Executive Summary

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Gains in Labor Productivity from Trade Liberalization

Ⅲ. Economic Effect of Labor Productivity Gain by Trade Liberalization

Ⅳ. Results

Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks

Appendix

References
 

This paper uses the most recent Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) DB version 9 and a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyze the economic effect of enhancement in labor productivity that trade liberalization has in the APEC. In particular, unlike the previous studies that apply tariff reduction, this paper focuses on the changes in labor productivity reported by Ahn et al. (2016). The results show an increase in the real GDP of countries with gains in labor productivity. In particular, the results of this study indicate that the benefits of trade liberalization would be even larger for developed countries with a similar level of gains in labor productivity. It is also suggested that the efficiency of production structure or scale of economy may work for developed economies. In conclusion, this paper suggests another reason to pursue trade liberalization within in the APEC region.

 

Keywords: Labor Productivity, Dynamic CGE Model, Trade Liberalization, Real GDP
 

Executive Summary

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Why ‘Inclusive Integration’?

1. What is ‘Inclusive Integration’?
2. Trade Liberalization and Inequality
3. Cost of Less-Inclusive Integration

Ⅲ. FTAAP: Current State of Play and Missing Link

1. Pathway to the FTAAP
2. Assessment of Scenarios
3. Missing Link in the Current Scenarios

Ⅳ. Strategy for Realizing Inclusive Integration with the FTAAP

1. Negotiations Front
2. Domestic Policy Front

Ⅴ. Conclusion

References 

   While the pathway to the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) has been intensely discussed with a focus on its architecture, something has been missing: how to link trade and investment liberalization with inclusive growth of the APEC economies. The APEC economies have been increasingly open to trade and investment, but domestic distortions persist. The consequences have been less beneficial effects of trade and investment liberalization to domestic stakeholders. In particular, less-advantageous minorities have become more vulnerable to external economic shocks. If these failures are not urgently and seriously addressed, political support for further integration towards the FTAAP will continue to weaken. This reckoning has led to this paper.
   This paper offers policy options to make the FTAAP more conducive to inclusive growth of the APEC economies. Policy proposals are offered in two fronts. At negotiations, a grand compromise between advanced and developing economies should be sought to make negotiations agenda more comprehensive and balanced. Under this grand bargain, protected sectors in advanced economies ? potential exporting sectors for developing economies ? would be opened in exchange for more commitment in new rules by developing economies. To make this grand bargain politically possible, each side should do its homework domestically. Empowering human capital and skill upgrading programs will be urgent and imperative, along with designing more effective trade adjustment assistance programs. To enhance the possibility of achieving this comprehensive and balanced agenda, and to ensure all are on board, a two-track commitment should be designed. At the domestic front, major distortions which have obstructed a more inclusive integration in the past should be urgently corrected. Specifically, policy preference for incumbents should be removed; labor markets should become less rigid; capital markets should be accessible to all; and social safety nets should be strengthened.
 

 

  The Northeastern China actively started implementing customs facility modernization along with transport development projects since 2010. Countries which borders with the Northeastern China, Russia Far East, Mongolia and North Korea also joined cross-border infrastructure projects mostly initiated by China while Korea’s participation is still limited.
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the recent cross-border infrastructure projects and the financial source in the Northeast Asia. In particular, this paper investigates the current status of transport, energy, customs construction projects, planned and implemented at the northeastern part of China which borders with the Russian Far East, Mongolia and North Korea.
  The characteristics of the recent cross-border infrastructure projects can be summarized as follows. At First, the recent implemented projects were mainly initiated and funded by China. Secondly, projects initiated and funded by China were better being implemented. Third, a majority of projects were initiated based on political reasons rather than economic feasibility.
  Cross-border infrastructure projects in Northeast Asia have produced limited results so far due to different national interest, but as economies in this region are highly complementary, infrastructure development is expected to gain momentum in the long run. In this aspect, the paper suggests to utilize all possible financial cooperation options which includes the GTI(Greater Tumen Initiative) scheme, an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism among four Northeast Asian countries as well as bilateral, existing funding cooperation scheme to further promote infrastructure projects in the region.
 

Preface

Chapter 1. Introduction - Are SEZs and Business Hubs the Best Tools for Development?(Douglas Zhihua ZENG and Hyung-Gon JEONG)

1. Special Economic Zones
2. Business Hubs
3. Structure
4. SEZs and Business Hubs Are Contextualized Policy Tools

Chapter 2. Special Economic Zones as a Tool of Industrial Development: case of Masan FTZ in South Korea (Hyung-Gon JEONG and Jong-Hun PEK)

1. Introduction
2. Export Processing Zone as a Tool of Industrialization: Case of Seven Zones in South Korea
2-1. Background
2-2. Evaluation of the FTZ Policy in South Korea
2-3. The Success Factors of Masan FTZ
2-4. Challenges Regarding Continued Success

Chapter 3. Free Economic Zone as a Tool of Transition to an Innovative Economic Growth: Case of IFEZ in South Korea (Hyung-Gon JEONG and Jong-Hun PEK)

1. Introduction
2. Incheon Free Economic Zone: Its Performances and Future
3. Evaluation of Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ)
3-1. Evaluation of Development
3-2. Evaluation of FDI Attraction
4. Possible Measures for Success of IFEZ
4-1. Improving Competitiveness by Attracting More Domestic Firms
4-2. Consolidation through De-designation
4-3. Strengthening Linkage between SEZ Policy and Overall Industrial Development Policy
5. Key Lessons Learned from Korean Special Economic Zone Policies
5-1. Offering Overarching Development Strategy and Vision for SEZs
5-2. Designation of SEZs Should Be Based on Economic Demand
5-3. Reducing the Overlaps among SEZs
5-4. Establishing an Efficient Governance System
5-5. One-Stop-Shop Service and Customized Support
5-6. Building an Outcome Evaluation and Exit System Appendixes

Chapter 4. Innovation and Structural Transformation: The Case of Shanghai Free Economic Zones and Free Trade Zones (Guangwen MENG and Douglas Zhihua ZENG)

1. Economic Development in Shanghai
1.1 The Rapid Growth of Economy
1.2 Service-oriented Industrial Structure
2. Development of Shanghai Free Economic Zones
2.1 Phase of ETDZs (1984-1990)
2.2 Phase of Comprehensive FEZs (1991-2012)
2.3 Phase of Pilot Free Trade Zones (2013-Present)
3. Successes and Challenges of Shanghai FEZs
3.1 Factors Leading to Success of Shanghai FEZs
3.2 Challenges Faced by Shanghai FEZs in Its Development
4. The Major Lessons Learned

Chapter 5. Invitation Strategy for Cutting Edge Industries through MNCs and Global Talents: The Case of Singapore (Kim Song TAN)

1. Introduction
2. Business Hub for MNCs: 1960s to Late 1990s
3. Business Hub for Global Creative Talents: From Early 2000s to Date
4. The Singapore Experience: Success Factors and Lessons
5. Conclusion
Appendix

Chapter 6. Hong Kong’s Business and Financial Hub Development: Factors, Challenges and Policy Implications (Yan DONG)

1. Introduction
2. Profile of Hong Kong Business and Financial Hub
3. Hong Kong Financial Sector’s Development History
4. Key Factors for Success
4.1 Policy Factors
4.2 Internal Factors
4.3 External Factors
5. Challenges regarding Continued Success
5.1 Regional Challenge from Other Business and Financial Hubs
5.2 Trade Modes Changing and Prevalent of Intra-firm Trade 239
5.3 Industrial Hollowing and Comparatively Slow Economic Growth
5.4 Economic Independence
6. Key Lessons Learned
6.1 Innovation and Industry Promotion Polices are Important
6.2 Free Market Environment Invigorates the Economy
6.3 Sound Legal System and Effective Regulation Policies Should Be Adopted
6.4 Fair Competition are Embodied in Economic Policies
6.5 Skilled labor and Talented Professionals are Crucial to Industry Development
6.6 Improving the Autonomy of the Economy
7. Policy Implications
7.1 Foster an Innovation-led Growth Mechanism
7.2 Further Optimize Free Market Economic Environment
7.3 Promote Manufacturing Sector Development
7.4 Construct a Politically Stable Society
7.5 Strengthen Economic Relations with Mainland China
7.6 Provide Better Physical Infrastructure
7.7 Harmonizing the Relation between Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing

Chapter 7. Building a Successful Logistics and Production Hub: The Case of Dubai with Special Reference to the Jebel Ali Free Zone (Sherif MUHTASEB)

1. Introduction
2. Profile of Dubai and the JAFZ
3. Background and History of Zones in Dubai
4. Key Factors for Success
5. Challenges for Continued Success
6. Key Lessons
7. Policy Implications

Chapter 8. Policy Implications of SEZ and Business Hub Development in Asia (Douglas Zhihua ZENG and Hyung-Gon JEONG)

1. Key Elements of a Holistic Approach
2. A Sound Legal and Institutional Framework
3. An Attractive Business Environment
4. Careful Planning, Design, and Operations
5. Persistent Skills Training
6. Constant Technology Learning, Innovation, and Industrial Upgrading
7. Strategic Location and Strong Connectivity
8. Linkages With Local Economy
9. A Good Balance Between Industrial Development and Social/Urban Development
10. A Monitoring, Evaluation, and Exit System
11. Some Factors Specific to SEZs or Business Hubs
12. Conclusion
References

Executive Summary 

Around the world, there are 4,300 special economic zones throughout more than 130 countries: the zones in Asian countries have been quite successful, while on the other hand, those of Africa and some other countries have not performed well so far. Especially, some special economic zones and business hubs in Asian countries such as South Korea, China, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as Dubai, have been quite successful in terms of innovative and dynamic economic growth. Not all of the zones in the countries were successful: some of those were recognized as so-called “white elephants.” As successful cases received more and more attention, however, there has been a steady increase in the need to learn the secret of success from these cases in terms of policy implications. This paper was designed to fulfill these needs, and especially to be a fine policy guide book for developing countries which will introduce special economic zones as a way to boost their economies in the near future.

The subject cases of this study include the Masan Free Trade Zone and Incheon Free Economic Zone in Korea, the Shanghai special economic zone in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai. In this study, special economic zones are classified into two types, industrial zones and business hubs, analyzing each type’s success factors and policy implications. The examples of successful SEZs in industrial zone-type included the Masan Free Trade Zone and Shanghai special economic zone. These zones are the representative SEZs which have functioned as industry and economy boosters, along with the industrial clusters of the surrounding areas. The examples in business hub-type zones were Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dubai. The Incheon Free Economic Zone in Korea was also considered in the same category, which focuses on switching to a new innovative economy and growing into a business hub for the Northeast Asian region.

In general, the types of special economic zones in a certain country are closely related to the level of its economic development. Most of the industrial zone-type special economic zones have begun in labor-intensive industries, and then shift into a more complex form of SEZ as the income level increases. Especially, the zones gradually evolve into a business hub which covers all the features of a city, such as better circumstances for living, R&D environment, and superior environment for investments. In general, special economic zones based on manufacturing industries, the so-called “1st generation of special economic zones,” have less forward and backward industrial effects through linkages with the domestic economy, and are very dependent on the financial support of the central government. However, in modern times, more and more countries are now introducing new special economic zones in areas which have strong linkages with the domestic economy and relaxed regulation systems. For example, special economic zones in China have functioned well as “test-beds” for new policies and deregulations, as well as for maximized freedom of economic activities. These are the 2nd generation of special economic zones. Global environmental change and the concern about the sustainability of the environment have led to a new type of SEZ, which is a high-ranked and correlated type of SEZ. It can be called the 3rd generation SEZ, which is a convergence of the first and second types of SEZs, pursuing such goals as low carbon, green growth, and eco-industrial parks. As such, regardless of the generation of the special economic zones, the success of special economic zones is highly dependent on a certain country’s economic circumstances and comparative advantages. Based on this precondition, the long-term development plan of the country, commercial feasibility, target markets, accessibility of SOC, skilled workers and technical innovation ability have become additional success factors.

First, as a part of this study, the Masan Free Trade Area (Chapter 2) and Shanghai special economic zone (Chapter 4) were introduced as successful industrial zones. The Masan Free Trade Zone has been rated as one of the most successful examples since it was first designated as an export processing zone in 1971. It has contributed to the advancement of Korea’s export industries in conjunction with neighboring industrial clusters, greatly facilitated by Masan’s superior geographical location. It has also contributed to the dynamic growth of Korean companies through job creation, technology transfer, and technical cooperation between domestic and foreign companies such as Sony and Nokia. Due to its great achievements, the Masan SEZ is considered to be one of the best EPZs (Export Processing Zone) in the world and was chosen as a success model of promoting foreign investment policy for developing countries by the World Economic Processing Zone Association.

In China, the central government has designated a number of special zones since 1980 to carry out economic reform. The purpose of the zones was not only to attract foreign investment zones to boost manufacturing industries, but also to create test-beds of to compare the market economy against the formal socialist planned economy. Shanghai has designated various types of zones depending on each phase of the economic development, and has made steady efforts to make Shanghai the center in terms of economy, finance, trade, logistics and innovative economy through mutual cooperation between the zones. In this study, Economic and Technological Development Zones, Pudong New Area, Export Processing Zones, and the recently designated Free Trade Zone were included as the subjects. The study aims to indicate the roles of special economic zones in the process of transition to a dynamic economic development and innovation in the economy, the success factors, and the problems they face.

Business hub-type special economic zones are bigger than industrial zones, designated in areas where trade and finance, logistics and services activity is very intense. Incheon Free Economic Zone, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai, which aim to be the business hubs of Northeast Asia, serve as a logistics and financial hub as well as the regional headquarters of multinational companies. Business hub-type zones require a substantial period from their development to success. In order to attract multinational companies, a considerable period of time is required to establish confidence in the region’s bright future. Hard infrastructures such as ICT, transport and logistics infrastructure, better training conditions, and living environments that allow residents to enjoy their leisure time are very important. In addition, regulation should be minimized, English should be the official language, and efforts should be made to insure soft infrastructures, such as convenience in administration processes, are well developed.

The representative examples of successful business hubs in Asia would be Singapore and Hong Kong. Singapore has rapidly grown from an underdeveloped country into one of the most affluent countries in the world within a mere 50 years. Since its independence in 1965, it has transformed into one of the most dynamic and innovative economies, and one of the most successful business hubs in the world today. All institutions in Singapore work with the most transparent and advanced systems, and operate training facilities which can foster skilled workers and professionals. In particular, the nation is equipped with the hard and soft infrastructures mentioned above as a precondition of business hubs. With the government’s active support and one-stop services, a business-friendly environment and excellent human resources, it is recognized as one of the most successful business hubs in the world, with its geographical advantages. The fifth chapter of this report provides an analysis of this method of dynamic and innovative economic growth as a business hub. An analysis on Singapore’s economic policies after the 2000s, which have focused on the transition to an innovative economy, is also included in the chapter. Hong Kong is another city located in the most advanced and opened area, which operates as a representative business hub for the Asian region. Chapter 6 of this report indicates how Hong Kong has developed into Asia's business and financial center, and into a dynamic and innovative economy.

Dubai is one of the most dynamic and efficient business hubs in the world thanks to its various geographical advantages, linking Asian and European continents. The success of Dubai was based on huge investment in the infrastructure sector by the Dubai government, which has made Dubai one of the world’s most important trade hubs in a relatively short period. Dubai International Airport is the largest airport in the world, attracting 70 million passengers a year. Air freight has also increased exponentially ─ approximately 250 million tons of logistics passed through Dubai in 2015. The Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ), founded in 1985, has been rated as the most successful free trade area in the world and become a benchmark target due to its success based on global linkages (connectivity) and the supply chain. The JAFZ currently generates approximately 20% of Dubai’s total GDP, and contributes to expanding the manufacturing base and the dynamic growth of Dubai’s economy. Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis on the JAFZ in conjunction with the success story of Dubai. In particular, the success factors of the JAFZ, its roles in the process of Dubai’s growth into a global logistics hub, and JAFZ’s current challenges and the policy difficulties are discussed.

Finally, the Incheon Free Economic Zone is included as a subject of this study because it is seeking to transition into an innovative economy and attract foreign investors through deregulations, and finally aims to become a Northeast Asian business hub. South Korea designated the Free Economic Zone in 2003 as a measure to shift toward higher value-added industries and strengthen service industries after the Asian financial crisis in 1998. The Free Economic Zone was dedicated to attracting foreign investment by ensuring the maximum level of economic freedom and improving living environments for foreigners. The background of promoting the policy was to become a business hub of Northeast Asia, because Korea can utilize its geopolitical and economic advantages, located between Japan and China. The Incheon Free Economic Zone, introduced in Chapter 3 of this report, has the highest potential for success among the eight free economic zones in South Korea due to its advantageous geographical location. Incheon Free Economic Zone is drawing a huge amount of attention in terms of Korean SEZ policy, and a number of international media have expressed their interest. The Incheon Free Economic Zone is close to Incheon International Airport, which is one of the most competitive airports in the world in terms of service, and is also adjacent to Seoul and other industrial clusters in Korea, as well as to China. Based on this superior infrastructure, service industries and high-tech industries have been fostered intensively. Incheon Free Economic Zone serves as a test bed for the introduction of new technologies, as well as a shelter for leading research institutions for R&D, world-class universities, and a number of international organizations. Despite the achievements so far, many challenges lie ahead for the Incheon Free Economic Zone. This study provides a wide range of policy proposals for the success of the Incheon Free Economic Zone.

Chapter 8 provides the conclusion, drawn from the analysis of the success stories of the six special economic zones, and a summary of key success factors. In conclusion, the success factors of industrial zones and business hubs are each explained, together with the appropriate types of special economic zones for each step of economic growth. In addition, a well-run special economic zone policy enables dynamic and innovative growth, but an inappropriate special economic zone policy leads to a waste of high costs and effort, ending with a “white elephant” situation. The policy implications provided in the conclusion of this study were derived from the case studies in the previous chapters.
 

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical Background

3. Data and Methodology

3-1. Data and TFP Estimation
3-2. Methodology: Quantile Regression

4. Empirical Results

4-1. Main Results
4-2. Shape of Quantile Regression Curves: Exporters vs. Non-exporters
4-3. Robustness: Alternative Volatility Measure
4-4. Exchange Rate Volatility with Adjacent Major TradingPartners: China vs.Japan

5. Discussion and Conclusion

References

Appendix. Production Function Estimation Results 

  This study examines how exchange rate volatility can influence total factor productivity (TFP) in various dimensions. Using Korean manufacturing plant-level data for 1990-2007, we first compare and contrast the effects of exchange rate volatility on TFPs between two different exchange rate regimes―pegged and free floating. We find that the exchange rate volatility had a negative effect on productivity in both regimes but this negative effect was greater during the period when exchange rate fluctuation was restricted, compared to the period with free floating rate. We also find that the negative effects of the volatility on productivity were heterogeneous over TFP quantiles and exhibited an inverted W-shape curve. In particular, the negative effects were more pronounced for exporting plants that had the lowest or highest TFPs. 

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Construction of Data Sets

2-1. Deriving Net Value Added in Exports
2-2. Offshoring
2-3. Transaction Costs

3. Value Added in Exports and Ricardian Comparative Advantage

3-1. Empirical Model and Data
3-2. Empirical Results
3-3. Robustness Check

4. Offshoring and Transaction Costs as a Source of Comparative Advantage

4-1. Empirical Model and Data
4-2. Estimation Results

5. Conclusion

Appendix

References
 

  This study tests whether Ricardian comparative advantage is valid for value added in exports that does not include intermediate inputs imported from various industries in a number of countries. Using a panel data on valued added contents of bilateral exports, we find that changes in the labor productivity lead to growth of value added in exports. This implies that Ricardian comparative advantage is an important determinant of exports in longitudinal changes. The estimated coefficients of the observed productivity turn out to be larger than those of CDK (2012), implying that Ricardian comparative advantage has greater influence on determining the patterns of trade in a world with global value chains.
  This study also investigates the role of offshoring and transaction costs in comparative advantage. We use data on value added in exports, offshoring in materials and services, and transaction costs at the country and industry-level for the period 1995-2009 calculated from World Input-Output Table which covers 40 countries and 14 manufacturing industries. Employing a system GMM estimator to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem, we find that services offshoring has positive effects on comparative advantage while material offshoring affects it negatively. We also find that transaction costs have a negative effect on comparative advantage. Moreover, it turned out that there is a magnification effect of transaction costs on the induced value added in exports.
 

 

   The conventional wisdom on full currency convertibility is that countries should pursue it with a steady and gradual approach, because it can be destabilizing, for instance as with s peculative currency attacks, erosion of monetary policy effectiveness, and additional risks faced by financial institutions.   
   This paper aims to identity domestic institutional requirements for successful currency convertibility in Korea. Authorities should undertake reforms in the following four areas to accompany capital account liberalization: establishment of a sound and consistent macroeconomic policy framework; establishment of a strong prudential and supervisory framework; improvement of the market infrastructure for local capital and foreign exchange markets; and enhancement of risk management capabilities for financial institutions. This study emphasizes, among others, the importance of a credible macroeconomic policy stance, consistent with t he exchange rate regime, and a financial market structure sufficiently strong and flexible to allow for an effective defense against speculative currency attacks. Also examined are the Chinese government’s concerted policies to internationalize the renminbi(RMB) and the mechanics of recent speculative attacks on the RMB. The paper determines that despite the speculative pressures, the Chinese authorities can continue on with the RMB internationalization policy as they have sufficient resources and safeguard policy tools to sustain the currency convertibility program.
   To conclude, the Korean won can be successfully internationalized if it pursues foreign exchange liberalization policies with accompanying reforms to strengthen its macroeconomic, financial, and prudential regulatory policy framework. 

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Literature Review

3. Estimation Strategy

3-1 Data Description
3-2 Model Specification
3-3 Econometric Issues

4. Estimation Results

4-1 Regular Workers
4-2 Temporary Workers
4-3 The Relative Demand between Permanent and Temporary Workers

5. Concluding Remarks

Appendix

References 

In this paper, we examine the impact of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) on the overall employment, using Korean industry-level data for the period 2007-2014. We further decompose the effects of OFDI into types of foreign investment and workers’ skill levels, separately for each employment status (permanent and temporary), so that we capture whether the MNEs initiating foreign investment prefer to employ temporary instead of permanent workers. Our main findings show that there is little evidence of the impact of OFDI on the overall industry employment of permanent workers, while OFDI is positively associated with the overall employment of temporary workers. Besides, OFDI leads to an increase in the number of jobs created for medium-skilled workers regardless of employment status, whereas there is a negative relationship between OFDI and the temporary employment of low-skilled workers. To be more specific, efficiency-seeking and export-platform-seeking types of OFDI is associated with an increase in the employment of medium-skilled workers.

 

 

   The Russian economy has recently taken a sharp turn for the worse because of the shift in the global economy following the crisis in Ukraine and its critical impact on the Russian economy in general. As a result, Russia is facing the worst economic condition since 2009, recording a negative 3.7% growth in 2015. The purpose of the following research is to analyze the change in the Russian economy following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in terms of two core causes: Western economic sanctions against Russia and the decline in oil prices.
   The crisis in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the international relations within Eurasia. Not only that, Russia and Ukraine are sitting in their worst disunion since the dissolution of Soviet Union, but the Russian-Western relation also remains to be sharply discordant. Most notably, the economic sanction war is still in progress between the Russian and the Western world, and the following are the key elements of Western sanctions against Russia. First, the European Union and the United States are pursuing target sanctions upon the core areas of the Russian economy, rather than the trade embargos or the block in currency exchange. Secondly, in the case of the European Union, the specific range of economic sanction is comparatively narrower than that of the United States. On the other hand, the Russian government has imposed an import embargo and restrictions on select items upon the Western nations that are participating in the economic sanction. The core characteristic of the Russian economic sanction against the West is that the embargo is only restricted to items imported by Russia; this was a strategical plan aimed to promote the national industry amidst the Western economic sanctions and dropped oil prices through import substitution.
   The Western economic sanctions and the decline in oil prices had negative effects on the Russian economy. The former of the twoincluding the prohibition of the Western sale of military or strategic resources to Russia and the restriction of sale on energy facilities and advanced technology-discouraged foreign trade, led to financial instability and built uncertainty regarding the Russian market. Accordingly, a decreased inflow of the capital for businesses affected by the sanction, increase in currency exchange risk, discouraged business activity, capital outflow caused by lowered Russian market confidence, and decrease in investment have followed. The latter of the two had the greater impact on the shift in Russian economy. Approximately 30% of Russia’s GDP relies on exportation, and raw material export constitutes 90% of the entire exportation activity, wherein two-thirds are oil and natural gas. Due to the nature of the Russian industry structure and export items, the decline in oil prices is reinforcing an economic recession in Russia by inevitably contributing to the decrease in energy resource export, decline in economic growth, worsening of financial expenditure over revenue, devastation in value for Russian Ruble, sharp decline in stocks, reduced investments, diminished productivity in industries, and weakened domestic market. Ultimately, it was the key shifting points in the post-Ukrainian crisis international economy (viz. Western economic sanctions and decline in oil prices) that worked as the core cause of the deterioration of Russia’s economy. It can be asserted that the basic conditions of lower oil prices had the worst effect on Russian economy as a whole, while the Western economic sanctions relatively had limited effects.
   The following are the speculated policy implications proposed under the scope of this study. A prolonged economic sanction war between the West and Russia, along with the dichotomic opposition that has formed, greatly limited the Korean government’s policy options in breadth. In addition, as the North Korean nuclear crisis provoked a sharp tension and opposition within the Korean peninsula, a three-nation joint industrial venture of the Rajin- Khasan project by South Korea, North Korea, and Russia has also entered a complete cessation. However, it is noteworthy that Japan, while being a participant in the sanctions against Russia, is in the process of strengthening its approach towards Russia since the North Korean nuclear crisis. Accordingly, South Korea must readjust its existing policies by comprehensively and objectively evaluating the achievements and future tasks of Russia-related Eurasia Initiative policies. Such evaluative efforts must not only take the unique nature of the current state of affairs and the potential for future collaboration into consideration, but also focus on devising new plans for cooperation with Russia. To this end, it is necessary to look toward different directions in constructing a new actual cooperative system between Korea and Russia, in its continued expansion of both civilian and governmental networks, and in devising and advancing Korea-Russia partner projects. Plans for an additional degree of coexistence and mutual cooperation that can give practical benefits to Russian economy ought to be prioritized over focus on non-repetitive ceremonial events. Specifically, Korea must devise particular plans that can contribute to projects such as modernization of the Russian industry, development of the import substitution industry, industrial innovation, and enhanced productivity. Such is a model for a new industrial collaboration between Korea and Russia, and it is a construction of Global Value Chain. If the environment of sustainable cooperation between the two countries is formed through such endeavors, the Korean-Russian relation may open the door for a new stage of progress: 3.0 Era of Korean- Russian Partnership.
 

 

This paper aims to estimate time-series data of China's direct investments on North Korea from 2000 to 2015. In order to achieve such a goal, problems of official and unofficial reports related to the subject are presented first. Then, original estimates are drawn by utilizing firm-level overseas direct investment data and proxy variables.
The estimation process starts from aggregation of data appeared in all press releases and earlier studies. A basic analysis on collected items suggests that China's ODI on North Korea has continuously increased from 2004 to 2012, except for a brief period around Pyongyang's second nuclear test in 2009. Investments seem to enter a downturn after the third test in 2013. Such a trend matches the one suggested by China's Ministry of Commerce(MOFCOM) by and large; however, there was a big difference between the two in volume and trend of ODI from 2004 to 2005. Therefore, some revisions are needed to obtain reasonable time-series data.
This paper suggested the first stage estimates by matching former data of Chinese firms to newly obtained lists. The number of samples is almost doubled even after filtering out flawed ones. Based on a more reliable set of data, estimated amount of China's investment on North Korea after 2000 is 759.98 million dollars total. This estimate is 1.74 times larger than figures reported in MOFCOM, implying that a significant portion of ODI turns out to be unrecorded especially during 2005-2007.
In order to further include unofficial investments, the second stage estimates are presented by constructing a proxy from bilateral trade data. For example, since a large part of unreported investments take the form of barter trade, North Korea's mining facilities imports from China are likely to indicate a similar trend with Chinese ODI on DPRK mines. North Korea's own demands, deduced from government spendings data, are subtracted. The final result implied that investments not reported to MOFCOM are even more; estimated total flows are 1001.16 million USD, about 2.42 times than official figures. It is highly probable that most of the missing parts are barter-like ones, and such a type of ODI are still prevalent.
The above results offers a new insight on North Korean regime's rate of foreign exchange earnings. If the rise in DPRK's exports of natural resources after 2000 is mainly driven by barter-like investments from China, actual foreign exchange earnings are much lower than increments from the export surge. Considering that primary products induce only a minor inter-industrial effect and investments last a short term, the conclusion of this paper resulted in a slow recovery of North Korean industries despite normalization of mines after mid-2000s.