It is noted that the formation of the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India is one of the most significant political events in the rearrangement of world order after the Cold War. After President Yeltsin defined the situation after the end of the Cold War as a ‘cold peace’ and proposed the idea of strategic co-operation among the three nations in 1993, the initiative was taken in 1996 by Yevgeny Primakov, then Russian foreign minister, who supported the idea of 'eurasianism.' Since 2006, after their declaration of the Year of Russia, Year of China and Year of India, the three nations have endeavored not only to enhance political-economic cooperation but also to build common values by taking a cultural approach. The Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India, which can be interpreted as an ‘Entente Cordiale,’ can be defined as a ‘political alliance’ or ‘quasi-alliance’ closer to a network alliance rather than a military alliance. This paper is composed of three main parts. First, this paper outlines a brief history of Sino-Russian relations which has demonstrated dual aspects of conflict and cooperation since the Cold War era. Secondly, it gives special focus to several cooperative and competing factors that exercised great influence on the development of relations between China and Russia in the post-Cold War era. Third, considering that American forces have played an overwhelming role in maintaining US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, it examines how the RIC regime as a burgeoning strategic triangle might go on to establish a multi-polar system for power balancing, under closer cooperation between China and Russia. Regarding factors of cooperation between the two nations, we can summarize some factors briefly. These include: settlement of the Sino-Russian border dispute, exclusion of the 'three evils', comprehensive economic cooperation, military cooperation such as holding joint military exercises, arms imports from Russia, and mutual exchange of revolution in military affairs (RMA), etc. As part of a search for a multi-polar system to counter US hegemony, this would involve reinforcing a multilateral or regional cooperation system including SCO, RIC, BRICs, Six party talks, etc. On the other hand, there are also some conflicts which not only prevented the two nations from establishing full-fledged ties, but actually pose a greater long-term threat to each other. There are still some factors hindering the development of closer relations between the two nations and enhancing their mutual confidence, such as engagement of the US in Asia, emergence of a G-2 system, the 'China threat' derived from the Rise of China, and competition for SCO leadership. Although Sino-Russian relations has recently been defined as a 'comprehensive strategic cooperative relationship' which has characteristics of coexistence simultaneous with those for cooperation and conflict, what is certain is that they are the most important stakeholders as well as core actors among SCO members in the course of establishing RIC as a strategic triangle. From a viewpoint of strategic pragmatism, because cooperative factors are more influential than factors for competition in Sino-Russian relations, it is anticipated that these two nations could maximize mutual interest by not only minimizing influence of competition, but engage in diplomacy for selective cooperation based on 'seeking common ground while reserving differences (literally chinese expression is qiutongcunyin).' After all, given that the US made a decision to promote re-engagement and re-balancing in the Asia-Pacific through the new policy of 'Pivot to Asia' in 2011, it would be critical for China and Russia to effectively deal with conflict factors in order to establish and develop a firm RIC triad in the future. The relations between Russia and India embodies factors for cooperation and conflict at the same time. The cooperative factors are in economics and security - more specifically, in military, science and technology. There are even cooperative factors in regional conflicts and territorial disputes. The fact that India imports 60% of the Army’s military hardware, 70% of its naval vessels and 80% of aircrafts for the Indian Air Force from Russia clearly illustrates the level of the military cooperation between the two nations. Russia and India share common interests in the issue of regional conflicts and territorial disputes. For Russia, the handling of issues related to the Chechen secession and regional conflicts in Central Asia are critical for the maintenance of national/territorial integration and stabilization of the post-Soviet space. To India, a territorial disputes with Pakistan such as Kashmir and the Islamic secessionist movements stand out as recognized risk factors. On the other hand, there are conflict factors between Russia and India like those involving the US and China. Russia does not necessarily oppose the reinforcement of cooperative relationship between the US and India; however, it would be unbearable for Russia if the strategic interests which Russia has historically possessed in Asia were damaged as a consequence. It is possible that the enhancement of military collaboration between the US and India can cause the strategic erosion for Russia in Asia, such as in Central Asia, in the long term perspective. The most important issues in the conflict factors between India and China are territorial disputes, energy and resources, settlement of the sphere of influence in South Asia, and the ‘asymmetric perception’ on strategic values between two nations. Sino-Indian relations were switched to a cooperative one with Russia as the strategic adhesive, and the conflict factors between China and India, for example, territorial disputes, have been institutionally resolved. However, if elements of the Sino-Indian conflicts are not structurally resolved, it is possible that cleavages in Russo-Indian relations will come to the surface. While the Russo-Chinese relations is a ‘strong link’ and Sino-Indian relation is the ‘weak link' in terms of the formation of the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India; the Russo-Indian relations can be deemed an ‘initial point’ of the link. At the time of the formation of the Strategic Triangle, Russo-Indian relations were not deemed as vital in comparison to Sino-Russian relations; however, it would have been difficult to form the Strategic Triangle if the strategic relations between Russia and India had not been restored and strengthened. The Russo-Indian relations which complements the Sino-Indian relations in the formation of the Strategic Triangle functions serves as a 'facilitating' factor in the structural evolution of the Triangle. Russia and India agreed to the formation of a multipolar system as all three countries opposed the unipolar global order, as Russia pursues the restoration of its status as a great power and defence of the sphere of its influence, while India also wishes to be a global power in the region and world. As long as the US strengthens its Asian policy such as the ‘Asia shift’ or ‘pivot to Asia’, and intensifies the strategic encirclement of China, China will continue to strengthen strategic links with Russia and india. It is clear that the strategic link with India make Russia a stronger global actor. At the same time, India can strengthen its position on global issues by establishing a strategic connection with Russia. In this regard, India is able to resolve security concerns over China and contain the emergence of China as the sole hegemon in Asia. The competition and conflict between the two groups, the Continental Triangle of Russia, China and India (which includes a Russo-Indian connection); and the Maritime Triple Alliance of the US, Japan and Australia led by the US, can lead South Korea into a strategic dilemma. The Strategic Triangle is related to the Lesser Northern Triangle of North Korea, China and Russia which is based on the treaty of amity and friendship. For South Korea which is linked to the Maritime Triple Alliance through the Korea-US mutual defense agreement, it is desirable to avoid entrapment in the conflict structure and minimize the ‘alliance dilemma’, and to establish a peace regime in the region. In order to establish the East Asia peace regime, the Helsinki Process is regarded as one of the most convincing alternative models. Given that the Helsinki Process aims to institutionalize security and peace in Europe by recognition of the status quo of borders and territories, it is clear that the East Asian version of the Helsinki Process should start from the resolution of territorial disputes and the recognition of status quo of borders. Russia, China and India are deeply involved in territorial disputes in Asia as parties of interest. Considering the situation that the US uses military 'exercises' to impact territorial disputes in East Asia, it is possible that the Strategic Triangle of Russia, China and India will also become actively involved in the territorial disputes in the region and influence issues such as Dokdo. The relationship between China and India is the weakest link in the "China-India-Russia triangular cooperation regime". The India-Russia relation has been the facilitator in this triangular regime, and the China-Russia relation has served as the driving force. But because of mutual strategic distrust, China and India could not overcome the conflicts in various spheres and this has created a 'drag' in terms of the development of the triangular cooperation regime. The 1962 war between China and India was a turning point in contemporary China-India relations and had a deep and negative impact on relations between the two countries, especially on India's China policy. Though China-India relations have improved substantially since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988, and also the agreement to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity in 2005, distrust and conflict have not gone away. On the other hand, it means that improvements in China-India relations could take the triangular cooperation regime to a new level. At present, there are both of positive and negative factors in China-India relations. The positive factors are (1) China and India desire a peaceful security environment to concentrate on economic and social development instead (2) two states need the other's collaboration in resolving domestic political problems such as Tibet for China and Kashmir for India, (3) as developing countries, they share a common interest in international climate change negotiations and multilateral trade negotiations (4) they provide diversity as a diplomatic asset that ensures flexibility and autonomy in foreign relations. The negative factors are (1) unsettled territorial disputes and the rise of nationalism which hinder (the) two countries from resolving the said dispute (2) competition for dominance in Asia where the spheres of influence of two countries overlap (3) economic conflicts caused by the trade deficit of India in bilateral trade. Considering these factors, we can lay out four different scenarios for this bilateral relationship for the middle term: strategic cooperation, cooperative relations, competitive relations and strategic rivalry. Because of geopolitical competition and territorial disputes, we cannot expect the advent of strategic cooperation in the near future. Yet considering the huge political and economic costs, it is difficult for two countries to go back to confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War. The most likely possibility is a combination of competition and cooperation. If the positive factors play a leading role in the bilateral relationship and two countries succeed in separating the cooperative elements from strategic conflicts like territorial disputes, the two sides could continue to develop a cooperative relationship. If the negative factors play a leading role but the two sides do manage to avoid military conflict, a competitive relationship will emerge instead. In the latter instance, a triangular cooperation regime cannot develop smoothly. But in the former instance, it could be transformed into a meaningful multilateral cooperation forum with robust civilian exchanges and impact on the international order (due to China and India's rapid growth and huge potential). In that case, it could offer both opportunities and challenges to Korea. The main challenges include further multi-polarization of world politics which demand increased flexibility in Korean foreign policy, and the threat of increased economic competitiveness of China and India could pose to the Korean economy, especially in the manufacturing industry. But there could also be opportunities such as the increased chances of controlling China's rise through multilateral cooperation and a new large market which China and India's economic growth could provide to Korea. Despite the existence of conflict factors, the Triangle System led by Russia-China-India in cooperation with Central Asian states within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(hereafter, SCO) has raised the status of the SCO and the triangle system itself both in Asia and the Eurasian Continent. Furthermore such condition has also resulted in Russia maintaining an position of superiority, with China extending its influence in a practical and gradual way, and India making rapid and efficient advances within a short period and displaying itself under the sun; all the while checking increases in American unilateralism initiated by the Bush administration in 2000. On the contrary, US has seen its position erode although it is constantly engaged in Asia politically, militarily and economically. Ever since the 2008 Georgia War has exposed US inability in that area, it is likely to say that Russia's status became stronger while US influence was slightly reduced. The Georgian War also proved the viability of the Russian military and its firm political will, while demonstrating Russian power to countries of Central Asia, the SCO, and the triangle. One of the key reasons that the US was not able to extend its influence in Central Asia is, more likely than not, the existence of the triangle system based on the SCO. Of course, Central Asian states regard US as a main outside player in the region and as the only country capable of projecting power all over the world. The Central Asian states recognize the importance of America's global role in maintaining their independence, diplomacy, expansion of security autonomy and sustainable economic development. Furthermore, these states have to maintain friendly relations with the US which can hold the fierce Sino-Russian competition/expansionism with respect to Central Asia. However, the Central Asian states will try to cooperate with the US in a manner that does not impact the triangle system and Russia-China alliance. The cooperation with the triangle system within the SCO has provided Central Asian states with a chance to establish their own foreign policies and test them. The SCO could provide institutional leverage where those states could promote various diplomatic options against China, Russia and India in order to achieve their interests and also a balance the power dynamic so that no one power attains too much influence. The triangle system, in the context of mutually horizontal relations and multilateral cooperation, has been a platform for newly independent states to proceed with state-building and system transition in a stable manner. Therefore, we can conclude that the relations to the triangle system within the SCO has been somewhat beneficial for Central Asian states, in terms of enhancing their status as sovereign states, securing respect for their sovereignty and common security, extension of diplomatic autonomy, economic development, and mediation of regional conflicts and disputes. The relation between Central Asian States and the triangle system within the SCO has implications for Korea as follows: first, the multilateral organization where powerful states participate could lead to remarkable reduction in the level of uncertainty in terms of security for weak states. The experience of Central Asia clearly shows that conflicts and disputes among the region's small countries and also between the major powers and small states could be efficiently mediated and managed. For instance, since 2000 when the SCO has been fully activated, conflicts over territory among member states have been brought under control. The region's history contain its share of upheavals and events such as the Andijan uprising, but they are unlikely to characterize events at the international level. Therefore, it offers a useful reference for Korea, who has its own issues and conflicts such as six-party talks, relaxation of tensions between North and South Korea, territorial conflicts in East Asia, disputes regarding history and so on.

 

In Central Asian countries, the volume and role of SWFs (sovereign wealth funds) have gradually increased. SWFs in Kazakhstan (NFRK, National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan) and Azerbaijan (SOFAZ, The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan) have increased notably in recent years because of growing incomes from energy exports. They were founded around same time: NFRK was established in 1999 and SOFAZ was established in 2000. They were also established in a similar manner, by presidential decrees. As of July 2012, total assets for NFRK is at 58.2 billion dollars and while the figure for SOFAZ is 32.6 billion dollars.
There are some similarities in the role and management strategies of SWFs in two countries. SWFs of two countries have the following similarities in terms of the roles.
First, SWFs serve stabilization functions for national economies, especially in the periods of crisis. The economies of the both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is very vulnerable because energy export depends on the global economic situation. In addition, the global economic situation is often unpredictable. If for no other purpose than for overcoming unpredictable economic crises, energy exporters like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan need to prepare stabilization funds.
Second, SWFs can assist mid-term or long-term strategy for diversification of national economies. The proportion of energy in total exports of the two countries are high: 72% in Kazakhstan and 95% in Azerbaijan. It is vitally urgent that both countries develop industries in non-energy sectors; and the two countries have made various efforts for the purpose of diversifying their economies. In Kazakhstan, Samruk-Kazyna wealth fund was established to manage the principal government corporation. And in Azerbaijan, SWF is helping the AIC (Azerbaijan Investment Company) establish new companies in non-energy sectors.
Therefore, we can conclude that SWFs of the two countries have definite roles in short term stabilization programs and long term development strategies.
In terms of management strategies, SWFs of both countries have the following similarities. First, their investment strategies tend to be conservative. Most of their investment is concentrated in fixed assets of developed countries, while the volume of investment to shares is relatively low. As a result, the impacts on SWFs of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan from crashes in equity prices during the global financial crisis were low.
Second, SWFs of both countries are problematic in terms of transparency. In particular, SWF of Kazakhstan provides little information on its operations to the public. There is no published annual report or other documentation on investment strategy or performance. Unlike SWF of Azerbaijan, the SWF of Kazakhstan did not accept the Santiago Principles, which was established for accountability and transparency of SWFs in 2008.
In terms of the role of the President, Presidents in both countries have a critical role in decision-making processes of SWFs. Although there are committees within the SWFs, the presidents have the final say in all major issues. 
In the future, the assets of the two Central Asian countries will likely increase further. At the same time, the assets' roles in their respective national economies will be increased gradually, which means Korea will need to cooperate with SWFs of these countries. SWFs of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are willing to diversify their investment to financial sectors of developing countries, such as Korea. Therefore we need to attract investment of SWFs to the Korean financial sector.
On the other hand it is necessary for Korean companies to take part in SWF projects in Central Asian countries. Although these countries made efforts to diversify their economies, industry diversification has yet to be accomplished. Accordingly, there could be many projects with respect to the development of infrastructure and promoting the non-energy sector.
Also Korean companies can cooperate with SWFs for investment in another country. For this purpose, it is possible to combine technique, experience of Korean companies, and capital of SWFs of Central Asian countries.

The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiation which was launched in November 2001 has been at stalemate for more than eleven years. As many empirical studies has shown, the progress of the multilateral trade liberalization is crucial for the continuous growth of the global economy. The stalled DDA is expected to impede on the continuous growth of the world economy.
Against this backdrop, this study intends to analyse the factors which have led  the stalemate of the DDA negotiation and to present some implications for its completion. In particular, this study tries to analyse the delaying factors in the three major market access areas, namely, agriculture, non-agriculture market access (NAMA) and services. And this study aims to present some international cooperation plans as Korea alone cannot solve the problems.
The overall reasons that the DDA negotiation has not been progressed are as follows: Firstly, the US has not shown its political leadership. President Obama has not delivered his leadership in international trade policies under the circumstances that his approval rating has been falling.
Secondly, In the EU where its member nations have suffered the fiscal crisis, the economic conditions do not support the policies for market opening and reduction of subsidies in the agricultural sector.  
Thirdly, FTA as a substitute for the DDA negotiation has been proliferating. As major member countries are actively pursuing FTA negotiations, the effectiveness of the DDA negotiation with regard to market opening is declining. 
Meanwhile, if we analyse the delaying factors in the three key market access sectors, the agricultural sector can be divided into domestic supports and market access areas. In the domestic supports, developing countries are confronting with the US in that excess benefits are given to the US. In the market access area, special products and special safeguard mechanism for the developing countries are the key issues. In particular, it is accepted that special safeguard mechanism is necessary, but India is confronting with the US and EU on its conditions for exceeding the UR concessions.
In NAMA, the sectoral liberalization is the major issue. And on this issue, whether China will participate or not is the key. The participation of the emerging developing countries such as China is crucial to reach the critical mass in order for the sectoral liberalization to be taken into effect. China is opposing the mandatory participation, arguing that the participation in the sectoral liberalization must be on the voluntary basis.
In the service sector, the developing countries do not have interests in the multilateral liberalization negotiations due to their worries about the possible market failures. Accordingly, the trade-off negotiations have not been tried. Furthermore, the lack of progress in agriculture and NAMA also affect the service negotiation. This is because that the deadline of the submission of the second revised offers is linked to the deadline of the modalities of agriculture and NAMA. 
Under these circumstances two scenarios can be considered as the overall international cooperation plans for the completion of the DDA negotiation. For the optimistic scenario, it can be proposed that duty exemptions be provided to the LDCs' products as well as the trade facilitation issue be linked to the aid for trade. In addition, IT service agreement can be proposed because it can be considered as a precondition for the success of the ITA II negotiation.
As the pessimistic scenario, in the market access side, it can be considered to adopt the most conservative version among the various proposals put forward so far in the goods area and also to adopt the revised offers in the services area which have been submitted since May 2005. In addition, as a way to alleviate the oppositions from the developing countries, the linkage between trade facilitation and the aid for trade as well as the duty-free and quota-free treatment for LDCs can be considered.
As the compromise plans in the major sectors, firstly in the agricultural sector, it can be summarized as developing countries accept the position of the US in the domestic supports while they can attain concessions from the developed countries in the area of special products and special safeguard mechanism.
In NAMA, the US and China should agree on the sectoral liberalization negotiations. For example, the US can have China participate in one of the sectors which it prefers and instead the US should participate in the negotiation for the textile and clothing and allow China can select another sector voluntarily. Otherwise, it can also be considered to conclude the NAMA negotiations abandoning the sectoral liberalization negotiations since the benefit by doing so will still be greater than the loss from the failure of the overall NAMA negotiations.
In the service area, it is inevitable that its progress is tied with the progresses in the agriculture and NAMA. In the service area alone, it is necessary to have enhanced prudential regulations and pro-competitive regulations in order to alleviate the worries of the developing countries about the possible market failure. As a method of attaining this objective, a 'services knowledge platform' has been proposed, where sectoral regulators, trade negotiators and interest groups can discuss the assessment of the current policies and possible reforms to bring benefits.

We analyze the relationship between the government debts and credit rates of OECD countries between 1995 to 2010.
In the chapter 2, we first summarize the OECD countries’ credit rates history and the definition of sovereign credit rates. We also report the relation between the credit rates and macroeconomic variables. The credit rates drop quickly in case of downgrading, but they rise steadily otherwise. The countries with international currencies get the better credit rates but the credit rates are affected by the debts. The countries’ credit rates drop when they get the bailout from IMF, they recover very slowly due to stigma effects. The countries which has the stable macroeconomic conditions have the better credit rates and the lower interest rates and CDS premiums.
In chapter 3, we analyze the how the OECD countries’ credit rates are determined by using linear panel model and ordered logit model. We focus on the total debts, foreign debts, short-term debts, foreign currency debts, international currency status and difference between upgrading and downgrading. When the debts increase, the credit rates get down. The effect has magnified, if the debts are supplied by foreigners or foreign currencies. If the countries have the international currency, their credit rates are not sensitive to governments’s debts and other determinants.
In Chapter 4, we look into the four countries’ cases with the most volatile credit rates changes. In Greece and Iceland cases, their credit rates are downgraded due to the sudden increase of debts. In Slovakia and Poland cases, the debts do not play as a key determinant in upgrading their credit rates. In every cases, the per capita income and the frequencies of financial crises are the main determinant of credit rates’ changes.
In Chapter 5, we look into the credit rates history of Korea and how the determinants work in Korean credit rates’ changes. We also suggest how to manage the government debts in terms of maintaining the desirable credit rates. The Korea’s credit rates are upgraded during the global financial crisis due to diminishing the stigma effects from Asian currency crisis. The increase of per capita income and current account surpluses contribute the upgrading. We suggest to maintain governments debts, foreign debts, foreign currency debts and amounts of issuance in order to keep or improve the credit rates. And we also suggest to internationalize won.
 

This study analyzes the causes of the European debt crisis and reviews reforms the eurozone has pushed for in order to solve the crisis. It also focuses on the future prospect of economic governance of the eurozone. European debt crisis has spread over the entire Eurozone despite the bail-out of Southern European countries. Starting from Greece, Ireland and Portugal were bailed out and since the second semester of 2011, Italy and Spain have been under pressure of a potential debt crisis due to their soaring bond yield rate. During the early period of the crisis, the Eurozone focused on providing liquidities to Greece. However as the crisis affected other countries one after another, Eurozone’s responses have become more comprehensive, recognizing that the crisis is related to insolvency beyond liquidity crisis. The causes of the debt crisis can be analyzed in two parts: macroeconomic factors of individual countries and structural default of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The fiscal stimulus measures used during the global financial crisis caused serious damage to fiscal sustainability of the individual eurozone countries. In addition, a failure in economic governance (Greece) and a distorted growth strategy based on asset bubbles (Spain and Ireland) provided a cause for the crisis. Since the debt crisis, the financial market has been increasingly doubtful of the integrity of the eurozone as a monetary union and this lack of confidence has turned up as diverging yield rates of government bonds. With regard to the structural problems of the eurozone, it seemed that eurozone countries adopted the single currency without serious budget disciplines and coordination mechanisms for fiscal policies. The ambiguous role of the European Central Bank (ECB) as a “lender of last resort” is also pointed to as the reason that the crisis has spread. Political factors acted strongly from the early stage of the debt crisis and the latter has an aspect of a political crisis about the European integration. Major actions were slow and ill-coordinated due to lack of leadership at the EU level. Germany and France did not share views in tackling the crisis from the beginning. In order to tackle the debt crisis and reform economic governance, the eurozone has advanced various measures in strengthening the fiscal discipline and reducing macroeconomic imbalances. First, the European Commission initiated economic governance and surveillance structures, along with two dimensions, 1) strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 2) preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances within the EU and Eurozone. The European commission introduced successfully the European semester which intend to exert peer pressure for relevant budget control for each members. The new economic governance set a mechanism for correcting macroeconomic imbalances based on an early warning system. In addition, 25 members of the EU signed the new fiscal pact which set up debt brake in each members’ legal system and strengthen sanction in case of violation. The ECB’s responses have been increasingly active. In order to keep financial markets stable, the ECB has intervened in lowering base interest rates to the lowest level, buying more sovereign bond in secondary markets and providing massive low-interest loans to European commercial banks. In October 2012, its president announced the ECB would purchase sovereign bonds of short maturity without limit, if the crisis spreads further. This announcement has been interpreted as a willingness of the ECB as a lender of last resort. There is a consensus that the Eurozone needs strong reforms in order for the euro to survive in the future. Firstly, it will be inevitable to push for a certain level of fiscal integration to sort out the current crisis. However, this will require a high level of political compromise, as well as efforts of debt-ridden countries for structural reforms and budgetary discipline. Progress towards fiscal integration will depend highly on political agreements between Eurozone Member States. Secondly, correcting macroeconomic imbalance between members will be a key issue in the medium and long-term, because the debt crisis is regarded as a consequence of diverging competitiveness between members. Thirdly, it will be increasingly necessary to develop a close coordination mechanism of economic policies between members. This mechanism will have to address not only budgetary behavior of Member States, but also comprehensive economic policies including labor market reforms and industrial policies. In the historical perspective, however, the EU has been developed through multiple crises, repairing its structural problems and resolving the differences among members. These precedents provide optimistic expectations for EU and Eurozone’s institutional reform. However, given the recession in real economies and de-leveraging in the financial market, the Eurozone may encounter a low-growth period for next few years. The European debt crisis has attracted a lot of attention from Korean media and policy makers, because the crisis provides various policy lessons in several areas. Particularly, some insist that Korean government needs to be careful regarding management of its public finances, given the future demand in social security and pensions. The others argue that the debt crisis of the Southern European countries did not result from excessive social spending, but from failure in creating a positive relationship between the welfare system and economic growth. At this point, we can elicit some policy lessons as follows. First, it is necessary to consider future fiscal demand in setting up a social security system. Population aging will be a more salient issue in Korea than any other OECD members in a couple of decades. Second, it is necessary to monitor development of household debt, because increasing private debt can exert indirect impact on credibility of fiscal sustainability. Third, Korea should develop domestic demand as well as maintaining competitiveness of its export industries.

The objective of the study proposes new strategies and concrete action plans of Korea's assistance, looking at the Official Development Assistance(ODA) status of the major donor countries and international organizations for Lao Human Resource Development(HRD), most important area for socio-economic of Laos, which is least developed country.
The study describes Laos strategies in the national development goals to find out the HRD demand. The analysis of the study includes not only the Government of Laos' own goals but also Lao socio-economic status and trends to get an accurate demand for HRD assistance, prioritizing the relatively weak and urgent field in local circumstances. It provides Laos socio-economic indicators and objective statistics relevant with HRD status. It explains that Lao HRD development has suffered from the imbalance of regional, ethnic, gender in addition to Lao governance issues.
This study also reviews ODA strategies and action plans of major donor countries and the international organizations in the field of Laos' HRD. The World Bank(WB) and the Asian Development Bank(ADB) have presented detailed goals for the targeted area and specific assessment methods, emphasizing the continuity and linkages between ODA programs. And these organizations have also stressed the partnership with other donor countries in the field of Lao HRD. Japan has set the strategic area for promoting the effectiveness of ODA by emphasizing the linkages between their HRD projects in Laos. And Japan has dispatched a training personnel dedicating to HRD in Laos and also supported to establish a permanent institution for the field of Lao higher education development. Australia has made mid to long-term strategies for Lao HRD and the annual report for the evaluation and inspection of the strategies. Australia has also focused on the support of Lao local and overseas scholarship for the higher education that it may maximize the effect within a small development assistance budget.
Korea has been a key partner in Laos' development over last 20 years, scale of Korea's ODA to Laos has ever increasing, the greatest proportion of it has been provided for Lao HRD. By far Korea's existing programs has been obvious somewhat for improving Laos HRD infrastructure. However, without a strategic approach and long-term planning, these programs have been shown to undermine its effects.
The study recommends within a limited budget Korea's ODA for Lao HRD is required new strategies as followings in order to maximize the effectiveness. At first, Korea's ODA for HRD should be concentrate on a specific region, sector, support measures in Laos. Thus, it is necessary for Korea's ODA to focus all of efforts, selecting the most underdeveloped and isolated area particularly in poor educational circumstance.
Secondly the dispatching of educational advisor and the establishment of permanent institution in Laos should be actively examined to enhance consistency and continuity in the program of Korea ODA.

The year 2011 witnessed unprecedented political change in the Middle East. Citizens took to the streets in mass protest against deepening poverty, high youth unemployment rates, corruption and longtime dictatorship. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen underwent regime changes, while there is an ongoing full-fledged civil war in Syria.
It remains to be seen whether such political changes in the Middle East will bring about significant social and economic transformation. The Arab Spring seem to have shaken the deep-rooted patriarchal and Islamic authoritarianism that has long been rampant in the region. The civilians of the Middle East could too question the legitimacy of the State and demand political change. The governments in turn are actively addressing issues causing social discontent, raising wages, and increasing investments for social infrastructure in the areas of housing, road construction, education and health and medical care.
This book summarizes the changes in the Middle East since the Arab Spring from an economic cooperation point of view and draws implications for Korea. More specifically, we look at how Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya have fared since the Arab Spring and how their major economic partners, the US, China, Japan, and France have reacted to circumstantial change. We then examine the nature of economic cooperation between Korea and each of the three middle eastern country,
Four prominent political and economic features seen currently in the Middle East as of 2012 are identified: contention among preexisting and newly emerging political forces, increased public spending, strengthened protections for domestic labor force and firms, high unemployment and corruption, and rising regionalism. We suggest that the Korea focuses on strengthening non-governmental linkages, reevaluate and revise trade and investment agreements with middle eastern countries, and reinforce development cooperation.

This study aims to explore some specific characters based on the involution of diplomatic relations comparing each regime after independence in Myanmar. Furthermore, it needs to seek some probabilities in the previous and present diplomacy each. Finally, it prospects future and its features of foreign policy which has been propelling by the new government. This study is based on the three crucial diplomatic policy factors, such as individual level by ideas and norms of political leader, inter-state level composed with sociocultural factors, and intra-state level which deals with international order.
The basis of foreign policy of Myanmar is nonalign neutralism, which has been decide from the individual and intra-state level, including political idea of independentista, geopolitical situation surrounding independent Myanmar. Especially, political ideas of leaders, such as Buddhism, humanitarianism, socialism had absorbed inter-level.
Before the end of the Cold War, Myanmar had pushed ahead a bandwagon strategy, not to be dragged into the Western and the Eastern sides but accepted outer assistance in order to national reconstruction and economic development. But super powers like the U.S., USSR and China assisted various physical aid and exported political ideology in order to put Myanmar under their influence.
As China, which is the most important state toward Myanmar’s foreign policy, had expanded Cultural Revolution to Myanmar in 1960’s, tension was building up between two countries. USSR had took advantage of confusion so that she realized the expanding strategy into Myanmar. There was a lot of competition among the super powers surrounding Myanmar in the Cold War era. On the contrary, Myanmar responded to strengthen nonalign strategy, withdrawing the Nonalign Movement in 1971.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the EU clearly declared against the neo-military regime and started the comprehensive sanction to Myanmar since 1993. The neo-military, setting up a taking political power as their first purpose, has chosen to cooperate with China to penetrate to pressure from western countries. On other side, the neo-military pursued a loose solidarity establishing or reestablishing diplomatic relations with non liberal countries which might stand on the side of Myanmar.
Regardless of diplomatic scope expanding, Myanmar’s dependency toward China intensified. ASEAN which agreed to Myanmar as a member country with Constructive Engagement in 1997 dispersed on the case of Myanmar take ASEAN chairmanship in 2006. On the other side, China always protected Myanmar whenever Myanmar’s problems stood in the international stage, then Myanmar gave lots of natural resource to China as returning thanks for favors. Therefore China could make a structure her sustainable economic development with policy for separating politics from economics.
However, there happened some different views including bring up the Myanmar problems into UNSC led by the U.S., China’s tepid response and the visit to China of Maung Aye who was an ex vice-chairman of military council. Those factors could changed Myanmar’s standing toward China. In other words, China has taken priority in economic benefit than internal problem of Myanmar, also has been changing to tepid stand on pressure and criticism from western countries against Myanmar.
It made changing of ruling strategy of junta that they felt piled fatigue from long lasting military rule and crisis of regime setback, which succeeded into unpreceded reform and opening when the new government launched. As one of reform programs, foreign policy changed from bandwagon to hedging strategy. Myanmar will pursuit national interest, trying to balance of power between two power countries, the U.S. and China under the uncertain regional circumstance. The U.S. will check China’s power, strengthening engagement to Myanmar, while China will also keep the U.S.’s power, keeping her original policy toward Myanmar.

The aim of this working paper is to examine economic policies of Iran's leading political factions around from Mousavi to Ahmadinejad, which are based on characteristics of political and factional structures of the country, suggesting some policy implications for South Korea.
A hybrid political structure combining Republican and Islamic institutions was established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, a core ideology of Iran, has forced political factions to devote themselves to the Supreme Leader and values of the Revolution such as Islamic governance under Sharia and economic independence from foreign powers. This unique system has constrained Iran from moving into the global economy from current economic isolation imposed by international sanctions.
As a republican state, however, Iran has experienced political coalitions and conflicts through presidential as well as parliamentary elections by the direct vote of the people every four years. Policy differences by major political leader are as follows. During the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s, the Mousavi administration controlled economy with austerity policy and highlighted the Revolutionary spirit. The Rafsanjani administration attempted to win traditional merchant-elite classes (bazaari) and industrial capitalists, as well as to improve foreign relations with the West in order to promote post-war reconstruction. The Khatami administration continued Rafsanjani’s pragmatic economic policies, but put greater emphases on foreign direct investment than the predecessor. Contrary to Khatami’s economic reform program, the Ahmadinejad administration has increased government involvement to reduce social inequality, providing subsidies for food and fuel.
Despite current political uncertainties and economic sanctions, Iran has huge potential for economic growth with large construction sectors, huge consumer market of 75 million people and abundant hydrocarbon resources. Given its strategic significances, U.S., EU, and Japan can expand economic relations with Iran in the long term. Thus Korea also should prepare for more cooperative economic relations, which will be necessary in the post-sanctions period of Iran.

The pharmaceutical industry in India is the world’s 12th-largest in terms of sales, approximately 16 billion dollars in 2011. It has shown double-digit growth in the last ten years and this exceeds the Indian economy’s growth as a whole. Compared to the Korean pharmaceutical industry, its size was smaller until 2008 but became larger and the gap between Korea and India keeps increasing.
  India has been in trade deficit with Korea, especially in the manufacturing sector but in surplus in the pharmaceuticals since 2000. In terms of generic drugs, India holds 20% share in the world and has the highest number of the U.S. FDA approved manufacturing plants except the U.S., which implies high competitiveness in the world pharmaceutical market. India’s high competitiveness causes constant trade surplus with Korea and Japan in the pharmaceuticals and this led to opposition of Korean and Japanese pharmaceutical firms against FTA with India.
  In this report, we analyze and evaluate the Indian pharmaceutical industry and compare it with the Korean pharmaceutical industry. We provide current market situation, structure, institutions as well as its history since the 1950s.
  In chapter 2, we present a brief summary of the pharmaceutical market in microeconomics perspective before introducing the Indian market because the pharmaceutical industry has several distinct characteristics that are different from other industries. Next, we provide recent trends of the world pharmaceutical market.
  In chapter 3, we show the history, market situation, characteristics, government policies and institutions of the Indian pharmaceutical industry since the 20th century. We expecially pay attention to the differences before and after the enforcement of TRIPs in India (The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
  In chapter 4, we study trade pattern of the pharmaceutical sector between Korea and India, analyze the chapters and clauses of the pharmaceutical sector in the agreement of the Korea-India CEPA, and show the differences in the contents of the pharmaceutical sector between the Korea-India and the Japan-India CEPA.
  In chapter 5, we analyze the competitiveness between the Korean and Indian pharmaceutical industries with various trade related indices as well as a simulation method. In the simulation, we test a situation of no tariff after the Korea-India CEPA. Moreover, we perform the SWOT analysis for both markets and compare the results to see how these two markets share common or different factors. Through these analyses, we suggest co-petition strategies for both countries in order to achieve win-win outcome.
  In chapter 6, we provide the case studies on Korean firms that have entered the Indian market and Indian pharmaceutical firms that are interested in the Korean market.
  Lastly, in chapter 7, we summarize the previous chapters and provide policy implications for the Korean pharmaceutical firms as well as the Korean government in relation to the Indian pharmaceutical market.