The study examines methodologies for quantitatively analyzing the impact of global supply chain fragmentation and applies these approaches to scenarios involving critical minerals. It identifies two primary analytical approaches: microeconomic and macroeconomic.

Microeconomic methods provide detailed insights at the item or firm level but face challenges due to limited access to specific supply chain data. Macroeconomic methods, while suitable for industry- or national-level analysis, often rely on unrealistic assumptions when applied to item-level fragmentation. Despite the significant macroeconomic effects of disruptions in critical supply chains, existing item-level analysis techniques struggle to capture these impacts accurately. For instance, efforts to link item-level analysis with GDP using linear programming or inoperability input-output analysis often encounter limitations due to rigid assumptions about input-output structures. High-tech items, in particular, pose challenges due to their complex supply chain interdependencies and their significant influence on final production.

To address these issues, the study proposes an integrated methodology combining machine learning techniques for microeconomic analysis with the OECD METRO model for macroeconomic evaluation. This approach considers key issues and transmission channels identified in previous research. The study also reviews critical mineral management policies in major economies such as the United States, European Union, China, and Korea. The United States identifies critical minerals essential for economic and national security through legislative measures like the 2020 Energy Act and has implemented strategies to strengthen North American supply chain resilience. The European Union has updated its critical raw materials list every three years since 2008 and enacted the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024 to expand production capacity and enhance international cooperation. China, despite lacking a clear legal definition of critical minerals, strengthens its resource management through export controls and cooperation with resource-rich countries. Korea designated 33 minerals as critical through its 2023 Critical Minerals Securing Strategy, prioritizing 10 strategic minerals essential for industries like electric vehicles and semiconductors. However, Korea’s reliance on imports for most critical minerals highlights its vulnerability.

The study conducts a vulnerability analysis of Korea’s critical mineral supply chains using indicators such as the Trade Specialization Index (TSI) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). It identifies high global supply chain concentration in minerals like cobalt, lithium, and neodymium, which are crucial for secondary batteries and electric vehicles. To assess geopolitical risks, it examines import trends from China across seven countries from 2017 to 2023. Sharp declines in imports of gallium, graphite, and rare earth elements suggest potential disruptions due to trade conflicts or export controls.

The study employs a Dual-Stage Attention-Based Recurrent Neural Network (DA-RNN) model to predict the impact of critical mineral fragmentation on Korea’s exports of key items like batteries and semiconductors under three scenarios involving germanium, graphite, and rare earth elements. The results show significant decreases in export values across all scenarios. For example, restrictions on germanium imports led to a 3.9% decline in battery exports, while rare earth element shortages caused a 10.8% drop.

Using the OECD METRO model, the study evaluates the macroeconomic impact of critical mineral fragmentation under two approaches: direct analysis of import disruptions (Approach 1) and integration of microeconomic results into macroeconomic simulations (Approach 2). The findings indicate that germanium fragmentation could reduce Korea’s real GDP by 0.15%, while graphite and rare earth element disruptions could lead to decreases of 0.14% and 0.89%, respectively.

Based on these findings, the study recommends strengthening supply chain monitoring systems by integrating fragmented platforms across government agencies and establishing a centralized control tower. It also suggests diversifying procurement strategies, promoting R&D for substitute materials, and supporting SMEs through digital-based supply chain management platforms. Additionally, it emphasizes harmonizing policies with major economies to prevent over-securitization and redundant investments while expanding international cooperation for joint mineral exploration and development projects.

Since the onset of the U.S.-China trade dispute, economic tensions between the two countries have persisted, with the Biden administration maintaining a hardline stance on China. With the recent return of the Trump administration, a large-scale tariff war is once again anticipated, making thorough analysis and policy responses increasingly critical. This study examines the impact of the tariff war triggered by the U.S.-China trade dispute on the Korean economy, and derives policy implications based on the findings.

First, the U.S. tariff increases on Chinese goods have led to a decline in Korea’s exports to the U.S. and a reduction in imports from China, thereby reshaping trade flows. However, the strengthening of U.S. non-tariff barriers has increased Korea’s exports to the U.S., particularly in consumer goods, suggesting that Korea can play a crucial role as an alternative supplier. Consequently, the Korean government and businesses must diversify their markets beyond key trading partners by expanding into emerging markets such as Southeast Asia and Latin America to mitigate trade risks. To achieve this, the government and research institutions should systematically collect and analyze data on the economic, political, legal, and consumer trends of these emerging markets and provide relevant insights to businesses.

Furthermore, to diversify its export industries, Korea must enhance its manufacturing competitiveness and foster high-value-added industries. Given the complementary nature of Korea’s exports of industrial goods to the U.S. with those of China, an increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods could potentially lead to a decline in Korea’s exports to the U.S. Therefore, Korea should diversify its export portfolio to include not only industrial goods such as semiconductors and machinery but also consumer goods, thereby mitigating the negative impact of trade disputes. To achieve this, Korea should continuously invest in research and development (R&D) to advance products and services while enhancing industrial processes through expanded investments in Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and R&D. Additionally, policies should be implemented to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by promoting technological innovation and providing tax incentives to strengthen overall industrial competitiveness.

Additionally, a systematic response to non-tariff barriers is required. Amid ongoing trade disputes and rising protectionism, non-tariff barriers have been reinforced alongside tariffs, often offsetting the effects of tariff policies. Thus, focusing solely on countering the negative effects of tariff measures may introduce unnecessary uncertainty, underscoring the need for a comprehensive response that also addresses non-tariff barriers. Accordingly, response strategies should take into account the simultaneous impact of systematic trade policies, including tariff and non-tariff measures. Moreover, a preemptive monitoring and early warning system should be established to continuously track trends in non-tariff barriers and enable swift policy responses.

Next, adjustments to foreign direct investment (FDI) strategies are necessary. Following U.S. tariff increases on Chinese goods, Korean multinational corporations (MNCs) have shown a tendency to increase their FDI in the U.S., a trend particularly evident among large enterprises. Meanwhile, although the number of subsidiaries of Korean MNCs operating in China has been declining—particularly among firms with higher import shares and heavily dependent on the global value chain—, the overall scale of FDI to China has not significantly decreased. This suggests that firms are reallocating their investments in China more efficiently. In particular, U.S. tariff measures on Chinese goods have created opportunities for Korean firms to expand their investments into third countries such as ASEAN, leading to increased FDI in this region. This trend reflects ASEAN’s advantages, including low production costs and strengthened connectivity with both the U.S. and Chinese markets, positioning it as an attractive alternative investment destination for Korean firms. Therefore, the Korean government should formulate policies to support the FDI strategies of Korean businesses while also considering measures to prevent the hollowing out of domestic industries.

Finally, ensuring flexible macroeconomic stability policies, including foreign exchange market and monetary policies, is crucial. Analyzing past U.S. trade policy shifts reveals that as U.S.-China trade conflicts intensified, trade policy uncertainty increased before tariff adjustments. This led to a depreciation of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar and heightened exchange rate volatility. The impact of trade policy uncertainty did not have a statistically significant effect on Korea’s key macroeconomic variables, as its influence on exports and imports was offset by the depreciation of the Korean won. However, U.S. tariff increases negatively affected Korea’s total production and dollar-denominated exports, partially explained by changes in the won-dollar exchange rate and price levels. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that Korea’s macroeconomic policies can respond more swiftly and flexibly. Coordination between monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies should be strengthened to maintain economic stability.

In summary, changes in U.S.-China trade policy have significantly increased trade costs between the two countries, leading to reduced trade volumes and rising import costs, with substantial structural impacts on third-country economies, including Korea. Consequently, the Korean government and businesses must develop strategies to adapt flexibly to the evolving trade environment, followed by further research and policy discussions should continue. In particular, to minimize the negative impact of the prolonged U.S.-China trade dispute on Korea’s trade environment, more sophisticated trade policies should be formulated, and measures should be implemented to support Korean firms’ FDI strategies amid growing protectionist trends.

Additionally, policy support should be strengthened to enable Korean firms to respond flexibly to the restructuring of global value chains. Furthermore, institutional improvements are needed to enhance the speed and flexibility of macroeconomic policies, allowing for effective responses to exchange rate volatility amid increasing uncertainty in U.S. trade policy. Through these measures, Korea must establish a comprehensive strategy to ensure continued economic growth and competitiveness despite the U.S.-China trade conflict and shifts in U.S. trade policy with other countries.

As Korea’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) continues to grow, so does the need for a more coherent research ecosystem to support effective policymaking. This reference study aims to inform policy discussions on the development of Korea’s international development research infrastructure by exploring the roles, functions, and contributions of leading research institutes in the field. Focusing on their institutional characteristics, operational models, and relevance to Korea’s policy environment, the study provides foundational insights for building a more strategic and integrated research system.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of research trends in Korea and abroad. In Korea, while academic research on development cooperation has declined over the past five years, policy- and project-oriented studies commissioned by ODA implementing agencies have increased significantly. This reflects growing policy demand, but also highlights several limitations: many of these studies are short-term, conducted on an ad hoc basis, narrowly focused on immediate issues, and often lack coherence, making it difficult to ensure continuity or generate long-term strategic value. The fragmented nature of Korea’s ODA system—where multiple ministries and agencies not only implement projects but also commission research independently—further hampers efforts to build a coherent knowledge base, foster collaboration, and strengthen long-term research capacity.

While Korea currently lacks a dedicated research institute for development cooperation, some leading international cases demonstrate more integrated and multifaceted approaches. Given the multidisciplinary and practice-oriented nature of development cooperation, specialized research institutions are expected to perform a range of functions that go beyond traditional knowledge production. These include policy advisory, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, knowledge dissemination, global networking, discourse shaping, and responsiveness to emerging global issues.

Chapter 3 examines ten major international research institutes engaged in development cooperation, focusing on their operational models, roles, and core functions. These institutes conduct both academic and policy-oriented research, respond to emerging and priority development issues, and actively contribute to global discourse. They also disseminate knowledge through a variety of platforms and channels.

Common thematic areas include sustainable economic and social development, climate change, peace, and governance—often approached from the perspective of global public goods. Many institutes also take the lead in advancing research on topics they have strategically prioritized, such as human security, social and economic justice, and digital transformation, while conducting country- and region-specific studies in parallel. Increasingly, they are placing emphasis on evidence-based evaluations of development effectiveness and impact.

These institutions play a key role in shaping international discourse by identifying timely research agendas and spotlighting emerging issues. Their ability to offer relevant, policy-oriented insights enhances both their strategic value and practical influence. In addition, they actively promote outreach, collaboration, and global partnerships, reflecting the inherently international and problem-solving nature of development cooperation.

From an institutional standpoint, many of these research institutes operate with flexible staffing structures and conduct multi-year research projects, often in collaboration with external experts and networks. Given the complexity and multidimensionality of development challenges, such long-term engagement—supported by sustained data collection and rigorous analysis—is essential for generating credible findings. In Korea, where government budget cycles tend to constrain multi-year research, establishing a dedicated research institute with a continuous mandate could help ensure coherence and overcome the inefficiencies of fragmented, one-off studies.

Based on this analysis, the study identifies key roles and functions for establishing a specialized research institute in Korea. These include conducting regular foundational and reference studies on critical development issues, building robust knowledge repositories, facilitating knowledge sharing and dissemination, and supporting timely policy responses to international development challenges. A dedicated institute could enhance the quality, continuity, and responsiveness of research efforts, while also strengthening Korea’s engagement in global development discourse.

In the short term, it is essential to articulate a clear vision and operational framework for such an institute, and to lay the groundwork—both in terms of institutional infrastructure and government support systems—for a continuous research ecosystem. Over the longer term, efforts should focus on building institutional capacity through stable staffing, sustainable funding, deepening expertise, and strong networks. Ultimately, the institute could serve as a national knowledge hub for development cooperation research.

Executive Summary

Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Literature Review
1.3 Data
1.4 Structure of the Report

Chapter II. Consumer Behavior in India
2.1 Consumption patterns in India
2.2 Household Financial Portfolio in India

Chapter III. Optimism and Consumer Behavior
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Estimation Strategy
3.3 Household Consumption and Saving in India in Relation to the Direction of Forecasting Error
3.4 Category 2 Consumption Expenditures Relative to Income
3.5 Food Subcategories
3.6 Saving Rate
3.7 Household Financial Portfolio
3.8 Conclusion of Chapter 3

Chapter IV. Conclusion
4.1 Summary of the Research
4.2 Discussion

References

Appendix Tables: Household consumption by region and gender

This study examines Indian household consumption and financial behaviors using data from the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS), focusing on how spending patterns and financial strategies evolve in response to economic conditions, demographic factors, and forecasting errors.

Chapter 2 analyzes household consumption patterns, revealing that food accounts for nearly half of total expenditures, emphasizing its critical role in household budgets and food security. Non-food consumption is more dynamic, with significant shifts during the COVID-19 pandemic. Spending on non-essential categories like entertainment and dining declined, while healthcare saw a modest increase. Education and healthcare remain smaller components of spending, reflecting budgetary constraints, particularly among lower-income households where post-pandemic financial pressures further limited these expenditures.

The chapter also highlights regional and demographic disparities. Rural households allocate a larger share of their budgets to food, reflecting subsistence needs, while urban households spend more on non-food items due to higher incomes and market access. Female-dominated households allocate slightly more to health and education, suggesting a prioritization of family welfare and human capital investment influenced by socio-cultural factors. These findings underscore the need for targeted policies to address disparities in essential spending areas like health and education.

Chapter 3 explores how forecasting errors—discrepancies between expected and actual financial outcomes—shape household financial decisions, including consumption, savings, and borrowing. Households with optimistic errors increase non-food consumption while reducing savings, particularly in liquid assets like fixed deposits, favoring immediate consumption. Conversely, pessimistic households reduce spending on non-essential services while increasing savings across all asset types as a precaution against economic uncertainty.

Urban households with optimistic errors show stronger tendencies to reduce formal savings and increase spending on food and services. Rural households with pessimistic errors prioritize informal savings mechanisms but reduce food expenditure more significantly. Post-COVID trends reveal that pessimistic households intensified precautionary savings across all asset types while reducing debt exposure, reflecting heightened economic caution.

Borrowing behavior also varies with forecasting errors. Optimistic households favor informal borrowing channels like shop-based credit, especially among low-income groups with limited access to formal financial institutions. Pessimistic households broadly reduce debt exposure across both formal and informal sources, with this effect being more pronounced in rural areas. Post-COVID analysis shows that the cautious approach tied to pessimistic errors has intensified, while the impact of optimistic errors on borrowing has diminished. Overall, this study highlights how Indian households adapt their financial strategies based on economic conditions and sentiment-driven forecasting errors. It underscores significant regional and demographic variations in these behaviors, emphasizing the need for targeted policy interventions to promote balanced growth in essential areas like health and education while enhancing financial resilience across household segments. These insights are critical for designing policies that address disparities and foster stability in the face of economic uncertainty.

Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, the country has rapidly expanded its international development cooperation efforts. Today, Korea ranks 15th among the 31 DAC member countries in terms of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on evaluating the outcomes of these aid initiatives and identifying ways to enhance their effectiveness. The government is actively exploring strategies to improve ODA performance, with a particular focus on project packaging, large- scale project development, and branding.

In parallel with this budgetary expansion and the drive for increased effectiveness, building a knowledge ecosystem for international development cooperation has become a central priority for all stakeholders involved. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), development consulting firms, academic associations, and research institutes all play vital roles in this process to ensure greater impact. Facilitating smooth interaction between these stakeholders is crucial for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international development cooperation efforts. Furthermore, managing the supply and demand for professional human resources is key to strengthening the knowledge ecosystem. Policymakers should focus on how to train and effectively deploy entry-level professionals in this field.

The primary aim of this study is to identify the policy measures needed to train and utilize entry-level professionals, a critical factor for more efficient and effective implementation of international development cooperation in Korea, where the knowledge ecosystem is still in its early stages. In addition to a comprehensive literature review, the study employs two other research methodologies. First, a survey was conducted among graduates and current students of graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) at selected universities. The aim was to gather practical insights into the current state of education and training for entry-level professionals, thus yielding policy recommendations. Second, case studies were carried out in Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom to identify lessons that could be applied to Korea’s context.

The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the research identified several key challenges in the operation of the knowledge ecosystem, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of professional human resources. On the supply side, three primary obstacles were identified: (ⅰ) the lack of an integrated curriculum that balances both field knowledge and practical experience; (ⅱ) insufficient synergy between regional expertise education and courses related to international development cooperation; and (ⅲ) the underperformance of the qualification system for professionals in this field. On the demand side, two factors hinder the effective functioning of the ecosystem: (ⅰ) the lack of competitiveness among private consulting firms capable of executing ODA projects efficiently and effectively; and (ⅱ) the absence of a robust support system for job placement and career development for professionals.

Based on these findings, the study offers three key policy recommendations. First, it is recommended that the government reorganize the national education system for training professional human resources and play a more active role in this process. While the government has concentrated on quantitative expansion of the ODA budget since joining the OECD DAC, it is now essential to prioritize quality assurance by assessing how effectively and efficiently the budget is being utilized. A critical aspect of this process is improving the quality of professionals involved in international development cooperation, which aligns with the main objective of this study. To achieve this, we recommend that the government review existing human resource training programs, with a focus on supporting select graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) that provide foundational education for professionals. By enhancing the quality of their programs and expanding their reach, the government can significantly improve overall training standards. Additionally, programs run by public institutions like KOICA should be expanded and strengthened through increased budgets and synergies with GSIS programs. In the medium to long term, the study suggests considering the establishment of a “National Graduate School for International Development Cooperation” (tentative name), where the government would take a more direct role in training professional human resources.

Second, to ensure more efficient and effective use of the national budget, we recommend the creation of a demand base for professional human resources by increasing the participation of private consulting firms. Although this sector is still in its infancy, involving more private consulting firms is essential for expanding the demand for qualified professionals. Development consulting is a high-value knowledge industry, and greater participation from private firms will facilitate the accumulation of valuable knowledge and experience. This, in turn, can benefit Korea’s international development cooperation efforts and foster opportunities for collaboration on larger-scale ODA projects led by international organizations such as the World Bank and ADB.

Third, while the first two recommendations focus on the supply and demand sides of professional human resources, it is equally important to ensure smooth matching between the two to maximize the efficiency of job support and employment services. Our recommendation is to establish an integrated platform to manage professional human resources in international development cooperation. This platform should act as a two-way mechanism, facilitating job matching and capacity building for both early-career and mid-level professionals, ensuring more efficient alignment between the supply of trained professionals and the demand for their skills.

This study investigates the consideration of unintended effects within South Korea’s burgeoning Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs. Despite Korea’s growing role as an emerging donor, research on the unintended consequences of its aid interventions remains limited. This analysis addresses this gap by examining how key Korean ODA implementing agencies, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) and the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH), address unintended consequences in their evaluation reports.

Employing a mixed-methods approach – literature review, text analysis, and qualitative content analysis – the study explores the extent to which these agencies analyze and report on unintended effects in evaluations conducted over the past decade. Text analysis of agency reports (extracted from KOICA, KEXIM and KOFIH websites) identifies the frequency and nature of unintended effects discussed, utilizing software (CAQDAS) and keyword searches (“unintended,” “unplanned,” etc.). Thematic analysis then categorizes identified effects based on established typologies(Koch 2024; Jabeen 2018).

Findings reveal that Korea’s major aid agencies analyzed unintended effects in approximately 8% of evaluations, with KOICA featuring a balanced view of both positive and negative effects, while KEXIM and KOFIH focused predominantly on positive effects. The most frequently observed positive unintended effect was the spill-over effects, spread of benefits to non-beneficiary groups and area, fostering community solidarity, economic gains, and empowerment for women. A microcredit program targeting women for increased household income inadvertently led to partners’ awareness of women’s economic and social capacity, leading to enhanced understanding of human rights. Additionally, a cross-sectoral effect was observed in a school feeding program, where children’s educational outcomes improved as a result of better nutrition.

In contrast, negative unintended effects, such as elite capture and regressive targeting—wherein benefits unintentionally excluded vulnerable populations—highlighted gaps in project design and stakeholder engagement. Notably, rural development programs like the Samaeul initiative were found to unintentionally benefit wealthier farmers, excluding poorer ones (regressive targeting, Koch, 2024). Similarly, vocational training for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-conflict settings risked unintended discrimination within IDP communities, potentially undermining social cohesion. In microcredit program targeting former refugee villagers provided loans for agricultural activity, unintentionally marginalizing female-led/elderly-led household as they tend to have insufficient labor to increase agricultural productivity.

Conversely, macro-level effects like anti-aid sentiments, governance issues, and environmental impacts were rarely mentioned. These findings may be attributed to factors like East Asian cultural tendencies that discourage open discussions about failure, the relatively recent and smaller scale of Korean interventions, and the absence of a colonial past unlike traditional donors.

Additional semi-structured interviews with domestic and international evaluation experts, reaffirmed the study’s conclusions and contributed to refining its recommendations. The analysis underscores the importance of developing more complexity theory and systems thinking based Theory of Changes that could help predict and indentify not only intended but also potential unintended consequences of the evaluated intervention. Strategies include assessing risks and designing safeguards for negative unintended effects during project planning, fostering mechanisms to enhance positive spillover, and strengthening human rights and gender considerations. In performance management, recommendations emphasize monitoring not only outputs and outcomes but also underlying assumptions and risks, and refining ToRs to mandate or recommend UIE evaluation where relevant. Additionally, evaluators could adopt open-ended, exploratory interview technique and evaluation methods like outcome harvesting, and participatory narrative inquiry (PNI) which are arguably better suited to identify the unintended effects in development interventions.

The study suggests institutional measures to conduct more strategic evaluations with long-term perspectives. Establishing a culture that distinguishes evaluation from auditing is also recommended as a precondition for further discussion and evaluation of unintended effects of international development cooperation as donor agencies are reluctant to openly discuss the unintended effects of their intervention, which are often perceived as negative results of mismanagement of taxpayer’s money.

This study marks the first in-depth examination of unintended effects in Korean ODA evaluations. By comparing practices across donor countries and defining unintended effects in the Korean context, the study provides critical insights for enhancing developmental effectiveness, helping policymakers, evaluation managers, and researchers consider new, often-overlooked aspects of development cooperation. Importantly, this research underlines the need to address both planned and unintended effects in Korea’s ODA, setting a foundation for resilient, inclusive, and sustainable aid interventions.

Infrastructure is an important area for expanding Korea- India cooperation. With the Indian government continuing to expand its investment in infrastructure, India’s market potential is high. Infrastructure development is an important factor in supporting Korean companies as a partner to foster India’s manufacturing industries, which is what India needs most at the moment. Moreover, the participation of Korea in infrastructure projects is an effective way to enhance its national image in India. As the Korean government is expected to make a bilateral EDCF framework agreement with India, this study aims to contribute to expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation, especially with a focus on EDCF.

Chapter 2 analyses the infrastructure development plans of the Indian government. The Indian government recognises infrastructure as a key driver of economic growth and is promoting a comprehensive infrastructure policy centred on the National Industrial Corridor Development Programme. Infrastructure development in India is important for promoting the growth of manufacturing, securing national connectivity, stabilising water resources, and diversifying energy sources, ultimately leading to an improvement in national income and a reduction in income inequality.

The third Modi adminstration maintains policy continuity by allocating 11 trillion rupees, equivalent to 3.4% of GDP, to the infrastructure sector in the 2024/25 budget. The Indian government is actively promoting private and foreign investment through a trinity structure consisting of PM Gati Shakti, the National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP), and the National Monetisation Plan (NMP). This is evident in the state-level infrastructure development plans, with roads, railways, ports, energy transition, power supply, and water resources/management at the core of their development plans.

In Chapter 3, the current activities and plans (demand) for infrastructure development in India are analysed on a project basis. As of July 2024, a total of 14,923 investment projects are underway, with 10,357 projects in major infrastructure sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, electricity, industrial complex public infrastructure, and water resources. By sector, the largest number of projects, 5,560, are concentrated in the transportation sector, followed by 3,110 in the water sector, 1,117 in the power sector, and 531 projects in the industrial complex.

In India, there are currently about 1,000 major infrastructure projects in the planning stage. Uttar Pradesh has many projects in the railway sector, while Maharashtra is planning projects centered in railway and logistics infrastructure, and water and environmental management. Gujarat is now focusing on water and environmental management. In West Bengal, 149 projects are in the planning stage for the road sector alone, and there are many plans in the railway, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water and environmental management sectors. Rajasthan is focusing upon railway and power projects, and Haryana has many railway projects. In Tamil Nadu, there are projects planned, especially in the aviation, urban public transport, power generation, industrial complex, and water management sectors. In Andhra Pradesh, many projects are planned in the sectors of roads, railways, urban public transport, industrial complexes, and water resources. Karnataka has major projects in the sectors of roads and water resources management.

Chapter 4 analyses the ODA strategies and cases of Japan, Germany, France, and EU for infrastructure in India. They have established ODA strategies focusing upon the infrastructure sector. More than 90% of their ODA are concessional loans. They prioritise untied loans, but also adopt tied loans. For example, Japan is providing tied loans in railways. These countries focus their support on areas that align with their own ODA strategies. Japan takes programme-oriented approaches rather than participates in individual projects, while Germany and France tend to focus on individual projects through ODA policies that are segmented by field.

Institutional and policy cooperation is an important part of infrastructure ODA. For example, Japan is working with the union and state governments of India to supplement the overall systems and policies. It also work closely with their own companies in infrastructure development projects to identify challenges in the project, collect opinions, and design the project so that its own companies can benefit. A common problem in infrastructure ODA projects in India are the delay of the project period.

Chapter 5 identifies the potential for Korean companies in India through surveys and interviews. Korean companies have shown strong performance in industrial facilities such as thermal power plants, oil refineries, and chemical plants. They positively evaluate India’s high growth potential and show strong potential for high-value projects such as high-speed railways, sea bridges, and port development, etc. Korean companies cited India’s complex administrative procedures and strong competition as major constraints. They are keenly aware of the need to mitigate administrative risks and secure financing in India.

Chapter 6 presents policy recommendations for expanding Korea-India infrastructure cooperation. As a latecomer in development cooperation with India, Korea’s ODA for India’s infrastructure needs to be carried out in consideration of India’s strategic importance as a market as well as production base. In particular, the EDCF should be prioritised to promote Korea’s investment in India. However, rather than pursuing infrastructure projects in India from the perspective of short-term profits, Korea should make diverse project portfolios that meets the needs of India so that build a relationship of trust between the two countries.

When identifying infrastructure projects in India, it is necessary to find some states to cooperate with and to closely contact them. The areas that have been prominent in India’s recent infrastructure development plans are roads, railways (including metros), ports, energy conversion and power supply, and water resources/water management; they are reflected in infrastructure projects that are underway or planned. It is necessary to proactively present to India the areas where Korea has a technological advantage, centering on areas above mentioned.

In addition to the financial scale, the ‘plus’ factors such as knowledge sharing and technical cooperation are important in the ODA for India. In other words, it is necessary to discover a package project that covers consulting for development, programme loans for policy development, construction projects, technical cooperation, etc. To promote such comprehensive projects, Korean government need to combine the ODA tools of each ministry in a single project.

Korea has to enhance India’s understanding of Korea’s technological competitiveness in the infrastructure sector. It is necessary to invite India’s top-level decision makers such as the state prime minister and high-level officials to conduct workshops and field trips. In addition, partnerships should be promoted between Indian union or state-level institutions and Korean institutions in key areas, which will help understand India’s needs and secure local partners.

Efforts should be made to participate in projects from the planning stage. This will reduce the risk of the project and contribute to the discovery of projects in which the interests of both countries match. In addition, the dispatch of sector experts should be expanded to identify the development intentions of India’s state government, and to match Korean companies that have relevant technologies. In this process, these experts can play a leading role in arranging meetings between Indian government offcials and Korean institutions and companies.

The Korean government and related organisations’ support for companies operating in India is also needed. Government- wide cooperation is essential to discuss the demand for infrastructure cooperation between Korea and India. This is because infrastructure cooperation demand is often linked to industrial cooperation, and there are differences in the areas of authority of the two governments. Also, Relevant institutions or organisations need to systematically and continuously provide companies with information on India’s legal system, taxation, financing, etc. and train of local market experts. Korean companies are raising the need to establish local support centres, which is the idea that stress local networks that can help with possible administrative and legal issues.

This study aims to outline the direction of South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar by examining the current political and economic situation in Myanmar and reviewing the Myanmar-related policies of major countries. Myanmar, having shown hope for political transformation after political reforms in 2011 and the establishment of a civilian government in 2015, has returned to its past trajectory as the military reasserted control through a coup in 2021. The country now finds itself in a state of turmoil, with the military struggling to fully consolidate its hold on power. The current situation in Myanmar shows no clear hope for democratization.

The international community broadly condemned the Myanmar military’s coup. The United States and Europe, in particular, have imposed strong economic sanctions on Myanmar, which is now once again under military rule. Countries sensitive to democracy and human rights issues, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as ASEAN and some of its member states have also joined in these sanctions. However, the degree of participation varies according to each country’s circumstances, though they generally resort to a sanctions-based response towards Myanmar, ranging from selective to comprehensive sanctions.

In contrast, China and Russia have taken a more flexible stance on Myanmar’s military coup, displaying a more engaging approach. They have politically supported the Myanmar military, undermining UN sanctions and condemnations led by Western nations. While they advocate for a quick stabilization of Myanmar’s current political situation, they regard the coup as an internal affair and refrain from interference. Economically, they continue to expand cooperation with Myanmar. Russia, in particular, has significantly increased its military support for the Myanmar military since the coup. Thus, these two countries adopt an engagement approach, which varies from selective to comprehensive engagement based on the degree of involvement.

For South Korea, Myanmar was seen as the last “land of opportunity” in Southeast Asia following its political liberalization in 2011. Official development assistance and investments in Myanmar increased significantly. However, since the military coup in 2021, the South Korean government has suspended almost all political and economic relations with Myanmar, aside from humanitarian aid. While this cannot be considered comprehensive sanctions, it represents a fairly high level of selective sanctions. At the same time, there are various incentives to restore relations with Myanmar, such as South Korea’s ties with ASEAN, economic security considerations, supply chain issues, and investment opportunities in Myanmar. This presents a dilemma between the reality of military rule in Myanmar and the economic benefits that could be gained from the country.

Nonetheless, given the core direction of South Korea’s foreign policy, it is premature to pursue economic opportunities in Myanmar at this time. In the short term, it is unlikely that South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar will change before the 2025 elections, which will be held by the military. The question then arises: what approach should South Korea adopt depending on the political scenarios that may unfold in Myanmar after the 2025 election? If the post-election government is essentially a continuation of military rule, South Korea’s policy and stance towards Myanmar should remain unchanged in the short term. If, however, pro-democracy forces manage to take control and initiate reforms either before or after the election, South Korea’s policy could be adjusted to align more quickly with the new political landscape. Lastly, if Myanmar descends into a state of civil war or becomes a failed state, South Korea’s policy will need a complete shift, focusing primarily on refugee assistance, peacekeeping in response to the conflict, and protecting South Korean nationals in Myanmar.

South Korea’s Myanmar policy in each of these scenarios will inevitably intersect with the policies of other major countries engaged with Myanmar. Depending on the scenario, the policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to move in similar directions. Although there may be differences in pace, South Korea may find it essential to collaborate with these countries in rebuilding Myanmar should it resume a path towards democratization or in countering China’s growing influence under military rule. China and Russia may find prolonged military rule advantageous and are likely to expand their influence as much as possible. Finally, ASEAN’s approach is expected to be largely aligned with South Korea’s, allowing for potential synergy. However, ASEAN may show greater tolerance towards Myanmar’s military government, and, if military rule stabilizes over time, ASEAN may eventually recognize and cooperate with such a regime. In this context, South Korea will need a rationale to reconcile the contradiction between the “severed ROK-Myanmar relations” and “cooperation with Myanmar as a part of ROK-ASEAN cooperation.”

To address the complex challenges in international development, the role of social enterprises, particularly social ventures, is increasingly vital. These enterprises employ innovative and sustainable approaches to tackle multifaceted issues, by blending social objectives with economic gain and bridging corporate structures and nonprofit organizations. They offer effective solutions to development challenges through innovative approaches and technological integration, fostering a close collaboration with marginalized communities and local groups in developing countries. Nevertheless, activities and studies on the role of social enterprises in international development, especially in terms of individual corporate activities, remain limited due to institutional constraints and scarcity of information available. This study focuses on the features of social enterprises to illustrate their roles and contributions within the context of international development cooperation. By focusing on social ventures as the main form of social enterprise in international development, this study attempts to move beyond previous limitations and yield practical insights on facilitating the participation of social enterprises in international development, and to increase their impact.

Following an introduction of the study, Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for understanding some essential characteristics of social enterprises. Our research highlights the lack of a universal definition for social enterprises and the varying scope of these organizations across different countries. In Chapter 2, we examine discussions at the OECD and UN, along with the background and status of social enterprises in major countries.

Our review found that the countries have formed distinctive social enterprise institutions according to their macro policy background. We also discovered that they apply flexibility on the definition and scope over time. Notably, the UK, France, and Denmark, which saw the development of social enterprise institutions starting in the late 1990s, promoted social enterprise as a means to complement government welfare. Therefore, these nations emphasize the main feature of social enterprises as businesses that prioritize social value. In contrast, the development of social enterprises came into prominence in the Netherlands during the 2000s. In the Netherlands, social enterprises flourished as skilled personnel from civil society organizations entered the private sector. Unlike other countries, the Netherlands maintains a flexible perspective on determining social enterprises, foregoing any legal limitations on the forms of social enterprises. Well-known for its vibrant tradition in civil society engagement, the United States recognizes social enterprises through various legal frameworks. Flexibility is allowed in the social values pursued by each enterprise. Likewise, international organizations such as the OECD and the UN also provide flexible definitions of social enterprises. The organizations position social enterprises as key players in addressing evolving and intricate development issues.

In South Korea, institutions for social enterprises were developed during the 1990s with a strong focus on job creation. As a result, a narrower official stance toward “social enterprises” was formed, compared to the other countries discussed in this chapter. In a broader perspective, other forms of social enterprises also exist in Korea, such as self-supporting enterprises, cooperatives, village enterprises, and social ventures. This study focuses particularly on social ventures, which are defined most inclusively and have the institutional capacity to engage in international activities.

Chapter 3 compares and analyzes approaches and support programs in the UK, Netherlands, and the United States. These countries actively promote private sector participation in international development. For example, the UK has been supporting social enterprises since the 2000s, mainly through capacity-building. Since 2015, there is a shift towards indirect impact investment – through development finance institution, from direct capacity support.

The Netherlands has traditionally underscored the pursuit of national interests by encouraging private sector participation in international development. It is currently pursuing social value by requiring corporate social responsibility in all business-engaged international development activities. In addition to technical support (consulting, networking), the Netherlands also provides financial support, often employing indirect support for local companies in developing countries through development finance institutions.

The United States maintains robust private sector involvement in international development. The U.S. promotes the participation of socially innovative enterprises in line with USAID’s Private Sector Engagement (PSE) policy. Enterprises are supported through financial aid, advisory support, networking, and research collaboration. The U.S. distinguishes itself from other donors by providing direct funding to social ventures through development finance institutions (DFIs), therefore, leveraging additional private investment.

In contrast, Korea ‘s support programs for social ventures remain at a nascent stage. KOICA’s Creative Technology Solution (CTS) supports the initial business development of startups and ventures with innovative technology. Under the KOICA Innovative Business Solutions (IBS) project, there have been co-financing with domestic social impact investors to discover, nurture, and support local startups in developing countries.

The following chapter provides a review of Korean social ventures, including those participating in KOICA’s CTS program, as well as case studies of companies active in international development cooperation. Findings indicate that most KOICA CTS participants are registered as ventures, not as social ventures or (preliminary) social enterprises. They are predominantly classified as impact ventures or conventional ventures with some commitment to social value. On the other hand, companies interviewed for the case study identified themselves as social ventures, highlighting a gap between institutional classification and self-perception.

Examples of social ventures engaged in international development cooperation include Enuma Korea (education), Vuno (healthcare), Wiplet (water), Cornerstone T&M, Greengoods (rural development), Verywords, Envelops, and Pharos Marine (technology, environment, energy). These enterprises were initiated or adapted their business goals to prioritize social value creation in developing countries. Many leverage innovative technologies or mature business models to establish profitable structures, while utilizing public support to enhance their business model and to secure investments. In addition, many of them work closely with local stakeholders, ranging from the government to NGOs and community residents.

Lastly, Chapter 5 analyzes and presents the findings to identify key constraints in stimulating social venture participation in international development cooperation: (1) the gap between institutional frameworks and on-the-ground realities, (2) the lack of opportunities, and (3) the scarcity of entrepreneurs in development cooperation. To address these challenges we suggest a revision of policies related to social enterprises. In Korea, the Social Enterprise Promotion Act, enacted in 2007, has remained largely unchanged, failing to adequately reflect today’s social challenges and corporate realities. Drawing on the UN’s experience of amending social enterprise roles to address evolving demands, as well as OECD Guidelines on social enterprise institutions, adjustments to the social enterprise framework are essential. This should include revisions in the certification system and an expanded scope for social enterprises to reflect contemporary challenges, such as aging population, inequality, and environmental issues. Furthermore, it is imperative to enhance the efficacy of the institutional framework by providing tangible benefits to businesses. Many companies participating in the KOICA CTS are registered under the venture enterprise system, which offers substantial benefits such as tax exemption, low interest rate loans, R&D support, and so on. This stems from how registration as social or social venture enterprises provides no tangible benefits to these businesses, which in turn highlights the need for incentives within the social enterprise framework, as seen in the U.S., which provides practical incentives to enterprises with social missions.

Secondly, there is a need to expand programs that potential entrepreneurs can access. This will lead to fostering social enterprises involved in international development cooperation as well as revitalizing the private sector ecosystem in international development. Taking on from the lessons learned, current programs such as the KOICA CTS and IBS can play an even more pivotal role in attracting and fostering potential entrepreneurs in international development. In the long-term, it would be beneficial to explore impact investment for enterprises tackling development issues through development finance institutions, as in the cases of the UK, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Lastly, there is a need to cultivate entrepreneurs who possess a strong understanding of and interest in international development. The social ventures reviewed in this study can be broadly categorized into two types: those that focus on developing innovative solutions aimed primarily at developing countries ("social purpose-driven" ventures) and those that aim to apply innovative solutions to the local challenges in developing countries through entrepreneurial spirit (“innovation-driven" ventures). Strengthening the developmental impact of innovation-driven enterprises while enhancing the business models of social purpose-driven enterprises will improve the sustainability of their solutions and operations. The Dutch example could serve as a useful reference in reinforcing development objectives within existing programs. At the same time, it is also crucial to identify and nurture potential entrepreneurs who are willing to modify their business activities to fit developing countries.

This study aimed to gain comprehensive understanding of the form and characteristics of social enterprises in Korea to increase their participation in international development. The study seeks to assess the effectiveness of support programs and identify challenges from the perspective of the businesses. Furthermore, as a policy study, it compares Korea’s social enterprise systems and programs with those in other countries to identify areas for improvement. This research provides an overview of social enterprise development in international organizations, various countries, and Korea. It also documents the experiences of companies involved in these activities. Subsequent policy researches are expected to bridge the gap between policy and business activities. We also hope that the business cases analyzed in the report will serve as valuable references for increased participation of social entrepreneurs in international development cooperation.

India is a digital market with huge potential and influence. India is actively building a data governance system; Of all the digital policies currently in place or being established in India, about 25% (53 policies) are related to data governance. Against this backgroud, we study the data governance policies and regulations in India, as well as the cooperation between India and major countries, and cases of companies.

Chapter 2 analyses India’s top-level data policy framework that forms the foundation of the data economy and the data regulations that govern its implementation. India is considering a long-term, comprehensive data governance framework such as the ‘National Data Governance Policy (draft)’. It is also building a government-led data accumulation and utilisation system, India Stack. The establishment of a government-led data ecosystem is a key feature of India's digital transformation policy and has the potential to spread as an alternative to other latecomers to digital transformation.

India's data regulations are in line with global standards while seeking its own path. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 is business-friendly and avoids excessive restrictions. It is characterised by the introduction of a negative approach that allows cross-border data transfer in principle. However, sector-specific data localisation regulations are applied, and there are some parts that need to be specified in application. The Non-Personal Data Governance Framework (draft) announced in 2020 expresses the government's intention to create data platforms and data marketplaces, but further discussions are needed regarding the possibility of excessive restrictions. The Digital India Act (draft, 2023) is a comprehensive legal framework that responds to the rapid growth of new technologies and large technology companies represented by platforms. Through this, the regulatory environment for large technology companies in India will be newly established. It is likely that data regulations will be introduced for new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as transparency standards for data processing based on types of platforms.

In Chapter 3, we analysed the aspects of data governance in India expressed through digital trade policy. India has maintained a protectionist stance on data openness in WTO negotiations and bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and the EU. The US government has been raising the issue of data barriers with India, but given India's strategic importance, it is unlikely that the US government will exert bilateral trade pressure. However, it is likely that US companies will continue to raise issues and exert influence on India's data policy.

The EU and India are placing more emphasis on discussions about data governance in general rather than regulations, and it is expected that bilateral discussions will focus on areas where the interests of the two sides, such as artificial intelligence, coincide. It is noteworthy that the EU is responding to India's initiative to spread digital public infrastructure(DPI).

It is unlikely that Australia will be able to implement the liberalisation of cross-border data transfer and the restriction of data localisation measures in the CECA negotiations with India. However, Australia has been able to induce India to open up in the AI-ECTA service trade and financial services negotiations. Australia seeks to expand digital trade and data trasnfer with India and pursue institutional compatibility under the framework of strategic cooperation such as the QUAD.

Despite India's high economic dependence on China, it is likely to remain wary of China in the digital sector. In particular, Chinese companies’ investments in areas directly related to data security are expected to be treated with great sensitivity.

India is presenting Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a key agenda at major international forums such as the G20 and the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly (WTSA-24), as well as multilateral forums such as QUAD, and is stepping up its efforts to make its DPI model an international standard. This is believed to be an attempt to expand India’s influence in the process of building digital infrastructure, especially in global south.

Chapter 4 synthesises the above research and presents policy implications. First, it is necessary to respond to the issues that may arise in the process of introducing data norms in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) provides separate regulatory grounds for large-scale data processing companies and does not clearly state the legal basis for data processing, which may cause uncertainty in corporate activities. The Korean government needs to pay attention to the list of countries that the Indian government plans to announce as data transfer restriction countries. The Digital India Act (draft) currently under discussion is expected to have a major impact on corporate activities by strengthening the transparency of data processing, with platform companies as the main target.

Second, we can consider indirect measures to make the activities of data-related companies freer through negotiations with India. Like AI-ECTA, efforts should be made to increase the level of openness of computer and related services, engineering and integrated engineering services, provision and transfer of financial information, and software provided by financial data processing. If the data related articles are included, it is possible to include a temporary clause as an intermediate step in the liberalisation of data transfer and data localisation, and to review it after the establishment of the India’s data system. Meanwhile, Korea needs to pay attention to strengthening cooperation between like-minded countries. Korea is already participating in the Korea-US- India iCET, and it is necessary to actively respond to the QUAD countries’ agenda for cybersecurity and DPI cooperation.

Third, digital cooperation with India requires the building of trust capital, and key area is DPI. India's DPI is a government-led model with no precedent, and is likely to attract the attention of developing countries. It is necessary for Korea to consider responding to the DPI cooperation agenda in the G20, ITU, UNDP, and QUAD. Korea should also pay attention to cooperation for the development, interoperability, and inclusiveness of DPI in developing countries. It would also be possible for Korea to cooperate with India in projects such as capacity building and expert exchanges for developing countries.

Fourth, Korea should seek cooperation in the digitalisation of the public sector in India using ODA. It is believed that cooperation can be found in tasks such as standardising data management, data security, building data platforms, and expanding public data accessibility, etc. In particular, the digitalisation of government services in the process of urban development in India is a field with high potential for cooperation.

Fifth, it is necessary to establish continuous bilateral contact platforms so that Korean and Indian policy makers can share the changing aspects of data governance. It is necessary to set current issues such as data and DPI as an ongoing agenda in channels such as the ministerial-level industrial cooperation committee between the two countries, which is scheduled to be established, and the established Korea-India Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Council. Going further, the two countries could consider forming partnerships between relevant ministries and operating regular forums to exchange issues related to data governance. In addition, the difficulties faced by Korean companies entering India should be actively communicated through the Korea-India government-to-government dialogue channels, such as the Korea-India Fast Track Mechanism, Invest India, etc. Cooperation with a third country can also be promoted. Rather than the United States, which already has its own influence in India, cooperation with Japan may be more effective.