Continuous economic crisis have deepened resource nationalism, and natural resources have been transformed from simple trade goods to state-of-art strategic weapon in recent decades. Since Latin America is one of the biggest market and raw material supplier, most industrialized countries are looking for the concrete collaboration with Latin America.
However, Korea’s bargaining power is not strong enough to ensure the solid partnership with Latin America. Japan and US traditionally have the strongest leverage in this region and China is emerging rapidly through financial power based on economic growth.
This research project has mainly focused into energy and sustainability. Because of dramatically increased public’s awareness on environmental problem and sustainability, Latin American governments have limited political power to exploit its natural resource without serious consideration on environment. As time passes, environment protectionists are acquiring bigger political influence in local politics.  Latin American governments and foreign investors should face uncountable difficulties, if their natural resource development lacks serious consideration on environment. We show the current status of Latin American natural resource and environments and reveal the increasing importance of sustainability of development in this region. Through such approach, we provide the chance of deeper and wider understanding on this region's natural resources and environmental problems to policy makers as well as private companies.
The first half deals with the issues related with petroleum industry in the world, bio ethanol in Brazil, natural gas industry in Venezuela, as well as thorough overview on the status of natural resource of Latin America. The second half deals with forest development and environmental problem in Mexico, Amazon development, coffee industry, eco tourism as well as the overview on the development strategy of Latin America. The former mainly disputes about natural resource and energy while the latter provides analysis on environment and sustainability problems in this region.

In this study, it focuses on the social and cultural codes and its successful case, consumption pattrns of Telenovela which popular sentiment is best reflected in the television series in Latin America regarding the broadcasting and video industry as the heart of the cultural industry.
Telenovela is the drama genre and has become popular culture, regardless of the age and sex, to be enjoyed in the current Latin America about 20 million viewers as well as around the world. Both home and abroad, the industry is growing due to international co-productions and to channel secure with theme and narrative configuration capabilities, through the foreign direct investment. Therefore, for the effective spread and settlement of the Korean Wave, first and foremost an in-depth research is indispensable.
Regarding to Telenovela in Latin America, there are already some valuable researches in Korea, but most of them are introduced an overview of that in fact. In this study, unlike previous studies, the successful factors of Telenovela will be defined by social and cultural context. This study will be able to understand social, cultural and historical characteristics of Latin America further the emotion of local people and their experiences. It will be provided reference points and the implications to establish export strategy of Korean broadcasting and film industry represented by the Korean Wave, in Latin America, ultimately.
In this study, it is focused on Mexico and Brazil in Latin American countries. With the U.S. both countries are market leaders as well as major producers and consumers of Telenovela in the world. Especially Televisa and TV Azteca in Mexico, Brazil's TV Globo and SBT are regarded as representing broadcasting organizations. In addition, Mexico and Brazil, as belonging to a culture of Hispanic America and Portuguese-speaking America each, geographical and cultural diversity can be considered respectively. They are best examples of representing different typical Latin American Telenovela genre. Moreover, to visit the survey site in an impossible situation that is relatively easy to secure data points of the study area, such as it is considered that reason has.
Meanwhile, it is limited to analyse Telenovela production, which aired since the 1990s until recently. The study set by since the 1990s, the data acquisition is relatively easy including timely background like the transition of the global paradigm, which is the end of the Cold War and neoliberal launched in Latin America. Thanks to the development of the relevant media and technology, Telenovela was developed to the spread point full-fledged pop culture industry in Latin America.
This study assess the audience's interpretation of the messages imparted by Telenovela through a reception analysis for tracing successful factors and consumption patterns of political and social situation of the country under the relationship between the area's cultural and emotional factors considering the implications. Through this survey, by predicting in future political, social and cultural trends and spending patterns of consumers of Telenovela in Latin America, it is possible to examine the merits of Korean TV drama and to propose for the future effective policy measures.
The main contents of this study can be divided into five parts as follows.

󰋫 The Purpose of the Study
It is supposed to suggest implication of the effective strategies of next 'Korean Wave' for Latin American market by evaluating through essential code of the social and cultural and consumption patterns of Telenovela which is admitted as a representative successful case in Latin America.

󰋫 Theoretical Background
Including theoretical discussions of cultural exchanges between countries with respect to content, with view of media, political economy theory and traditional cultural imperialism and active consumerism, microeconomic models with vision of the media-economics and the centrists to the point of view of the third alternative and so on. Based on this, to discuss the concrete process how cultural contact and acculturation appear after examining through the "cultural discount effect" and "sweet potato runners" and then broadcasting film aspects from the perspective of cultural studies are properly consulted mainly.

󰋫 Overview of the Telenovela Broadcasting Video Market and Industry in Mexico and Brazil
It is mentioned the status of the television broadcasting industry which is divided into terrestrial and pay-TV market in Mexico and Brazil. It is recognised the gravity and the significance of Telenovela industry throughout investigating their growth process of Televisa, TV Azteca in Mexico and TV Globo and SBT in Brazil, in which are in charge of production, consumption and the initiative export. In addition, it is introduced the origin and content, formal characteristics and content competitiveness of Telenovela.

󰋫 Analysis of Successful Case of Telenovela with Social Political Code
In this chapter, it is analysed by applying a comprehensive analysis of Mexican and Brazilian Telenovela that reflected in the social and cultural codes and successful case, Telenovela consumption patterns on consumers. By analysing in various aspects as women, drama, religion, history, social issues, education, and politics, etc. it is traced on the other hand Telenovela consumption patterns and the paradigm shift, further the policy implications  for Korean Wave spread in Latin America to be utilized as basic data.

󰋫 Suggestion and Policy Implications
In this chapter, it is analysed and evaluated previous articles related to strategy and policy around broadcasting video contents for the spread of the Korean Wave and then is suggested alternative for Korean Wave spread and settlement in Latin America.

This report is presented with primarily social and cultural point of view, consisted of two parts largely related to the production of the drama and the policy.
Production-related policies are presented "making storytelling style reflected the narrative structure of Telenovela and the co-operation script with local writers", "settlement ongoing monitoring systems for local viewers in Latin America", "rediscovering effort for dramas which was not popular in Korea", "co-production of Latin American market-oriented Drama", "co-translation including Latin American culture experts".
In terms of political "the formation of industrial, academic, council affiliated organization for the spread and settlement of Korean Wave", "providing broadcasting contents diversion to free of charge" are presented.

 
Aging of the population, development of advanced yet expensive medical technology and growing income inequality in Korea present tough challenges to its current health care system. Korea is certainly not alone in the pursuit of solutions to such challenges. Developed countries including the US and the Britain have already implemented different measures to reform their health care system while Latin America has been introducing various reforms to its health care. Health care reform efforts of developed countries such as the US, Japan, Britain and Germany have already been analyzed by and presented to Korean academic community.
However, researches on health care reform in Korea, which is extensively focused on cases of developed countries, turned out to have several limitations. Considering the complex nature of Korean health care system, it is crucial to look into cases from developing countries where health care has developed as a tool to induce rapid industrialization rather than a way of expanding citizenship rights. Therefore, just by looking into health care systems in developed countries would not be enough to fully understand possible reform measures for Korean system.
In that sense, Latin American cases offer valuable lessons. Both Korea and Latin America need to reduce health care expenditure without sacrificing its quality of care. Latin American countries have attempted health care reforms introducing measures such as privatization, decentralization, community participation and targeting. One interesting aspect of Latin American cases is that it tends to address the whole health care system rather than just focusing on health insurance. By shedding lights on reform measures tried by Latin American countries, we could obtain an opportunity to overcome simplistic understanding of health care reform which equates health care reform with health insurance reform.
This research aims at introducing Latin American health care reforms, especially reforms in Chile, Mexico and Argentina, to Korea academic community in order to broaden health care reform researches in Korea. Furthermore, this study hopes to contribute to diversify Korean Latin American Studies which have not paid much attention to policy analysis especially of health care.
This research consists of 6 chapters. The second chapter overviews health system and discourses regarding its reform in Latin America. It pays special attention to policy recommendations from international financial institutions such as World Bank, IDB and IMF. From the chapter 3 to the chapter 5, this paper analyzes three cases of Latin American health care reforms; Chile, Mexico and Argentina. Each chapter overviews health system in each country and analyzes process and effects of health care reforms. In the last chapter, this study sheds lights on some lessons from Latin American health care reforms to Korea.
Latin America achieved significant improvement in health since the World War II. From 1960s to 1990s, the average life expectancy of Latin America increased from 54 to 70 while its infant mortality dropped during the same period from 161 out of 100,000 live births to 60. However, the important improvement in health does not necessarily mean diminution of health inequality in the region. The health inequality based on race, gender, class and region still persists or gets worsen. For example, indigenous groups in Latin America tend to experience lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality.

This research paper seeks to understand the nuclear policies and trends of the MBA (Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) in the nuclear renaissance era and discuss how Korea’s nuclear energy policies should change to make inroads in the MBA region. By looking into the history of MBA’s nuclear energy policy and status quo of their nuclear energy industry in depth, it is possible to see the changes made in the nuclear energy industry accordingly to national policy changes. Policy variables that are needed for Korea to enter the nuclear energy market of MBA, such as technological self–reliance, financial investment resources, institutional perspectives of nuclear energy laws and institutions, fuel cycle, the degree of international cooperation, have been analyzed. For future cooperation among MBA and Korea in the nuclear energy sector, SWOT analysis was used to identify the possibilities of policy approaches and broaden our understanding of the matter.
The first chapter, the introduction part of this paper, examines the start and development for the nuclear energy industry in MBA, identifies the reasons why these three Latin American countries are significant to Korea and the possibilities for nuclear energy cooperation. In particular, how Korea should act to the recent energy policies of MBA, which is planning on diversification of its energy source and efficient management of its energy industry, is one of the critical issues. Various guidelines were set for efficient research analysis via the research’s content, scope, and method of research. Collecting and monitoring the basic data on nuclear energy industry and existing documents and papers published by think tanks and professional organizations helped increasing the accuracy of this research paper. The second chapter categorizes the history, status quo, and degree of international collaboration of the nuclear energy industry into periods. The three countries’ technological independence, financial investment, institutional characters, policy formulation, decision–making, internal and external policy conflicts, and actual policy changing process have been thoroughly dealt with.
Initiated in 1955, Mexico set forth an industry policy with unprecedented technological complexity and extremely difficult problems. The fact that in took almost 2o years to make the program for activating the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station as policy shows the nature of the problem. Mexico’s nuclear energy policy can be divided into 4 periods: initial nuclear energy policy formulating and agenda selection period (1955～1972); the Echeverria and Portillo administration’s nuclear energy industry implementation period (1972～1982); the de La Madrid administration’s policy crisis and commercial nuclear energy operation period (1983～1990); and up to the present is defined as nuclear energy management and new agenda selection period. The actual realization of Mexico’s nuclear industry started in the 1970s. In that period, nuclear energy rose as an alternative energy source due to the rise in international oil prices and the increase in domestic energy consumption, which meant more imports of oil. This naturally turned the spotlight to nuclear energy.
Mexico’s nuclear energy industry experienced a totally different development process compared to Argentina and Brazil. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, after World War II, the two countries developed its nuclear energy technology possessing abundant human resources (scientists and engineers) and receiving foreign aid. They put more weight on military purposes. Meanwhile, Mexico chose to rely on and adopt foreign technology (mostly from the United States). Mexico also had no chose but to focus on commercial and peaceful use of nuclear energy because it was the leading nation of the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty which aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
In 1967, the early part of the first period, Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad(CFE) commenced joint cooperation with the Stanford Research Institute(SRI) bearing in mind the possibility of constructing commercial nuclear energy facilities. However, the policy making process encountered obstacles from the beginning. Scientists (especially those of The National Nuclear Energy Commission, Portuguese: Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear; CNEN) argued for investment in basic science before building nuclear power plants while the CFE’s strategy concentrated on quickly acquiring the know–how of nuclear power technology by importing a power plant from abroad. Such strategy of the CFE hindered the progress in Mexico’s nuclear power development profoundly. The turnkey–based construction of the nuclear power plant did not bring much benefit. Not only did Mexico fail to gain technological self–reliance, it also failed to become financially independent. In 1970 Mexico’s first nuclear power plant was funded by the World Bank, the export–import banks of the United States and Japan, and other sources of foreign capital. Moreover, internal and external conflicts blocked the way of Mexico’s nuclear power policy aiming for energy diversification, comparative advantage, transference of technology, and elevation of its international status. The Mexican government’s policy brought limitations of its national freedom. Nuclear energy development was delayed because of public opinion and internal conflicts of nuclear power agencies even in the 1980s. Although the official objective was consistently to obtain technological independence, Mexico still remained reliant on foreign technology even after Laguna Verde became operational. The situation was the same even in the 1990s. In addition, Mexico’s vision to become a technologically developed nation or a nuclear power nation only created disputes within the country and did not lead to progress. Laguna Verde became a lesson that shows how difficult it is for developing countries to earn technological self–reliance in nuclear energy. Indeed, there were many external factors that made Mexico to constantly depend on foreign technology and investment. Examples of these factors would be the Chernobyl incident, instability of the international oil market, Mexico’s susceptibility to foreign financial market, public opinion, problems of the policies carried out by the Mexican government, and other structural factors that fundamentally did not allow self–reliance for Mexico in any aspect. Furthermore, the six–year term of each administration made Laguna Verde’s policies inconsistent.
Mexico’s nuclear power policy can be summarized as the following. The weakness of its nuclear policy is defined by Mexico’s lack of freedom, technology, infrastructure, connection between oil and nuclear power programs, and political and executive consistency. Then what should developing countries like Mexico do in order to develop nuclear power which can contribute to development and growth? Mexico’s lesson is simple. Such socially, politically, and economically sensitive industry should be coped with solutions for overcoming diverse internal and external structural limitations and obtaining technological independence, which would require international cooperation.
Brazil’s nuclear policy differed among administrations. Nuclear energy policy began in earnest during the military regime period (1964～1985). The military government saw nuclear power as both a means of national security and economic development. So Brazil’s ministry of science and technology invested heavily nuclear energy for technological self–reliance. However the first turnkey–constructed nuclear power plant Angra 1 by Westinghouse of the United States and Angra 2 by KWV of Germany did not bring satisfactory results.
Since then the Geisel administration implemented the so–called nuclear parallel plan, developing uranium enrichment technology on one hand and a nuclear submarine on the other. All major energy policies including the government led oil development plan, construction of the Itaipu power plant, alcohol fuel development policy, and the nuclear energy program, passed congress. In 1984, Brazil succeeded in uranium enrichment by using ultra high speed centrifuge.
The Sarney administration (1985～1990), the first civilian government after three military regimes, included the secretly carried out nuclear development program to the national energy policy and strived to regain international trust by ensuring the world Brazil’s commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy via adding amending its federal constitution. Brazil announced the initial completion of its nuclear fuel cycle in 1987.
However, Brazil’s nuclear policy was halted for a decade during the Collor (1990～1992) and Cardoso administration (1993～2002). The nuclear policy regained momentum during the Lula administration (2003～2010), which adopted the viewpoint of past military regimes. As a result in October 2003, Brazil successfully enriched uranium and expected to commercialize it within 10 years. The IAEA classified Brazil as a country capable of enriching uranium up to 20%. The upcoming Rousseff administration has already proclaimed its stance on continuing efforts to develop nuclear energy as the main energy supply source.
The reason why President Lula focused on nuclear energy is that constructing a nuclear power plant has become more economically efficient than building a hydroelectric plant. In addition Brazil plans on becoming a major supplier in the uranium enrichment market and is determined to acquire the core technology to be recognized as a self–reliant state by the international community (with only 1/3 of Brazil explored, Brazil has the world’s sixth most uranium deposits and is expected to become no. 2).
The Brazilian government aims to build an additional four nuclear power plants until 2030. Brazil is currently cooperating with Argentina in jointly constructing a nuclear reactor which would be standardized for Latin America. Therefore, human resource training and technology transference may be a significant variable in entering Brazil’s nuclear power market.
Meanwhile the federal constitution forbids private investment in nuclear energy. President Lula and President–elect Rousseff believe that the government should operate key industries. Although already privatized industries would not be nationalized again, federal energy corporations such as Petrobras or Electrobras are not likely to be privatized. Instead, creative ways for attracting domestic and foreign investment should be considered in order to lay inroads in Brazil’s nuclear power market.
Brazil is interested in the relation between Korea’s industries and government. Accomplishments in basic science are commercialized by industries which are backed by government policies. Such relation drew the attention of the Lula administration which perceived scientific innovation the source of economic growth. The succeeding administration will share the same interest. Ways to integrate Korea’s production technology and knowledge on nuclear power facilities and reactor producing technology with Brazil’s uranium development and nuclear fuel cycle technology must be studied. Moreover, we should consider policies to expand science technology cooperation between Brazil’s biotechnology, oil exploration technology, aviation manufacturing, and satellite launching technology and Korea’s IT, shipbuilding technology, and high speed railroad technology.
Argentina is rich in oil, natural gas, and water resources. Although it is capable of becoming energy self–reliant, Argentina is suffering from energy shortage due to decrease in natural gas supply and increase in electricity consumption to 9%. Argentina is considering ways to secure the energy it needs for economic growth by developing nuclear energy. Nuclear power’s advantages of stable energy supply, easy procurement of raw materials, economic efficiency, and preventing global warming are positively viewed in Argentina.
Argentina realized the economic significance of uranium already in the 1940s and carried out uranium exploration and development projects and in the 1950s initiated nuclear power generation. Argentina’s nuclear energy policy can be divided in to three periods. The first period is from 1950 to 1982 when nationalism and independence was at the core of the nation’s policies. It refused to accept the international community’s efforts for comprehensive nuclear safety measures because they limited Argentina’s national freedom. Consequently the world grew suspicious about Argentina’s nuclear program. In this period Argentina established the infrastructure for nuclear energy and succeeded in domestically producing nuclear power related technologies. The second period, 1983 to 2000, was when Argentina gave up its nuclear power development policy. Pressured by economic depression and international nuclear power accidents, Argentina scrapped its nuclear policy and joined in the Tlatelolco treaty (1994) and the NPT (1995). The last period, from 2001 to the present, is the period in which the nuclear policy regained spotlight. Influenced by the nuclear renaissance era and the desperate need for energy supply led to expansion in investment towards nuclear power
In the short term Argentina’s nuclear power policy will focus on maintaining the existing nuclear power plants. In the long term Argentina acknowledges nuclear energy as the alternative energy of the future which is why it tries to meet the international standard on greenhouse gas emissions and energy diversification despite is economic and financial problems. Even though the younger generation of the society is stirring public opinion against nuclear energy due to safety and environmental issues, the public is quite cooperative to nuclear energy policies since it has traditionally been a part of its national policy.
Argentina’s nuclear power industry was led by the government affiliated CNEA which possesses both horizontal and vertical autonomy. The CNEA enjoys freedom from authority and bureaucracy in policy decisions and has contributed to independent nuclear energy development. The CNEA carried out a consistent nuclear policy for 40 years. However in the 1990s when Argentina abandoned its nuclear policy, the CNEA’s role diminished and was divided into three bodies.
One of the key characteristics of Argentina’s nuclear energy development process is that the government induced active participation of domestic industries. Argentina has always required the participation for domestic companies in the construction of nuclear power plants and transference of technology upon signing a contract, which allowed Argentina to achieve comprehensive development.
Argentina today has two operational power plants, one under construction, six research reactors, four particle accelerators, three nuclear energy research centers, one heavy water factory, two research facilities, one uranium refining factory, and numerous nuclear medicine schools and radioimmunoassay centers. Argentina’s research reactors are considered to be the best in the world. The CNEA is entitled with full authority to own and operate the reactors. All nuclear reactors in Argentina are pressurized heavy water reactors and use natural uranium as raw material and heavy water as moderator. The next nuclear power plant will also share these traits. The three power plants each had 30%, 50%, 70% participation of Argentinean companies which was a great opportunity for domestic companies to gain experience and contributed to the localization of technology.
Based on its accumulated technology and experience, Argentina has become the key player in the fourth generation nuclear reactor market. Argentina’s very own CAREM nuclear reactor is a highly stable and economic all–in–one reactor which is a strong competitor of Korea’s SMART reactor. Argentina is planning on becoming the world’s 10th exporter of nuclear reactors. Completing nuclear fuel cycle is crucial to gaining freedom in the nuclear energy industry and energy self–reliance. Considerable economic benefits also follow. Having a  Clear objective of becoming self–reliant and investing and aiding the industry accordingly has made Argentina a key supplier in the international nuclear energy market. Argentina has cooperative relations with regional countries, Libya, Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Australia, the Netherlands, Jordan, and Korea. Recently the Argentinean government is subsidizing the nuclear industry to create more professional jobs.
Argentina is already an influential supplier and is actively implementing nuclear energy policies despite the 20–30 years when the world turned its back against nuclear energy. Therefore Korea’s strategy towards Argentina should be different from newly rising nuclear energy markets. Although Argentina falls behind in reactor management, Argentina possesses the experience, knowledge and human resources contending that of Korea. For mutual gains, a strategic affiliation would be a win–win strategy for the two countries.
The third chapter of this research paper introduces the key subject, policy directions for Korea’s nuclear energy industry. To draw up specific policies, specifics of Korea’s capabilities and MBA’s policies should be analyzed. National power may make or break nuclear energy exports which are why political will and diplomatic capability cover a huge portion in this part. First, Korea’s current export status and the Korean government’s ambitious ‘Nuclear Energy Export Industrialization Strategy’ are examined to find problems in Korea’s competitiveness in exports. Next, a SWOT analysis based on the results of chapter 2 will show what Korea must consider in exporting to MBA.
A comparison analysis has been conducted between the strengths and weaknesses of the Korean nuclear power industry and the opportunities and threats exporting to MBA have; mainly the opportunities and threats in technology, finance, energy matrix, human resources, international politics, international economy, and structural aspects. In addition, an action plan of Korean industries’ export direction has been specified. Detailed strategies or policies for Korean nuclear energy industries include strengthening inroads into the Latin American market strategy, strengthening internal strategies for exports, fuel supply strategy, strengthening international competitiveness via image improvement strategy, financial strategy, joint cooperation in human resource training strategy, and strengthening nuclear energy diplomatic capability strategy. These are specific, core plans for devising a strategic policy.

 

 

This study aims to seek for Korean’s strategies and responses to expand in Myanmar, investigating on the internal and external policy of a new Myanmar government in 2011 and the changing possibilities of the major countries toward Myanmar. To do this, this study firstly analyzed the whole procedures and results of the general elections which were held on 7 November, 2010 after 20 years since 1990.
Secondly, it scrutinized views of the international society and response of the Burmese authorities. Then the Burmese economic reform achievement was surveyed focusing on privatization ahead for the general elections, and verified a diplomatic and economic exchange between Korea and Myanmar. Based on mentioned points, this paper finally aims to set up a new Korea's approach toward Myanmar.
This general elections were blamed in means of undemocratic, unfair, unfree and not inclusive for the people since approved the new constitution after the referendum in 2008. This claims were not changed when electoral situation had launched in March 2010.
Not only main political parties such as National League for Democracy (NLD) which is the winner in the 1990 general elections and Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) did not register the political party to the Union Election Commission, but political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and other 2,100 peoples cannot run for election candidate and vote for the parliament as well.
Therefore, the general elections could be estimated as being manipulated by the government authorities and as not a multi party democratic ones in terms of free and fair because the members of the Union Election Commission were filled with pro-government figures, electoral laws which were included the heavy prohibitions and regulations were severely undemocratic, and key incumbent members took part in the runs for elections as a party member of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) which is pro-government political party came from Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).
A new Myanmar government could be given legitimacy from the surrounding countries and some neutralized countries may seek for new approach to cooperate with Myanmar or make their own strategies to enlarge in Myanmar, though the result of the general elections were damaged internationally. Internally, a new government could clear military regime as has sustained by the military junta, but they would not keep their ruling strategies like depending on physical power and closed stance in the international society.
Even they would uphold a their ruling cause through economic development which could cause physical benefit and social welfare to the national peoples as doing away with the state owned economic structure, giving them more privatization of the state owned enterprises (SOEs).
In macro level, there is possibility that regime support countries and regime oppose countries sustain their original own policies toward Myanmar, but we have to see the changing possibilities of Myanmar's strategies. Some regime support countries would adopt more aggressive expanding strategies than present limited advances toward Myanmar, participating in excavation to energy sector and contesting regional hegemony in the Andaman Ocean and Bay of Bengal. However, It seems that Myanmar will seek rather multiple diplomatic approach than depending on the power countries what is a typical manner at present in order to enlarge her national interests through using geopolitical and geoeconomic values. On the way to do this, Myanmar wants to be a pivotal country keeping the balance of power in Southeast Asia.
For those reasons, it is time that Korea has to consider turing previous sideline approaches and needs to make a chance to preoccupy Myanmar which is to be an emerging market Myanmar. Furthermore, Korea could be an alternative power to check China and India, strengthening relation with ASEAN including Myanmar rather than to be an observer on the regional hegemony contest. It means that Korea can seek national interests with continuous overseas market expansion, improves external national images, makes advanced diplomacy which could create peaceful and harmonious regional orders as well as has a good chance to establish a status as a middle group country in Asia.

In 2010, Korea has become 24th member country of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Development Aid Committee, DAC. Hereby Korea is the first nation which changed its position form an ODA recipient to a donor country after the establishment of OECD in 1961. Korea as an emerging donor is trying to develop its ODA policy accord with the United Nation's MDGs.
According to recent data, ASEAN received about 25 per cent of Korea's total ODA disbursement. Moreover, ASEAN is a core region of cooperation in terms of politics, economy and diplomacy. The importance of ODA comes not only from its characteristics of humanitarianism but also it is one of the important sources of a country's soft power which can lift up the nations's diplomatic ability and reputation. Therefore Korea's ODA toward ASEAN has its significance beyond a mere numerical growth.
Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in ASEAN but its relation with Korea has been rapidly improved. The number of Korean tourists who visited Cambodia reached 300 thousands, the two nations' trade volume increased six times more than 1997 and Korea's investment to Cambodia jumped seventy-fold from the year of diplomatic normalization in 1997. Now Cambodia is the sixth largest investment destination for Korea while Korea is the second largest foreign investor in Cambodia after China and the accumulated volume of the investment reached $ 2.75 billions. Also, Cambodia is one of our strategic partners for economic cooperation. In 2008, Cambodia was Korea's the second largest recipient who received $ 1.3 millions of grant. In spite of the growing need of systemic approach to ODA policy, there are few studies which deal with the ODA strategy toward Cambodia. For this reason, this study aims to analyze Cambodia's ODA circumstance to suggest ODA policy direction accord with Korea's new diplomatic strategy to Asia. To do so, this study will compare China, Japan and the World Bank's ODA policies. The strengths of these donors ODA strategy may provide good tips on Korea's ODA strategy toward Cambodia. Also through the field trip to Cambodia, we would scan Korea's current ODA strategy to develop it in the efficient way to reduce poverty and to boost economic growth in Cambodia.
Japan's ODA policy toward the South Asian region has been criticized as the country strongly pursues economic interests through ODA. Japan's foreign aid in Cambodia, however, is not criticized neither by government officers nor by civil society. Japan keeps its chanel open with Cambodian local governments to research aid demand areas. Especially, Japan established NGO desks in the local JICA offices which connect Japan's development NGOs and Cambodia local NGOs. Unlike in Indonesia, Japan does not seek natural resources and markets simultaneously in Cambodia. This may be one of the reasons that Japan ODA policy has a fine valuation in Cambodia.
China's foreign aid has very unique characteristics. Often China's aid does not meet the international standard of ODA as its purpose of aid is highly related with political leverage or economic ripples toward the recipient countries. Nonetheless many recipients welcome China's aid since it gives huge amount of aid promptly under the principles of reciprocity and "non-interference in domestic affairs." Traditional donor countries admit that China's aid has many problems in terms of the global standard but they do not deny China's contribution to the international ODA field. Some ODA people and NGO people who we met in Cambodia also showed similar perspectives.
It would be difficult to get some lessons from China's aid policy since its uniqueness and Korea's lack of aid resources. Yet some see China's strategy in the more positive manner since Korea's current ODA budget is not sufficient enough to meet international assistance purpose. There is a suggestion that Korea should consider China’s strategies more seriously.
Korea just has been joined DAC. Korea’s position among DAC members is not really firm neither strong at all right at this moment. That is why Korea should concern how well those recipient countries will give credit for Korea's ODA. Korea should set ODA Strategies samrtly according to recipients' evaluation.
Even Japan and China have been operating ODA Policy for their own interests. Korea’s economy is much smaller than Japan and China. Then Korea more likely needs to recognize the limit of aid funds for ODA and to develop specialized ODA policy according to Korea’s economy scale. We should take consider China’s strategies which is to avoid contempt from donor countries but to have reciprocal relationship with recipient countries by helping recipient countries to reduce their poverty and by supporting the local people to feel that they are actually being helped.
Doctor Kwon Yul suggests that Korea which has very limited resource should actively collaborate with China. From his point of view, Korea and China,as newly rising donor countries, both have lots of common to share, Korea can hand over ODA management and evaluation skill and Know how to China. ODA joint project with China can give Korea the stable funding. Cases of China's ODA to Cambodia bring several tasks that Korea has to develop its own ODA model. Korea’s ODA model has to be shaped other than material aid due to limit resource. It is supposed to maximize aid effectiveness. From that point of view, Korea has to revitalize exports to Cambodia. Genreally, Cambodia shows satisfaction about Korea’s aid system. The biggest reason is Korea has experienced the same economic difficulties because of that, Korea understands developing countries situation so unlikely the Western donors, Korea tries to meet the needs of Cambodia.
Some western donor countries emphasize aid consulting system, In this way, Assistance can be interference of Cambodia’s customary and its administration so Cambodia government prefers Korea’s aid system.
Currently, Korea focuses on not only material ODA but also developing software ODA project. But like Saemaeul Movement, such development experiences of Korea are not really welcomed from Cambodia as we expected it is.
Because of the difference situations and circumstances between Korea and Cambodia, the experiences that Korea went through in the past are not fitting into Cambodia’s current situation. in addition to that, Cambodia basically wants aid to be put into the sectors which immediate aid effectiveness can be seen.
As mentioned above, Korea’s ODA system to Cambodia is generally satisfying but still Cambodia sees that scale of aid from Korea is very limited and insufficient.
So if Korea keeps providing this amount of ODA and takes into consideration Korea’s own interests Cambodia will turn aside Korea’s ODA efforts to Cambodia.
 The critical problem pointed about Korea’s ODA is that communication channel between donor country and recipient country has not been settled yet. For example, Policy dialogue has not been institutionalized yet between Cambodia government (or local communities) and KOICA.
Because of this, Korea’s aid effectiveness can’t be transmitted to Cambodia government, Cambodia’s demands or requirements can’t be transmitted to Korean government.
Especially Cambodia government has been struggling to find out how Korean NGOs work in Cambodia. even though, Korean NGOs often have held many collaborated development projects in Cambodia their activities are not recognized well. KOICA has been playing a role of bridge between Korean NGO and Cambodia government but, lack of institutionalized policy dialogue, it is really difficult to communicate to share the information about those projects.
This research aims to suggests key ODA strategies to Cambodia for maximizing Korea’s ODA effectiveness as it below.
Current aid projects meets Cambodia’s development strategies though, compare to China, Japan, Korea needs to actively participate into core strategy Governance sector which has comparative advantage like efficient and fair administrative system building.
-Korea should take part in donor countries cooperation system like CDCF,GDCC,TWG.
-Korea’s general ODA strategy, apply selection and concentration principle into ODA and Cambodia should be the one to be selected and concentrated.
-In terms of ODA effectiveness, Government should not only promoting Government oriented Official Development Assistance but also consider supporting NGO oriented assistant projects.
-Before aid enforcement system, It is urgent to have integrated support system of grant aid and concessional loan through policy consultations between the ministry and office,
-To Take consider of Kore’s ODA scale, it is necessary to extend cooperate projects with other countries.
-PBA or Pre-PBA Aid system should be put in a practice
-Government should increase PPP Project budget to Cambodia and develop collaborate model fits into Cambodia

This study tries to deduce several key factors that enable successful science and technology official development assistance (ODA) for sustainable development of three ASEAN countries. For this purpose, the research team set up a noble and robust research framework that analyse science and technology (S&T) ODA for sustainable development. The framework includes three dimensions. 1) the issues of sustainable development and priority orders of those issues 2) evaluation on S&T capability 3) demand for S&T cooperation/ODA. The research team divides the issues of sustainable development into 18 fields and evaluate each field whether the field is in high demand of S&T cooperation, whether the field receives significant social importance and priority but lacks S&T capability to certain degree. The field is then identified as a promising field for Korean S&T cooperation to enhance ODA for sustainable development.
Therefore this report examines and presents three cases: Cambodia, Vetnam and Philippines in following manner. The capability of industrial S&T and the level of sustainable development is presented in each country case. In addition, the priority order of sustainable development issues (18 fields) and priority order of them for S&T cooperation is also presented. 
In sum, Cambodia is so concerned with environmental (water in particular) issues and health problems, upon this, these fields are of high demand for S&T cooperation. Therefore concentrating ODA effort on these fields could enhance effectiveness of ODA. In the case of Vetnam, they want to build technologically advanced small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and they specifically demand Korea's advanced technology of construction and transport system. Building new satellite cities of sophisticated sewage system with engaging local SMEs would be beneficial. As for Philippines, S&T cooperation should be directed to support poor people, for example, by providing cheap electricity to slums and derelict local villages.
In terms of four large classification of 18 fields, Cambodia picked the preservation of environment (36.7%) and sustainable economic development (36.6%) as top priorities, Vetnam counts sustainable economic development (52.4%) as top, Philippines picked sustainable economic development (34.8%) and Urbanization and poverty gap (34.6%) as most important.
The actual value of this study lies in suggesting analyzing framework for S&T ODA. In particular, the methodology enables to set priorities of S&T cooperation to achieve sustainable development of those developing ASEAN countries. However, the methodology also inherently restricted by the knowledge and scope of survey respondents. In the future wider sampling of diverse experts may increase the usefulness of this study.

 

This study attempts to find the implications for an effective operation of Korea's ODA policy in three Southeast Asian countries - Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, which will hereafter be referred to as CLV. In particular, this study proposes some policy measures in enhancing the effectiveness of Korea's ODA policy on CLV focusing on human development through investment on education.
Mainly based on  statistical data and survey analysis, we found that low productivity of human capital caused by poor educational infrastructure and services has been a major factor behind the lower level of CLV’s economic development. The international community's efforts through ODA were also ineffective because of diseconomies of scale, lack of donor-recipient partnership, and lack of cooperative system among donor nations.
In sum, we propose following policy measures to make Korea's education ODA in CLV more effective: (1) build a cooperative system among related public institutions for more effective operation of CLV's human capital development, (2) retrain teachers in higher educational institutions in cooperation with private institutions such as universities and non-government organizations, (3) develop more practical educational services in vocational institutions in connection with private companies, and (4) strengthen ODA management system by means of establishing bilateral (between donor and recipient) or multilateral (among donor countries) cooperative mechanism.