India is a digital market with huge potential and influence. India is actively building a data governance system; Of all the digital policies currently in place or being established in India, about 25% (53 policies) are related to data governance. Against this backgroud, we study the data governance policies and regulations in India, as well as the cooperation between India and major countries, and cases of companies.

Chapter 2 analyses India’s top-level data policy framework that forms the foundation of the data economy and the data regulations that govern its implementation. India is considering a long-term, comprehensive data governance framework such as the ‘National Data Governance Policy (draft)’. It is also building a government-led data accumulation and utilisation system, India Stack. The establishment of a government-led data ecosystem is a key feature of India's digital transformation policy and has the potential to spread as an alternative to other latecomers to digital transformation.

India's data regulations are in line with global standards while seeking its own path. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 is business-friendly and avoids excessive restrictions. It is characterised by the introduction of a negative approach that allows cross-border data transfer in principle. However, sector-specific data localisation regulations are applied, and there are some parts that need to be specified in application. The Non-Personal Data Governance Framework (draft) announced in 2020 expresses the government's intention to create data platforms and data marketplaces, but further discussions are needed regarding the possibility of excessive restrictions. The Digital India Act (draft, 2023) is a comprehensive legal framework that responds to the rapid growth of new technologies and large technology companies represented by platforms. Through this, the regulatory environment for large technology companies in India will be newly established. It is likely that data regulations will be introduced for new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as transparency standards for data processing based on types of platforms.

In Chapter 3, we analysed the aspects of data governance in India expressed through digital trade policy. India has maintained a protectionist stance on data openness in WTO negotiations and bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and the EU. The US government has been raising the issue of data barriers with India, but given India's strategic importance, it is unlikely that the US government will exert bilateral trade pressure. However, it is likely that US companies will continue to raise issues and exert influence on India's data policy.

The EU and India are placing more emphasis on discussions about data governance in general rather than regulations, and it is expected that bilateral discussions will focus on areas where the interests of the two sides, such as artificial intelligence, coincide. It is noteworthy that the EU is responding to India's initiative to spread digital public infrastructure(DPI).

It is unlikely that Australia will be able to implement the liberalisation of cross-border data transfer and the restriction of data localisation measures in the CECA negotiations with India. However, Australia has been able to induce India to open up in the AI-ECTA service trade and financial services negotiations. Australia seeks to expand digital trade and data trasnfer with India and pursue institutional compatibility under the framework of strategic cooperation such as the QUAD.

Despite India's high economic dependence on China, it is likely to remain wary of China in the digital sector. In particular, Chinese companies’ investments in areas directly related to data security are expected to be treated with great sensitivity.

India is presenting Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a key agenda at major international forums such as the G20 and the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly (WTSA-24), as well as multilateral forums such as QUAD, and is stepping up its efforts to make its DPI model an international standard. This is believed to be an attempt to expand India’s influence in the process of building digital infrastructure, especially in global south.

Chapter 4 synthesises the above research and presents policy implications. First, it is necessary to respond to the issues that may arise in the process of introducing data norms in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) provides separate regulatory grounds for large-scale data processing companies and does not clearly state the legal basis for data processing, which may cause uncertainty in corporate activities. The Korean government needs to pay attention to the list of countries that the Indian government plans to announce as data transfer restriction countries. The Digital India Act (draft) currently under discussion is expected to have a major impact on corporate activities by strengthening the transparency of data processing, with platform companies as the main target.

Second, we can consider indirect measures to make the activities of data-related companies freer through negotiations with India. Like AI-ECTA, efforts should be made to increase the level of openness of computer and related services, engineering and integrated engineering services, provision and transfer of financial information, and software provided by financial data processing. If the data related articles are included, it is possible to include a temporary clause as an intermediate step in the liberalisation of data transfer and data localisation, and to review it after the establishment of the India’s data system. Meanwhile, Korea needs to pay attention to strengthening cooperation between like-minded countries. Korea is already participating in the Korea-US- India iCET, and it is necessary to actively respond to the QUAD countries’ agenda for cybersecurity and DPI cooperation.

Third, digital cooperation with India requires the building of trust capital, and key area is DPI. India's DPI is a government-led model with no precedent, and is likely to attract the attention of developing countries. It is necessary for Korea to consider responding to the DPI cooperation agenda in the G20, ITU, UNDP, and QUAD. Korea should also pay attention to cooperation for the development, interoperability, and inclusiveness of DPI in developing countries. It would also be possible for Korea to cooperate with India in projects such as capacity building and expert exchanges for developing countries.

Fourth, Korea should seek cooperation in the digitalisation of the public sector in India using ODA. It is believed that cooperation can be found in tasks such as standardising data management, data security, building data platforms, and expanding public data accessibility, etc. In particular, the digitalisation of government services in the process of urban development in India is a field with high potential for cooperation.

Fifth, it is necessary to establish continuous bilateral contact platforms so that Korean and Indian policy makers can share the changing aspects of data governance. It is necessary to set current issues such as data and DPI as an ongoing agenda in channels such as the ministerial-level industrial cooperation committee between the two countries, which is scheduled to be established, and the established Korea-India Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Council. Going further, the two countries could consider forming partnerships between relevant ministries and operating regular forums to exchange issues related to data governance. In addition, the difficulties faced by Korean companies entering India should be actively communicated through the Korea-India government-to-government dialogue channels, such as the Korea-India Fast Track Mechanism, Invest India, etc. Cooperation with a third country can also be promoted. Rather than the United States, which already has its own influence in India, cooperation with Japan may be more effective.

As major countries compete to deepen ties with ASEAN, the ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN+1) cooperation mechanism is poised to gain further momentum. In 2021, Australia and China established Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) with ASEAN, followed by the U.S. and India upgrading their relationships to CSPs in 2022, with Japan following suit in 2023. In 2024, South Korea also formalized a CSP with ASEAN, marking the 35th anniversary of the ASEAN-ROK dialogue partnership. Amid mounting challenges to ASEAN centrality arising from U.S.-China rivalry, ASEAN is likely to leverage the ASEAN+1 mechanism to attract greater engagement and cooperation from dialogue partners across the Southeast Asian region. Against this backdrop, this study aims to examine ASEAN’s dialogue partnership mechanisms and evaluate South Korea’s role within this framework. Through a comparative analysis of major dialogue partners’ cooperation initiatives and a perception survey of ASEAN experts regarding the ASEAN-ROK partnership, this study seeks to provide insights into enhancing South Korea’s engagement with ASEAN.

Chapter 2 explores how ASEAN manages its relationships with dialogue partners, highlighting the strategic objectives of its dialogue partnership mechanisms and their integration into ASEAN’s broader external relations strategy. The findings underscore ASEAN’s efforts to establish unified guidelines for managing dialogue partner relationships and apply them consistently across all partners. ASEAN develops cooperation agendas tailored to its specific needs and ensures that dialogue partners adhere to protocols established by ASEAN during negotiations. For ASEAN, the ASEAN+1 mechanism is prioritized not only for its efficiency but also as a means of safeguarding ASEAN’s central role in the region. It also serves as a tool to maintain a dynamic equilibrium, preventing any single dialogue partner from gaining excessive influence. These characteristics provide a clearer understanding of how ASEAN-led regional multilateralism functions and the recent increase in the number of CSPs established with ASEAN. In addition, ASEAN emphasizes openness-avoiding exclusion or discrimination against specific partners-as a core value in its dialogue partnership. It also requires dialogue partners to adhere to its self-defined procedural and substantive norms, collectively known as the “ASEAN Way.” These cooperation mechanisms reflect ASEAN’s dual objectives of preserving its centrality and maintaining autonomy in its external engagements.

Building on ASEAN’s emerging cooperation needs, Chapter 3 examines how ASEAN’s major partners advance their ASEAN+1 cooperation under the CSP framework. The analysis focuses on the U.S. and Australia’s tendency to prioritize ASEAN’s institutional capacity for community development. Both countries also focus on deepening collaboration in specific, targeted areas rather than pursuing broad, wide-ranging initiatives. In contrast, China channels substantial financial investments into fostering cooperation that directly serves its economic interests while carefully managing security issues with ASEAN. Japan adopts a blended approach, integrating elements of the U.S., Australian, and Chinese strategies. It supports institutional development for ASEAN’s community-building efforts and provides significant financial assistance, while distinguishing itself from China by promoting quality infrastructure. South Korea primarily directs its efforts toward economic cooperation but allocates fewer financial resources than China or Japan. Its initiatives are largely concentrated on bilateral projects that highlight its contributions, with less emphasis on strengthening ASEAN’s institutional capacity. Unlike the U.S. and Australia, which prioritize resource efficiency through targeted initiatives, South Korea takes a broader approach, engaging across multiple fields. While this approach showcases versatility, the lack of signature projects or standout initiatives that distinctly elevate South Korea’s visibility diminishes its overall impact. This underscores the need for a more strategic and systematic approach to ASEAN-ROK cooperation, from a long-term perspective.

Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey of ASEAN experts on dialogue partnerships and ASEAN-ROK relations, along with their key implications. The survey reveals that ASEAN places the highest value on economic cooperation and favors dialogue partners that implement programs aligned with its priorities. Japan (27.9%), Australia (17.8%), the U.S. (16.2%), China (10.3%), and South Korea (9.0%) were ranked as the most reliable partners for promoting regional peace and prosperity. While South Korea’s position behind Japan, the U.S., and China aligns with its relative economic scale and influence, its lower ranking compared to Australia—a fellow middle power with smaller financial contributions to ASEAN— highlights opportunities for improvement. South Korea could gain valuable insights from Australia’s cooperation model to maximize its impact and recognition across ASEAN. Meanwhile, South Korea’s strengths as a dialogue partner are most evident in economic cooperation, with 54.3% of survey respondents highlighting this area. However, respondents identified a “lack of strategic interest beyond the Korean Peninsula” and “overly cautious approaches to regional security issues” as key weaknesses, highlighting limitations in South Korea’s perceived reliability as a political-security partner. The top five most active areas of South Korea’s cooperation were recognized as trade and investment (19.6%), culture (15.4%), science, technology, and innovation (15.2%), education and capacity building (15.0%), and ICT and the digital economy (14.7%). These areas represent the fields where South Korea has actively focused its cooperation with ASEAN, garnering positive evaluations for its contributions to economic collaboration, cultural soft power, technological innovation, human resource development, and support for digital transformation.

Based on the findings from Chapters 2–4, Chapter 5 provides policy recommendations for South Korea to advance the CSP with ASEAN. First, South Korea should make greater efforts to work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat and support its capacity-building efforts in community-building. While the U.S., Australia, and Japan actively seek to incorporate input from ASEAN officials when identifying cooperative projects, South Korea has tended to propose its own initiatives aligned with ASEAN’s specific needs. Although these projects do address ASEAN’s priorities and are often practical and efficient in execution, this approach could lessen ASEAN’s sense of ownership over the initiatives. This perception may lead to South Korea being viewed more as a partner focused on delivering outcomes, rather than one genuinely dedicated to working collaboratively with ASEAN in planning cooperation projects. To address this, South Korea should actively collaborate with the ASEAN Secretariat to ensure its input is reflected in the selection and development of cooperative projects. Strengthening communication with the ASEAN Secretariat will also help South Korea better identify ASEAN’s most pressing needs. Additionally, prioritizing support for institutional foundations and capacity-building within the ASEAN Secretariat will strengthen ASEAN’s ability to drive its community-building efforts effectively. These measures will not only enhance ASEAN’s ownership of cooperation projects but also elevate South Korea’s standing as a key and trusted partner in the region.

Second, in formulating a new plan of action (POA 2026–2030) for the ASEAN-ROK CSP, South Korea should focus on developing a strategic framework that aligns with ASEAN’s needs while capitalizing on Korea’s competitive strengths, rather than simply expanding the number of projects across various fields. Limited resources should be concentrated on signature areas of cooperation where South Korea can make the most impactful contributions. Promising areas include digital transformation, science and technology, culture, and cybersecurity. Furthermore, South Korea should identify niche areas with high ASEAN demand and minimal involvement from other dialogue partners. An effective strategy could involve enhancing support for integrating and creating synergies across cross-cutting issues within ASEAN’s three communities. This approach would greatly enhance ASEAN’s ability to address complex, multifaceted challenges in a cohesive and effective manner.

Third, to deepen the CSP relationship, South Korea must establish itself as a comprehensive strategic partner by building trust and demonstrating its commitment to ASEAN’s broader priorities. Achieving this requires consistency and continuity in ASEAN policies, as well as strengthened institutional mechanisms through enhanced high-level and working-level consultations. Regular monitoring of the implementation of summit and ministerial outcomes is also critical. Additionally, South Korea should expand its engagement in the security sector, where its presence is perceived as weakest among ASEAN’s three communities. South Korea can contribute to strengthening the functions of ASEAN-led multilateral platforms, by taking the lead on specific agendas where it has expertise, including transnational crime, cybersecurity and defense industry.

This research studies the political economic determinants of protectionist trade policies by focusing on the role of domestic politics. The authors provide theoretical frameworks with empirical evidence, and expand discussions towards policy case studies of selected nations. This multi-dimensional approach broadens understanding on protectionist trade policy implementation of major trade partners of Korea. The authors provide implications for Korea’s policy reactions to its major trade partners.

Chapter 2 comprehensively reviews the theoretical discussions on the political economic determinants of trade policy. It includes literature on endogenous trade policy (tariff) formation theories and related empirical contributions which led researchers to construct stylized facts. Among the mechanisms reviewed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on the median-voter approach and political support function approach in providing external validities with empirical evidence. Chapter 3 first estimates cross-country panel estimations with a sample from 141 nations from 1991 to 2019 by focusing on the tariff barriers. Estimations confirm that inequality mechanism is robustly supported by interacting with national factor endowment, while the mechanism through ideological orientation is not statistically confirmed. Chapter 3 extends discussions towards governments’ intervention on trade policies to incorporate the concept of non-tariff barriers. When the frequency of intervention is positioned as the dependent variable, the authors again confirm that the inequality channel is significantly identified.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide policy case studies by focusing on major trade partners of Korea: the United States, China, European Union, Vietnam, and Indonesia. For the United States, authors focus on the channel of lobbying, which has been the major source of interactions between policy makers and special interest. Chapter 4 analyzes firm-level and industry-level lobbying contributions of Korean special interests and draws comparisons with those from East Asian nations. For China, authors review historical developments of protectionist trade policies of the country, and how it is related to the strategic frameworks of the current Chinese administration. Chapter 4 provides case reviews on recent policies of China such as export controls on rare earths.

Moving on to the European Union, Chapter 5 estimates voter-level voting choice probabilities to identify whether individual attitudes toward climate change affect voting choice. By this estimation, the authors confirm that recent green trade barriers implemented by the European Union reflect domestic demands from voters. Individual views on climate change were a critical determinant of voting choice in recent elections. The qualitative analysis in Chapter 5 supports the findings by focusing on the European Union’s trade barriers on electric vehicles and the CBAM.

Chapter 5 expands the discussion to policy cases in Vietnam and Indonesia. An analysis is conducted on the political and economic background of anti-dumping duties on cold-rolled stainless-steel products to protect Vietnam’s steel industry, import regulations to protect the poultry industry, and export restrictions to promote the mining industry. For Vietnam’s anti-dumping duties on steel, it examines how the petitions from steel companies and the government’s intent to protect the steel industry interacted. Through interviews and literature review, Chapter 5 also investigates how Vietnam’s poultry industry protection plan and mining promotion plan were reflected in policy formulation. For Indonesia, the export restriction policy on raw minerals and resource nationalism can be understood in connection with populist agendas. Also, agricultural export and import restrictions have interdependently evolved with Indonesia’s food sovereignty discourse. Lastly, the chapter addresses the domestic background of Indonesia’s local content requirements, which posed significant challenges for South Korean companies, from the perspective of government-business interests.

Through the quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted in this study, the authors derive the following policy implications. To establish sustainable trade strategies for Korea, trade authorities must devote significant effort to understanding not only the economic constraints faced by counterpart countries but also their political constraints. This is because, in some cases, political constraints may serve as more binding restrictions than economic ones. By identifying the political and economic determinants of protectionist policies, it is possible to build a conceptual framework for forecasting and proactively addressing future protectionist measures, whether they strengthen or weaken.

To prevent Korean corporations’ lobbying activities in the United States from becoming politically biased or inadvertently delivering distorted messages to the U.S. political sphere, Korea’s trade authorities should consistently monitor these activities. This can be achieved through public channels, such as the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, or private organizations, such as the Federation of Korean Industries, and efforts should be made to ensure political balance. Furthermore, the government and private sector must share the background and context of Korean corporations’ lobbying efforts to effectively align Korea’s trade policy responses with private lobbying activities. Based on the study’s analysis of China, the authors emphasize the critical importance of Korea’s ability to interpret the actions of the United States and China through a political lens. To this end, they advocate for the establishment or expansion of specialized economic security departments and organizations within relevant ministries and the Presidential Office of Korea. Particularly, as strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Korea must proactively leverage its increasing strategic latitude vis-à-vis China to formulate independent strategies.

Given that the European lobbying system differs structurally from its U.S. counterpart, it is necessary to reassess the current effectiveness of Korea’s communication channels with the EU. Specifically, evaluating which is the more effective channel—government-level communication or private-sector corporate communication—should guide the development of a collaborative government-private sector response manual for addressing potential escalations in EU trade barriers. In Southeast Asia, focusing on the political-economic context of protectionist measures in key countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, Korea’s trade authorities should prepare a narrative emphasizing that expanding cooperation with Korea is free from the political constraints faced by Vietnamese and Indonesian authorities. For instance, as highlighted in Chapter 5, the Korean government should revisit Vietnam’s measures on the steel and mineral industries and Indonesia’s local content requirements to refine its trade negotiation strategies.

The sectors within Vietnam and Indonesia that the authors cover in Chapter 5 are sectors in which Vietnam and Indonesia have benefited significantly from Korean firms’ local investments in terms of supply chain and value chain development. Consequently, the argument that expanding cooperation with Korea aligns with Vietnam’s and Indonesia’s industrial protection and development objectives can be substantiated with quantitative evidence. To prepare for similar measures potentially emerging in Vietnam and Indonesia, Korean research institutions should preemptively conduct studies quantifying the industrial development effects induced by Korean firms’ local investments in these countries. Such studies would enable Korea to substantiate its claims with robust empirical evidence.

The global community is striving to establish a New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) to support developing countries in addressing climate change. This research examines international efforts to mobilize climate finance and analyzes the scale of contributions from donor nations. It further suggests strategies for Korea to engage in future climate finance mobilization efforts.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of global climate finance discussions and mobilization efforts, while analyzing the key issues surrounding the NCQG. Although most parties agree that the primary purpose of climate finance is to support adaptation and mitigation activities, a universally accepted definition of climate finance remains elusive. Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the international community has been discussing climate finance as an effective vehicle to assist developing countries. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement also includes provisions on climate finance. Reports from the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), the OECD, and the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) indicate that global climate finance has primarily focused on mitigation efforts, even as the financial needs of developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation continue to grow. In 2010, developed countries committed to jointly mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 to support climate action in developing countries. However, given the significant financial demands outlined in developing countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), recent NCQG discussions have centered on key issues such as the providers of climate finance, the scale of funding, the scope and sources of support, its alignment with the Paris Agreement, and measures to transparency in finance tracking.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature and methodologies related to climate finance tracking and analyzes the scale of climate finance provided by donor countries, based on the OECD’s most recent five-year dataset. Bilateral flows include climate change support via the Rio Marker for climate change, while multilateral flows are estimated based on donor contributions to multilateral organizations and funds allocated for climate change. This analysis also includes private finance mobilized through public interventions by donor countries. Japan, Germany, and France have emerged as major bilateral donors. Since 2020, Korea has significantly increased its bilateral climate finance, providing an average of $1 billion annually, although only 28% and 32% of its support is reported as primarily targeting mitigation and adaptation, respectively. In terms of multilateral aid, the top four donors, including Japan and the United Kingdom, accounted for over half (52.4%) of total contributions. Countries that mobilized significant private climate finance employed various financial instruments to leverage private sector investments. Based on OECD data, Korea’s climate finance is estimated to range between $670 million and $1.16 billion.

Chapter 4 analyzes the climate finance-related strategies and policies of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, which are major donors of climate finance for developing countries. Japan has been the largest provider of climate finance among OECD DAC member countries in recent years. Japan is using transition finance instruments such as climate transition bonds to increase funding for green transformation (GX). In addition, it has been actively promoting emission reduction projects in developing countries and multilateral climate cooperation, especially with ASEAN. The UK manages climate finance in the form of ODA as International Climate Finance (ICF). Unlike other countries, it has developed a dedicated national strategy for ICF and evaluates its performance of support based on key performance indicators (KPIs). Additionally, the UK collects data on private climate finance and works to enhance developing countries’ access to climate finance. Sweden, while having a climate finance portfolio similar in size to Korea’s, demonstrates a higher level of private sector participation. It has successfully attracted private investment through guarantees and has established statistical systems and governance based on legal ordinances. These countries have commonly increased public climate finance, developed statistical systems, and strengthened efforts to mitigate private investment risks through development finance institutions (DFIs). However, they differ in their methods of aggregating climate finance data (e.g., the use of Rio Marker data and the application of various coefficient ratios by support purposes) and in their specific strategies for mobilizing private investment.

Chapter 5 analyzes the necessity and constraints of private climate finance, the current state and private sector strategies in the area of climate finance creation, and case studies on promoting the use of private resources. Globally, the importance of utilizing private resources has been emphasized due to the substantial gap between the scale of climate resources and investment demand, coupled with the challenges of expanding public resources. Given the nature of climate change projects, which primarily target developing countries, there are various constraints that hinder private sector participation, including general economic conditions, various policies and support measures, and the regulatory environment. Consequently, while the scale of private climate finance has gradually grown, it still lags behind the upward trend in public climate finance. Nevertheless, the private sector is actively working to reduce funding for fossil fuels and expand climate-related financial products by participating in diverse climate finance cooperation initiatives and implementing independent carbon neutrality strategies. Moreover, based on notable implementation cases in the international community, this study identified promising financial mechanisms, including pooled investment funds, green bonds, green securitization, and crowdfunding, to promote the use of private climate finance.

Chapter 6 reviews domestic climate finance policies and presents an approach for Korea to support global climate finance efforts aimed at assisting developing countries. It is essential to establish a foundation that enables Korea to contribute climate finance commensurate with its national capabilities, thereby contributing to global issues and simultaneously promoting domestic greenhouse gas reduction goals and the transition to a low-carbon economy. To achieve this, this study proposes the following policies and measures. First, policymaking must consider the entire lifecycle of climate finance, from mobilization to utilization and tracking. It is necessary to establish a system for Korea to strategically mobilize and utilize climate finance for international support, while closely monitoring and evaluating the support provided. Second, measures should be implemented to build a comprehensive climate finance statistics system to generate and manage statistical data. Third, it is crucial to identify the obstacles that hinder developing countries from effectively employing climate finance. Furthermore, public climate finance should be leveraged to mitigate the diverse risks that the private sector encounters in the early stages of investing. Fourth, it is also necessary to promote private sector financing through various financial mechanisms and to improve the financial support system. Finally, it is crucial to enhance domestic support for disadvantaged sectors and vulnerable groups impacted by the transition to carbon neutrality, and to allocate additional resources to facilitate the shift to a low-carbon economy.

This study analyzes the impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake on economic growth and evaluates the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in mitigating the damage caused by the disaster. In the aftermath of natural disasters, emergency relief funds are quickly allocated to support victims, particularly in developing countries that face challenges in responding to such crises. These funds help with immediate survival and recovery efforts while also contributing to societal stability and long-term reconstruction. As the frequency of environmental disasters increases due to climate change, the demand for humanitarian aid has grown significantly.

The economic impact of natural disasters varies depending on the affected country’s capacity and the scale of financial assistance it receives. Developing nations, with limited disaster response capabilities compared to developed countries, tend to experience more severe consequences. Emergency relief funds are designed to address this disparity, and their effect on economic growth can vary based on the scale of the funding provided. This study investigates the effects of the 2015 Nepal earthquake and assesses the role of emergency relief funds in mitigating the damage.

Chapter 2 of this study examines the concept and definition of emergency relief funds, provides examples of their application, and outlines their operational mechanisms. Emergency relief funds are established to provide rapid humanitarian assistance during emergencies such as natural disasters, wars, and accidents. These funds, sourced from contributions by international organizations, governments, and NGOs, are used for the provision of emergency supplies, recovery efforts, and medical assistance, ensuring the protection of lives and safety. One key example is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). This fund mobilizes resources during crises and issues Flash Appeals to the international community. Allocation plans are determined through discussions within the UN OCHA’s cluster system, where sector-specific agencies collaborate, exchange information, and make decisions.

Chapter 3 explores the economic impact of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, investigates potential resource allocation distortions, and analyzes the role of emergency relief funds. The study begins by identifying the earthquake’s impact on economic growth. According to the literature on natural disasters and economic growth, four hypotheses exist: the “trend recovery hypothesis,” where the economy temporarily declines but eventually returns to its original trajectory; the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” where the economy fails to recover; the “sustainable recovery beyond the trend hypothesis,” where the economy grows beyond its original trajectory due to disaster-induced reforms; and the “creative destruction hypothesis,” where the destruction of outdated capital leads to increased productivity. The findings of this study align with the “irreversible loss hypothesis,” as the affected regions in Nepal failed to return to their original economic trajectory, showing a relative decline compared to unaffected regions.

The economic impact of the earthquake was more severe in areas with a lower proportion of upper-caste populations compared to regions with higher proportions. Possible explanations for this discrepancy include imbalances in resource allocation or differences in disaster recovery capabilities. Upper-caste populations are more likely to have connections with groups responsible for resource distribution. However, this study finds no significant differences in the amount of emergency relief funds allocated between regions with higher and lower upper-caste populations. This suggests that the internal processes of UN OCHA, which assess sector-specific funding needs and priorities, minimize the potential for caste-based bias in resource distribution.

The disparity in disaster recovery capabilities could account for the differences in economic impact. In Nepal, caste-based differences in income levels, asset ownership, and access to information contribute to varying recovery capacities. The study further examines the effects of emergency relief funds, revealing that in regions with lower upper-caste populations, emergency relief funds positively affected economic growth, unlike in areas with higher upper-caste populations. This is attributed to diminishing returns on resources in regions with relatively lower human and physical capital. By focusing support on regions with lower upper-caste populations, more efficient and equitable outcomes can be achieved.

Executive Summary

Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Background
2. Objectives of the Study
3. Research Methodology
4. Chapter Composition
5. Research Limitation

Chapter 2. Overview of the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
1. History of Korea-Africa High-Level Forums
2. Government-Level Strategies for Economic Cooperation with Africa
3. Comparative Analysis of Previous Korea-Africa High-Level Forums and the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
4. Analysis of the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit Joint Declaration

Chapter 3. Korea’s ODA Strategies for Africa: Focus on the Key Agendas of 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
1. Rethinking the Underlying Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment
2. Agricultural Development
3. Environmental Sector: Climate Change, Desertification and Deforestation
4. Urban Transportation: Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
5. Supporting Industrialization through TVET Program
6. Healthcare
7. Digital Cooperation
8. Sharing Korea’s Development Experience with Africa

Chapter 4. Developing Government Support Strategy through SWOT Analysis for African Market Entry
1. SWOT Analysis for African Market Entry
2. Recommended Government Support Strategies Based on SWOT Analysis

Chapter 5. Securing Reliable Critical Minerals
1. Energy Transformation and Strategic Minerals
2. Supply Chain of Strategic Minerals
3. Strategic Minerals and Africa
4. Supporting Private Sector Mineral Development

Chapter 6. Leveraging International Development Financial Institutions
1. Constraints in Financial Support to Africa
2. Utilizing Development Financial Institutions (DFIs)
3. Examples of DFI Financial Support
4. Co-financing with Development Financial Institutions

Chapter 7. Conclusion

References

국문요약

Contributors

This report examines strategies for strengthening Korea’s economic and development cooperation with Africa, focusing on key agendas from the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit. The analysis covers critical areas, including agriculture, environmental issues, urban transportation, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), healthcare, digital cooperation, and the sharing of Korea’s development experience. Additionally, the report provides recommendations for securing reliable critical minerals and leveraging international development financial institutions to support cooperation efforts.
Africa faces significant agricultural challenges, including low productivity, limited use of modern inputs, poor infrastructure, and vulnerability to climate change. Customized smart farm solutions adapted to African contexts are necessary to support the establishment of agricultural processing facilities and cold chain systems. Korea can build partnerships to develop agricultural policies and regulatory frameworks, promote public-private partnerships in the agriculture sector, and support the development of agricultural research and extension services. This will improve irrigation and water management systems and promote the adoption of climate-resilient crop varieties and farming practices.
The Korea-Africa Partnership can address critical environmental challenges in Africa, including the impacts of climate change, desertification, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity. Various projects can be developed, such as reforestation, sustainable land management, and biodiversity conservation. Supporting early warning systems for climate-related disasters will benefit recipient countries. Training on environmental impact assessments and green growth strategies, promoting sustainable urban planning, and developing green infrastructure will also be beneficial. Korea can assist in implementing integrated water resource management approaches to promote circular economy initiatives and waste management solutions.
Rapid urbanization in Africa is creating significant challenges related to traffic congestion, road safety, and air pollution. Korea can develop pilot projects for intelligent transportation systems (ITS) in major African cities to support the development of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, provide technical assistance for transportation master planning, and promote electric mobility solutions adapted to African contexts. Additionally, Korea can help develop non-motorized transport infrastructure (e.g., bicycle lanes, pedestrian walkways) and support capacity building for urban transport authorities to promote transit-oriented development approaches.
TVET is a top priority area for Africa’s skills development. TVET projects focused on key industries (e.g., manufacturing, ICT, agriculture) should support the development of national qualification frameworks and promote industry-academia partnerships for TVET. Korea’s ODA projects can include quality assurance systems for TVET to support the modernization of TVET infrastructure and equipment and promote entrepreneurship education within TVET programs, including e-learning and blended learning approaches.
Africa’s healthcare challenges include a high burden of infectious diseases, rising non-communicable diseases, and weak health systems. Projects should aim to strengthen primary healthcare systems, support the development of telemedicine and e-health solutions, and establish centers of excellence for specific diseases. Promoting pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturing capabilities through capacity building for health policy and management, along with community health worker programs and health education initiatives, is essential.
Digital transformation is urgently needed in African countries. Korea has developed a well-designed e-government system that is envied by many. African countries need to improve customs, procurement, statistics, and more. Partnership projects can develop innovation hubs and tech parks to provide technical assistance for ICT policymaking and regulation, promote digital financial inclusion initiatives, and support the development of digital content in local languages. Digital literacy programs targeting underserved populations will be necessary to promote the adoption of emerging technologies (e.g., AI, IoT, blockchain) in key sectors.
Korea’s development experience can serve as a benchmarking model for African countries. Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) includes economic planning, industrial policy, export promotion strategies, human resource development, public sector reform, governance improvements, science, technology, and innovation policies, among others. Korea-Africa partnership projects that adapt Korean development models will provide policy advisory services tailored to specific African countries. This will support the development of think tanks and policy research institutes and organize study visits and exchange programs for African policymakers and experts to explore the adaptation of Korean development approaches.
There is a growing concern regarding the security of critical minerals for the clean energy transition, highlighting Africa’s significant mineral resources. Korea can strengthen partnerships with African countries rich in critical minerals to support sustainable and responsible mining practices and assist in developing mineral processing and value-addition capabilities. This can include technology transfer in the mining and mineral sectors, developing transparent and effective mineral governance frameworks, investing in geological surveys and resource mapping, and promoting local content development in the mining supply chain.
Development finance institutions (DFIs) will be crucial for the Korea- Africa partnership to support economic cooperation. Improving co-financing arrangements with multilateral and bilateral DFIs can strengthen cooperation with the African Development Bank. This will utilize innovative financing mechanisms like blended finance and enhance Korea’s capacity to structure and implement complex development projects. Strategic partnerships with European DFIs with extensive African experience can strengthen Korea’s development finance institutions to better support African projects. Additionally, it can promote private sector participation through public-private partnerships and risk mitigation instruments.
The 2024 Korea-Africa Summit provides a strong foundation for deepening this cooperation. Moving forward, it will be crucial to translate the summit’s commitments into concrete actions and sustainable long-term partnerships. This will require continued high-level engagement, regular policy dialogues, and the establishment of effective implementation mechanisms.

India’s state enterprises, or central public sector enterprises (CPSEs), are playing a key role in numerous industries. Although the country began its economic liberalization in the early 1990s, large-scale privatization did not gain momentum due to strong political and societal opposition, allowing CPSEs to maintain their pivotal position within the Indian economy. Starting from the mid-2010s, the number and total size of CPSEs increased as the Narendra Modi government actively mobilized these enterprises to pursue economic development. As of 2022, there were 389 CPSEs with total revenues exceeding 30 trillion rupees (approximately 350 billion dollars).

This report focuses on the agriculture-related sector, electric power sector, transport infrastructure sector, energy, minerals and metals sector, and defense sector as promising areas for Korea-India cooperation. It examines the role and key projects of India’s major CPSEs within these industries. Major CPSEs were selected based on indicators such as assets, revenues, and employment, as well as their roles in government development strategies. The report finds that major CPSEs play a crucial role in all five selected sectors. CPSEs in the agriculture-related sector are prominent players in fertilizer production, food trading, and food storage. In the electric power sector, CPSEs are leaders in thermal and nuclear power generation. CPSEs are also in charge of significant public transport infrastructure projects in the road, rail, port, and airport segments. In the energy, minerals and metals sector, CPSEs hold substantial shares in upstream and downstream businesses. Defense CPSEs lead the domestic production of military vehicles, ships, and aircraft.

While the Indian government actively employs CPSEs for development, it also recognizes the importance of the private sector. To attract private investment, the government has been improving the business environment by easing regulations and strengthening infrastructure. Moreover, it has been encouraging cooperation between CPSEs and international companies and organizations.

This report analyzes a set of case studies involving CPSEs and international companies or organizations. These cases can be divided into two areas: industrial cooperation and development cooperation. In the area of industrial cooperation, the goals of CPSEs include gaining access to advanced technologies and capital while strengthening supply chains. In comparison, external partners seek to leverage CPSEs’ local knowledge, networks, and market access. In the area of development cooperation, major advanced countries’ development agencies and global development financial institutions have been expanding funding to India with CPSEs charged with the execution of numerous development projects.

India is a pivotal partner in the Indo-Pacific era. As Korea seeks to strengthen its partnership with India, the most populous country in the world and soon to be the third-largest economy, the Korean government and businesses can consider cooperating with India’s CPSEs. Based on in-depth analyses of CPSEs, this report suggests five strategies referred to as the 5Ms (Monitoring, Meeting, Marketing, Matching, and Metamorphosis) to enhance relations with these enterprises.

First, Korea’s government institutions and industry associations need to strengthen their monitoring of India’s CPSEs. To prepare for potential disruptions in key natural resource supply chains, a monitoring team can be tasked to collect information on CPSEs with increasing influence in the global commodities market. Additionally, the team can gather critical information on India’s major development strategies and projects by monitoring CPSEs. As state enterprises play an important role in several large emerging economies, these monitoring activities should be extended to these countries.

Second, while India’s CPSEs actively cooperate with international companies and organizations, their interaction with Korea remains limited. To address this, Korea could organize “State-Enterprises Meetings” with Indian counterparts as an initial step toward collaboration. In these meetings, high-ranking officials from both countries’ state enterprises can discuss India’s development challenges and industrial trends and explore potential areas of cooperation. Korean companies could also identify solutions for some of the obstacles they face in India.

Third, the Korean government could support the marketing activities of Korean businesses aimed at CPSEs, which serve as important contractors in large projects in India. The designated organization would collect and provide information on CPSEs’ contractual relationships, purchasing intentions, and tender regulations as well as arrange seminars and exhibitions aimed at promoting Korean products to CPSEs.

Next, the Korean government could establish a unit responsible for identifying and designing potential cooperation projects by matching the needs of both India and Korea. This team, composed of industry and development experts, would plan cooperation projects aligned with the development strategies of both countries. Given that government-initiated projects involving India’s CPSEs tend to proceed relatively quickly, the team would benefit from close consultation with these enterprises in its search for potential areas of cooperation.

Finally, the report emphasizes the need for a metamorphosis in the Korean government and businesses’ approach to India. Korean businesses should seriously consider expanding local manufacturing capacities, while the Korean government needs to diversify development cooperation tools. With the Indian government advancing its industrialization strategy, Korean businesses targeting India’s vast market are advised to establish local manufacturing facilities. As CPSEs strive to increase indigenization in line with government policy stance, local production will be particularly important. Turning to the role of the Korean government, it could learn from major development finance institutions and policy finance institutions that utilize diverse tools to cooperate with India’s CPSEs. It could also expand its portfolio of policy tools by incorporating guarantees, debt and equity financing, and triangular cooperation mechanisms in addition to grants and concessional loans.

The Latin American region, while still abundant in fossil fuels, is also regarded as having significant potential in the renewable energy sector. The global transition to renewable energy presents an opportunity for industrial development in Latin American countries, which hold comparative advantages in this field. Many Latin American countries possess strong cost competitiveness in solar and wind energy. These global needs, coupled with the region's strengths, underline the necessity of fostering green energy. However, it is evaluated that the conditions required to realize these goals are not fully in place, necessitating responses through international cooperation. This study aims to analyze the current status and institutional foundations of the green energy industry in Latin American countries and, based on this analysis, propose directions for the advancement and cooperation of Korean companies.

This report seeks to understand the structure of the green energy industry in Latin America, focusing on solar, wind, and hydrogen energy, and to explore pathways for Korea's cooperation with the region. It especially highlights Chile, with its significant advantages across all renewable energy sectors and high political stability; Brazil, with the largest market in Latin America and strengths across almost all energy sources; Mexico, which ranks next in market size and holds great potential in solar energy; and Colombia, where energy accessibility is a major issue and official development assistance (ODA) could serve as a key cooperation channel.

Chapter 2 provides a macro-level discussion on the energy transition in Latin American countries. By examining shared and persistent characteristics, it identifies factors to consider for the development of the green energy sector and collaboration with Korea. It points out that underlying the region’s longstanding issues of low growth and inequality are problems in the corporate growth ecosystem, particularly institutional issues such as favoritism toward state-owned enterprises. Many Latin American countries find it difficult to meet energy transition demands on their own, requiring external investment. However, outdated institutional factors in Latin America are likely to continue to act as barriers to attracting investments for energy transition and green energy development.

This chapter also delves into the green energy potential of Latin America. According to IRENA (2023), countries like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have significant cost advantages in the solar and wind sectors. Northern Chile, Peru, and Mexico hold immense potential in solar energy, while the Patagonia region (southern Chile and Argentina), parts of Colombia, and eastern Brazil excel in wind energy. Additionally, Brazil and Argentina are well-suited for bioenergy production using agricultural resources. These diverse renewable energy resources contribute to the region being one of the largest renewable energy producers globally.

The study highlights the role of hydrogen as an energy source for achieving carbon neutrality, with particular attention to green hydrogen (produced using renewable energy), which is attracting the interest of many companies and nations. Latin America, with its abundant solar and wind resources, has the potential to supply electricity for hydrogen production at the lowest global cost and aspires to become a leading exporter of green hydrogen. Emerging international hydrogen industry platforms, including the Global Hydrogen Council, could facilitate Korea’s collaboration with Latin America in this field.

Lastly, the issue of a just and equitable transition is emphasized not merely as a social concern but as a practical challenge that significantly impacts the identification and execution of projects. International organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are focusing on technical cooperation to support a fair transition. While private companies may concentrate on business aspects, governments and public sectors need to take responsibility for related areas, such as community development, and actively consider relevant models.

Chapter 3 explores Korean companies’ perceptions of the renewable energy industry and Latin America’s potential, based on a survey of 100 professionals from diverse energy companies and institutions in Korea. While respondents generally recognize Latin America’s cost advantages, they do not view it as a critical strategic region. This is attributed to not only a lack of information but also challenges such as political instability, licensing issues, and land ownership disputes in the region, underscoring the need for policy responses.

The chapter also examines the technical advantages of Korean companies to identify comparative strengths. In solar energy, midstream and downstream capabilities stand out, while in wind energy, partnerships with European firms are suggested as a key strategy. In the hydrogen sector, Korean firms are recognized for their strengths in hydrogen-powered vehicles, tankers, and ammonia co-firing technologies.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia and proposes strategies for cooperation. Chile is identified as the most favorable country for entry due to its excellence in both solar and wind energy, clear hydrogen-focused policy direction, and proactive stance on foreign investment and collaboration. The report suggests positioning Chile as a hub country, offering an empirical model for other Latin American nations. It emphasizes establishing stable domestic and international demand plans, leveraging Chile’s interest in securing customers, and building long-term relationships through human exchanges and joint research.

For Brazil, while it is the largest economy in South America, significant challenges such as foreign exchange risks and a lack of information and relationships are noted. The report proposes a detour strategy through partnerships with European companies already established in Brazil and suggests targeting unique growth areas like biofuels and internal combustion engine components.

In Mexico, despite its technical potential, the report anticipates that regulatory practices favoring state-owned enterprises will remain entrenched. It recommends focusing on small-scale distributed energy markets and energy demand along the U.S. border. For Colombia, the report highlights the country’s market-friendly policies and status as a priority ODA partner. It advocates for continued ODA projects targeting regions excluded from the power grid and active involvement in Colombia’s hydrogen energy plans.

Chapter 5 synthesizes the findings to propose strategic cooperation directions for the four major countries and draws lessons from the collaboration approaches of other donor nations. A key feature of advanced donor nations’ energy policies is the integration of energy cooperation with other development projects. Many countries are implementing policy-oriented ODA projects to drive the entry of their domestic firms. Energy cooperation requires not only private investment but also government collaboration, necessitating comprehensive partnerships, including policy coordination. Korea’s experience with initiatives like the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and the Energy Industry Promotion Program (EIPP) offers advantages. However, Korea’s relatively short history of collaboration with Latin America suggests the need to focus on partnerships with willing countries in the region or to actively pursue collaborations with European nations or international organizations that have longstanding relationships with Latin America.

Lastly, the report highlights policy recommendations, including the identification of cooperative projects through international organizations like CABEI and IDB, strengthening intergovernmental cooperation through knowledge sharing and joint research, and improving internal feasibility studies for business development in Latin America.

The green transition and shifts in industrial paradigms have intensified the global competition for critical minerals essential to renewable energy systems and electric vehicles. The rising demand for these minerals has created more complexities for global supply chains, presenting greater challenges compared to the era of fossil fuel. In response, both mineral producers and consumer countries are formulating strategies to enhance economic security and diversify mineral supply chains, promoting public-private partnerships as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

With its abundant reserves of these minerals, Africa is emerging as a key partner for economic diversification. Major mineral-rich African countries are revising mining-related laws and regulations to attract foreign investment and secure the needed increase state participation in the mining sector. Meanwhile, major global economies are bolstering diplomatic ties with these countries while supporting private investment into Africa. However, the expansion of the mining activities for critical minerals has led to various environmental and social concerns including human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and corruption in Africa. Consequently, establishing responsible and ethical mineral supply chains is important for achieving a just transition.

This study explores the potential for Korea to strengthen its partnership with Africa in securing supply chains of critical minerals. As a country heavily reliant on imported minerals, securing stable supply chains is vital to Korea’s economic resilience. Fostering cooperation with Africa, particularly in the development of graphite and rare earth elements, is crucial for maintaining stability in the supply chains of batteries and electronic vehicles, which are central to Korea’s economy.

To enhance Korea-Africa cooperation in the critical minerals sector, this study outlines three key strategies for the Korean government. First, policymakers must develop approaches tailored to Africa’s unique regional characteristics, and pay close attention to the shifts in the priorities and policy directions of African partner countries. Second, efforts should be made to revitalize resource diplomacy, strengthening bilateral cooperation with African mineral- producing countries while engaging in multilateral cooperation with global partners to complement Korea’s capabilities. Third, expanding financial and non-financial support will be essential to incentivize the private sector to engage in mineral resources and infrastructure development in Africa. Diversifying funding sources and bolstering the operational capability of support institutions will be instrumental in achieving these goals.

South Korea, with its heavy economic reliance on international trade, has undergone significant changes in its labor market due to trade shocks. Since the early 2000s, for example, the rapid economic growth of China and Vietnam has dramatically increased trade volumes between these countries and Korea. This surge has notably altered Korea’s industrial employment landscape, affecting worker income levels and job security. Workers in industries facing heightened import competition from China and Vietnam have experienced diminishing earned income growth rates and an increased risk of involuntary job loss, while those in industries with rising exports to the countries have benefited from enhanced income growth and job stability (Koo and Kim 2020, Koo et al. 2022).

This study aims to investigate how South Korean workers have transitioned across industries and occupations in response to trade-induced shocks resulting from the economic rise of China and Vietnam. It assesses whether the Korean labor market has efficiently realigned labor from industries at a comparative disadvantage to those at a comparative advantage, given the evolving trade structure. ​The study further explores the mechanisms through which these labor shifts impact worker incomes and overall economic welfare, identifying inefficiencies in the labor reallocation process.​ These findings inform discussions on policy approaches that could enhance the effectiveness of labor reallocation.

The main distinctions of this study compared to previous research are as follows. ​First, it is the first study to empirically examine the impact of trade shocks with China and Vietnam in terms of labor reallocation across domestic industries and occupations.​ Second, by using a general equilibrium trade model that explicitly considers friction costs of inter-industry labor reallocation and industrial linkages, the study estimates the labor adjustment costs by industry and the resulting welfare effects. Third, by utilizing the Employment Insurance Database, an administrative record containing information on all employees enrolled in Korea’s employment insurance system, the study provides a more accurate and comprehensive analysis of long-term labor reallocation trends—from 2003 to 2019.

The primary research focus and findings of each chapter are outlined below. In Chapter 2, diverse micro data including the Employment Insurance Database are used to analyze the overall inter-industry labor mobility in Korea since the 2000s. The focus is on identifying the patterns and characteristics of average worker movements, particularly between the light industries, which face stiff competition from Chinese and Vietnamese imports, and the heavy industries, where export growth is concentrated. Chapter 3 estimates the impact of changes in South Korea's trade with China and Vietnam, driven by their rapid economic growth since the 2000s, on the movement of domestic workers between industries and occupations. Unlike Chapter 2’s descriptive analysis, Chapter 3 emphasizes revealing causal relationships through a 2SLS econometric model using instrumental variables, while enhancing accuracy with the employment insurance administrative database. In Chapter 4, a dynamic general equilibrium trade model reflecting the domestic labor market and input-output structure by industry is employed to assess how the trade shocks with China and Vietnam since the 2000s have impacted Korean welfare and how the adjustment costs required for labor reallocation between domestic industries have contributed to this. Finally, Chapter 5 examines recent key advancements in South Korea's vocational training, higher education, and employment support policies, focusing on effective strategies for facilitating labor reallocation in response to trade shocks. Additionally, it explores specific areas for policy enhancement and provides recommendations for improvement.