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  • 포용적 혁신성장을 위한 주요국의 경쟁정책 분석과 정책적 시사점
    Study of Competition Policies for Inclusive and Innovative Growth

    The share of income possessed by the top 1% in major countries is increasing, together with a rise in the inequality index. Previous studies have pointed out globalization, skill-biased technological progress, and digital transfor..

    Minsoo Han et al. Date 2021.12.30

    competition policy, industrial policy
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    The share of income possessed by the top 1% in major countries is increasing, together with a rise in the inequality index. Previous studies have pointed out globalization, skill-biased technological progress, and digital transformation as factors for deepening inequality. More recently, however, weakening market competition and deepening industrial concentration along with these factors have been noted as major factors in deepening inequality. In the same context, the role of competitive policies in promoting market competition should also be considered as a countermeasure against deepening inequality beyond the traditional view. Against this backdrop, this study conducts case studies and empirical analysis of major countries and proposes a competitive policy direction to achieve inclusive and innovative growth pursued by the Korean government.

    First, in Chapter 2, we looked at changes in the industry concentration of the US and the EU—the former which enacted the Sherman Act, the first antitrust law in the world, and the latter another pillar in the history of global competition policy—then examined recent trends of policies in both regions. In both the US and the EU, industrial concentration has generally increased along with the recent proliferation of the digital economy. In addition, as the enforcement of competition laws in these regions is strengthened, the direction of competition policy is changing toward regulating not only anti-competitive actions that directly affect consumer welfare but also actions that can indirectly affect consumer welfare. For example, the US has issued an Executive Order on Promotion Competition in the American Economy, calling for a whole-of-government effort to prevent damage to workers, entrepreneurs, and consumers across the industry, promote profits, and promote competition. The EU has also proposed legislation to strengthen regulations, including regulating corporate unions, restricting participation in public procurement, and initiating ex officio investigations in order to block various circumventive attempts to distort market competition. We can also see a more proactive response to the expansion of the digital economy in the US, which proposed the “Stronger Online Economy: Opportunity, Innovation, Choice” bill, while the EU also introduced a regulatory bill that strengthens fair competition for digital platforms in the EU. 

    In Chapter 3, the impact of deepening industrial concentration on inclusive innovation growth was empirically analyzed through national and industry-specific panel data. Here, we used the labor income share as an estimate representing inclusiveness and the total factor productivity as an estimate representing innovation. Also using the methodology of Battiati et al.(2021), we estimated the national and industrial markup, using the estimated markup as an estimate of the concentration of industry. On the other hand, estimates of trade dependence, R&D costs, foreign direct investment, financial openness, etc. were also utilized as other control variables. According to the results of empirical analysis using data from EU Klems from 1995 to 2017, the deepening of industrial concentrations increases total factor productivity, but it has been shown to statistically significantly reduce the labor income share. Based on the results of this empirical analysis, it can be interpreted that the deepening of industrial concentration has a negative effect on inclusive innovative growth.

    In the first part of Chapter 4, we divided Korea’s competition policy into four areas: traditional competition promotion policies, economic power concentration suppression policies, consumer policies, and fair trade policies for small and medium-sized enterprises, and found the following three major changes.

    First, the number of high-level sanctions tended to decrease in the field of measures to curb economic concentration, while law enforcement performance itself decreased in traditional competition promotion policies. This change can be interpreted as the concentration of human resources and capabilities of policy authorities in other areas, such as the fair trade policy of small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, the reduction in enforcement in the field of traditional competition promotion policy appears to be due to the complexity of the incident itself and the difficulty of demonstrating economic effectiveness, rather than due to the reduction in unfair practices. Second, there is also a tendency to focus more on handling large-scale cases with large market ripple effects. This can be interpreted as the policy authorities trying to efficiently utilize limited human and physical resources. Finally, in the field of fair trade policy for small and medium-sized enterprises, we can see a tendency to strengthen both institutional discipline and law enforcement. More specifically, the number of measures in this area tended to increase mainly on subcontracting and affiliated business laws, and the highest level of sanctions, fines, and accusations, were taken against law-breakers.

    In the second part of Chapter 4, the impact of changes in the current status of Korea’s competition policy enforcement in the above four areas was examined from the perspective of inclusive innovation growth. The “inclusive innovative growth index” demonstrates the impact of the enforcement of competition laws by index by selecting three indices: the Industrial Concentration Index, the Factor Income Distribution Index, and the Future Growth Engine Index. The results of our empirical analysis are as follows.

    First, regarding the effect of easing industrial concentration, only fair trade policy on small and medium-sized enterprises was consistently effective. In addition, it was found that only this policy statistically significantly reduced all profitability-related estimates (net return on capital, net profit, and operating profit) of large companies. These results show that law enforcement in the field of fair trade policy for small and medium-sized enterprises has further achieved the same benefits as easing concentration.

    Second, as with the results of the first empirical analysis, strengthening law enforcement in the field of fair trade policy for small and medium-sized enterprises statistically significantly reduces total factor income, labor income, and capital income of large enterprises compared to SMEs. These results suggest that competition policies can contribute to strengthening inclusion by narrowing the gap by company size in income earned in return for supplying production factors. On the other hand, the traditional competition promotion policy was also weak, but it was found to contribute to strengthening inclusion at the 10% significance level. 

    Lastly, with respect to the future growth engine index, the effect of competition policies on investment by company size was not evident. However, it was found that the majority of average companies’ R&D expenditure was increasing. However, our analysis does not support the claim that only law enforcement in the field of SME fair trade policy is effective. For example, in the case of traditional competition promotion policies, there is a possibility that the defined market itself is narrower than the industry classification in our study, so the effect may not have been shown. Also, in the case of the policy to suppress the concentration of economic power, it was not directly subject to verification in our analysis in that it is a system that regulates the concentration of ownership. Furthermore, the policy goals pursued by individual policies and the pathways of their influence may differ for each policy field. Therefore, although our study found that only in the field of SMEs fair trade policies had a statistically significant effect on inclusiveness, it is worth noting that these results do not mean that other policies have no effect on inclusiveness.

    Based on the above research results, our research suggests the following policy suggestions for contributing to the sustainable, inclusive, and innovative growth of Korea’s fair trade policy. 

    First, the direction of competition policy must be re-established at the government-wide level. For example, it is necessary to expand the scope of Korea’s competition policy and expand it in a direction that values industrial policy and macroeconomic effects by more actively considering values such as fairness, inclusion, and social welfare along with existing micro-competition restrictions. To this end, we judge it necessary to reexamine the importance of competition policy at the pan-government level, using the competition authority as the control tower, and to re-establish a new direction for competition policy in domestic economic policy.

    Second, policy capabilities should be focused more on improving competition-restricting regulations to alleviate the monopoly and oligopoly market structure. Of course, there is currently a legal basis for the Fair Trade Act in Korea, and about 20 regulatory improvement tasks are discovered every year to prepare improvement measures. However, there is a limit to discovering and improving regulations that have a great impact on the market due to the non-cooperation of related ministries with regulatory authority. Therefore, at the national economic level, it is necessary to focus on inclusive innovative growth and make efforts to improve the monopoly and oligopoly market structure while empowering competition authorities.

    Finally, in response to the transition to the digital economy, the paradigm of competition policy must be reestablished. First, excessive substantive pre-regulations that impede the innovation, scalability and development potential of the platform business should be avoided, but structural measures beyond behavioral measures should be taken against acts that distort market competition. In addition, in situations where the effects of regulations are unclear, it is reasonable to consider introducing additional regulations after first introducing indirect regulations based on a market-based approach and analyzing their effects. Second, it is also possible to consider introducing and operating the “shift of the burden of proof” in the digital field, which allows business operators to prove the competition-friendly effect first in determining whether or not competition laws have been violated in the review of a business combination. Third, it is important to continuously discover competition law issues in the digital economy field through the expansion of human and material resources of the competition authorities. For example, institutionalizing the collection of filing fees could be considered, as in other nations such as the United States, allowing the competition authority in Korea to secure financial resources, and through this, recruit human resources and reinforce its research capabilities to enhance professionalism. Lastly, research on the gig economy issue in the platform labor market, which is newly emerging in the digital economy field, and active competition policy enforcement should also be conducted.
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  • 미중 전략 경쟁 심화와 경제·안보의 블록화가 남북관계에 미치는 영향
    US-China Strategic Competition, Economic and Security Blocs: Impact on Inter-Korean Relations

     The US’ strategy to contain China through the formation of allied blocs is materializing in multiple ways. America has one single goal. It intends to correct China’s international behavior. This stems from America’s inten..

    Jaewoo Choo et al. Date 2021.12.30

    North Korean economy, international politics
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     The US’ strategy to contain China through the formation of allied blocs is materializing in multiple ways. America has one single goal. It intends to correct China’s international behavior. This stems from America’s intentions to correct what it perceives as fraudulent theft and exploitation of US information and technology on the part of China. In particular, the US is now engaged in efforts to subdivide and specify existing alliances according to its requirements.

     There is widespread concern over the resurgence of a new Cold War stemming from America’s strategy to contain China. In the past, the Cold War signified an extended period of peace without world war, amid constant tension and confrontation between the two superpowers and heated competition in geopolitics over differing ideologies and strategic interests. This state of affairs made trade and exchange impossible between the two competing ideologies. Countries in one bloc could not establish diplomatic ties or engage in trade with countries in the other bloc.

    During the Obama administration, the US military strategy was developed around the concept of AirSea Battle. To respond to China’s A2/AD strategy, the US focused on neutralizing China’s command and control system. However, the concept of AirSea Battle carried the risk of military conflict while aiming to deter China’s maritime expansion. After the Shale Revolution and the recovery of the US economy, the US military shifted to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in Global Commons: JAM-GC.

    During the Trump administration the US military began to transition toward the Joint Warfighting Concept, in which the role of ground forces was emphasized. The intention was to increase joint warfighting effectiveness in a contested environment. Due to COVID-19, this concept was finalized during the Biden administration. In response to China’s A2/AD in the East and South China Seas, the United States abrogated the 2019 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and lifted its range restrictions of mid-to-long range missiles. Since then, the US has planned to deploy surface-launched ballistic missiles, missile defence systems, and electronic warfare forces in this region. In other words, with the deployment of these weapon systems, the US intends to be ready to counter Chinese surface-to-ship missiles like the DongFeng 21 and 29.

    The Biden administration’s strategy of forming economic blocs is increasingly taking shape. First, in the field of trade and commerce, it continues the same retaliatory tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. This applies continued pressure on China to abide by the Phase One Agreement between the United States and China. At the same time, Biden continues to exert strong pressure on China to correct practices it regards as unfair and irrational, which are not related to the trade agreements but have a significant impact on trade between the US and China. The Biden administration is willing to accept the drawbacks from this “decoupling,” or weaker trade interdependence with China.

    Second, the Biden administration is continuing and strengthening measures to exclude major Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei from the US market under the pretext of security threats in the IT sector. These sanctions and measures were initiated by the former Trump administration, and are now being expanded against Chinese companies. The Biden administration is emphasizing that the IT sector is not only important in economic terms but also security terms within the strategic competition with China. To secure the upper hand, the US is likely to maintain the technology gap to pressure China and to maintain its technological dominance.

    Third, the US is pursuing a strategy of establishing a new global supply chain that excludes China. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis revealed the vulnerability of the US manufacturing sector‘s supply chain. America is shifting from laissez-faire policies to active industrial policies that directly intervene in the market to rebuild the domestic manufacturing sector and foster its own companies.

    In the US-China strategic competition landscape, the “objective needs” for inter-Korean cooperation are increasing, while the space for cooperation is gradually decreasing. The intense strategic competition of the US and China equates to growing influence by these superpowers on the political dynamics of the Korean Peninsula. As the US-China conflict escalates on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-US alliance will be more important, having a distancing effect on the two Koreas. Accordingly, the autonomy of South Korea and North Korea in foreign relations, including Korean Peninsula issues, will decrease, and inter-Korean relations will be increasingly marginalized within the political dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula. As is well known, the most extreme form of such political dynamics on the Korean Peninsula was during the Cold War. The two Koreas belonged to different blocs centered on the US and Soviet Union, respectively, in effect reducing inter-Korean relations to military and ideological confrontations and conflicts. There is a high likelihood of this state of affairs appearing in future inter-Korean relations.
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  • 미중 반도체 패권 경쟁과 글로벌 공급망 재편
    The US-China Battle for Semiconductor Supremacy and Reshaping of Global Supply Chain

       Realization of digital transformation(DX) and the Fourth Industrial Revolution(4IR) has led the development of new technologies in areas such as AI, big data, metaverse, autonomous vehicles, digital currency, and bloc..

    Hyung-Gon Jeong et al. Date 2021.12.30

    economic outlook, barrier to trade United States of America China
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       Realization of digital transformation(DX) and the Fourth Industrial Revolution(4IR) has led the development of new technologies in areas such as AI, big data, metaverse, autonomous vehicles, digital currency, and blockchain. While these sectors are expected to continue to grow, major countries including the United States and China are fiercely competing to secure a global supply chain for the semiconductor industry. The global division of production in the semiconductor industry has been built on free trade and has driven corporate innovation and technology development. However, the trend of techno-nationalism and efforts by each nation to construct value chains within own their territories are expected to have an adverse effect on the global semiconductor industry. The ever-deepening hegemony competition between the U.S. and China in the semiconductor sector could have a profound impact not only on the Korean economy but also on restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain. This study analyzes the supply chain structure and risks of the Korean semiconductor industry, along with U.S. and Chinese polices to foster the semiconductor industry, going on to explore corresponding countermeasures.
       The first chapter details the research methodology used in the study and how it differs from previous studies, followed by the academic and policy contributions of our study.
       An analysis of the current state of the global semiconductor industry and risks in the semiconductor supply chain of the United States follows in the second chapter. Division of labor by value chains has progressed significantly in the global semiconductor industry. Countries are specialized in various manufacturing stages (chipless → fabless → foundry → ATP → delivery) and the GVC has been established according to each country’s strength. The United States and Europe specialize in product technology while Korea and Taiwan are strong in process technology and China, Taiwan, Vietnam and Malaysia have comparative advantages in ATP. The global value chain has been arranged based on these advantages and driven production efficiency for decades.
       Semiconductor manufacturers in the United States take the largest market share and dominate the supply chain in the global market. U.S. companies however, are comparatively weak in the wafer processing and EUV equipments sectors, while their market share in other sectors such as IC design, related intellectual property rights(IP) and manufacturing equipments remains high. Recently, as the risk has increased in semiconductor supply chains, countries are actively responding with policies to strengthen their semiconductor production capacity.
       The U.S. government has also undergone tremendous changes in its public support system for major industries such as semiconductors. Prior to 2019, individual project support was centered on various departments of the federal government and each local government, but since 2020, legislation to provide a comprehensive support system with a significant budget has been submitted, promoting cooperation with Congress. In June 2020, the bill for the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors(CHIPS) for America Act was introduced, aiming to fund R&D and secure technology supply chains to revive the semiconductor manufacturing industry in the United States. This was followed by the American Foundations Act of 2020(AFA), aimed at providing subsidies to promote the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing facilities. The two bills were included in the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 in June 2021 and passed by the Senate. The new legislation mostly aims at strengthening the U.S. science and technology capabilities, including semiconductors, and responding to hostile threats from China. It also emphasizes cooperation with allies in various investigations and sanctions against China in particular, meaning it will be necessary to closely monitor developments regarding these bills.
       Chapter 3 covers China’s policy to foster the semiconductor industry, engaged in a hegemonic competition with the United States.
       China’s semiconductor industry has grown rapidly by 12% per annum since 2016, accounting for 60% of global semiconductor consumption and 33% of final demand. The country heavily relies on Korea and Taiwan for semiconductor imports. Demand for semiconductors in China continues to increase, with China’s deficit in the sector reaching -233.7 billion dollars in 2020.
       China currently serves only as a semiconductor consumption market, and all key technologies related to manufacturing are owned by the United States and its allies or partners. The U.S. sanctions against China in the semiconductor industry are targeted at high technology areas of less than 10nm, while exports of U.S. products in the area of general-purpose technologies are permitted. China accounts for only 5% of global semiconductor sales, and plays a limited role in the global semiconductor supply chain, mainly involved in the assembly, test, and packaging(ATP) sectors of the supply chain.
       The Chinese government is inducing massive investments in the semiconductor sector to lower dependence on semiconductor imports and mitigate supply chain risks. In addition, China selected the semiconductor sector as one of the strategic development sectors in the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 in March 2021, and is fostering the semiconductor industry with the national semiconductor fund, various tax support measures, and through the Star market, the Chinese version of the NASDAQ. However, export control, investment sanctions, and financial sanctions currently implemented by the U.S. are major obstacles to increasing China’s independence in semiconductors.
       In Chapter 4, the global semiconductor industry supply chain at the corporate level and the status of semiconductor companies in the U.S. and China within the global supply chain are analyzed.
       Using network analysis, the current status of the global semiconductor supply chain was analyzed and schematized, also identifying the location of companies in the supply chain by estimating the between centrality and degree centrality between semiconductor companies. U.S. companies and Samsung Electronics stood out in the network analysis while Chinese companies remained weak. However, China’s Huawei, Lenovo, and Xiaomi are gaining presence in the global supply chain. These Chinese companies are not directly involved in semiconductor production, but act as consumers of semiconductors as they produce IT devices such as PCs, smartphones, and tablets.
       In this chapter, it was confirmed that China’s Hisilicon, which is specialized in design and manufacturing, and SMIC, which is specialized in foundry, are not influential in the global semiconductor supply chain and show high foreign dependence. China’s Huawei, while not a producer of semiconductors, is regarded very important in the global supply chain, but remains highly dependent on U.S. suppliers. According to Eikon’s database, 1/3 of suppliers which provide products to SMIC are U.S. firms, followed by European companies in the UK or Germany. Among 43% of the suppliers that provide goods to Huawei are U.S. companies and 20% of sellers are also from the United States. This means that U.S. companies account for the largest portion in the suppliers and sellers dealing with Huawei. On the other hand, it turned out that the proportion of Chinese domestic suppliers was about 15% and that of sellers was about 10%, respectively. As we can see, the high foreign dependence of Chinese companies makes it difficult for them to become self-reliant. This indicates Chinese semiconductor companies will likely face difficulties in the U.S.-led global semiconductor supply chain for a considerable duration.
       Finally, in Chapter 5, the supply chain structure of the Korean semiconductor industry is analyzed in detail.
       In 2020, Korea’s semiconductor imports amounted to about $57.03 billion in total, mainly from China(31.2%), Taiwan (20.4%), and Japan(13.6%). System semiconductors and memory semiconductors take 70.8% of total semiconductor imports and their proportion is 39.1% and 31.7%, respectively.
       Most of Korea’s imports in the sector from China and Hong Kong are memory semiconductors(78.3%) and system semiconductors (44.6%), while system semiconductors are imported from Taiwan, semiconductor equipment and materials from Japan and the United States. Twelve items out of semiconductor materials account for 80.9% of total imports, and these items are still highly dependent on Japan. Korea’s semiconductor exports in 2020 amounted to about $95.46 billion, mainly to China(43.2%), Hong Kong(18.3%), and Vietnam(9.6%). Memory semiconductors accounted for 62.0% of all semiconductor exports and system semiconductors 28.0%, with these two areas representing 90.0% of all Korean exports of semiconductor chips. 71.3% of Korea’s exports of memory semiconductors and 46.6% of system semiconductors were to China and Hong Kong, with China taking up a large portion.
       Korea has established a global supply chain base linked to China and the United States and constructed a specialized production system. Due to the large number of packaging companies in China, most exports to China are wafer-processed semi-finished products, while imports from China are mainly in the form of intrafirm trade from investment corporations established in the country by Korean chip producers such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. Particular care should be taken to manage supply chains in areas where Japan possesses an overwhelming advantage. Korea needs to closely monitor and manage supply chains of related items, as its technical vulnerability of depending on Japanese sources in the areas of materials, components and equipment will persist for the time being. 
       Another risk is that Korean companies that produce semiconductor materials are highly dependent on overseas suppliers as they lack source technologies. Along with basic raw materials for semiconductor manufacturing, items that account for more than 50% of semiconductor process imports are considered to be subject to supply chain risks and require constant management.
       The strengthening of U.S. leadership in semiconductors and its ongoing policy of decoupling from China are the biggest variables in the global supply chain structure of the semiconductor industry. The U.S. is expected to thoroughly block China’s access by building a “digital fortress” around China to prevent the Chinese semiconductor industry from accessing new technologies, while applying stricter control over core semiconductor technologies. The U.S. is also expected to leverage its technology superiority to contain China, inducing de-Sinicization of semiconductor companies investing in China in the long term, while reorganizing its supply chains to relocate high-tech semiconductor production out of Chinese territories. Advanced countries with core semiconductor technologies and tech firms with exclusive technologies are expected to further cement their dominant position in the global market, while the supply chain structure between allies will be reinforced.
       The global market is involved in a war to gain technological hegemony, and Japan will continue to hold in check Korea’s semiconductor industry amid this new Cold War situation. The growing alliance between the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan in semiconductors could pose a challenge to the Korean semiconductor industry. Korean semiconductor companies have grown to meet the semiconductor demand of multinational companies in China and Chinese companies, but will likely be affected by the direction of the U.S.’s semiconductor technology control policy in the future.
       The diversification and duplication of supply chains is an important issue, and Korea’s semiconductor industry is facing an era of global value chain transformation. In the short term, Korea should actively enter the U.S.-led supply chain and focus on stabilizing its own supply chain. It will also be necessary to plan for reorganization of the current supply chain to disperse the current dependence on specific countries.
       In addition to the government’s strategy to foster the semiconductor sector, there is urgent need to expand R&D manpower, establish a comprehensive semiconductor research institute, support semiconductor factories in the metropolitan area, and improve regulations. The Seoul Metropolitan Area Readjustment Planning Act should be flexibly operated, and a graduate school specializing in semiconductors should be established through the enactment of a special act. Recently, China has established a number of universities specialized in semiconductor-related fields to actively cultivate the manpower it needs, and Korea could benefit from benchmarking these efforts.
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  • 기후 변화가 아프리카 농업 및 분쟁에 미치는 영향과 시사점
    The Effect of Climate Change on Agriculture and Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

       As the economy grew rapidly after industrialization, these changes have led to higher temperatures and precipitation uncertainty, and climate change has become a task that the international community must solve togeth..

    Munsu Kang et al. Date 2021.12.30

    economic development, environmental policy Africa Middle East
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       As the economy grew rapidly after industrialization, these changes have led to higher temperatures and precipitation uncertainty, and climate change has become a task that the international community must solve together. The sixth assessment report (2021) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that the Earth’s temperature has increased by more than 1°C during the 21st century alone compared to the industrialization period (1850-1900). The report also warned that mankind will lose the ability to predict weather if global responses to climate change are hindered. Particularly in Sub-Saharan African countries, problems such as food insecurity, water scarcity, etc. will arise because of climate change. Chronic declines in agricultural productivity and water resources have already begun to occur, and conflict has increased as common resources have become scarce.
       Agricultural activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are the main generators income and food security, and in many countries in this region, more than 50% of the people are engaged in agriculture. However, higher temperatures and lower precipitation are leading to a decline in agricultural productivity, and farmers are more likely to experience agricultural failure because they often lack climate adaptation skills. Schlenker and Lobell (2010) predicted that climate change would affect a decline in the productivity of major crops, such as maize, millet, sorghum, and groundnuts, in Africa. Decreases in agricultural productivity could lead to increased agricultural prices and a food security crisis, especially for vulnerable groups, if government-level food supply is lacking. Bellemare (2015) found that soaring agricultural prices caused instability, indicating that responding to climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa could lead to peace in the region, a benefit beyond agricultural productivity.
       This study demonstrated the effect of climate change on agricultural productivity and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Climate change can affect conflict in various ways. First, as mentioned previously, decreased agricultural productivity promotes an increase in food prices, which can lead to conflicts because of increased poverty. Second, when a natural disaster occurs and the production infrastructure collapses, local residents migrate on a large scale, resulting in conflicts between migrants and natives. Third, water shortages caused by droughts can reduce pasture area, and conflicts arise when pastoralists invade farmers’ land. Although conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have often been triggered by political, religious, and ethnic issues, this study examined the policy implications of higher temperatures and lower precipitation by examining how climate change relates to conflicts.
       Chapter 2 examines climate change trends and the Official Development Assistance (ODA) status of climate change adaptations made by major donor countries. To do so, we used Climate Hazards Center InfraRed Temperature with Station (CHIRTS) and Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) published by the UC Santa Barbara Climate Hazards Center. In the late 1960s, the average annual temperature in Sub-Saharan Africa was 24°C, but in just 50 years, the temperature increased by more than 1°C, exceeding 25°C in 2010. Temperature increases in Sudan, the Central Africa Republic, and South Sudan, located near the Sahara Desert, were higher than in other regions. Although West Africa did not see a significant increase in temperature, the average temperature exceeded 27.5°C, and the region is considered more vulnerable to temperature increases than other regions. In addition, the number of days of annual heat waves has continuously increased in West Africa. From 1950 to 2017, the annual average precipitation for African countries decreased by more than 100 mm, from 1,180 mm to 1,048 mm, and West Africa and Central Africa showed a particularly rapid decrease. One concern is that annual precipitation volatility has increased, and as this happens, rainfall prediction weakens and farmers miss sowing times, leading to reduced agriculture production. Therefore, this pattern indicates that the climate of Sub-Saharan Africa is seeing mid- and long-term changes.
       In 2001, the international community began discussions on climate change adaptation at the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP7) in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Marrakesh Accords contained measures to support developing countries, the least developed countries, and Small Island Developing States, which are particularly vulnerable to climate change. In 2006, the action plan was embodied through the Nairobi Work Program (NWP). The international community has proposed climate change action as the 13th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), but as the IPCC (2019) states, a plan to achieve climate change goals could increase the number of poor people because it clashes with the plan to achieve food security and poverty goals, which is the SDG 2. At the continent level, the Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020 agreed to build climate resilience in Africa.
       Because the African continent produces very little carbon emission, except for South Africa, and adaptation to climate change is recognized as a significant issue, the international community is proposing that African countries be in line with climate change adaptation rather than mitigation. The international community provides enormous adaptation support for agriculture production sectors and infrastructure and services related to water supply and hygiene. In the short term, food aid to areas suffering from climate crisis accounts for more than 17% of the total contributions worldwide to climate change adaptation. South Korea has also increased its adaptation aid for the agricultural education and training sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the aspect of climate adaptation South Korea is most interested in for that region is water supply services. Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, the scale of support for climate adaptation is much larger than that for climate mitigation, and it is likely to increase in the future.
       In Chapter 3, we discuss about the effect of climate change on agricultural productivity in African countries, using agricultural productivity data by country from both the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The largest crops produced in Sub-Saharan Africa include maize, sorghum, and millet, and rice production continues to increase. The demand for cassava, a root crop, is high, and in terms of cultivation area, it is the fourth most cultivated crop in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using scenario analysis, we found that when the maximum temperature increases by 1℃, the maize yield will decrease by about 7%. When the maximum temperature increases by 2°C and 4°C, the maize yield will decrease by 13% and 26%, respectively. The millet yield also decreases with an increase in temperature, and the rice yield varies depending on regional characteristics, but the yield increases slightly.
       Regarding regions, maize productivity is expected to decrease significantly in West and East Africa because of the high average temperatures in those regions. Maize is vulnerable to high temperatures, and in countries with maize as the staple food, adaptation strategies should be drawn up as soon as possible. The rice yield is expected to increase when temperatures increase, especially in central and eastern Africa, but in West Africa, which consumes a lot of rice, it is expected to vary greatly from country to country, even though no significant difference exists in average rice productivity. Rippke et al. (2016) predicted when alternative crops should be considered by regions as the temperature increases, indicating that beans and maize are more likely to be replaced by other crops. Also, in West Africa, bananas and yams will be replaced by other crops because of the difficulty of production.
       Chapter 4 examines the effects of climate change on conflict in Africa. In the beginning, we show the distribution of four types of conflicts: battles, attacks on civilians, nonviolent protests, and riots. Four countries with much conflict are Somalia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa, but the form and pattern of conflicts vary from country to country. In addition, countries with increased conflicts in the 2010s include Sudan, Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Angola, indicating that the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa are not characteristic of a specific region. The frequency of battles and attacks on civilians has decreased significantly, but nonviolent protests and riots have increased in urban areas. In this study, correlations were identified between conflicts and the annual average temperature, and it was found that conflicts were more frequent in areas with higher temperatures. However, it was not determined whether natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, were caused by the increased frequency of conflicts. Because political, religious, and ethnic hegemony played an important role in the outbreak of conflict in Africa, it is difficult to argue that climate change directly affected the conflict. However, it is worth noting that civilian conflicts are on the rise, including conflicts between farmers and nomads in Nigeria, Sudan Darfur, Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, and conflicts between migrants and native residents.
       The second half of Chapter 4 contains the analysis results regarding the effect of climate change on conflict. It was found that the average temperature and the trend of battles and attacks on civilians had an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship. As the temperature increased, the frequency of battles and attacks on civilians increased, and when the temperature exceeded a certain point, the frequency of battles and attacks on civilians decreased. In contrast, protests and riots declined as warm temperature conditions continued, and they increased from then on when a certain temperature threshold was exceeded. It can be interpreted that increased temperatures can trigger conflicts between farmers and nomads, and conflicts between natives and migrants, and increased economic loss and competition for limited resources can lead to protests against the government. In this study, neither increases nor decreases in precipitation or volatility were statistically significant regarding conflicts.
       Chapter 5 derives the implications of South Korea’s cooperation in responding to climate change in Africa, according to the analysis results of the effect of climate change on agricultural productivity and conflict. South Korea has been increasing the scale of green ODA related to climate adaptation and recently announced a strategy to further expand green ODA. However, regarding the adaptation strategy for the agricultural sector, the IPCC (2019) warned that the potential effects may be different for each strategy. Therefore, in this study, suggestions were made that focused on fields with high potential effects and high local demand when introducing climate adaptation strategies. 
       First, because the risk to the agricultural sector is increasing from climate change, index-based insurance system support was proposed to protect farmers experiencing agricultural failure. Index-based insurance is in higher demand in developing countries than in developed countries that operate crop accident insurance, an index-type insurance that compensates for losses from rainfall or temperature levels. In the case of African countries, no crop accident insurance market exists, so farmers have to deal with the damage caused by climate change. To alleviate this problem, a social safety net for farmers must be established, and index-based insurance could be an alternative. 
       Second, it is necessary to establish a support strategy that develops a water-energy-food nexus. South Korea has provided much support for comprehensive rural development projects in terms of regional development strategies, and few cases exist of integrated approaches encompassing a water-energy-food nexus in the field of climate adaptation. To expand green ODA and support climate change adaptation, the demand for a nexus approach that encompasses water-energy-food is expected to grow. 
       Third, R&D cooperation should be further strengthened to improve seed variety and the agricultural value chain. Although South Korea’s Rural Development Administration (RDA) represents this interest, additional cooperation with international organizations and agricultural research institutes in Africa will be needed to improve maize seeds and crops that Korea has a comparative advantage in, such as rice.
       Fourth, the importance of technological cooperation, such as disaster warning systems and climate-smart agriculture, is increasing, and this type of cooperation between Korea and African countries needs to be more active in expanding green ODA. To build peace in Africa, it is necessary to pay more attention to cooperating to reduce conflict and promote conflict arbitration.
       Climate change is affecting aspects of basic development in Sub- Saharan Africa, such as quality of life, poverty, and food security. Active cooperation from the international community is required to adapt to climate change, and Korea also needs to make green ODA cooperation more effective in alleviating climate conflicts in Africa and preventing decreased agricultural productivity.
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  • 코로나19 이후 글로벌 가치사슬의 구조 변화와 정책 대응
    Structural Changes in the Global Value Chain and Policy Responses after COVID-19

       The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), which broke out in December 2019, is changing the lives of people and economies around the world. Unlike typical economic shocks, COVID-19 spreads globally through human-to-human c..

    Hyoungmin Han et al. Date 2021.12.30

    trade structure, trade policy
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       The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), which broke out in December 2019, is changing the lives of people and economies around the world. Unlike typical economic shocks, COVID-19 spreads globally through human-to-human contact and because of its diversity of biological variation, the impact of the pandemic is being prolonged. The spread of COVID-19 is acting as a new shock factor upon global value chains (GVCs) in terms of crisis management, as it has increased the biological risk caused by infectious diseases and limited the movement of human and physical resources. More specifically, in early 2020, because of the spread of COVID-19 in China, so called the world’s factory, production shutdowns were unavoidable and this disrupted production in a number of associated countries. Then in 2021, as unexpected digital demand spiked due to the continuation of COVID-19, the supply of semiconductors has encountered difficulties keeping up with the demand and production has been delayed in many countries. Considering these cases, the impact of COVID-19 on GVCs is substantial and proper policy responses are required.
       Meanwhile, it is highly difficult to directly identify the impact of COVID-19 on GVC structures. This is due to the significant difficulties involved when examining the impact of COVID-19 on GVCs, as it is continuously changing and intertwining with various factors such as policy uncertainty before COVID-19, changes in production and demand and digitalization of production. Also, the impact of COVID-19 is likely to be combined with pre-existing factors which have induced changes in GVC structure. Therefore, in this study, we comprehensively look at the direction of the ongoing GVC changes after COVID-19 based on the literature and quantitative data, and derive government support policies and tasks. The summary of findings is as follows.
       First, we attempt to identify the factors influencing GVC structure changes before COVID-19. The factors are protectionism, increased policy uncertainty, changes in production environment and demands in Asia, introduction of new technologies, digitization and automation of production, disasters and health risks, etc, all of which increase or decrease trade costs. Based on international input-output tables, when looking at the structure of participation in production, the linkage structure of final goods and intermediate goods between countries and the length of production, our analysis is that these complex factors have generated structural changes such as strengthening GVCs in Asia, localization of production network and simplification of production length, which means that proximity to markets has increased.
       Second, we explore the changes in GVCs after COVID-19. Decision-making that determines a company’s GVC structure is based on theoretical factors including transaction costs, property rights, relative price differences in production factors, overseas transfer costs of work, complementarity between production technologies and investment climate as production base (e.g. proximity to major markets, factors of production, infrastructure). Therefore, if these factors have not undergone significant changes due to the development of information and communication technology, the structural changes in GVCs due to COVID-19 are expected to be limited. However, if COVID-19 increases the possibility of accelerating the digital transformation or production automation, changes in GVCs after COVID-19 should be considered to be largely driven by changes in production technology.
       Third, COVID-19 has a negative impact on both sides of supply and demand of GVCs. When considering the proportion of overseas demand and supply of production in major countries, in the case of an external demand shock caused by COVID-19, the decrease in US demand is expected to affect Asia, and the decrease in China’s demand is expected to affect developing countries. In the area of external supply shocks, the supply shock is predicted to be particularly substantial in developing countries. When checking the trend of trade and investment after COVID-19, in trade, we have found the role of Asia’s GVC has increased and regional trade functions in Asia and Europe have become stronger. In investment, we found regional production bases in regional central countries (the United States, China, and France) expanded, and an overall trend of localization of production networks is observed. This means that the GVC structure since COVID-19 has maintained or strengthened changes in the role of Asia as a production base and reduced production length (i.e., increased production proximity to consumer markets). Also, although green field investment in most industries has been on the decline since COVID-19, investment in the telecommunications industry has increased, capturing responses to digitalization in major countries.
       Fourth, this study conducted an empirical analysis based on the gravity model to analyze the actual impact of various external shocks on GVC trade (intermediate goods trade). As a result, it is confirmed that external shocks such as natural disasters and health risks are negative factors on GVC trade, especially on the production of commodities (forward-linked) such as raw materials. In addition, the impact of external shocks on GVC trade was smaller in countries with higher levels of trade openness and digitalization. These results suggest that Korea, which has a high proportion of intermediate goods exports, is highly likely to be sensitive to external shocks, and that it is necessary to maintain a high degree of trade openness and digital access with major production-linked countries to mitigate the extent of such shocks.
       Fifth, in order to examine the microscopic changes before and after COVID-19, we analyzed the global production network changes of global leading companies. Analyzing changes in the production and sales structure of representative companies in countries leading certain industries can be a crucial clue to identify changes in GVCs after COVID-19, but due to concerns over leakage of sales know-how, information on production and sales networks is restricted from collection through surveys or expert interviews. As an alternative, the analysis was conducted using Bloomberg Supply Chain Analysis (SPLC) containing relationship values between the analyzed companies and their suppliers and customers. The results of our case analysis of global leading companies showed similar flows to previously identified changes in GVCs. Taiwan’s share increased in all supply chains of leading semiconductor companies, while Japan and France’s share increased in global automakers’ supply chains. Japanese companies’ share increased in the supply chain of the world’s top three clothing companies, while French companies’ share in Selling, General & Administrative expenses (SG&A) increased. In other words, the role of production in East Asia and some European countries has increased. In addition, there are clear indications that digitalization and automation of production has progressed under COVID-19, such as the introduction of robots or expansion of investment in digital technology in the semiconductor, automobile and fast fashion industries.
       Last, in this paper, we conducted a survey of 229 overseas Korean companies in the industries where Korean companies have entered global markets most actively — electronics, transportation equipment, textile, clothing, and shoe manufacturing — to examine changes in GVC structure and policy demands in these industries before and after COVID-19. According to the results of the survey, compared from before and after COVID-19, the proportion of raw materials and intermediate goods supplied (i.e. procurement/importation) from East Asian sources as well as the proportion of raw materials and intermediate goods sourced from the local countries the companies had increased. When it comes to sales networks, we found an increase in the proportion of China, a reduction in the proportion of Korea, ASEAN and EU, and an increase in the proportion of sales to all local markets except for the EU.
       Meanwhile, the results indicate that most of the Korean companies surveyed had suffered loss during COVID-19, of which approximately one-third have recovered from the damage sustained. In particular, the fundamental causes of losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic can be analyzed in various aspects of demand and supply, such as “deterioration or restriction of working environment due to the spread of infection or lockdown,” “reservation, reduction, cancellation of orders from domestic and foreign supply lines/customers,” “delay or disconnection of imports of raw materials, parts and products,” and “deterioration of the logistics environment.” In order to overcome COVID-19, overseas Korean companies first responded by mobilizing their internal capabilities by for instance “reducing local employees or reducing labor costs”, “adjusting the utilization rate”, or “adjusting inventory.” Relocation of production bases, which were directly triggered by COVID-19, accounted for 6.6% (15 firms) of all surveyed companies, 6.6% (15 firms) of changes in procurement routes, and 7.0% (16 firms) of alterations on sales route. As above, very few companies had changed their production networks and most of these were surveyed as companies operating in Vietnam. In addition, Korean companies recognize the digitalization of production and the spread of the green economy as risk factors for GVCs and in the case of SMEs, they seem to lack sufficient preparation for these transitions. According to the results of this survey, before and after COVID-19, overseas Korean companies are generally strengthening their dependence on production in China, ASEAN, and South Asia, and simplifying production paths centered on local markets in GVCs. They evaluated COVID-19 as a short-term factor, so they are primarily responding to it by utilizing internal resources of their companies. And there have not been much changes in the GVC structure of Korean companies with COVID-19 as a direct factor.
       In summary, our analysis shows that the changes in the GVC structure after COVID-19 are relatively more influenced by existing factors, such as increased demand in Asia, changes in the production environment, and policy uncertainty such as the US-China trade dispute, rather than the direct factors of COVID-19. However, as examined in the empirical analysis, health disasters are a major negative factor in trade of intermediate goods, and overseas Korean companies have suffered from production reduction and sluggishness in terms of supply, and a decrease in sales/exports and demand due to COVID-19. Therefore, in this study, we propose two policy directions: responding to short-term factors, such as damages and supply chain disruption due to COVID-19, and responding to mid- to long-term factors, such as the rise of production networks in Asia, digitalization and automation of production, and the rise of the green economy. Short-term response means short-term policy support to alleviate disruption of GVCs caused by the direct impact of COVID-19. More specifically, we propose strengthening international cooperation in labor mobility and trade liberalization and providing customized support by country and industry to respond to shocks in supply chains. In addition, in consideration of the mid- to long-term factors that currently affect changes in GVCs, we suggest strengthening production linkage centered on ASEAN and India, reinforcing the establishment of the regional value chain (RVC) of Korea through support for local productivity improvement and participation in mega FTAs, establishing a global vaccine hub for rapid health risk response, improving digital connectivity and increasing robustness in GVCs based on the Digital New Deal, and providing support for low-carbon production in preparation for a green economy based on the Green New Deal.
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  • 외국인력 유입의 사회경제적 영향: 유럽 내 아프리카 이민자 사례 및코로나19 대응을..
    The Socioeconomic Impact of Immigration: Cases of the African Immigrants in Europe andthe Response to Covid-19 Pandemic

      This study examines the direct and indirect effects of the influx of foreign workers on the economic, societal and policy response through a case study of African immigrants in Europe and an empirical analysis of the COVID-..

    Youngook Jang et al. Date 2021.12.30

    economic cooperation, labor market
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      This study examines the direct and indirect effects of the influx of foreign workers on the economic, societal and policy response through a case study of African immigrants in Europe and an empirical analysis of the COVID-19 travel restriction policy. A review of European immigration cases is expected to provide policy implications for Korea, where the share of foreign workers is gradually increasing. In addition, this study attempts to understand the impact of the dependence on immigrant workers on domestic policy decisions in the time of national emergency like epidemics. 
       Specifically, Chapter 2 focuses on the current status of foreign workers in the EU. The foreign workers of the EU are concentrated in member countries with large economies, such as Germany. Currently, the number of non-EU immigrant workers exceeds that of intra-EU immigrant workers, but the latter have been increasing in recent years. The sectoral distribution of foreign workers varies by country. More than one-third of foreign workers in Germany are employed in the industrial sector, whereas in France, foreign employment stands out in the service sector. The distribution of foreign employment in Belgium is not very different from that of native employment. Finland is characterized by a high percentage of foreign employment in agriculture compared to other EU member states.
       Chapter 3 deals with the characteristics of African immigrants in Europe. Many of the workers with African origin are either from countries with an existing colonial background or with geographical proximity. In terms of human capital, immigrant workers from Africa  account for a large share of the economically active population and those under the age of 15, and are characterized by an overwhelming majority of males. Also, the education and skill levels tend to be lower among the African migrants, who also show a higher rate of unemployment rate than the native-born or other migrants. These characteristics suggest that immigrants from Africa may compete with low-skilled native workers in the receiving country’s labor market.
       The human capital characteristics of African migrants lead to socially negative perceptions and discrimination against them in Europe, which is the main focus of Chapter 4. When reviewing the previous literature and statistical evidence, the findings suggest that discrimination against African immigrants in the setting of school, workplace, and media is indeed widespread. According to the European Social Survey, the influx of skilled workers is found to be favored by the citizens of receiving countries, and negative perceptions against African immigrants are not independent of the socioeconomic status of immigrants. In addition, a difference is observed between the perceptions of immigrants from other EU countries and those from Africa. 
       Chapter 5 attempts to study the impact of the presence of the foreign workers on policy-making, and concludes that the strength of the entry restrictions during the COVID-19 epidemic was affected by share of foreign population. In the countries that are highly dependent on foreign workers, there have been difficulties in supplying labor due to entry restrictions and border closure during the COVID-19 pandemic. The empirical analysis shows that the entry restrictions were passively imposed where the share of immigrant is high. This trend was observed more conspicuously in high-income countries where various policy combinations could be used in addition to entry restrictions. Through these results, it was confirmed that dependence on foreign workers had an impact on policy-making in national emergency situations. 
       The above-mentioned results of this study can be used for future immigration policy in Korea. The social and economic impact of the influx of immigrants or migrant workers is diverse, and despite its benefits, it can lead to negative consequences such as discrimination, conflict, and polarization. As reviewed in Chapter 1, the foreign population in Korea is rapidly increasing, and given the trend of declining population born in Korea, the incentives to block the influx of foreign populations can be seen as very low. Therefore, it is necessary to develop various policy alternatives in advance to offset the negative impact of the influx of foreign manpower.
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  • 러시아의 우주산업 발전 동향과 국제협력 전망
    ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ КОСМИЧЕСКОЙ ОТРАСЛИ РОССИИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА В ОБЛАСТИ КОСМИЧЕСКОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ

       Развитие космической промышленности во многом определяет технологический облик страны на международной арене. Приче..

    Сергей Валентей et al. Date 2021.12.30

    Russia Eurasia
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    Введение

    РАЗДЕЛ I СТРАТЕГИИ РАЗВИТИЯ КОСМИЧЕСКОЙ ОТРАСЛИ РОССИИ
    Глава 1. Формирование космической отрасли России и ее влияние на экономику
    Глава 2. Современная стратегия России в области космической деятельности
    Глава 3. Международная стратегия России в области космической деятельности

    РАЗДЕЛ II АНАЛИЗ ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕННОЙ БАЗЫ И ПРЕДПРИЯТИЙ КОСМИЧЕСКОЙ ОТРАСЛИ РОССИИ
    Глава 4. Анализ производственной базы космической отрасли России
    Глава 5. Финансовый анализ деятельности предприятий космической отрасли России
    Глава 6. Развитие рынка спутниковых космических услуг
    Глава 7. Развитие рынка космического туризма

    РАЗДЕЛ IV МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО  В ОБЛАСТИ ОСВОЕНИЯ И КОММЕРЦИАЛИЗАЦИИ КОСМОСА
    Глава 8. Опыт и перспективы международного сотрудничества России в области освоения и коммерциализации космоса
    Глава 9. Анализ реализации совместных корейско-российских проектов международного сотрудничества в области космической деятельности
    Глава 10. Оценка потенциала развития международных проектов Республики Корея и России         в области космической деятельности

    Заключение

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    Summary
       Развитие космической промышленности во многом определяет технологический облик страны на международной арене. Причем, в эпоху IV-й промышленной революции крайне важную роль играет сфера «нового космоса», стимулирующая совместные космические проекты как на уровне государств, так и частного бизнеса.
       Уровень претензий на «новый космос» определяет и объемы финансирования развития космической отрасли. Поэтому не удивительно, что по расходам на космос, относительно объема национального ВВП в размере 0,24%, Россия фактически находится на 1-м месте. Более 0,2% от ВВП на эти цели может позволить себе на ряду с ней только США.
       Для подобной политики имеются серьезные технологические основания. 
       Огромный исторический опыт работы по разработке космической техники, ее обслуживанию и эксплуатации – сильная сторона российской космической отрасли. Вторая особенность этого опыта в том, что по причине ее закрытости в СССР, инженерам отрасли приходилось создавать все образцы космической техники самостоятельно без зарубежных партнеров, однако в тесной кооперации с многочисленными предприятиями промышленности одной страны. В результате в России сформировалась широкая продуктовая линейка космической техники.
       Успешный опыт реализации многих космических программ на протяжении десятилетий также говорит о сильных сторонах России в данной сфере. Высокие стандарты качества изделий позволили выйти на мировой рынок космических услуг. Доказательство этому то, что практически каждый второй в мире запуск в космос в начале XX века осуществлялся российскими ракетами.
       Несмотря на очевидные преимущества российских изделий космической промышленности, очевидны слабые стороны космической отрасли РФ, на что постоянно обращают внимание руководство космической отрасли РФ и ее предприятий. Во-первых, это отсутствие конкуренции производителей. Во-вторых, устаревшая производственная база ряда предприятий. В-третьих, определенная зависимость от зарубежной компонентой базы (особенно при производстве некоторых спутников связи). 
       Имеются и иные угрозы конкурентным позициям России в основании космоса.
       Это касается, прежде всего, рынка коммерческих запусков космических аппаратов, в том числе с отечественных космодромов. Ослабление позиций связано с переделом рынка за счет агрессивной ценовой конкуренции со стороны молодых космических компаний из США. Среди них можно отметить «SpaceX», за несколько лет переформатировавшей, казалось бы, сложившийся на долгие годы вперед рынок космических запусков. 
       К направлениям нейтрализации перечисленных выше негативных тенденций следует отнести развитие международного сотрудничества при реализации космических программ и проектов; динамичное развитие технологий в смежных отраслях; рост спроса со стороны экономики на космические услуги. Движение по указанным направлениям не позволит России потерять занимаемые позиции. Этому также будет способствовать ориентация руководства страны на развитие космических технологий, гарантирующая финансовую поддержку отрасли из бюджета.
       Россия является продолжателем традиций еще советской космонавтики, проложившей дорогу в космос всему человечеству в конце 50-х годов XX века. Но времена меняются и многие технологии, которые были уделом избранных, постепенно распространяются по всему миру. Это требует изменения стратегии. По этой причине, в настоящее время руководством российской космической отрасли делается ставка на перспективные разработки в области космической энергетики. В частности, ядерной энергетической установки, являющейся ядром будущего межпланетного космического буксира «Зевс». 
       Однако в условиях IV-й промышленной революции ориентация на собственные силы – ошибочная политика. В клуб космических держав входит все больше стран. И одна из них –Республика Корея.
       Совместная корейско-российская деятельность в области исследования и использования космоса основывается на общих стремлениях в государственной политике обеих стран и их технико-экономических возможностях. Если Россия способна осуществлять фактически любые виды космической деятельности, то Республике Корея это только предстоит. Но несмотря на ограниченный бюджет, выделяемый государством для KARI, в этой сфере наблюдается существенный прогресс. Например, Корея может гордиться достижениями в области спутниковых технологий связи и дистанционного зондирования Земли (ДЗЗ). Тем не менее, потенциал именно в «новом космосе» у страны огромный. Самое главное, что на волне IV-й промышленной революции эксплуатация космоса Кореей уже приводит к весьма позитивным результатам. 
       Республика Корея зарекомендовала себя в целом как надежного партнера. Речь идет об организации подготовки и запуске первого корейского космонавта. Достаточно известен и проект первого корейско-российского ракета-носителя KSLV-I. Несмотря на серию технических сложностей, ракета достигла космоса, вывела макет спутника, и это позволило Корее на основе мощной производственной кооперации с Россией сделать уверенный самостоятельный шаг для разработки и запуска KSLV-II.
       Не прекращается сотрудничество между нашими странами и по услугам космических запусков. 
       С 2003 года было осуществлено 23 космических запуска для вывода космических аппаратов, созданных в Республике Корея или по заказу корейских компаний, либо в кооперации с другими странами. При этом сотрудничество именно с Россией по числу запусков не только наиболее активное, но и не имеющее на своем счету ни одного аварийного запуска. Очевиден рост активности корейских заказчиков, намечаемый в предстоящем 2022 году на мировом рынке запусков. Ожидается рекордный 2022 год по числу запусков – 7. Можно отметить два самостоятельных запуска корейской стороной для отработки возможностей ракеты Нури с демо-спутниками. Не исключен первый космический запуск корейской частной компанией «Perigee Aerospace» ракеты “Blue Whale 1”. Россия запустит на ракете “Союз-2.1а” в 2022 году сразу 5 корейских спутников (CAS500-2 и 4 кубсата). В этом же году ожидается старт первой корейской лунной миссии. 
       Окончание сотрудничества в области разработки средств выведения на орбиту значительно снизило уровень взаимодействия двух стран. Тем не менее, возможно сотрудничество в области разработки и коммерческих пусков легких и сверхлегких ракет, спутниковой связи, ДЗЗ, поставки компонентной базы, а также фундаментальных исследований космоса. 
       Привлечение частного бизнеса к общим космическим проектам позволит увеличить их потенциал и снизить себестоимость за счет организации здоровой конкуренции. Поддержка же важнейших крупных проектов самими государствами снизит бизнес-риски.
       Успехи Кореи в реализации мобильных сетей 5G позволяют организовывать коммерческое обслуживание многих густонаселенных государств восточного полушария в кратчайшие сроки. В этом могут помочь российские геостационарные спутники. Они свяжут наземные зоны обслуживания 5G магистральными каналами без существенных вложений в инфраструктуру наземных коммуникаций. Россия также заинтересована в обеспечении мобильной связью и интернетом своих территорий, удаленных от оптико- волоконных каналов. Она реализует соответствующую федеральную программу. Однако наземное оборудование 5G в России только разрабатывается. Поэтому для России этот проект также актуален.
       Большинство современных разработчиков спутниковой связи отдают предпочтение низкоорбитальным спутникам. Планируется запуск сотен и тысяч аппаратов. А это позволяет говорить об ожидаемом взрывном расширении рынка услуг по производству спутников и их компонентов, а также о высоком спросе на пусковые услуги, по причине малого времени жизни спутников на низкой орбите. Космические аппараты на орбитах придется обновлять не реже одного раза в 5-7 лет.
       Группировка спутников, имеющая на борту космических аппаратов маршрутизатор и оборудование для межспутниковой связи, позволит иметь глобальное покрытие земной поверхности без необходимости иметь большое количество наземных ретрансляторов и волоконно-оптических магистральных каналов между ними. Перспективным видится организация оптической межспутниковой лазерной связи. Развитие совместного проекта по развертыванию космической информационной сети легко разделяется на несколько независимых с коммерческой точки зрения этапов. Каждый из них вполне самодостаточен.
       Корея и Россия имеет совместный интерес в Арктике. Он заключается в разработке больших запасов углеводородов и эксплуатации Северного Морского Пути (СМП). Энергетическая политика Кореи, основанная на водородных технологиях, требует ускорения решения вопросов получения доступа к большому количеству углеводородов. А СМП – это существенная оптимизация грузоперевозок. В обеих задачах Россия и Корея являются партнерами.
       Для осуществления хозяйственной деятельности в Арктике требуется обеспечение ледовой и геологической разведок на огромных территориях. Технологии ДЗЗ позволяют решить поставленные задачи наиболее эффективным способом. Особое предпочтение отдается радиолокационным спутникам, так как за полярным кругом имеются длительные полярные ночи, а климат Арктики характеризуется частой сильной облачностью. Оптическое ДЗЗ при таких условиях работает не эффективно. Объединив работу национальных радиолокационных спутников для решения поставленных задач, Россия и Корея получит эффективный механизм хозяйствования в Арктическом регионе.
       Возможна организация множества совместных проектов, связанных с пусковыми услугами. Важной задачей является удешевление пусковых услуг. Ее обеспечит многоразовое применение отдельных элементов конструкции ракеты и возвращаемого космического аппарата. Решенная техническая задача возвращения с орбиты тяжелого груза позволяет организовывать в перспективе производство в невесомости.
       Весьма перспективными могут быть проекты по очистке космического пространства от космического мусора и обслуживанию космических аппаратов на орбите Земли.
       Для решения фундаментальных научных проблем ученые и проектировщики Кореи могут присоединиться к международным проектам, в которых участвует Россия. Это, например, разработка и производство научных приборов для крупнейшей спутниковой астрофизической обсерватории «Миллиметрон» на базе космического аппарата «Спектр-М». Участие Республики Корея в Российско-Китайском проекте Международная Научная Лунная Станция (МНЛС) позволит на отличающихся от американского проекта «Артемида» условиях осуществлять исследование Луны. Тем более, что в настоящее время прорабатываются совместные американо-российские варианты взаимодействия при реализации МНЛС и «Артемида». 
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  • 신보호주의하에서 미국의 대외경제정책 평가와 방향
    Evaluation and Direction of U.S. International Economic Policies under Neo-Protectionism

       This study analyzes and evaluates the impact of foreign economic policies implemented during the Trump administration's four-year tenure, and aims to predict the direction of foreign economic policies under the Biden ..

    Gusang Kang et al. Date 2021.12.30

    trade policy, industrial policy United States of America
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       This study analyzes and evaluates the impact of foreign economic policies implemented during the Trump administration's four-year tenure, and aims to predict the direction of foreign economic policies under the Biden administration launched following the 2020 presidential election. The former President Trump put “America First” as the slogan of economic policies and imposed import restrictions and tariffs on trading partners based on Sections 201, 232, and 301 of U.S. trade acts. The Trump administration's trade policies using various trade remedies not only aroused great antipathy from countries affected by those measures, but also led to retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods and services from other countries. In addition, the Trump administration strongly promoted renegotiation, claiming that some existing trade agreements had been concluded unfavorably to the U.S., and also actively conducted new trade negotiations based on bilateralism.
       In this study, we conduct an empirical analysis to find out how the Trump administration's tariffs on imports had an effect on the U.S. economy. First, we examine the effects of the Trump administration's tariffs on steel and aluminum under the Section 232 remedy and tariffs on imports from China under the Section 301 on employment in the U.S. According to the empirical results, the tariffs have the effect of increasing employment through the protection of domestic industries. Moreover, looking at the effect of tariff imposition on industrial production, we find that it has the effect of reducing industrial production through both protecting domestic industries and imposing retaliatory tariffs. Summarizing the above results, we argue that the Trump administration's tariff measures had a somewhat positive effect on the U.S. industrial employment, but it is difficult to say that the policy effect that President Trump initially expected was achieved as the measures also had a negative effect on industrial production.
       In addition, this study conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of the 2018 tax reform on U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) to examine the impact of other foreign economic policies promoted by the Trump administration. Based on the empirical results, the tax reform had a short-term effect in reducing U.S. FDI. However, the sharp decline of U.S. foreign direct investment in 2018 compared to that in 2017 is mainly due to returning foreign income, held by U.S. multinational technology giants such as Google, Apple and Amazon in tax havens such as the British Bermuda and Ireland, to their home country.
       President Biden strongly criticized the former Trump administration's unilateral and protectionist trade policy for not only severely eroding the U.S. leadership in the world but also having a negative impact on the domestic economy. Nevertheless, policy actions of the Biden administration so far are not likely to be significantly different from those of the Trump administration. Although the Biden administration recently reached an agreement with the EU on the withdrawal of tariffs on steel, those tariffs on other trading partners and the Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports are still in place. The Biden administration, however, is expected to pressure China in various different ways from the Trump administration. For example, the Biden administration will continue to demand the implementation of China's commitments to the Phase One trade agreement reached by the former Trump administration with China. Furthermore, the administration is anticipated to link human rights and environmental issues to trade measures to apply more pressure on China.
       Like the Trump administration, the Biden administration's other foreign economic policy directions are showing strong protectionist perspectives. President Biden witnessed the shortage of essential medical supplies such as masks, respirators, and protective suits, as well as semiconductors for vehicles, during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the Biden administration has been shaping policies to address these kinds of supply chain risks due to the pandemic. For example, President Biden has decided to strengthen application of the “Buy American Act,” which stipulates that domestic products can be used preferentially in the federal government procurement sector. Moreover, he has implemented policies to reorganize the global supply chain with a focus on the U.S. in key products (semiconductors, high-capacity batteries, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients) and industries (defense, health, ICT, energy, transportation, agriculture) excluding China.
       Based on the above analysis, this study presents the following policy implications. First, in preparation for the modernization of digital trade rules, it is necessary to strengthen digital trade cooperation with middle power countries participating in the WTO e-commerce negotiations along with a detailed analysis and review of the economic impacts. This is because the U.S. is leading the WTO e-commerce negotiations by demanding high-quality digital trade standards, and these negotiations are being conducted mainly in large advanced economies including the U.S. and the EU. Second, in the process of reorganizing the global supply chain centered on the U.S., Korea needs to take advantage of the benefits provided by the U.S. federal government and strengthen cooperation in the supply chain based on norms with the U.S. Through the ROK-U.S. summit in May 2021, Korea is planning to make large-scale investments in the U.S. in the semiconductor and electric vehicle battery fields, and the U.S. also wants to make up for weak points in its supply chain in these fields. Third, Korea needs to reach an amicable agreement with the U.S. on trade remedies that have already been applied. As seen in the results of the previous empirical analysis, it is difficult to see that the tariffs imposed by the former Trump administration had the expected positive impact on U.S. industries. In this regard, Korea should also strive to persuade the U.S. to replace existing relief measures such as the Section 232 steel quotas by raising the need to strengthen its supply chain with the U.S.
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  • 러시아의 동북아 에너지 전략과 한-러 신협력방안: 천연가스 및 수소 분야를 중심으로
    Russia’s Energy Strategy in the Northeast Asian Region and New Korea-Russia Cooperation: Focusing on the Natural Gas and Hydrogen Sectors

       This study explores new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between t..

    Joungho Park et al. Date 2021.12.30

    economic cooperation, energy industry Russia Eurasia
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       This study explores new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between the two countries, reflecting changes in the international energy environment, such as climate change and decarbonization, which are in full swing at the global level.
       In Chapter 2, this paper examines the geopolitics of energy coming into the 21st century and Russia’s new energy strategy. First, while tracing changes in energy geopolitics and hegemony in the 21st century, we analyzed changing factors that directly or indirectly affect the new hegemony structure, such as technological development, the growth of alternative energy markets, and climate change issues. Then, we reviewed the main contents and points of Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2035 and hydrogen energy development plan, identifying the direction of Russia’s energy strategy toward Northeast Asia.
       In Chapter 3, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of the energy cooperation strategies of China and Japan, major Northeast Asian countries, with Russia. In particular, we comprehensively reviewed the progress, major achievements and characteristics of China and Japan’s cooperation with Russia in the natural gas sector. In addition, this study draws policy implications for Korea based on a careful review of energy policy directions for Russia pursued by China and Japan, which have recently declared carbon neutrality.
       Chapter 4 comprehensively evaluates Korea’s energy strategy and Korea-Russia energy cooperation. Korea’s energy cooperation with Russia has been an area of great interest since the early days of diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia. However, looking at the overall situation so far, energy cooperation between the two countries has had nearly no remarkable achievements other than the Korea Gas Corporation introducing natural gas from Sakhalin. Cooperation between the two countries in the field of gas remains at the level of commercial relations based on purchases and sales. In this regard, we proposed a plan for Korea-Russia cooperation that reflects changes in the new energy market.
       Finally, Chapter 5 presents new plans for Korea-Russia energy cooperation. This includes signing a “New Energy Partnership” cooperation agreement, vitalizing and strengthening the governance of energy cooperation with Russia, finding ways to cooperate in the area of energy in traditional and new fields, devising ways to cooperate in energy-related and other industries, and developing new cooperative measures in response to major transitions in the energy sector.
    In conclusion, this study emphasizes that strategic consideration and political will at the government level for energy cooperation with Russia will act as a key factor for the development of bilateral relations with Russia and the future of the Northern Policy.
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  • 중국의 디지털 전환 전략과 시사점: 5G 네트워크 구축과 데이터 경제 육성을 중심으로
    China’s Digital Transformation Strategy and Implications: Focusing on Building 5G Network and Fostering Data Economy

       China’s digital transformation is emerging as a future growth engine for the Chinese economy in the post-corona era, and the US-China trade dispute is gradually expanding into the digital realm. In light of these dev..

    Wonseok Choi et al. Date 2021.12.30

    industrial structure, industrial policy China
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       China’s digital transformation is emerging as a future growth engine for the Chinese economy in the post-corona era, and the US-China trade dispute is gradually expanding into the digital realm. In light of these developments, we need to analyze the digital governance and data-related norms promoted by the Chinese government and recognize the differences between Korea and China. In particular, cooperation in the digital field based on 5G technology and data differs from existing cooperation in that outcomes remain uncertain in the field, while these can be expected to have a large ripple effect, indicating the need for in-depth analysis. This report analyzes China’s digital transformation promotion policy and competitiveness, based on which we seek policy implications and ways to cooperate with China to enhance Korea’s digital competitiveness. In particular, we intend to present relevant policy implications by focusing our analysis on the field of 5G technology and data, which is the most core and fundamental field in digital transformation and a key driving force in the Korean government’s Digital New Deal strategy.
       Chapter 2 examines the current status and characteristics of China’s digital transformation strategy. China has proposed the framework of “four orientations” (digital industrialization, industry digitalization, digital governance, and data valuelization development). First, China’s digital industrialization represents the increase and development of added value in the ICT industry. China is undergoing both expansion of the service and software industries in the ICT (digital) industry, and the promotion of Internet industrialization based on the growth of Internet companies. Second, industry digitalization represents integration of digital technology with other industries and triggers a digital transformation of the real economy. The size of the economy in this field accounts for more than 80% of China’s digital economy, and it is a rapidly growing field that is driving digitalization of the secondary industry. Third, digital governance means improving administrative systems and institutions through the use of digital technology. Fourth, data valuelization development means building a system to utilize data as a production factor of the digital economy. Although the economic size of the third and fourth sectors has not been estimated yet, the Chinese government is paying attention to these sectors as the digital transformation is accelerating. 
       However, despite the rapid growth of China’s digital economy, the low localization rate of industrial software and weak global competitiveness are judged to be the limitations of China’s digital transformation. In addition, China’s digital market has not been opened to foreign companies and there is a possibility that conflicts with advanced countries such as the United States and the EU may escalate in the future due to the government’s measures to strengthen its influence. It is judged that these factors will act as an obstacle to China’s efforts to promote external cooperation in the digital field.
       Chapter 3 examines the Chinese government’s 5G technology development, 5G network construction strategy and strategies by major 5G industry companies to promote technology standardization. China has been promoting the development of 5G technology since 2013, after which it began commercialization of 5G communication services in 2019, and since then has been increasing the number of low-cost base stations (3.5GHz band) and expanding coverage areas. Through this, the Chinese government intends to expand various digital service markets and implement technology development and application business models suitable for various frequency bands in the long term. In addition, the Chinese government is rapidly building a 5G network by expanding new infrastructure investment and network coordination to avoid duplicate investments among telecommunication companies. Therefore, we can expect a 5G technology ecosystem to be rapidly established in China based on this 5G network.
       Since 2018 China has introduced “group standards,” in which several entities such as companies and research institutes jointly participate in the establishment of standards, and is promoting the standardization of 5G-related technologies. This study analyzes the group standards cooperative network between members of the China Communication Standardization Association (CCSA), which occupies an important position in ICT technology and policies in China, to identify key institutions and companies in the creation of a 5G technology ecosystem. According to our analysis, the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT), the ICT policy research institute of the Chinese government, was analyzed as the most important institution constituting the cooperative network of 5G technology group standards in China. This shows that government think tanks are playing a significant role in China's 5G technology cooperation network in terms of coordinating efforts and establishing guidelines. In addition, as the influence of the CCSA is gradually increasing in the process of international standardization in communication technology, it is expected that mutual checks and competition between American and Chinese companies will continue to intensify during the process of establishing 5G technology standards.
        The greatest competitive advantage enjoyed by China for its digital transformation is the existence of various digital companies based on its huge domestic market. This report analyzes the case of the China Mobile 5G Innovation Center, promoted by Chinese telecommunication companies and companies with major 5G technologies to create an industrial ecosystem, as a new example of open innovation. The results of this analysis show that China's 5G ecosystem has a demand for cooperation with many alternate companies, indicating the possibility of various types of cooperation models being created, and applied innovations in the 5G sector led by telecommunication equipment companies and platform companies will become more important than telecommunication companies. In addition, based on the success in major first-tier cities, various forms of applied innovation are expected to emerge in second- and third-tier cities as well.
       Chapter 4 analyzes the current status of China’s data economy, its policies, and smart manufacturing, which is expected to generate the greatest added value through the convergence of data and real economy in China. Hardware accounts for the highest proportion of China’s big data market, whereas the sales structure of the global big data market is more than half concentrated in the service sector. One of the confirmed reasons for this is that China is deploying data locally for data security and personal information protection when using big data.
       In addition, China was analyzed as holding advantages over the data economies in other countries in terms of data production, government’s initiative (policy), and data management (big data management department/data bank and exchange). China will continue developing servers and storage source technologies and promoting cloud applications, Internet security, and IDC operation capabilities, while aiming to become a early mover in technology for finance, telemedicine (online treatment), artificial intelligence, and autonomous driving. Efforts to revitalize data banks and data exchanges to build a larger data ecosystem are expected to continue as well.
       China’s fostering policy for the data sector is gradually moving from the stage of big data collection to forming an industrial chain through big data integration and sharing. In addition, China has announced the Data Security Act and Personal Information Protection Act to reorganize and revitalize the domestic data market. These data norms are: ① strengthening data control by government agencies for the purpose of national security, and ② could possibly act as a non-tariff barrier to the domestic market, while ③ related laws are already in effect but detailed rules have not been established. This means Korean companies will have to be cautious, as digital cooperation between Korea and China is likely to incur significant transaction costs due to the differences in systems between the two countries. Therefore, we can consider policy communication between the two countries as the most important task in digital cooperation.
       China’s recent promotion of “data assetization” is a process of forming the exchange value of data, characterized by the realization of economic profits through market distribution transactions. China’s first data ownership platform, the People’s Data Asset Service Platform, has been used to examine the legality of data, and in some regions related policies have been announced and platforms have been established and put into operation. In addition, starting with the establishment of the Guiyang Big Data Exchange in 2014, evaluated as the world’s first data exchange, data assetization began on an experimental basis. Since then, 16 data trading platforms in the form of open markets have been established and operated by 8 public-private joint ventures (Guiyang, etc.) or private initiatives (Chongqing, etc.).
       According to China’s “Smart Manufacturing Development Index Report 2020 (2020年智能制造发展指数报告)”, the areas of automobile manufacturing, electronic equipment manufacturing, and chemical manufacturing outpaced other industries in the development of smart manufacturing. In addition, as a result of analyzing the global value chain (GVC) participation of the top 10 industries with advanced smart manufacturing in China, exports through GVC increased in all of the top 10 industries, and in particular, forward GVC participation (i.e. producing and shipping inputs that are further re-exported) has increased compared to backward GVC participation (i.e. using imported inputs to produce goods that are shipped abroad). Therefore, if the competitiveness of China’s smart manufacturing grows rapidly in the future, there is a possibility that China’s share of added value in the GVC of automobile manufacturing, chemical industry, and electrical and optical equipment manufacturing will increase and the supply chain in China will be further consolidated. In addition, when comparing the results of smart manufacturing evaluations conducted by Korea and China up to 2019, the level of the two countries is judged to be similar. Therefore, in order to gain an edge in the smart manufacturing competition with China, it will be important for Korea to establish a smart manufacturing model based on data sharing.
       Based on the previous analyses, Chapter 5 sets out five policy implications.  Korea should: ① review the direction of its digital transformation policy, ② formulate plans to strengthen the competitiveness of Korea’s 5G industry, ③ establish strategy for information and communication technology standards, ④ design plans to expand Korea’s data market, ⑤ build communication channels with China on digital trade rules, and ⑥ utilize special economic zones in China and pursue the opening of digital services through the Korea-China FTA negotiations.

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처음 1112131415 마지막

공공누리 OPEN / 공공저작물 자유이용허락 - 출처표시, 상업용금지, 변경금지 공공저작물 자유이용허락 표시기준 (공공누리, KOGL) 제4유형

대외경제정책연구원의 본 공공저작물은 "공공누리 제4유형 : 출처표시 + 상업적 금지 + 변경금지” 조건에 따라 이용할 수 있습니다. 저작권정책 참조