In order to maximize management efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOE), privatization of SOE was the main trend in 1980s among OECD countries. In 1980s Korea also started to sporadically propelled privatization of SOE, and then the progress of privatization became more active after the IMF period. Since then there have been increased researches on foreign privatization cases, such as British experience, in order to provide privatization strategies for Korean SOEs.
As an extension of such efforts, this study attempts to draw policy implications for the privatization of SOEs in Korea through comparative analysis on privatization policy of Korea, China, and Japan. Above all, although Korea, China, and Japan are on different development stages, comparing the three will be valuable, since both similarities and differences are found in their process of privatization policy making. Furthermore, this comparative analysis is also significant, since the privatization of SOEs in each country will provide a foothold to vitalize mutual investments among the three countries. Especially, the privatization of Japan, the most advanced nation among the three, is worth to be benchmarked for Korea and China, and the privatization of China, the most active pursuer of OECD guidelines for privatization, is also worth to be reviewed.
Thus, this study comprehensively analyzes main characteristics, core issues and transition process of privatization policies in the three countries, especially compares and summarizes the results of researches by 1) definition and type of SOEs, 2) governance of SOEs, 3) background and purpose of SOE reform, 4) core issues by each reform periods, and 5) accomplishments and problems of SOE reform policy. As a result, definition and type of SOEs are shown to be similar, while governance of SOEs is clearly different among the three countries. China shows centrally collective governance (Central Model) by ‘State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council’. Japan shows the decentralized governance (Sector Model) by competent Ministries overseeing corporations with special legal status. Korea shows both the central governance by Ministry of Strategy and Finance and decentralized governance by competent Ministries (Dual Model). Problems of SOE policy in the three nations are also closely related to such difference of governance. However, in the case of China, incapability of corporations and government organization to realize effective governance is more significant problem than institutional inertia.
Based on the comparative analysis results of SOE policy in Korea, China and Japan, this study suggest the following policy recommendations. First, in light of the China’s reform case, policy efforts should be concentrated on maximizing autonomy of management according to OECD guidelines. Second, China’s SOE privatization should be utilized to vitalize and diversify Korean investment into China. Third, it is necessary to predict the target enterprises and the progress of Korean privatization based on Japan’s precedent, and relevant researches must be done in advance. Forth, the privatization strategy of Japan’s Sector Model can be the appropriate solution to gain both efficiency and publicness.

This research basically aims to fully understand the classification of Non-Tariff Measures(NTMs) and the method of estimating Ad-Valorem Equivalents(AVEs) of NTMs. Especially, of those ASEAN countries, it has studied Indonesia where has relatively large market and lately introduced a range of  Non-Tariff Barriers(NTBs). Also it has estimated AVEs of NTMs on specific steel products.
Since 2008, new classification system has been suggested with UNCTAD as a centre and it can be categorized into import measures and export measures. And the import measure is divided into technical measures and non-technical measures. Particularly the distinction of technical measures can be understood as a cause of the dramatic growth in Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures(SPS).
After global financial crisis, Indonesia has introduced the restriction of import policy on main import goods. This was for improvement of trade balance caused by export reduction, short-term native industry protection and long-term local industry promotion. Moreover, Indonesia supports from natural resources to manufacturing business in agriculture, shoes and steel industry to be expanded to export industry, as well as, they contribute various benefits to local industry in order to develop trade-related local service industry like financial and distribution.
For the AVEs of NTMs, firstly estimation method based on trade volume through gravity model and comparative advantage theory, is recently increasing rather than direct price comparison. This is because information securing on non-tariff item by item has become easier than before. Especially, statistics database such as TARINS of World Bank and UNCTAD has released the details of NTMs including SPS and TBT for each product. CoRe NTMS Database which is led by the United States international Trade Commission(USITC) has recently been introduced and the details of NTMs for major trade countries have also been released.
This research has estimated AVEs on NTMs of steel products in a whole world. Although it is under the similar condition of NTMs in accordance with the characteristics of those countries’ products, there is a big difference between the influences. Especially the product  having more elastic demand has shown much higher effect of trade protection.

This study analyzes structural problems of the Japanese Public Pension Scheme in a rapidly changing socioeconomic environment; brought on by population aging and low economic growth. It also aims to present the direction of reforms proposed by the Democratic Party of Japan for the Public Pension Scheme, in order to resolve the above issues. Low economic growth has received relatively little attention compared to population aging in Korea, yet it should be carefully reviewed since increasing unemployment and hiring of greater numbers of temporary workers could affect the pension scheme.
First, this paper systematically presents structural features and problems of the Japanese Public Pension system. The Japanese Public Pension Scheme consists of the Basic Pension without independent finance, the employees’ Pension Insurance (pay-as-you go method based on the social insurance system), differences in burden among workers and wages depending on occupation and corporate burden of welfare pensions. Because of this apparently complicated structural feature, Japanese Public Pension Scheme is facing difficulty in responding to changes in the social environment such as population aging and low economic growth. As a result, Japan’s Public Pension Scheme is facing questions as to whether it is sustainable, since it could become a cause of instability in pension finance, inter- and intra-generational inequality and overall vulnerability of the social security system.
However, the Japanese government did not attempt radical reforms that could respond effectively to changes in the socioeconomic environment, but only paid attention to reform limited to ‘shoring up’ the present system, in that they only consider increases in the insurance rate and reduction of wages. It is a foregone conclusion that the restructuring of Japanese Pension Scheme, at the fundamental level, is very necessary. The nationwide consensus on the need for pension scheme reform definitely led to a new political environment, resulting in a change of government for the first time in 54 years.
Then, can we expect the Democratic Party (new regime) of Japan to solve pending issues and restructure the country’s Public Pension Scheme? It may be too early reach a final conclusion as the Democratic Party’s reform has yet hit full stride; however, it has revealed enough of its outline for evaluation on the direction of the reform and its practicability. A positive aspect in their reform proposal emerges in that it clearly considered environment change such as population aging and low economic growth. However, they have yet to discuss even the most basic elements for the implementation of minimum security pension in the form of taxes, making us question whether they are genuinely determined about reforms the pension.
Korean Public Pension Scheme faces similar issues with its Japanese counterpart, such as instability of pension finances, the question of fairness between generations and possible blind spots. This paper elicits several implications for Korea by analyzing the Japanese case. First, it is very important to figure out actual conditions of the Public Pension Scheme and then take preemptive action against population aging. Second, we need to pay attention to low economic growth since it creates blind spots in terms of pension benefits, which could threaten the stability of thepension finance system in a long term. Third, Korean pension scheme has received much attention in relation to low fertility and population aging, but not low economic growth. This paper emphasizes importance of improving the pension scheme to prepare for the twin threats in the form of population aging and low economic growth.

In the post-Cold War era, there are growing transnational threats such as terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, piracy, natural disasters and diseases, and global warming. These threats transcend national boundaries and sovereignty so that a country alone cannot resolve these threats. With increasing transnational threats, a sustainable economic development and growth has also been threatened in the world and in Southeast Asia. As the number of people earning money from illicit trade of drug and human trafficking through organized crime and piracy increase over time, individual and social health and international peace and security are affected negatively.
To tackle with these transnational threats, international organizations and regional cooperative mechanisms have made efforts to reduce the drug and human trafficking, organized crime, and piracy and yet have not successfully resolved these transnational threats so far. In order for Southeast Asia to attain a sustainable economic development through international trade, it is necessary that countries in Southeast Asia take cooperative measures to tackle with these transnational threats with shared vision for drug, crime and pirate free Southeast Asia.
Therefore, this project is designed to analyze the current state of the transnational threats in Southeast Asia and to recommend alternative regional cooperative measures in tackling with these threats with the involvement of countries of Northeast Asia to be led by the Republic of Korea. As ROK endeavors to become a global Korea by making contribution to the creation of public good, regional mechnism which will be beneficial to all the countries in Southeast Asia and in Northeast Asia, working on transnational security threats will be able to become top priority policy agenda for the ROK government for years to come. The ASEAN countries also began to realize the importance of resolving problems of transnational threats collectively rather than individually because the network of transnational threats is rapidly growing and a country can not resolve these threats individually. However, Southeast Asian countries feel the lack of expertise and money to resolve these threats successfully. Therefore, ROK needs to help them to reduce and remove these transnational threats by providing top class experts and install regional cooperative mechanisms.
Because of limited financial support the ROK National Research Council for Economics, Humanities, and Social Sciences this year, our research project focuses on four transnational threat areas such as drug, human trafficking, organized crime, and piracy out of eight areas of the entire transnational threats in Southeast Asia. The next year project will focus on the remainder of the eight areas of transnational threats such as terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and global warming.
The research findings disclose the seriousness of drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, and piracy issue, while the piracy issue is less serious than the former three issues in Southeast Asia.
First, the drug problem becomes more serious over time in Southeast Asia. Opium is under control, whereas the amphetamine type stimulants (or ATS) becomes more serious. Below the half of the world’s ATS uses are the users of East Asia and Southeast Asia, while over half of the world’s methamphetamine seizures are people in Southeast Asia.
Second, more than 60 percent of the world’s human trafficking is taking place in Southeast Asia and almost one third of the human trafficking in targeting women and children in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, women coming from all over the world through human trafficking suffer from sexual harassment, becoming victims of sex business.
Third, the drug and human trafficking becomes more serious when these two crimes are intermingled with the international organized crime. In Southeast Asia, there have been so many losses incurred by the Russian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and Chinese Samhaphoe. These organized criminals are connected to the drug manufactures in the Golden Triangle Area along the Mekong River.
Fourth, 33 percent of 4,586 piracy cases that happened in the world between 1991 and 2008 occur in the Southeast Asian sea. Although the trend of Southeast Asian pirates shows a decline, economic losses associated with pirates entail massive losses that can not be recovered including ship damage, insurance costs, robbery, casualties, transportation delays, etc.
Since these transnational threats incur not only economic losses but also human losses, Southeast Asian countries have endeavored to resolve these problems individually so far with limited efforts regionally and internationally.
This research analyzed the limitations of the current approaches taken by the individual country, the bilateral approach, and the international approach to resolve these problems. Countries in Southeast Asia feel the need to combine and coordinate the individual approaches to achieve a shared goal of the drug and crime free Southeast Asia. Outstanding among these cooperative efforts to reduce and remove these transnational threats are ASEAN and ARF, while the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a regional institution building to resolve the piracy issue in Southeast Asia in spite of the limited success of the ReCAAP so far.
Therefore, this research project intended to develop alternative cooperative measures on the region-wide basis. As result of intensive study of the problems both through field interviews of those who are working to combat the crimes and pirates and through extensive literature surveys, this research result discovered that there should be two different approach to the four problems areas. On the issue of drug, human trafficking, and organized crime, there should be an integrated and combined approach to these three problem areas because the organized and networked crime organizations facilitate the drug and human trafficking mostly. On the issue of the piracy issue that occurs in the ocean, a different approach needs to be taken.
In order to reduce and remove transnational organized crimes associated with drug and human trafficking, we need to address four sub-topics: Establishing information and intelligence sharing mechanism among concerned countries; Capacity building of governments and public institutions to enforce law and regulations; Establishing multinational criminal law enforcing institutions, and; Establishing mechanism to prevent, detect, and forfeiture money laundering in cooperation with all the countries involved. In this light, this research report wants to recommend four alternative policy measures to reduce and remove transnational organized crime and drug and human trafficking. First, countries in Southeast Asia with the help of the Republic of Korea, China and Japan should strengthen ASEANPOL like EUROPOL to turn the current police chiefs’ meeting among ASEAN member countries into a strong and cooperative mechanism to combat transnational organized crime, drug, and human trafficking collectively with an installment of information sharing center. Second, ASEAN countries with the help of ROK, China, and Japan need to institutionalize the Towards AsiaJust Program which aims to support countries in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia to develop a more solid network of judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials to fight transnational organized crimes. The network needs to be strengthened and sophisticated to outsmart the rapidly growing criminal network. Third, ASEAN countries need to be encouraged by ROK, China, and Japan to launch in a full-fledged effort the Prosecutor Exchange Program (PEP) that South Korea initiated in association with the UNODC in Bangkok, Thailand, in order to facilitate joint research, promote exchange of prosecutorial expertise, to strengthen prosecutorial capacity, and to provide educational opportunities to those who are relatively weak in terms of prosecutorial capacity. Fourth, ROK, China, and Japan need to take the lead to form a collective fund to provide material support to the ASEANPOL, AsiaJust Program, the PEP, etc.
With regard to the piracy issue, we need to strengthen the ReCAAP that has been launched by the Japanese lead in 2006 and fourteen countries including all the countries in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia participate in. Since the main function of the ReCAAP is confined to the information sharing center, we need to broaden and deepen the mission of the ReCAAP by hosting navy officers and maritime police from each member country. Though South Korea contributed $100,000 annually to the ReCAAP and send one director level official to the ReCAAP, this is not enough to turn the current ReCAAP into a capable institution to prevent, seize, and penalize pirates occurring in Southeast Asia. In addition, ROK, China, and Japan need to conduct joint naval exercises by using the naval ships sent to Somalia to combat pirates there because those ships pass through the Southeast Asian sea. ASEAN plus three countries need to install education programs to teach the laws and regulations to prohibit the pirates and launch local development programs to improve living conditions of the residents who live in seashore of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines under the poor conditions. The South Korean ODA(official development assistance) needs to be linked intelligently and efficiently to the area of reducing and removing pirates that occur in the sea around Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines to make sea lanes of communication safer and beneficial to the flow of South Korean export and import.

The economic relationship between Korea and ASEAN countries has deepened over the past few decades. The geo-political importance of ASEAN has magnified as ASEAN members enter into free trade agreements with Korea, China and Japan. Also, as the regional underdeveloped countries like Vietnam and Cambodia started to grow fast in the current decade, the ASEAN is believed to strengthen its status in the world economy and politics in the future. Undoubtedly, the changing status of ASEAN urges Korea to extend its economic and political relationship with the countries in this area.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the socio-economic development of Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Sustainable development of these countries are in conformity with Korea’s interests as Korea regard these countries as strategic partners and plan to provide substantial portion of her ODA resources to these countries. It’s hard to consider Korea’s ODA policy has been systematic and efficient so far. As a member of Development Assistance Committee of OECD, Korea plans to increase her ODA resources significantly, which makes it indispensible to conduct a serious research on the recipient countries as well as to reframe its overall ODA policy. In this regard, this study not only provides a systematic method to evaluate socio-economic development of these countries but also evaluate the status of these countries. The main feature of the method is to establish consolidated indices for socio-economic development taking advantage of a variety of existing data. Secondly, a field study is conducted to complement the above method in order to reflect qualitative features of socio-economic development. Extensive interviews were conducted with local experts, government officials, scholars and international agencies with respect to Vietnam. Finally, the identification of most problematic areas enabled us to provide possible areas for cooperation between Korea and these partner countries. It is hoped that this study provides a good foundation in the process of ODA policy formulation to these countries.
It is not surprising that the ASEAN underdeveloped countries face similar challenges in the course of their socio-economic development. Actually, in almost every area of development capacity, the ASEAN underdeveloped countries are lagging behind those countries which they are targeting to catch up with. Obviously, it is not realistic for Korea to provide her ODA resource to help improve all the areas of problems considering Koreas limited ODA capacity and experience. Therefore, this study identified several areas of cooperation on which Korea should focus in formulating its ODA strategy.
For economic development, these areas include enhancement of infrastructure, institutional development for market economy, technological cooperation. Considering that industrialization is one of the most important development goals of these countries, strengthening these selected areas directly support the strategy by enhancing production capacities of these economies. Furthermore, this study take into consideration of the fact that Korea has comparative advantages in the above areas. For social development, health and education are selected for areas of cooperation. Peoples of these countries are exposed to various diseases like HIV, tuberculosis and malaria. Also, these countries do not provide adequate education service which is an essential element of sustained economic and social development. For these areas, this study provides general directions of ODA policy for Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar, respectively.

Executive Summary 

I.  Introduction 

II. General Survey on the Belarusian Economy 
2.1 Current Economic Situation 
2.2 Foreign Investment Climate in Belarus 

III. The External Economic Relations between Belarus and the EU 
3.1 Economic relations with the EU 
3.2 Political relations with the EU 

IV. Conclusion 

References 

Belarusian economic growth over the past 10 years has been fueled primarily by high economic growth in neighboring Russia and the rise in world prices of oil products. In particular, the basis of Belarus’s robust economic growth was subsidized energy prices from Russia and increases in domestic petrochemical industry production on the back of sustained high oil prices. Like this, the Belarusian economy depends significantly on external factors, especially the relations with Russia and its macroeconomic conditions. However, the fact that Belarus is Europe’s last autocratic nation and with little freedom of speech puts some distance between Belarus and the EU. Recently, the government of Belarus has undergone subtle changes in its external relations and foreign investment policy since the crisis in relations between Belarus and Russia started. Belarusian government will maximize its own interests by attracting investment from the EU.
This paper deals with a rough sketch of the macroeconomic situation of Belarus and its economic structure, and addresses economic relations between Belarus and the EU in depth. Moreover, this study predicts future external policy directions of Belarusian government and provides its policy implications from the viewpoint of foreign investors. Based on this study, although the government shows a favorable attitude in the foreign investment and relations with EU, Belarus’s accession to the EU or accession to a free trade zone with the EU does not seem likely to be realized in the near future. First of all, the EU is not interested in expanding their borders due to the fact that it brings EU countries more trouble than advantages. Belarus also does not have any plans to join the EU or seek formation of a free trade zone with the EU. Firstly, after joining the EU, Baltic countries have lost control of their industry and agriculture, and became simply a market for European companies. Second, due to its special relationship with Russia, Belarus has enjoyed the lowest prices on energy sources among all EU countries and most CIS countries. Third, Belarus has a political and economic system, which cannot be integrated into the European system, as they are distinguished from EU in the view of not only economic management, but also with respect to the role of state and government in society.
Considering these factors, it is much more possible for the Belarusian government to simply maintain a balance between pro-Russian and pro-European policies. The foreign policy of Belarus will be aimed primarily at expanding the level of FDI. To attract foreign capital, the government will seek to maximize several advantages of Belarus including geographical position, presence of free trade areas with Russia and Kazakhstan, cheap energy, well-developed infrastructure and skilled and cheap labor. Also, Belarus will try to expand its external relations to other countries, such as Latin America. Thus, from the viewpoint of foreign investors, it would be wise policy to keep an eye on Belarus’s subsequent external policies towards both EU and Russia.

There is increasing interest and investment on the 'new and renewable energy' technology as current government announced 'green growth' as major economic paradigm. While profile and promotion policy of developed countries such as EU, U.S.A. and Japan are known generally, those of South East Asian countries adjacent to our country are not known well. In this context, this study investigated economic profile, demand and supply of energy, development status and promotion policy and planning of new and renewable energy technology of five major South East Asian countries including Indonesia, Philiphine, Malyasia, Vietnam, and Thailand.
Based on the above primary study, the purpose of this study is to derive possible ways for improving reciprocal benefits in terms of mitigation of green house gases. Besides, we studied on current status of international cooperation projects relative to new and renewable energy between Korea and South East Asian countries and Korean government's supportive policies on oversea's resource development law and mitigation policy on tariff with regard to new and renewable energy.
First of all, transfer of integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology, hydrological power generation technology, biomass and biogas, biodiesel power generation and refinary technology, heat pump technology, and provision of feedstock for bioenergy are selected as major potential cooperation fields. It is expected to increase rate of return of the projects if they are connected with CDM program. Next, we suggest utilization of pre-existing international cooperation programs such as R&D cooperation projects of international energy agency, APEC new and renewable energy cooperation projects, and new and renewable energy forum of ASEAN+3.
Finally, as potential government supportive policies in the sense of cooperation with South East Asian countries, overseas resource development policy and tariff mitigation policy should be modified in order to boost overseas plantation of bioenergy and accommodate imports of feedstock for bioenergy.

Due to the global financial crisis, the role of developing countries has risen on the international stage. Therefore, the importance of cooperation with ASEAN - the major trading partner of Korea - is growing more and more. Especially, Vietnam and Indonesia are the major concerns among ASEAN countries because both have successfully overcome the global financial crisis and maintain the stable economic growth. Moreover, both are one of top countries in ASEAN in terms of an inflow of foreign capital. Notable is the fact that Vietnam and Indonesia have much interest about the industrialization in Korea. Also, they recognize that the major driving force of miraculous economic growth in Korea is the accumulation of human capital. Accordingly, they try to figure out the status of their human resource and develop it. The quantity and quality of human resource in Vietnam and Indonesia also matters for Korean firms and government considering them as candidates for the global production network.
Because of the interest in labor market of Vietnam and Indonesia, a lot of researches have done, especially in Japan. Representative ones are ｢アジア企業の人材開発｣ (副谷正信, 2008), ｢アジア 諸国における 労働力の 国外送りだしに関する 調査研究｣ (野村総合研究所, 2009), ｢ベトナム人材力調査報告｣(JETRO 2009). These researches mainly focus on the status of the labor markets, labor policies, and potentials of the labor market in South-East Asia. However, previous researches just end up with simple and plain approach, or depend on subjective data like surveys. Therefore, this research covers the information of labor supplies in Vietnam and Indonesia by profession as well as by population and region, and use various sources like objective data, interviews, and surveys.
Implications of the analysis of labor markets in Vietnam and Indonesia is related to global production network in Asia. In the international production division with China as the center, both countries will complement or partially replace China in terms of production. The key factor to construct the flexible and horizontal structure of the production division is human capital. In this context, this research analyze the status of the labor markets in Vietnam and Indonesia in various perspectives and evaluate them. The conditions in the labor markets is fairly positive. Both have cheap labors and young populations, and moreover, there is virtually no cultural and institutional obstacles. In Vietnam, labors are diligent and enthusiastic to learn new skills. The government also tries to enhance education and labor productivity. Indonesia has the large pool of stable labor force. Despite of complex regulations, low fluctuation is one of strongest advantages. Due to the skyrocketing wage compared with productivity, however, these positive circumstances might not go long. Policy measures for this problem is described below.
First, firms and government should find causes of rising wage and control them. Thoughtless wage increase to scout labors by firms plays a role to boost up wage. Therefore, firms should make commitment not to increase wage if not needed, and not to deprive labors of other firms without proper reason. Also, government should provide firms with the information of the labor markets so that they can be more flexible. Second, firms and government should find the way to increase the labor productivity in a long run for Vietnam and Indonesia not to lose their competitiveness. Firms can internally train workers for a long time, or financially support educational institutions. Korean government can support the policies of local governments for improving productivity. Or Korean government can provide local workers the chance to get a job in Korean labor market to improve their abilities. Third, stabilizing labor-management relations is needed. Especially in Indonesia, occasional strikes hinder foreign investment from times to time. These kinds of labor-management conflicts usually result from cultural differences, not from wage or welfare. Therefore, managers should understand their culture and maximize effective communication. Forth, Korean government can give advice for both countries on policies for industrialization and human capital based on its experience. It is difficult for them to change the industrial structure and to develop human capital by themselves. This kind of advice and cooperation can be beneficial for all in terms of promoting social and economical interaction. Fifth, we should change the way we understand Vietnam and Indonesia. We should not regard Vietnam and Indonesia as poor developing countries any more. There is a very little chance that Vietnam and Indonesia will stay in the low-quality production bases for decades. Therefore, we have to construct the more flexible global production network, which is not vertical network based on technological differences. Accordingly, firms should diversify their investment and expand to high value-added field. Moreover, we have to prepare to sell goods in their domestic market. Finally, we should consider them as future economic partners with high level of income and technology.

Thanks to the sweeping popularity of Korean pop culture around the world, known as Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, South Korea’s image overseas has changed significantly in recent years. Yet, a systematic, long-term research on this trend hasn’t been conducted thus far. Here we are going to examine potential ways to further promote South Korea’s image perceived by the Vietnamese media, based on Korea-related articles in Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan and a survey of local people.
In Vietnam, terrestrial, digital and satellite broadcasting as well as cable TV and radio broadcasting are available, with the number of international broadcasting channels on the rise. The media serves simply as a propaganda tool in Vietnam, since its key role is to promote the communist party and the government.
An analysis of Korea-related stories carried by Nhan Dan shows that the most frequently reported topic about South Korea comprised the relations between South Korea and Vietnam, while the Vietnam News Agency was the main source of those stories.
Economy-related photos topped the list in the number of pictures, and the Vietnam News Agency and Vietnamese photo journalists were the main providers of those photos.
As for news stories, there were many more reports that simply narrate particular incidents than in-depth, analytic articles dedicated to the backdrop, history and the social structure to explain incidents.
100 questionnaires were distributed to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and Ben Tre each, and the respondents were divided by ages, genders, jobs and hometowns. (About 68 percent of the questionnaires were collected in the end.) Those in their 20s made up the largest proportion of the respondents at 36 percent, women at 55 percent, teachers at 30 percent and those from urban cities at 86 percent.
In regards to South Korea’s image, 84.7 percent of the respondents replied that they had a positive image of South Korea. Asked if there was any shift in the image of South Korea, the largest proportion of 17 percent, except those who refused to answer (55 percent), said that they had no interest in South Korea at first but developed a good image gradually. The biggest factor influencing the creation of a positive image of South Korea was Korean dramas, followed by Korean movies and entertainers.
Based on these findings, we suggest that South Korea’s image be promoted both at the governmental and private level. First, the government needs to enhance cooperation and support aimed at providing the Vietnamese media with more accurate news stories about South Korea, expand the Vietnamese-language broadcasting program airing from Korea, show more interest in the correct use of the Korean language, and support the efforts toward more diversified and consistent broadcasting for Vietnamese people residing in Korea. It is also necessary to nurture and sponsor experts who will work at diplomatic offices in foreign countries and those specialized in multiculturalism-related issues as well as Korean-matters professionals in Vietnam. Lastly, the government needs to increase its economic assistance and exchanges of volunteer activities between the two countries.
At the private level, it is necessary to encourage and support not only exchanges of cultural products but also those of culture-related personnel and technologies. South Korean companies doing business in Vietnam should make greater contribution to Vietnamese society to improve Korea’s image in the area of private-level economic exchanges. Korean expatriates in Vietnam, for their part, should make as much effort as Korean companies there to contribute to promoting Korea’s image, bearing in mind that each and every of them is a diplomatic envoy representing his or her home country. And last but not least, it is necessary to support Vietnamese people living in South Korea through cultural and media programs so that Korea’s national image can get a big boost.

 

This book explores how national museums and monuments in Southeast Asia have constructed national identities. The book identifies the museums and monuments as cultural and political texts that have been used for certain purposes throughout history. At first colonial regimes made use of museums as means to construct the colonial territories and impose colonial identities on the governed peoples and also to promote themselves as benevolent preservers of the heritages of the colonies. Later, the modern nation-states inherited the colonial museum practices and have employed museums to realize and embody imagined communities.
The book comprising six case studies in major Southeast Asian countries is an outcome of interdisciplinary research that involves historians, anthropologists, and political scientists who shared their research methods and theoretical viewpoints developed in each discipline.
The first case study is concerned with Singapore. The Singaporean government established the Merlion, a half-lion and half-mermaid figure, as its national symbol along with various museums. The Merlion, an "invented" national symbol, came into being in reflection of explicit political intention. When the notion of "nation" was alien in newly independent Singapore, the government paid a close attention to create its own history in an attempt to mould various ethnic groups into the "Singaporeans." Through the displays of historical and cultural objects in the museums, the government intended to invent a "long" history of Singapore, as if it had enjoyed some hundred years of "collective" history. The museums in Singapore have been employed to plant such an image that Singapore is an old country. Exposed to the imagination, the Singaporeans are expected by the government to have a collective identity as Singaporeans.
The second case deals with the National Museum of Cambodia. This museum, established in 1920 when Cambodia was a French Protectorate, inherited both harms and benefits from colonial modernism. This legacy continues even today. Given that tourism is the most important income source for Cambodia, cultural policies concerning historical monuments are directly translated into national identity. It means that the Cambodian government's commercial promotion of the country as a legitimate heir of Khmer civilization is deeply associated with the projection of national identity. Thus, Cambodia identifies its national identity with Khmer identity, both identities not being separable. Indeed, this Khmer identity was a product of colonial scholarship. Later, the Khmernization of Cambodian identity was once again emphasized and strengthened under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979). The current government also attempts to project the equation of the "Cambodian national identity = Khmer identity = Angkor civilization" and employ it as a political and diplomatic tool to build up national identity and increase international attraction.
The third case engages in the National Museum of Indonesia. Unlike other museums in Southeast Asia, this museum represents the colonial discourse in its display. Established as a colonial museum, this museum still sustains colonial views on the indigenous society. The republic utilized the images constructed by the colonial force to identify its newly-defined national territory. However, in transferring the colonial museum to the modern one, the Indonesian republic failed to decolonize the museum display patterns. For instance, while the display emphasizes the Hindu-Buddha period, there are few displays regarding the Islamic period, when the archipelago experienced another internal development. In addition, another main emphasis of the display is focused on the "colonial era," which was defined in the museum display as a period spanning from the 17th to the early 20th century. This time depiction is erroneous as the real colonial period just started after the 19th century. What draws our attention is that the items categorized as artifacts of the colonial period include European-made scientific objects and furniture. This exhibition pattern gives the visitors an impression that during the period the scientific Europe was the only figure and in contrast indigenous initiatives remained absent. In sum, the museum display accounts for the archipelagic history with a few points: first, the archipelago once had a high civilization in the ancient Hindu-Buddha period; second, the archipelago lost its dynamics and inner energies to develop society afterward; and third, the loss of inner dynamics inevitably invited European colonial control equipped with scientific knowledge and technology. The failure of decolonization of museums was attributed to the lack of financial support and the inability and mismanagement of the Indonesian government and people in running the museum. It tells us that not every museum or monument project aiming to construct national identities resulted in success.
The fourth case explores the Bangkok National Museum in Thailand. The case focuses on how the museum intensifies three pillars of Thai national identity, namely "monarchy", "Buddhism," and "nation." The display of historical artifacts legitimizes the formation of Thai national identity. The salience of the monarchy-related artifacts comes from the historical fact that the monarchy was deeply involved in the initiation of the museum. It is also prominent that the Bangkok National Museum displays a number of Buddhism-related artifacts. It shows how Buddhism has been intimately associated with Thai national identity under the sponsorship of the monarchy: Buddhism was declared as the state religion during the reign of Rama V. However, the form of national identity relying on Buddhism contradicts religious reality in Thailand. Indeed, Brahmanism has been accommodated in various royal ceremonies throughout history. Furthermore, Buddhism has become syncretic, influenced by Brahmanism and animism. Despite the fact, the museum emphasizes only Buddhism, dismissing other religions such as Islam and Christianity both of which take some portions in southern Thailand and among hill tribes respectively. Above all, the museum heavily focuses on ethnic Thai cultural artifacts, paying little attention to other ethnic groups' ones. The history of Thailand in the museum is evidently equal to the history of the ethnic Thais; in contrast, the histories and cultures of other ethnic groups are not represented at all. The Bangkok National Museum displaying only the three pillars' related artifacts is limited in representing the whole reality of Thailand. The problem with Thai national identity in representation is clearly evident in the museum.
The fifth case deals with the Vietnam Museum of Ethnology (VME). This museum exhibits cultural artifacts of 54 ethnic groups in Vietnam, which were officially categorized by the government. During the post-1954 period, Vietnam launched socialist reform, declaring the elimination of feudal practices and colonial influences and the rehabilitation of Vietnamese tradition. In addition, the accommodation of various ethnic groups was another important task for the government. For the purpose, the government launched various programs including the establishment of the VME to intensify national identity and harmonious relations among ethnic groups. The VME's priority is to represent the cultures of the 54 ethnic groups in their "original" forms to the public. It is also targeted to meet the need to attract foreign tourists by promoting the Vietnamese tradition of harmony and co-existence. However, the VME reflects certain dilemmas in its exhibition. First, the government faces an unsettling task to emphasize uniformed national identity among the ethnic groups and demonstrate the variety of numerous ethnic cultures at the same time. Second, while the museum emerges as an important tourist destination, the government needs to maintain a socialist stance in the management of the museum. The solution to these dilemmas is to describe the ethnic cultures as their "original" forms, without reflecting their dynamics or changes over time.
The last case investigates the Ho Chi Minh Museum in Vietnam. This museum, with a particular focus on the life of Ho Chi Minh, represents a series of historical processes that Vietnam has experienced, including independence and unification. The project of venerating Ho Chi Minh as the father of nation is initiated not only as a credential to his dedication to nation but also as a tool to gain the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule. Emphasis on Ho Chi Minh is closely associated with the fact that the legitimacy of the current regime has been weak as economic reform has been intensified. In response to the situation, "Ho Chi Minh Philosophy" officially emerged in the early 1990s and it has been employed as a legitimate ideology since then. Various objects showing the life of Ho Chi Minh particularly emphasize how Ho Chi Minh became the symbol of unification of the North and South of Vietnam. In addition to the sections introducing the life and revolutionary projects of Ho Chi Minh, the museum installed two sections displaying Ho Chi Minh's affection for the southerners and in turn southerners' affection for Ho Chi Minh. Although this museum appears to exhibit a life of one man, indeed it displays the history of Vietnam since Ho Chi Minh is the personification of national destiny and history.
We make sense of some overarching issues through the cases explored in this book. First, there remains a gap between the displays and actual histories. The Southeast Asian nation-states' attempts to make use of the museums to create nationalistic narratives often result in widening the gap between them. Second, the discourse of colonial modernism is still evident in present-day Southeast Asia. The museums in Southeast Asia directly or indirectly inherited colonial legacy. Third, the degree to which the building up of national identities through museum-monument projects is successful is dependent on the governments' ability to recognize museums as useful political texts and exploit them for the purpose of nation-building.
This book will enhance the understanding of Southeast Asia and thus increase mutual relations between Korea and Southeast Asia. The book also provides a foundation for future studies that would engage in the issues of decolonization in museums and cultural policies in Southeast Asia.