil and gas has increased since mid-2000 as the price of hydrocarbon resources has risen. The development of new technologies, such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, contributed to the increase in unconventional energy production. Production from main unconventional oil sources (tight crude oil, oil sands and deepwater oil) has continued to expand around the U.S., Canada and Brazil. Unconventional gas production increased 4.3 times during the 2000－2017 period, and the proportion of unconventional gas production in global natural gas production also expanded from 8% to 23%. The increase in global unconventional gas production was largely attributed to expanded the production of U.S. shale gas, with unconventional gas production in China, Australia and Argentina showing an increase as well. We can expect to see further changes in the energy mix in the future. The share of oil demand is forecast to fall to 28 percent in 2040, compared with 32 percent in 2017, while gas will increase from 22 percent to 25 percent, according to the IEA's forecast for demand by energy source.
   Chapter 3 surveys changes in the demand side of the global energy market from the perspective of changes in oil demand due to low oil prices, increased demand for alternative energy, and strengthened environmental regulations. Economic growth in developing countries such as India and Brazil, which have seen rapid increases in oil consumption, is expected to play a key role in increasing oil consumption. Meanwhile, demand for natural gas and LNG is expected to increase due to rising demand for eco-friendly fuel, and the continued improvement in the competitiveness of renewable energy prices, particularly in the areas of solar and wind power, will boost demand for renewable energy. In addition, eco-friendly car policies and international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to prompt a drop in oil demand, but demand for petrochemical products is expected to continue growing as the global economy develops. The International Maritime Organization's tightened regulations on the sulfur content of ship fuel oil are expected to cause changes in demand among petroleum products and a shift to non-oil ship fuel such as LNG.
   Chapter 4 examines the background of changes in energy policy in the Middle East and the direction in which these changes are being implemented. The volume of oil supplied by non-OPEC oil-producing countries is expected to increase up to 2024, driven by the rise in U.S. oil production and exports, etc., and leading to a drop in OPEC's share of the world's oil supply. The continued low oil prices have had a negative impact on the economies of oil-producing countries in the Middle East, with governments taking steps to reduce various subsidies, restructure and privatize state-run companies and introduce taxes. This situation is affecting the energy sector of oil-producing countries in the Middle East and leading to changes in related policies.
   Middle East oil producers are making policy efforts to diversify their energy sources by proceeding with large-scale investments in alternative energy. Renewable energy has received particular attention as an alternative energy source, and interest in nuclear energy is also emerging in some countries such as the UAE. Middle East countries have recently announced their targets for increasing the share of renewable sources within their energy portfolios. The target ratio of renewable energy to total power generation varies from 10% to more than 50%, with Morocco leading the group at 52%. GCC member countries are also actively promoting the expansion of renewable energy and scheduled to primarily focus on solar energy in accordance with regional characteristics.
   Oil-producing countries in the Middle East are also stepping up energy policies to reform government spending and their energy consumption structure. In particular, governments are trying to alleviate their financial burden and energy consumption by reducing energy subsidies, which account for a high proportion of government expenditure and GDP. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have established a body in charge of energy efficiency and are also starting to introduce efficiency programs. To improve the efficiency of energy management, the governments are also working on projects to foster smart grid industries, such as advanced metering infrastructure and energy management system projects.
   Chapter 5 compares the current status of energy cooperation in Japan, China and India, economies heavily dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, and explores major cooperation cases. Japan has been trying to reduce its energy dependence on the Middle East countries in response to the recent expansion of geopolitical instability in the region. Japan has continued to promote relations with these countries in the energy sectors by diversifying areas of cooperation beyond the import of fossil energy commodities. Recent bilateral energy cooperation projects are mainly designed to utilize Japan's cutting-edge technologies and the rich resources of the Middle East countries at the same time. A joint feasibility study on renewable energy infrastructure using IoT technologies, and the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) to utilize reductions in greenhouse gas emissions could be prime examples of this cooperation. In addition, the Japanese government is making efforts to maintain resource development projects in the Middle East region. Japan has been especially active in maintaining diplomatic relations with the UAE, where 40% of Japan’s overseas oil concessions are located.
   China is strengthening its energy cooperation with oil-rich countries in the Middle East in order to secure a stable energy supply network linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Along with its high economic growth rate, China’s oil and natural gas consumption is soaring. On the other hand, China’s domestic production is limited and this is causing a rapid rise in energy imports. As energy supply has emerged as a major security issue, it has become more important to cooperate with oil-producing countries in the Middle East with abundant natural resources. Meanwhile, oil-producing countries in the Middle East are seeking stable export destinations for their energy exports, and to introduce new and renewable energy sources into their economies and diversify non-oil industries. In response, the Chinese government is trying to link the BRI with the logistics hub strategy of Middle Eastern countries to secure stable energy distribution channels. Based on the price competitiveness of its companies, China has recently been actively participating in the renewable energy sector, which Middle Eastern countries are demonstrating a strong will to develop. Cooperation has been strengthened as the Middle East oil-producing countries expand their presence in stable crude exports and energy markets by participating in Chinese oil and petrochemical projects and acquiring stakes in related companies.
   India produces oil and natural gas, but its consumption exceeds production and a large portion of its imports depend on the Middle East. As India's energy demand is expected to continue to grow, the Indian government is pushing for infrastructure project cooperation and joint ventures with Middle East countries, with a focus on enhancing energy security. It also encourages the acquisition of assets in the Middle East and other upstream sectors to reduce dependence on oil imports, and focuses on diversifying its sources of imports and expanding stockpiles of oil.
   Chapter 6 explores the direction of Korea’s energy cooperation with the Middle East based on an analysis of structural changes in the global energy market and response measures taken by oil-producing countries in the Middle East. First, Korea can explore ways to cooperate with Middle Eastern countries in the resource development sector. By expanding cooperation in resource development, Korea will be able to stabilize its domestic supply and demand of oil and natural gas, while also diversifying cooperation with these countries beyond energy imports. Middle East countries are currently experiencing severe financial shortages due to low oil prices, and are trying to encourage foreign investment in the resource development sector to secure investment funds and stable sources of income. While neighbouring countries of Korea, such as Japan, have already been actively supporting their own resource development projects for some time now, the Korean government’s support is relatively limited in its scope and even those support projects in operation have been partly reduced and abolished recently. Resource development projects are risky and require large capital investments, meaning they must be backed up with long- term and consistent government support. In addition, there will also be a need for government efforts to maintain friendly relations with the Middle East countries.
   The expansion of pipeline projects and other forms of transport infrastructure in the region will broaden the opportunity for cooperation in related areas. In the financial sector, investment by financial institutions in promising energy infrastructure projects could be considered, and continued support from export credit agencies (ECA) will be necessary. Moreover, as oil and gas storage facilities and terminals are expected to expand, Korean companies should be able to advance into the area of operation and management of these facilities, in addition to their construction. Technical cooperation in the areas of smart platforms for storage facilities and terminals, logistics management and operational software will be needed as well. Meanwhile, rising demand for LNG and GTLs will lead to more opportunities for companies, and to this end, it is necessary to strengthen competitiveness by increasing the capabilities of key technologies for LNG and GTL plants. In addition, cooperation in new energy sectors such as hydrogen liquefaction facilities will be possible, and related cooperation will expand hand-in-hand with future technological advances.
   Among the various smart grid-related sectors, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and energy storage systems (ESS) are promising areas in which Korean companies are equipped with a high level of technology and demand in Middle East countries is increasing. To expand the presence of Korean companies in these areas, in the short term the Korean government needs to expand financial support for small- and medium-sized companies participating in energy efficiency projects, and establish better support measures to provide information on the Middle East market. In addition, the Korean government should focus on establishing cooperation models to meet the demand for more diverse industries in the region by providing consulting services or participating in pilot projects, etc., through consortiums formed around KEPCO and with small- and medium-sized enterprises participating. In the long run, the Korean government could also consider establishing a joint investment fund or increasing financial support for companies participating in smart grid projects in the region to foster the industry. In the energy efficiency sector, Korean public agencies can first consider providing technical consulting services or exporting technology to Middle East countries wishing to operate test centers to improve energy efficiency. From a longer-term perspective, participating in joint projects to develop certification programs and standards for energy efficiency will help Korean companies to advance into the Middle East region.
   When considering future forecasts for the global supply and investment in the area of renewable energy, and the renewable energy policies of Korea and Middle East countries, cooperation between both sides in renewable energy should center on solar energy. In the short term, cooperation in building solar energy infrastructure for power generation and households can be promoted and expanded to technological development cooperation that can enhance the operational stability of power systems and increase their flexibility in the medium term. On a long-term basis, we could consider cooperation projects to develop hydrogen-related technologies using renewable energy and build a business model in this area.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 선행연구와 본 연구의 차별성
3. 연구구성

제2장 중국의 제조업 혁신 네트워크 구축
1. 「중국제조 2025」 추진과 제조업 혁신센터 사업
2. 중국과 미국의 정책사업 비교
3. 소결

제3장 전기차 배터리 사례
1. 중국의 전기차 배터리 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 전기차 배터리 혁신센터: 베이징(北京)시
3. 소결

제4장 반도체 사례
1. 중국의 반도체 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 반도체 혁신센터: 상하이(上海)시
3. 소결

제5장 디스플레이 사례
1. 중국의 디스플레이 육성과 국산화 추세
2. 국가 디스플레이 혁신센터: 광둥성
3. 소결

제6장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   U.S.-China trade friction is one of the major variables causing external economic uncertainty in Korea. The competition for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China has been pointed out as lying at the essence of the trade friction between the U.S. and China, prompted by China’s rise in technological prowess. As the most representative industrial development policy by the Chinese government to respond to this rise in the nation’s technological prowess, the Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) plan deserves detailed analysis and evaluation, based on which we can debate proper response measures. In this regard, this study analyzed and evaluated the progress of measures to establish a manufacturing innovation network currently ongoing within China, one of the key policy tasks of MIC 2025.
   We perform a comparative analysis of policy operations in China and the U.S., the latter being the benchmark for China, in order to analyze in depth the manufacturing innovation centers that form the core of China’s manufacturing innovation network. We also studied specific cases at manufacturing innovation centers in the sectors of electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays ? core areas in which China has succeeded in localization and is competing with Korea ? to understand the specific characteristics, achievements and limitations of these innovation centers. To allow a comprehensive examination of the demand for development in participating entities and industries, we analyzed the rise of local businesses in related areas, incubation policies promoted by the Chinese government, and the trend of localization, together with a review of operations at the innovation centers.
   This study has drawn the following conclusions and suggestions. China may benchmark U.S. policy, but is fine-tuning its own policies, which is having the effect of limiting its progress toward the goals initially set.
   First, China’s manufacturing innovation centers are operating upon a dual scheme of dividing national- and provincial-level centers. China’s provincial manufacturing innovation centers are established by local governments, after which they compete to be selected as national manufacturing innovation centers. This dual system incurs leads to the possibility of overlapping areas and investments in similar R&D projects.
   Second, manufacturing innovation centers in China feature a self-sustaining profit structure like private businesses. Some in China point out that it is contradictory to apply a corporate management system to manufacturing innovation centers established to play a role for the common interest of the industry. In addition, given the level of development of Chinese companies, it may not be sustainable to continue operations based on profit gained from commissioned research, technology transfer, technology certification testing, and the establishment and utilization of patent pools.
   Third, as seen in some cases of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries and displays, cooperation and networking between companies can be difficult in sectors where a competitive structure already exists, neither do these seem to have a significant impact on related industries. The United States requires in principle the establishment of manufacturing innovation centers in areas remaining in a pre-competitive state for industrial technology. China, on the other hand, has prepared a list of areas to establish manufacturing innovation centers, based on areas specified within the MIC 2025, but does not make considerations for industrial technology features, such as is required in the U.S.
   Fourth, according to our case analysis, innovation centers for semiconductors and displays are significantly linked to the industrial development strategies of the local government, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center lack in connectivity with local industries. This indicates it is likely that semiconductor and display innovation centers will be able to create synergistic effects in conjunction with intra-regional industrial clusters, while the electric vehicle battery innovation center will have less impact on related industries within Beijing.
   Although some operational results have been achieved in the case of innovation centers for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors and displays, the limitations described above have led to internal criticism and a call for policy coordination as doubt is cast on whether China’s innovation centers can eventually lead to the establishment of a nationwide network of manufacturing innovation centers, the original goal of this plan. Our expert interviews indicate a consensus for the need of policy coordination is emerging among China’s government agencies, academia and industries.
   Our case studies identify the following opportunities and threats created by the operation of manufacturing innovation centers in China, and industry policies in this area. China originally intended to establish manufacturing innovation centers for the core industrial sectors specified within the MIC 2025 plan, aiming to form a network of innovative players in each industrial sector. But so far, as suggested above, it appears that China’s manufacturing innovation center project will be insufficient to carry out this role in the actual application of policies, both in institutional and system terms. This trial and error in China’s policy operations serves as a positive factor for Korea to maintain the current technological gap with China. However, internal criticism of these policies and the discussion of alternatives in China can be seen as a threat in their potential for improvement, reflecting trial and error.
   In addition, since China holds a comparative advantage over Korea in certain areas within the value chain of the semiconductor industry, it will be necessary to remain cautious of the semiconductor innovation center establishing innovative networks and the current technology gap shrinking in foundry sectors. There is also the concern that Korea’s research and development know-how will be exposed during the process of collaboration between Chinese companies and multinational businesses, such as seen in the case of the display innovation center.
 

Executive Summary
 
1. Introduction

2. Literature Review 

3. International Comparison 
3-1. Marginal Company 
3-2. Share of Marginal Companies
3-3. Relationship between Marginal Share (10+) and Monetary Policy-Related Interest Rate

4. Determinant for Marginal Companies in Korea: 2013-2018
4-1. Data 
4-2. Empirical Methodology 
4-3. Empirical Results 

5. Conclusion 

References

  Since the global financial crisis, low interest rates have continued throughout the world. However, financial imbalance has deepened as much of the expanded investment during low interest rates did not lead to increased productivity. This study focused on the increase of marginal firms as a result of the adverse effects of financial imbalances on firms. The marginal firms were identified based on the company's financial statement, and the share of marginal firms by country was compared and analyzed using Worldscope data. As a detailed analysis on the marginal firms, the impact of borrowing interest rate on the possibility of becoming a marginal company was analyzed in the case of Korea with KED data. According to the international comparison, East Asia including Korea, China and Japan has shown a lower share of marginal companies than Europe, South Asia and Latin America. Empirical results through Panel Logit with Sector Fixed Effect Model show that the borrowing rate has a negative correlation with the probability the company will become a marginal company in the case of Korea. However, the impact of an increase in borrowing rates on the likelihood of becoming a marginal company depends on the degree of financial vulnerability. Specifically, an increase in the borrowing rate has a greater impact on the possibility to become ICR<1 in the companies with higher financial vulnerability indexes.
 

Executive Summary 

1. Introduction 

2. The Exclusion Request 

3. Data and Estimation 
3-1. Data 
3-2. Model Specification and Estimation 

4. Estimation Results 
4-1. Main Results 
4-2. Additional Analysis

5. Concluding Remarks

References 

   On March 2018, the Trump administration introduced 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent tariffs on aluminum imports. To minimize the adverse effects of these tariffs to downstream US producers who import these products, the exclusion request that grants tariff exemptions has been also established. In this paper we examined the determinants of the authority’s decisions on the exclusion requests. Our analysis focuses on the political factors. Specifically, we ask whether companies operating business in states where Trump won the majority vote (Trump state) in the 2016 presidential election were more likely to get tariff exemptions. Our estimation result suggests that firms located in Trump states were more likely to be granted exemptions. Especially it appears that the decisions were made based on a dual standard. While firms with lower sales to employment ratios were more likely to be approved for the exclusion requests in Trump states, it was the opposite for firms in non-Trump states.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 연구의 범위와 구성

제2장 중국 기업의 다각화와 경쟁력
1. 서론
2. 선행연구
3. 데이터의 구성과 성격
4. 다각화 현황
5. 소결

제3장 중국 국내외 특허와 산업 경쟁력 분석
1. 서론
2. 중국 혁신주체의 특허 출원 보유 증가와 산업경쟁력
3. 중국 ICT 산업 기업의 특허전략과 세계시장에서의 경쟁력
4. 소결

제4장 중국의 과학 역량 분석
1. 서론
2. 연구설계와 방법론
3. 중국의 과학대국화
4. 국제 과학 연구 협력 네트워크 속 중국의 위상
5. 미중연계 현황과 스트레스 테스트
6. 소결

제5장 중국 혁신형 산업클러스터의 지속가능성 평가
1. 서론
2. 중국의 산업 클러스터 정책
3. 혁신형 산업클러스터의 지속가능성 평가
4. 소결

제6장 중국특색의 당국가 체제와 기업가정신
1. 서론
2. 중국 특색 기업가 정신의 발전
3. 중국 특색 기업가 정신의 평가
4. 소결

제7장 결론 및 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   In the middle of the Sino-US trade and technology war, one important question is raised about whether China's technological power has risen to threaten the U.S. or not. In order to find an answer to this question, this report aims to evaluate the current status of China's technological catch-up or convergence to the global top level by using the data-based statistics and materials. In particular, this report starts from the authors' tireless effort to analyze China's industrial competitiveness by employing various microeconomic data. As well acknowledged, the most difficult task in the microeconomic analysis is to acquire relevant microeconomic data, which is not much available vis-a-vis macroeconomic data. In this report, each chapter is basically independent and self-complete as a research paper. Each author's main research questions and major findings are summarized below.
   The second chapter is written by Pilsoo Choi. He analyzes how the diversification strategy pursued by Chinese enterprises improve or worsen their competitiveness. He focuses on how different that diversification strategy of Chinese enterprises happened over time among different groups by the ownership, what sectors are the most actively diversified, and finally how much the diversification strategy affected corporate profitability. To answer these questions, he used Chinese corporate data. The diversification issue is nothing novel in the management science. In the corporation's evolution process, some corporations pursue the diversification strategy, while others not. That is solely the corporation's own choice, depending upon the market environment which the corporation belongs to. Many Chinese enterprises have also utilized the diversification strategy to cope with marketization and globalization of the Chinese economy through various forms - related or unrelated diversification. It may be said that the diversification strategy has nothing to do with technological improvement itself. However, that is closely related to strengthening enterprises' overall competitiveness.
   The author does not draw the conclusion that the Chinese enterprises' diversification strategy necessarily had led to the overall improvement of competitiveness. State-owned enterprises and private enterprises showed different patterns over time. On interesting finding is that high-profit services and high-tech enterprises most actively pursued diversification. By first developing core business platform and later linking many related businesses to this core platform, they could make much greater profits.
   The chapter 3 is written by Sungho Roh. He explores how Chinese enterprises' technologcial power has changed over time by analyzing their foreign and domestic patent application map. In particular, he focuses on the question of whether recent surge in the Chinese enterprises' patent applications have contributed to industrial competitiveness or not. He also diagnoses how major Chinese ITC companies' patent strategy has affected their competitiveness position in the global markets. For example, Huawei has been unique and unmatched in numbers of patent applications, but it is still qualitatively behind the U.S. tech companies such as Intel and Qualcom. Nevertheless, as the quantity expansion lasts long over time, a qualitative change will ensue.
   He finds that local patent applications increased more rapidly than the average of innovative companies in China. This result implies that patent activities among the local innovative companies are more or less overheated due to various policy measures supported and encouraged by the local governments. But the contribution of these patent activities to the improvement of productivity is inconclusive, depending on the sectors. Furthermore, the active patent applications do not necessarily lead to technology diffusion. In sum, evidently Chinese enterprises' R&D capacity tends to improve in some sectors. For example, Chinese innovative agents more actively pursue joint R&D cooperation with foreign tech companies in order to acquire R&D-related knowledge and technology and at the same time, more aggressively acquires patents and advanced technology through international mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
   The chapter 4 is written by Jong-Hak Eun. He analyzes China's scientific research capabilities by employing the research approach of bibliometrics, which is a empirical methodology to use very extensive date set. This approach is recently often used in economics as well. He collects most recent data up to 2018, in comparison with other researches. In 2018 alone, 1,470,000 research papers were published in the category of SCIE(Science Citation Index Expanded). In 2018 Chinese researchers' publication in the SCIE surpassed that of the United States in terms of number. He moves one step further to find out whether China's scientific research can be self-complete without any linkage or cooperation with the United States or not. He finds some possibilities. He indicates that the evidence of stronger China's scientific research capabilities may lead to the U.S.' recent move to contain China's technological rising. In that regard, he anticipates the possibility of U.S.' much stronger pressure and containment in the field of scientific research collaboration between China and the U.S. Recently, Chinese scientists are often excluded in the U.S.-centered global research collaboration networks. In addition, Chinese students are banned in the high-tech fields by the U.S. universities.
   The chapter 5 is written by Ikjoon Moon. He analyzes the competitiveness of the innovative industrial clusters which has been newly rising since 2013. He considers two types of externalities - Marshall-Arrow-Romer effect and Jacobs-Porter effects. He also carries out two case studies based on the next-generation internet technology cluster in Shenzhen and mobile internet cluster in Zhonggwanchun Beijing. By comparing these two cases, he concludes two different types of innovative clusters are competing to become a national champion. One is mostly driven by private companies, while the other is initiated by the public sector.
   He concludes that these new innovative clusters are not really different from the existing high-tech industrial development zones. And until now, it is difficult to find out the evidence of any visible progress. But, China's new experiment for upgrading industrial clusters will be a challenge to South Korea's do-nothing attitude. Geographical spillover effects can be maximized in the Marshall-Arrow-Romer model, while some positive externalities will happen across the sectors in the type of Jacobs-Porter model. These chinese experiments will be a good benchmark for South Korea in developing the upgraded long-term strategy for designing industry-academy-research clusters, nourishing start-ups and SME(small and medium-sized enterprises), and local innovation movements.
   Finally, the chapter 6 is written by Daewon Oh. He studies how China's entrepreneurship has evolved over time since 1978 (market reform and opening). First, he finds that diverse models in different regions such as collective ownership, private ownership, and foreign ownership model have changed from the early bud to more sophisticated ones. Particularly after the appearance of digital economy, new private start-ups and unicorn companies in China manifest Chinese style entrepreneurship. In his case study on Alibaba, he has shown how the Chinese start-up ecosystem has been organically working. He concludes that there is no one-size-fits-all model for the Chinese entrepreneurship. Too many models are competing in the Chinese-style socialist market economy.
   Nevertheless, Oh finds three characteristics of Chinese-style entrepreneurship. First, it is based on the negative-list approach which allows reform in advance without any institutionalization. This is Chinese-style experimentalism and pragmatism. Without any regulation, entrepreneurs can realize more easily their own vision and potential. Second, it is based on the private-public cooperative state capitalism, particularly in the competitive environment among the local governments. That means there is no single nation-wide model. But, diverse local models have been created based on the regional characteristics. Sometimes, Chinese-style human networking, so called Guanxi, plays an important role in coordinating diverse interests into a common goal, but it also often results in cronyism and corruption. Third, more recently, the central government has executed extensive policy support for mobilizing top brains - such as one thousand man plan and ten thousand man plan. In order to attract those top brains, the local governments provide many pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives.
   This report has some shortcomings. First of all, we do not develop our research into some comparative analysis on industrial competitiveness between China and South Korea. Our research only focuses on China. However, we try to draw some implications for South Korea. Hopefully, we are looking forward to seeing future research by carrying out comparative analysis on these five research subjects. As mentioned above, the five subjects are not organically combined. Each chapter focuses on the independent subject respectively, while a common keyword in this report is industrial competitiveness. Five factors in this report - diversification strategy, patent, basic scientific research, innovation cluster, entrepreneurship - are closely interconnected. We are looking forward to having another future research about how these five factors are interacting each other and forming overall industrial competitiveness.