The first objective of this research is to observe the changes in the global trade environment, focusing on the trade protectionism after the inauguration of the Trump administration in the U.S., while examining the Japanese government’s response to such changes, thereby drawing implications for Korea. To be more specific, this research focuses on how the Japanese government responded to U.S. unilateral trade pressures in the 1980s and 1990s, and how Japan, based on this experience, proposed and formed the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue. This objective is addressed in Chapter 2 of the study. The second objective of the study is to examine the competition between Korea and Japan from the perspective of free trade agreements (FTA), and analyze Japan’s FTA policy and strategy, focusing on the ASEAN-Japan FTA (AJCEP), RCEP, Korea-China-Japan FTA, the TPP 11, and the Japan-EU FTA. This discussion is covered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the study.
  Chapter 2, “U.S. Protectionism and Japan’s Trade Policy,” covers the surge of trade protectionism in the U.S. during the 1980s and under the Trump administration, and looks into the responding policy adopted by the Japanese government. The results show that the U.S. trade pressure on Japan in the 1980s prompted Japan to shift its trade strategy from a “mercantilist” trade policy based on export expansion to one focusing on direct investment or strengthening business partnerships between companies. In the field of semiconductors, this pressure by the U.S. acted as a decisive factor in deteriorating the global competitiveness of Japanese companies. Regarding the trade environment under President Trump, the Trump administration’s protectionist trade policy can be summarized as: 1) prioritizing domestic law over the WTO, 2) expanding import restrictions, and 3) renegotiating FTAs. In response to Trump’s protectionism, Japan has proposed a new form of trade council to be called the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue, in an attempt to evade direct and unilateral trade pressure from the U.S. The Japanese government’s “TPP-oriented” trade policy or its tendency to exclude exchange rate in trade talks are noteworthy in that they show Japan’s willingness to press for its profits.
  Chapter 3, “Japan’s Regional Trade Policy in East Asia,” examines Japan’s FTA policy and strategy for East Asia, focusing on the AJCEP (ASEAN-Japan FTA), RCEP and the Korea-China-Japan FTA. First, this study predicts Japan will continue to compete with Korea in the area of FTAs, based on the fact that the KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA concluded in 2010 had the effect of expediting Japan’s process of concluding the Japan-EU FTA and the TPP. Second, an analysis of the trade effects of Japan’s FTAs reveals that the AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral FTAs with ASEAN had the effect of increasing (in average) the total exports and imports, and mitigating the decline of Japan’s total trade that became conspicuous after 2012. In particular, the steel and automobile sectors, which the Japanese government had focused on to expand the global value chain of domestic companies, experienced growth in exports. Third, the study reveals that Japan’s FTAs contributed to strengthening regional production networks of Japanese companies in ASEAN countries. Both the proportion of Japan’s sales to the ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia) and the proportion of Asian regional procurement and sales increased after Japan concluded FTAs with ASEAN countries. Fourth, regarding the RCEP, this study emphasizes the need to adopt common concession and agree on a broader and higher level of tariff elimination than the ASEAN+1 agreements. At the same time, it also calls for the implementation of cumulative rules of origin to help Korean companies build production networks within the ASEAN and RCEP regions. Fifth, in relation to the Korea-China-Japan FTA, this study emphasizes the importance of: 1) publicly communicating the need for concluding the Korea-China-Japan FTA through strong political leadership, 2) adopting an rather than single undertaking, and 3) eliminating non-tariff barriers for trade facilitation.
  Chapter 4, “Japan’s Asia-Pacific Regional Trade Policy,” analyzes what Korea should consider when entering the TPP negotiation, based on Japan’s trade strategy as well as TPP 11 basic agreement. First, the political and economic background of Japan’s “obsession” with TPP, even after the exit of the U.S., is the fact that the original TPP agreement had almost satisfied Japan’s demand to “sanctify” the five agricultural products in Japan, and that the economic benefits of TPP 16 (including Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea while excluding the US) surpasses that of RCEP. Added to that is the TPP’s trade norms—including rules of origin, e-commerce, state owned enterprise, and intellectual property rights. As such, it is predicted that the Japanese government will maintain a very tough negotiating stance in the RCEP and Korea-China-Japan FTA, based on the TPP model. Lastly, the study points out the need to review Korea’s current tariff structure, should the Korean government wish to embark on a bilateral FTA with Japan, or participate in TPP in the future. Korea’s current tariff rates is relatively high compared to Japan’s, and this could greatly restrict Korea’s negotiating power vis-à-vis Japan when entering a negotiation with Japan. In addition, such an “asymmetric” tariff structure will inevitably end up increasing Korea’s trade deficit to Japan due to the phase-in tariff reduction and elimination.
  Chapter 5, “Japan’s EU Trade Policy,” examines Japan’s EU trade policy, focusing on the Japan-EU FTA concluded in December 2017. The results of the analysis are as follows. First, the Japan-EU FTA, together with the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), is important in terms of strengthening the strategic and economic relationship between Japan and the EU. Second, a comparison of the commodity market access between the EU-Japan FTA and the Korea-EU FTA revealed that the immediate tariff elimination rate was higher for Japan (96% of industrial products and 54% of agricultural products) than Korea (90.7%, 42.5%), while in regard to the period of tariff elimination for automobiles in the EU market, Japan agreed for 2 years more than Korea. Regarding the opening of agricultural markets in Korea and Japan, both FTAs reached similar level of agreements. Third, a comparison of the non-commodity market access between the two FTAs revealed that for the service sector, the Japan-EU FTA adopted a negative list approach, while the Korea-EU FTA adopted a positive list approach. Regarding investor protection, the issue was hardly raised at all during negotiations for the Korea-EU FTA, while in the Japan-EU FTA, various investor protection measures were discussed but the two sides were unable to reach a consensus, as Japan insisted on adopting the ISDS system while the EU wished to adopt the ICS system. It is estimated that the adverse effects of the EU-Japan FTA on Korea will not be large in macroeconomic aspects such as GDP, consumer welfare, employment, etc. In industries such as automobiles, automobile components and electronic devices, however, some adverse effects are to be expected. It is also noteworthy to remember that the Japan-EU FTA includes certain sectors that were not discussed in the Korea-Japan FTA, such as corporate governance, agricultural cooperation, and SMEs.