This report examines the status of U.S. semiconductor export controls and estimates their impact. We focus on two major areas of semiconductor export controls implemented by the Biden Administration: restrictions on certain semiconductor manufacturing facilities and AI chips.

In Chapter 2 reviews the history of U.S. semiconductor export controls, which progressively became stronger and broader in scope during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. In doing so, we confirmed that semiconductor export controls have become more frequent and in an effort to overcome the limitations of existing sanctions. Regarding export controls attempted by the Obama administration, American companies were able to circumvent them by assisting Chinese companies. The Trump and Biden administrations have closed such loopholes by expanding existing sanctions. The scope of the Trump administration’s sanctions against some companies, such as Huawei and SMIC, has been greatly expanded to include export controls targeting all of China under the Biden administration. Additionally, Chapter 2 reviews the concerns of various companies, associations, and organizations regarding these broader export controls and reviews key countries’ responses to the semiconductor supply chain.

In Chapter 3, we conducted an analysis of the semiconductor industry’s supply chain, encompassing equipment, materials, foundry, memory, and design sectors. For each sector, we scrutinized major companies and their relevance to semiconductor export controls, as well as the competitiveness of China’s semiconductor industry. By reviewing various public announcements and company disclosures, we investigated the potential impact of export controls on individual companies, particularly in the areas of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, memory semiconductors, and semiconductor design. It became clear that Chinese semiconductor companies were rapidly improving their technical capabilities with substantial support from the Chinese government in all areas.

In Chapter 4, we delved into the repercussions of semiconductor export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI chips, the two main targets of export controls. Our analysis showed a statistically significant decline in China’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Furthermore, Korea’s exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which serve as a complement to American semiconductor manufacturing equipment, have also declined as a result of the impositionof semiconductor export controls. Additionally, the imposition of export controls on AI semiconductors could potentially lead to a modest decline in demand for high bandwidth memory (HBM). While the baseline estimate indicates a smaller decline in demand due to the export controls compared to the broader memory market, the long-term impact could be significant, depending on the evolution of future export control measures and the expansion of the AI semiconductor market.

In Chapter 5, we projected possible extensions of semiconductor export controls to encompass heterogeneous integration technology and next-generation power semiconductors. Furthermore, we also considered the possibility of broadening the scope of countries involved in semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In addition, this report outlines policy implications, including the need to ensure the competitiveness of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to establish alternative production facilities to mitigate risk exposure, and to enhance the competitiveness of fabless companies.