This study conducts a historical and political analysis on the early years of European integration, including the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), from the perspective of “deal-making.” It probes the possibility that the creation of a specific regional institution may not guarantee an automatic spill-over to further functional progress and provides an alternative approach based on political engineering of cooperation. Early European integration often involved high political costs and progress was possible by taking political risks through multiple linkages of leadership.
Paradoxically, the alleged low political cooperation on coal and steel was enabled by the highest political drive to solve this “concrete and limited” issue. The pursuit of regional cooperation has a very limited window of
opportunity and would require skillful management in both domestic politics and diplomacy. The role of a leader is to secure a political space for the cooperation project and to convert latent opportunities into an actual deal.
Regional cooperation in Northeast Asia should directly deal with structural obstacles such as political environment and historical conflict. Instead of institution-building based on a unilateral proposal, regional cooperation strategies should focus on leadership networks, political coordination, and reconciliatory measures to facilitate actual “deal-making.” A preliminary consultation among the leaders is crucial in the early stage of regional cooperation; this needs to be complemented by politically empowered multinational expert groups on a long-term basis. The trilateral summit (South Korea, Japan, and China) and other high-level meetings should be more galvanized to build an effective communication channel that would clarify each other’s ideas and interests. Northeast Asian cooperation should be based on “the politics of dialogue” among diverse leaders and the public rather than introvert “declarations” and “monologues” targeting the domestic audience.
The agenda-setting of regional cooperation requires sufficient concentration and political endorsement on a “concrete and limited” project rather than proposing a spill-over-driven comprehensive package. The pragmatic utilization of existing networks and building blocks will facilitate the agenda-setting and increase the likelihood of successful cooperation. The examination of the European case also shows that a historical reconciliation may not be a precondition for regional cooperation. It could be drawn as an outcome of
the progress in multilateral projects, which will reduce the political cost of rapprochement by providing a useful political exit. Finally, the regional cooperation strategy in Northeast Asia should be complemented by a close coordination with the US and major international institutions to prevent a political veto and to expand the basis of common interests.