This study aims to analyze in depth grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia, and to draw implications for the realization of ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’
   The grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia are directly reflected in their policies on the Korean Peninsula. The Policy toward the Korean Peninsula of the Trump administration develops as follows. First, there are nuclear negotiations with North Korea. However, these negotiations remain deadlocked after Hanoi Summit because of differences between the White House and the Washington bureaucracy over the solutions for denuclearization. Second, there is the economic pressure on the Republic of Korea. Trump administration has criticized the allies for ‘Free-Riding’ on the US security commitments and demanded an increased share of defense expenses. And at the risk of damaging the alliance Trump also has put economic pressure on allies to solve its trade deficit, demanding revision of FTA and invoking the safeguard clauses. Third, there is a demand for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and switching allied strategy. Trump administration is pushing to strengthen the alliance to expand the Republic of Korea’s role in Indo-Pacific strategy. However, the US also reveals the intention to maintain military influence on the Korean Peninsula by expanding the role of UN Command even after the return of wartime operational control.
   There is no significant difference in policies of Xi Jinping administration toward the Korean peninsula from those of previous administrations. The basic principles that China invariably adheres to in the process of its policies toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, the stability and peace of the Korean Peninsula, Second, problem solving through dialogue and negotiations, Third, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Fourth, maintaining and expanding its influence on the Korean Peninsula using equidistant diplomacy and geopolitical means. Until now, Xi jinping administration has faced many complicated problems in relation to the Korean Peninsula. The biggest problem among them is the denuclearization of the korean Peninsula. China in association with Russia has proposed alternatives called ‘Freeze-for-freeze and dual-track approach’ to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and promote peace, but the negotiations between the US and North Korea remain deadlocked. China is participating in international sanctions and economic support for North Korea at the same time, leading to denuclearization and contributing to the stabilization of the North Korean regime while still regarding North Korea as a strategic asset. Also, Xi jinping administration is attempting to expand its‘One belt, One Road’ project into Northeast Asian region. The linkage of ‘One belt, One Road’ with the Korean Peninsula would serve as an opportunity to promote minilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in the region.
   Tasks of Putin administration’s policy toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, Adherence to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas. Since the 2000s, Russia has made an effort to maintain a balanced friendship with the two Koreas to enhance its strategic value on the Korean Peninsula. Second, Peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. For Russia, the North Korean nuclear issue is regarded as a immediate threat, but the regional confrontation centered on the ROK-US, the US-Japan and the China-North Korean alliances is a more intrinsic threat. Therefore, by establishing multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia and allaying its security concerns in the region, Putin administration strives to focus on developing Far East. Third, Expansion of economic cooperation with both Koreas and realization of tripartite economic cooperation. After the acceleration of so-called ‘Eastern Policy’ since 2012, in which Russia has tried to develop Far East through close economic cooperation with countries in Northeast Asia, these economic cooperations have become a major task on Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
   If so, how should the Republic of Korea respond to realize the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’ initiative? Under the Trump administration, it appears that the existing alliance between the Republic of Korea and the US seems to be nearing its end, and the ‘Pursuit of common interests’ has also been replaced by ‘Seeking American interests.’ Therefore, to pursue its own interests, the Republic of Korea also needs to make a complete revisions to its strategies as follows: First, when it comes to excessive calls for increased share of defense expenses, the government of the Republic of Korea should weaken the justification of the pressure, utilizing Washington’s bureaucracy and Congress’ concerns that excessive demands could lead to Seoul’s departure from the alliance. Second, regarding calls for participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, the government of the Republic of Korea should express its willingness to strengthen the role of the Republic of Korea in the defense of the Korean Peninsula, reducing pressure of Washington’s bureaucracy, taking advantage of President Trump’s indifference. Third, in order to reduce the security vulnerability caused by security dependence on the US, the government of the Republic of Korea should seek a ‘shift in alliance’ that fills the security vacuum by establishing a multilateral security regime in the long-term.
   The Republic of Korea is facing a diplomatic dilemma due to China’s growing influence and hegemonic competition between the US and China. As the competition between the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy is getting intensified, diplomatic options of the Republic of Korea will narrow more. Considering this situation, the Republic of Korea needs to implement the following strategies. First, it needs to be emphasized that even if the Republic of Korea participates in the Indo-Pacific strategy limitedly, this does not mean that it participates in any hostilities or siege against China. Second, the Republic of Korea should actively support the ‘One Belt, One Road’ connection to the Korean Peninsula, the conclusion of the Korea-China-Japan FTA and the institutionalization of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). This could not only contribute to paving the way for the initiation of minilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia, but could also serve as a framework for providing economic rewards to North Korea in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
   Since the 2000s, Russia has adhered to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas that maintains balanced friendship with the two Koreas, while steadfastly pushing for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the establishment of a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia, the expansion of economic cooperation with the South and North Korea and the realization of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia. Therefore, the Republic of Korea needs to make active use of Russia’s policy on the Korean Peninsula as follows: First, in order to maintain the impetus for the peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, it is necessary to ask Russia to provide a firm support for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and to play a role in preventing any heightened tension in the face of an unexpected crisis. In this process, strengthening relations between Russia and North Korea can be a positive factor in reducing North Korea’s excessive security and economic dependence on China. Second, the Republic of Korea should work closely with Russia in relation to ensure the security of the North Korean regime and to establish a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to cooperate closely with Russia to establish this mechanism as means and process for realizing a peaceful cooperation community, a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’ Third, with regard to the development of the Far East and the promotion of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia, the level of cooperation with Russia should be raised step by step. the Republic of Korea has to Recognize that Russia’s development of the Far East and promoting tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia can serve as a basic driving force for the realization of the economic cooperation community, which is a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’, and should improve the level of cooperation with Russia gradually, as the situation on the Korean Peninsula changes.