Due to a huge economic gap that opened up between South and North Korea after nearly seven decades of division in the Korean peninsula, it is expected that economic integration between South and North Korea would naturally give rise to a number of issues in political, economic, social, and cultural areas. Therefore, to analyze those issues and the path of economic integration between South and North Korea with regard to reunification of the Korean peninsula, this research aims to propose strategies for gradual economic integration between the two Koreas, by analyzing the major issues in economic integration, such as trade and investment, currency integration, and utilization of human resources; and assess their impact on the regional production networks and the economic cooperation process in Northeast Asia.
In Chapter 2, we theoretically prove that the current situation in the Korean peninsula, where many political barriers to trade exist, is Pareto-inefficient; and that it can achieve a Pareto-efficient situation by attaining institutional economic integration enabled by mutual agreement between South and North Korea. Based on the theoretical analysis and case studies on Germany, China and Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, Vietnam, Yemen, and the European Union, we proposed basic directions that economic integration between South and North Korea needs to follow: gradual approach to economic integration, separation of economic cooperation and integration from military and security issues, construction of an institutional framework for the economic integration, role of the private sector, gradual integration of currencies of South and North Korea, and establishment of a mechanism of political ties and stable decision-making process.
In Chapter 3, we prove that peaceful inter-Korean relations will boost trade and investment between South and North Korea. However, the pattern of expansion of trade and investment through economic integration is dependent upon differences in economic systems and industrial structures; and on competitiveness of companies of South and North Korea. Also, maintaining peace between South and North Korea is a prerequisite for them to improve efficiency of economic transactions. After that, it is necessary to build an institutional and practical framework in support of a market-oriented system, creation of dispute settlement procedures, and operation of special economic zones in order to facilitate trade and investment between South and North Korea.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a concrete plan to gradually integrate currencies of South and North Korea, by introducing the OKU (One Korea Indexed Unit of Account) linked with real values. Based on previous cases in Germany and the EU, it is necessary for South and North Korea to gradually integrate two currencies and hence introduce a new unit of account, such as the OKU, so that problems such as the timing of introducing a single currency and the ratio of converting two currencies, can be solved in market-oriented fashion. Therefore, we can minimize the uncertainty of the conversion ratio that may come from the process of integrating two economies, and ultimately lead the real economies to a soft landing following the process of economic integration.
In Chapter 5, this study analyzes how human resources in transition countries have responded to the direction and pace of economic transition, focusing on income, productivity, firms’ utilization, and so on. Human resources in North Korea would be positively evaluated due to a lower linguistic barrier and higher productivity compared to China and Vietnam. Therefore, we expect North Korea to be fairly well- endowed with human resources in terms of productivity and vitality of its population. However, it also has limitations, such as difficulty in understanding a market-oriented system and overcoming work intensity and technological gaps after the economic integration. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the following preconditions to effective utilization of human resources in North Korea and maximization of benefits from the economic integration: make visible progress in economic integration by setting clear goals, design concrete plans and gradually integrate the economies; achieve consensus on minimum wage levels and conditions for wage increases based on effective market-oriented coordination; consider plans to expand global cooperation among countries in East Asia to enable the North Korean work force to better understand the market system; and establish special economic zones in various areas, where influence of established powerholders are circumscribed, in North Korea.
In Chapter 6, it turns out that China's impact on production activities will decrease but the impact of Korea will increase, and hence the global impact will decrease by US$ 330 million. Based on this analysis, we need to consider two strategies for the economic integration as follows: initially focus on industries where North Korea has a comparative advantage over countries in Northeast Asia; and secure enough budget and funds to meet the costs of economic integration, and consider South Korea’s foreign direct investment in Northeast Asia as a private fund and official development assistance (ODA) and Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund as the public fund.
In Chapter 7, we analyzed how the economic integration between South and North Korea will affect economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. It turns out that economic integration between South and North Korea will benefit the two economies, and real GDP in North Korea will increase by 5.9%. In addition,  economic integration will have minimal impact on neighboring countries like China and Japan. However, North Korea will be worse off when North Korea does not integrate with South Korea and does not participate in economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. In addition, in the scenario where South and North Korea integrate with each other and China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea form a regional trade agreement, all countries involved will be better off.
In Chapter 8, after summing up all analyses conducted in the study, we propose a Comprehensive Economic Integration Agreement (CEIA or One Korea Agreement) as an institutional framework for gradually integrating South and North Korea. In addition, we suggest a carry- forward ‘Ten-Year Economic Integration Plan’ for gradual economic integration between South and North Korea. It is expected that we can minimize the adverse effects and disorder from the economic integration through the CEIA and ‘Ten-Year Economic Integration Plan’ as proposed in this research. In addition, even though this research has focused more on the gradual economic integration rather than a rapid one, it would be impossible to rapidly integrate the two economies over all sectors when the economic integration proceeds in a rapid way. Therefore, some findings of this research would be applicable to rapid economic integration between South and North Korea.

Cities are now home to half of the world's population. The United Nations predict world urban population to reach over 60% by 2050. Such trend is expected to intensify in the developing regions of Asia and Africa. While urban development as well as population increase in urban area are deemed as indices for development, unplanned urban expansion undermines urban growth, threatening the global pursuit of sustainable development.
Currently, the global community is contemplating Sustainable Development Goals with the termination of the Millennium Development Goals at the end of 2015. Unlike the MDGs, urban issues are set as a stand-alone target in the SDGs. Target 11 of the SDGs includes improving the urban environment, protecting urban vulnerable population, controlling air pollution, and so on. Especially, the target highlights urban response to climate change, such as greenhouse gas emission reduction and improved climate resilience in the urban areas.
Urban areas are large contributors of global climate change. However, agglomerated population in the urban areas make cities also vulnerable to climate change. According to the World Bank, cities produce approximately 2/3 of the world's GHG emission generated from energy production. Newly developing countries produce greenhouse gas emission which surpasses the developed countries. Traditionally cities often sit near rivers and oceans due to the advantage in connectivity and transportation. However, this makes cities vulnerable to climate related hazards such as sea-level rise and floods. Urban area in the developing areas are especially vulnerable to climate change due to the lack of social and economic infrastructure.
This study reviews main issues regarding urban response to climate change. Also, by reviewing the activities of major donors, the study seeks to draw implications for Korea in building urban climate change strategy.
A major challenge in urban climate change is the lack of consensus in urban definitions. Also, current indices in urban development are insufficient to fully comprehend the state of cities and their response to climate change. Discussions on the post-2015 development framework highlight tackling these limits as essential to further promote urban development goals. The global community is likely to expand discussing development goals according to national and regional circumstances when a universal global development agenda is finalized. Without a global consensus on the definition of a city, indices for monitoring the results are likely to be incomplete. Without adequate indices for development result monitoring, the purpose of setting a global development goal is subsided. Therefore, it is highly relevant for individual development agencies to thoroughly survey the status of target cities and share the result between partners. Developing a database for the status of cities can also be an appropriate measure.
UN-Habitat has been conducting surveys on the state of world cities and develops database with cooperation from other UN agencies. It is also working developing and improving a global urban index. The organization has also developed a framework for assisting cities to respond to climate change. This framework includes comprehensive reviews of the current status, seeking alternatives, implementation and results reviews. Adequate index setting as well as monitoring and evaluation of the results are indispensible elements of the framework. The World Bank has maintained urban development as one of its programs. The organization recently noted climate change mitigation and adaptation as a core issue and is currently expanding its activities regarding the issue. A distinctive feature of the World Bank program is that it support urban government competitiveness in attracting private finance. By enhancing city governments' financing capacity, the World Bank seeks to support an effective low carbon city development plan. It is noteworthy that the World Bank promotes local capacity building activities, building on its own experience on financial cooperation and understanding on large-scale financing for low carbon urban infrastructure.
With its urban division in place in the 1990s, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) has long been the sole bilateral actor in urban development. Sida has provided systematic support on urban environment and climate change issues in the development countries. SymbioCity is a bilateral cooperation program which stems from the Swedish experience of tackling environmental issues. Sweden provides advices and suggests detailed programs for sustainability to municipalities in developing countries through this program. Korea has accumulated experience in urban development through its rapid development since the 1970s. Furthermore, Korea seeks to bolster its ODA for climate change. Increased support for urban climate change mitigation and adaptation in the developing countries are deemed as highly adequate. Low carbon urban development was included as an element in the East Asia Climate Partnership program during 2009-2012. Unfortunately, substantial improvements were invisible. Taking account of the Swedish experience, it is important to develop programs, building on the Korean experience yet applicable to an international context.

This report analyzes the trends and characteristics, and the impact of migrant remittances to Southeast Asian development. Remittances, money transfers sent by international migrants to their kin at home, are increasingly recognized as a new source of development finance by the international community. Remittances to developing countries are large in volume, increasing steadily, and less volatile than other types of external financial inflows. Transferred directly to the households in need, remittances are widely credited for their contribution to poverty reduction in developing countries. This is why remittances have become a focus of great attention for the Post-2015 Development Agenda. In conducting the analysis, this report focuses on Southeast Asia, an important remittance-recipient region and a major economic partner for Korea.
Remittances to Southeast Asia show patterns similar to those of other developing regions. Remittances are a major source of external financial flows to the region, and they have been rising steadily over the past decades. And remittance inflows have been stable. Southeast Asia may not be on par with other regions including South Asia or Latin America in terms of the size of remittances, per capita remittances, or remittances as a share of GDP, but it ranks high in terms of the share of remittances in overall external financial flows and volatility of remittances in Southeast Asia are relatively low among the regions.
Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines accounts for the most of the remittances flowing into the region although its share has been on a gradual decline. Other countries in the region, especially populous countries of Indonesia and Vietnam, are receiving increasing volumes of remittances, as their migration outflows are on a steady rise. The level of remittances from smaller, more underdeveloped countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is also rising fast. It should be noted that remittances per capita exceed Official Development Assistance per capita in most Southeast Asian countries except Cambodia and Laos, which are aid-intensive countries. This suggests that remittances may have development potential that could complement foreign aid.
This report also performs statistical analysis using cross-country panel data with an aim to investigate whether development impact of remittances differ between Southeast Asia and other developing regions. The empirical results indicate that Southeast Asia does not differ from the others with respect to impact of remittance outcomes on poverty reduction and investment. However, remittances does appear to raise inequality in Southeast Asia to a greater extent, which indicates remittances may be concentrated into higher income groups than other regions. The relationship between remittances and growth is stronger in Southeast Asia. Finally, although appearing to strengthen financial development outside Southeast Asia, remittances have a negative impact on financial development in the region. This suggests that the receiving countries in Southeast Asia need to improve institutions to enable greater contribution of remittances to domestic financial development.
The government of Korea should continue to make an effort to reduce transaction costs of remittances and consider utilizing its foreign aid tools to enhance the development impact of remittances. It should also consider institutionalizing remittance sender surveys in the country to develop an effective research infrastructure for better understanding remittance outflows from Korea and their development impact in the receiving countries.

As discussions on the importance of trade as a driver of growth and development of developing countries moved forward around the globe, the role of Aid for Trade (AfT) has been given renewed emphasis. Since the AfT Initiative was launched at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, December 2005, the international community has expanded its support and assistance for developing countries, to facilitate trade by providing proper infrastructure and build productive capacity.
This study aims to provide policy implications for establishing policies or strategies regarding AfT based on analysis of recent trends and major issues in AfT. In 2012, the international community provided USD 3.87 billion in AfT, which represented an increase of approximately threefold compared to 2002 and this accounted for 26 percent of total ODA. While it is positive that the volume of AfT steadily increased, newly emerged priorities in AfT for donors and partner countries have been expanded, considering the rapidly changing trade environment. Furthermore, since the AfT initiative was launched 10 years ago, there have been increased concerns and attention on the part of the global community on the results and impact of AfT and thus OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has led the discussion on establishment of monitoring and evaluation framework.
Korea, which has achieved economic growth through active participation in international trade, has supported developing countries consistently to promote their trade. Case in point, Korea provided USD 780 million in support of AfT. Korea was 16th among DAC member countries in total ODA volume, but was 8th in volume of AfT.
The report suggests following policy implications for enhancing the effectiveness of AfT programs and projects, which accounts for 40 percent of total ODA. First, Korea should improve consistency and connectivity among AfT programs and projects, implemented by diverse ODA executing agencies, based on national AfT strategies and policies. Especially, when the government establishes a Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for priority countries, Korea should include trade as one of the priority areas where national AfT strategy should be merged with the assistance strategy, as to maintain consistency among AfT and ODA programs.
Second, when the government sets up the AfT programs, it should take care to recognize the changes in the global trade environment and have the changes reflected in the programs in a timely manner. For example, the global value chains (GVCs) has recently received significant attention among the international community. Reflecting this trend, Korea ought to develop AfT programs to help developing countries effectively take advantage of GVCs to promote their trade.
Third, the effectiveness of diverse official flows excluding ODA has also received much attention, in addition to efforts to broaden development finance. Therefore, Korea needs to develop an interest in diversification of sources of development finance such as equity investment or guarantees when it implements AfT programs. In addition, AfT could be utilized as leverage to mobilize private funds.
Lastly, one of the most urgent issues is the establishment of a performance framework for AfT programs because the AfT accounts for a significant portion among bilateral ODA of Korea. Korea should implement its AfT programs based on such performance framework. Objectives, outcomes and indicators, which are reflected into the AfT program, should be designed and included in the program identification and formulation phase. Furthermore, the performance framework should be utilized in the monitoring and evaluation, which would help to increase aid effectiveness as well as to enhance accountability and transparency of the AfT programs.

In early 2014, building on the Bali success, WTO Members began revisiting the rest of the DDA under its three main pillars of agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services. The implementation of the Bali package itself, however, turned out to be more difficult than expected. In July, India signaled that it was unwilling to join the consensus on a proposed protocol of amendment integrating the new trade facilitation agreement into the WTO rule book, unless it saw evidence of progress on the concerns it had raised in Bali, starting with a permanent solution on public stockholding. This new impasse, only six months after Bali, not only affected mutual trust among countries but also significantly delayed discussions on the post-Bali work programme mandated by Ministers. Fortunately, after several months of deadlock, an agreement reached in mid-November between India and the United States finally allowed Members to overcome the impasse, paving the way for the implementation of the Bali deal on trade facilitation, as well as progress on the broader negotiating agenda.
Members will now need to turn their attention to the arduous task of defining the contours and content of a possible post-Bali work programme. The first step in this process will consist of undertaking a reality check of the 2008 modalities. While the existing draft texts cannot be dismissed, Members also cannot ignore the fact that the 2008 draft modalities was not accepted as a basis of future negotiations by developed members, including the United States and the EU. Furthermore, during the process of negotiations on DDA work programmes, it is most likely that the draft texts will be significantly changed to reflect arguments of developed countries - the reduction of gap in the applied and bound tariffs, the reduction of farm subsidies of China and India, and the reduction of special and differential treatments for developing counties.
Given such circumstances, Korea, a member of the G-33, should establish feasible and effective negotiation strategies on the following key issues in which Korea has deep interest. First, Korea needs to support the positions of developed countries on reducing the difference in MFN applied tariffs and bound tariffs. The ratio of applied tariffs to bound tariffs in Korea is just 0.8, which is relatively high compared to average values for both developed countries (0.6) and developing countries (0.4). Therefore, it is reasonable to propose a new tariff reduction method which relates to water. For example, a larger cut is applied to products which have more water.
Second, in absolute terms, farm support in China is now nearing the level of EU farm subsidies although China’s farm support is heavily focused on payment for general services such as infrastructure. India’s agricultural domestic support has also grown dramatically in recent years with a particular emphasis on input and investment subsidies in developing countries. Since Korea’s farm support is still very timid, there will be almost no substantial impact on the operations of Korea’s agricultural policy.
Third, the reduction of S&D for developing countries could negatively affect Korea’s trade policies because it can produce results that Korea could not obtain: special products with no tariff cut. Hence, Korea needs to build its alliance with the G-33 firmly, which strongly support special products for developing countries. However, if the reduction of S&D for special products is unavoidable, Korea needs to put its emphasis on treatments rather numbers of special products because its agricultural production is centered on several products such as rice.
Finally this study shows that the political costs of an agreement to increase market access could be reduced substantially by using a proportional-cut approach (for example, overall X percent reduction with a minimum cut of Y percent on each tariff line, following the Uruguay Round model) rather than progressive tariff-cutting formulas which has been discussed till now.

The U.S. Constitution assigns to the Congress for the enactment of foreign trade policy. Therefore, congressional election results have a big impact on U.S. foreign trade policy. A number of studies have been conducted to analyze the determinants of foreign trade policy in the U. S. House of Representatives. It is believed that one of the most important determinants of the voting behavior of legislators is the interest groups particularly the contributions of the political action committees (PACs).
In this regard, previous studies have exhibited the limitations which led to the inability to overcome the endogeneity as the studies utilized cross-sectional data analysis. It is necessary to utilize various econometric models to overcome this endogeneity, one of which is the panel analysis model. In addition, this study further divided the PACs by industries to reflect their different attitude on FTAs. We also analyzed the perspectives by political party factions.
In this paper, panel data was created with seven FTA bills that passed the House of Representatives since 2000. To investigate the relationship in detail, we used the random effect panel logit model and the Hausman- Taylor 2SLS estimation. In addition, we conducted the quantile regression based on the contributions received by the PACs.
The empirical results are as follows. We find that the House of Representatives received larger contributions from the business PACs on the FTA bills, while contributions from the labor PACs were not usually supportive of FTAs. However, when business PACs are divided into industries such as agribusiness, telecommunications, defense, energy, finance, there were differences depending on the position of each industry. For example, the contributions received from business PACs varied by industry perspective, rather than being uniformly in favor of the FTA bill.
An analysis of each political party's stance with respect to FTA negotiation revealed that the Republican Party has a more FTA-friendly characteristic while the Democratic Party shows a varied voting pattern with visible voting deviations.
Another important influence on the voting behavior in the House of Representatives is political ideology. For example, the Democrats have generally opposed the FTA bill; however, there were differences of opinion among the Congressional Progressive Caucus, New Democratic Coalition, and Blue Dog Coalition. Also, while the Republicans are generally in favor of the FTA bill, differences of opinion were found for the FTA depending on the group, Tea Party for example.
On the basis of this study, we could come up with the following trade policy implications. First of all, the most distinctive determinant of the voting behavior in the House of Representatives is the contribution of each interest groups and political ideology. Thus, the distinguished feature of the U.S. trade policy process is that the opinions of congress and each interested groups are well reflected. Of course, the Korean government also attempts to reflect the views of associations and businesses at the trade policy-making stage. However, the role of Korean national assembly is considered to be limited in the trade policy making process. Therefore, Korea needs to institutionalize the trade policy making process so that the opinions of the congress, industry, consumers and the media are better reflected.
In addition, the political ideology of US lawmakers was found as another important factor in the U.S. trade policy-making process. Therefore, it is important to continue to make aware that Korea and the United States are close political allies. In doing so, we could utilize the Korea Caucus. Korea Caucus was launched in 2003 for the purpose of promoting the two nations ties and sharing of Korea-related information in Congress. Members of the caucus are pro-Korean legislators. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the ties with them, which will also help reduce trade disputes between the two nations.

Since 2000, Korean firms’ R&D investment have recorded an annual increase of 12.7% and accounted for 78% of total R&D investment in Korea, which surpasses that of U.S., Japan, and China. On the other hand, Korean firms’ exports and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) have steadily increased to record 562 billion and 24 billion dollars in 2013, respectively, which accounts for more than 50% of total GDP. Given the fact that the Korean economy heavily relies on firms’ R&D investment, exports and OFDI, our report provides in-depth analysis on the effects of R&D investment on exports and OFDI by using a rich set of Korean firm-level data. In particular, by considering the results from prior trade literatures that analyzed the effects of R&D investment on firm productivity and that examine the effects of firm productivity on exports and OFDI, we analyze the effects of R&D investment on exports and OFDI by incorporating firm productivity as a mediator.
In examining the effects of R&D investment on firm productivity, we first measure R&D investment as firms’ total expenditure on R&D activities, while measuring firm productivity using total factor productivity, capital productivity, and labor productivity. Using these measures, we find that R&D investment significantly increases firm productivity. In particular, to analyze how firm R&D investment affects its productivity-level over time, we use lagged R&D variables to estimate their effects on current productivity-level. As a result, we find that current and previous R&D investment have positive and significant effects on current productivity-level and that its magnitude becomes larger over time. In other words, firm productivity is significantly and largely associated with prior R&D investment. Alternatively, estimating the effects of R&D investment on firm exports using lagged variables, we find that R&D investment have positive and significant effects on current exports and that its magnitude becomes larger as R&D investment is made in prior. Evaluating the effects of R&D on OFDI through lagged R&D variables, our results show that R&D investment made in prior years significantly increases the current amount of OFDI and also raises the probability of firms’ engagement in OFDI in the current period.
To provide in-depth analysis on the effects of R&D investment on firm’s exports and OFDI, we use path analysis methodology to estimate the effects of R&D on exports and OFDI with and without incorporating firm productivity as a mediator variable. Our estimation results show that firm R&D has positive and significant direct and indirect effects on exports and OFDI through the increase in total factor productivity. Estimating the magnitude of direct and indirect effects, we find that firm R&D investment is more effective in increasing exports and OFDI directly than indirectly through firm productivity increase.
Given the fact that R&D intensiveness is different across industries, we perform the same estimations at the industry-level. Our estimation results show that firm R&D investment has significant positive direct and indirect effects through firm productivity on exports and OFDI among capital-intensive industries, namely, electronic components, auto-vehicle, and machinery equipment industry sectors; while it has insignificant direct and indirect effects within labor-intensive industries, such as textile and paper. Among capital-intensive industries, in particular, we find that firm R&D investment is more effective in directly increasing exports than OFDI in most sectors, while it is more effective in increasing OFDI than exports through firm productivity improvement in the auto-vehicle and machinery equipment sectors.
Our analysis provides significant policy implications on firm R&D investment. First, our estimation results that firm R&D significantly increases the productivity, exports and OFDI imply that R&D promotion policies towards the private sector are effective in improving firm performance and that more favourable policies towards firm R&D investment should be considered. Second, our findings that the magnitude of firm R&D effects becomes larger over time indicate that firms and governments should evaluate its effect from a long-term point of view. Third, policies that are designed to promote firms to invest in R&D activities would be more effective for capital-intensive industries than labor-intensive industries. Our results that direct and indirect effects of R&D on exports and OFDI are significant in capital-intensive industries imply that while promoting firm R&D investment in capital-intensive industries is effective, alternative measures should be considered to increase exports and OFDI in labor-intensive industries.

Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the East Asian countries have made efforts to guard against the crisis not only by being self-insured through the accumulation of foreign reserves but also by establishing a bilateral or regional financial safety net through the pooling of reserves. Holding ample amount of foreign reserves has proven itself to be useful but it comes with a high price tag. Moreover, in spite of noticeable achievements in recent years, the regional financial arrangement, namely the CMIM framework, had not been activated during the global financial crisis in 2007-08. Ironically, the bilateral currency swaps with the US Federal Reserve Bank played a pivotal role at that time in addressing some Asian countries’ liquidity shortages.
The crisis in 2007-08 has provoked a recurring discussion about the necessity of transforming the international monetary system and enhancing the alternative or complementary insurance mechanism of regional financial arrangements to fend off shocks. In the paper, we propose two ways to strengthen a regional financial arrangement in East Asia to make a practical contribution to the global architecture reform agenda and to build a resilient economy: (i) establishing a currency arrangement under CMIM framework to increase the usage of local currencies; and (ii) creating a cooperative framework between the AMRO and the IMF in the area of surveillance.

Preface
Contributors
Introduction and Overview
Statements by Hosts and Country Representatives

Part I. Regional Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Country Perspectives
- A Korean Perspective (Chang Jae Lee) 
- A Chinese Perspective (Zhang Jianping)
- A Japanese Perspective (Maeda Tadashi)
- A Russian Perspective (Pavel Minakir)

Part II: Energy Cooperation: Energy Infrastructure and Physical Connectivity
Japan’s Energy Challenges and Potential for Regional Cooperation (Tanabe Yasuo)
Energy Issues: Security, Alternative Systems, and Low-Carbon Futures (Terry Surles)
Prospects for a Cross-border Power System in Northeast Asia (Iinuma Yoshiki)
Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia: A Russian Perspective (Sergey Sevastianov)

Part III: Regional Cooperation and Integration
Regional Cooperation and Integration in East and Northeast Asia (Kilaparti Ramakrishna)
Cultivating Multilateralism in East Asia (Iwatani Shigeo)
Regional Integration in Northeast Asia (Wang Weina)

Part IV: Financing Regional Economic Integration through Cross-border Infrastructure Construction: Review and
New Approaches to Regional Multilateral Financial Institutions

Keynote Statement—Fulfilling a Long-held Dream: Financial Policy for a Unified Korea (Shin Je Yoon)
A Strategy toward a Regional Multilateral Financial Institution (Lee Jai-Min and Kim Yu-Ree)
Establishing a New Development Financing Institution: Comments and Observations (S. Stanley Katz)
Northeast Asian Financial Cooperation in a New Era (Fan Xiaoyun)
Comments on Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Zou Ping)

Part V: Cross-border Economic Cooperation: Tumen River Area Economic Integration for the Korean Peninsula

Political and Economic Imperatives behind North Korea’s Evolving Special Economic Zones (Glyn Ford)
Underdeveloped Sino-Russian Cross-border Cooperation (Natalia Ryzhova)
Creating a Northeast Asian Economy (Tony Michell)

Appendix I. Seoul Declaration and Agenda
Appendix II. Planning Meeting Summary and Agenda
Appendix III. Report of Field Visit to Rason Special Economic Zone, DPRK and Yanbian, China

The Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF) is a regional nongovernmental organization created in 1991 to sponsor and facilitate research, networking, and dialogue relevant to the economic and social development of Northeast Asia. The Forum is also committed to promoting understanding and relations among the peoples of Northeast Asia, North America, and Europe.
The main objective is for NEAEF to conduct research and conference activities aimed at functional economic cooperation such as cross-border energy, transportation and logistics infrastructure development, and capital mobilization. The Forum holds annual conferences, workshops, and seminars for planning, facilitating, coordinating, and implementing international and interdisciplinary solutions to common policy problems. It is the only nongovernmental regional organization in which all the nations of Northeast Asia and the US are consistent and active participants.
For the year 2014, NEAEF in collaboration with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), cooperated in efforts toward achieving closer economic and financial cooperation in Northeast Asia, and continued its focus on research, the annual conference, and meetings aimed at financing regional economic integration and establishment of the Northeast Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development (NEABCD). This work aims to promote functional economic cooperation in terms of cross-border resources, energy supplies, infrastructure construction, capital mobilization, and institutional development.
NEAEF, as planned for the year 2014, facilitated conference and meeting activities in which experts presented their perspectives, views, ideas, concrete proposals, and strategies relevant to the issues of a regional institution for financial cooperation.
This volume, which is the final part of a series of proceedings titled Financing Regional Economic Integration and Functional Cooperation for Northeast Asia: Toward a Northeast Asia Economic Community, presents the results of a project implemented in 2014 that includes presentations and summaries from the 23rd annual NEAEF conference and meetings, as well as related activities.