Recently in the Korean society, there has been an active expansion of discussion on the issue of hostile M&As. In Korea, the issue that is of most concern is the M&A of domestic enterprises by foreign capital. This paper introduces how the Japanese government responded to hostile M&A's as an example that can be referenced in Korea's efforts to solve this issue.

The ways in which the Japanese have responded to hostile M&As has caught Korea's attention One of the first things that is noticed in Japan's response to hostile M&As is the recognition and attitude of its government. Japan's government, even after foreseeing the proliferation of hostile M&As have focused more on the associated positive effects than the negative effects. Another way in which Japan's response has differed is that in order to deal with hostile M&A takeovers, the government has presented specific guides that gives suggestions to effective ways that Japanese companies can respond to M&As.

The biggest lesson to be learned is that like the Japanese government's legal oriented, and rational response which established specific guides of suggested conducts in response to M&As, the Korean government must discuss the creation of similar guidelines. There is a need for rational and objective dialogue to take place between businessmen, M&A legal and economic experts, government officials, and other related parties to evaluate what the present condition of the M&A environment is as well as to determine appropriate preventative measures that can be exercised by businesses. In particular, we have reached a point where it is necessary to promote rational discussions on preventative measures that can be taken against hostile M&As carried out by foreign capital.

These discussions must look not only at the effect on corporate performance and business innovation but also towards improving the contributions towards the value of businesses in the long-term, discussing existing problems, as well as promoting the inflow and usage of foreign capital, which improves Korea's economic competitiveness, while at the same time eliminating M&As, which impede such improvements. In addition, it is necessary to engage in further in-depth studies on cases of M&A market rules in developed countries like the US, Europe, etc. In the UK, Australia and New Zealand, the interests of shareholders are viewed as being of primary importance.

As a result, the amount of the governments' intervention in the M&A market is strictly limited. In contrast, though the US system at first glance seems to be open for M&A markets to form, if an M&A puts the strategic interests of the state in jeopardy, regulation is thoroughly exercised.Similarly, states exercise various degrees of regulation in M&As according to their respective situations. It follows that Korea should analyze and compare each of these advanced models and apply the one that is most appropriate to its conditions. Japan presents one such advanced model. Because of the intervention by administrative authorities, it is uncertain whether the guide-based model presented by Japan will be effective in fostering the formation of an M&A market in a consistent manner, and thus when we consider Korea's present condition, though its M&A standards are insignificant in comparison, we can make the evaluation that it has enough merit to be benchmarked in the short and middle-term.