The Ukrainian War has dealt a severe blow to the global order, which has yet to recover from the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the resulting changes are becoming irreversible. Changes that were already underway before the war are accelerating in an amplified form during the conflict. The Ukrainian War marks the end of the 30-year post-Cold War, post- globalization era . Over the next 3 to 5 years, the results of the restructuring of the global order will reveal its true nature. It is predicted that rather than a recovery of the old order or the emergence and solidification of a new order, it will be difficult to establish a single global order, and various orders will coexist, inevitably leading to ongoing power struggles. In other words, the global order will essentially evolve into a world of multiple orders.

The competition between the superpowers over the security and military sector is expected to be a fundamental factor in determining the nature of the order after the end of the post-Cold War order. A fierce confrontation is expected in the security sector as a whole after the Ukrainian War. The basis of the Biden administration’s China strategy is to strengthen international solidarity for the defense of the rules and norms order through the recovery of international leadership. The responses of adversaries to this US-led framework, such as Russia and China, are also strong. The Ukrainian War is likely to cause significant changes in the global military order and poses a multifaceted threat to the nuclear non-proliferation order. The Ukrainian War will also intensify traditional arms race among the superpowers and increase military tensions.

The United Nations and other international organizations have been criticized for not being able to function effectively due to conflicts between the US, China, and Russia. However, despite the criticism of the weak influence in the international community and the fatal institutional flaw of not being able to effectively respond to agendas where the permanent members are in conflict, the expectation of the UN to respond to global conflicts and crises is still high. In the international economic institutions and systems, there is a competition between the US-led forces and the forces led by China and Russia, but it is difficult to say that one side has the upper hand.

The war in Ukrainian further plunged the international economy, which had not yet overcome the shock of COVID-19, into a recessionary crisis and caused disruptions in the supply of goods and services, including food and energy. The economic interdependence, such as the value chain, which was maintained under the overwhelming economic logic of the post-Cold War era, showssigns of being reorganized into a form of supply network centered on one’s own country or trade and economic bloc formation centered on allies and friendly countries according to the security logic. Of course, this does not mean that the phenomenon of de-globalization, the formation of separated blocs and the fragmentation of the economic order means the complete collapse of globalization and the emergence of a new economic order, but for the time being, the phase where the logic of security is reflected in the overall economic relations between countries and the tendencies of economic protectionism are strengthened is expected to continue.

It is not easy to declare the end of the post-Cold War order in digital governance. This is because digital governance corresponds to a very wide range and layers, and the wide range of these issues makes it difficult to define as one single order. Rather, it can be said that each subfield has different characteristics. Looking at these areas before and after the Ukrainian War, it is difficult to say that there has been a clear change in direction. The Ukrainian War is accelerating various order transitions triggered by the US-China strategic competition, such as the decline of the liberal international order and the rise of the bloc order, the decline of free trade and the rise of protectionism, the rise of nation-centered industrial policy and technological nationalism. At the same time, there are growing concerns about the emergence of an unstable bipolar order and a new Cold-War style order . Moreover, as the two central orders, led by the US and China, are being established, a complex pattern is unfolding in which the center is deviating and multiconnectedness outside the center is strengthening.

Due to the conflict between the US and China before and after the Ukrainian War, the pattern of hegemonic competition is intensifying, and the field of climate change is an area that needs to be addressed through multilateral international cooperation as an issue related to the global commons, so there is a high possibility of deepening confrontation and obstacles to cooperation. Discussions on major cooperation agendas are currently underway as scheduled, but the situation is latent with the possibility of conflict and suspension of cooperation.

The transition to a world of multiple orders poses a major challenge to Korea’s national policy as a whole. Korea needs to meticulously analyze the process of the order reorganization by field and area and find ways to maximize Korea’s national interests. It is necessary to minimize the costs caused by the change of order, seize new opportunities, and establish a status that can guarantee Korea’s national interests not only in the short term but also in the medium and long term. In addition, Korea should not only react to changes in the order, but also actively participate in the reorganization of the order and strive to shape the new order in a way that is compatible with Korea’s national interests.

It is very important to establish a multidimensional framework for analyzing how changes in one area will affect other areas. In the future, policy authorities should be able to respond effectively by comprehensively evaluating and forecasting the direction of changes occurring in different areas. The status secured in one area can have a positive effect on the formation of the order in another area. The bargaining chip in one area should be applied to other areas, and if the conditions unfavorable to Korea must be accepted, compensation should be demanded in other areas.