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  • 카타르의 지속가능한 성장 기반 구축 전략과 협력 시사점
    Sustainable Growth Strategy of Qatar and Implications for Cooperation

    As a small state surrounded by great powers such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, Qatar has historically had little influence within its region. Until 1971, Qatar was considered an emirate along with the other emirates, which forme..

    unsu Kang et al. Date 2022.10.31

    경제성장, Economic cooperation

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    As a small state surrounded by great powers such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, Qatar has historically had little influence within its region. Until 1971, Qatar was considered an emirate along with the other emirates, which formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following its independence from the United Kingdom in 1971, Qatar did not demonstrate much diplomatic power, but Saudi Arabia exerted a strong influence on Qatar. Since the enthronement of King Hamad in 1995, Qatar has changed its diplomatic route. Aside from rapid economic growth, King Hamad pursued a policy of expanding its external influence through internal reform, neutral intermediaries, and pragmatic diplomacy. Specifically, Qatar has formed defense agreements with Western countries such as the U.S., UK, and France, as well as providing land to the U.S. for military purposes. Qatar not only maintains a friendly relationship with pro-Western nations, it also maintains close ties with anti-Western groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The broadcasting of Al Jazeera and the hosting of large events (e.g., the 2022 Qatar World Cup) are other ways in which Qatar strengthens its position within the Arab world. As a result, Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain broke their diplomatic ties with Qatar in 2017 and implemented a blockade on the country. Following this, the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, restored diplomatic relations with Qatar in 2021. As a result, Qatar has emerged as a mediating country expanding its influence, seen for instance in the mediation process of the U.S.-Afghanistan conflict.

    Natural gas exports have contributed to Qatar’s economic growth. With natural gas accounting for 80% of Qatar’s export value, the country is vulnerable to changes in international conditions such as low energy prices. In terms of total gas reserves, Qatar ranks third in the world, and in terms of production volume, it ranks fifth. After Australia, Qatar holds the second largest share of the global natural gas market. In light of Qatar’s high dependence on energy, its GDP has declined since 2013 due to low energy prices. While global energy prices have spiked following the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU, which is highly dependent on Russian gas, has begun to diversify its sources of import. As a result, Qatar is receiving attention from the European Union and Asian countries.

    Korea is Qatar’s top trading partner after Japan, India, and China. In addition, Qatar exports 16.6% of its natural gas volume to Korea. Korea and Qatar have worked to diversify their bilateral economic relationship since 2007, with the two countries holding high-level talks and agreeing to cooperate in the construction, energy, trade, investment, science and technology, health, defense, and education sectors. However, these efforts have not produced any notable developments to date, except in the energy sector. This study aims to propose bilateral cooperation strategies between the two countries beyond the area of natural resource trade.

    The second chapter examines the internal and external environment as well as the national development strategy of Qatar. Several initiatives have been launched by the Qatari government to advance a sustainable society by reducing carbon emissions and responding to the effects of climate change. Among these initiatives are the Education City, the Al Jazeera broadcast, and the Science and Technology Park. Qatar also benefits from a favorable environment due to the high demand for natural resources from abroad. Due to this situation, Qatar has announced plans to diversify its economy and become a more sustainable society. To overcome its economic vulnerabilities and drive green transition, Qatar announced its Vision 2030 and National Development Plan 2018-22, focusing on economic diversity, environmental sustainability, human development, and social inclusion. Qatar has also launched a Smart City, e-Government, and the Smart Qatar program (e.g., Hukoomi) incorporating digital technology. As part of its efforts to diversify its economic structure, the Free Zone Authority was established and investment regulations were relaxed in order to attract foreign investors.

    The bilateral relationship between Korea and Qatar has been described in Chapter 3, along with the demand for sector-specific cooperation. As part of our study, we selected five sectors, which include energy, digital technologies, food and water security, education, and health. In order to achieve an energy mix and industrial diversification, Qatar is developing the petrochemical sector and solar energy. Qatar strives to digitalize the public sector by integrating digital technology into all government sectors. Despite Qatar’s stable position in terms of food security, climate change may raise food and water security issues. Qatar does not perform well in the natural resource and resilience index despite its high food security index, compared to other developed countries, because of the extreme weather conditions. The Qatari government has therefore invested in adopting smart farms and reusing wastewater in agriculture as a result. There is a high demand in the education and health sectors for high-level education, science and technology, human resource development, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals.

    In Chapter 4, we identify potential areas of cooperation between Korea and Qatar. Our analysis in previous chapters indicates that solar power, desalination, smart farming, education with digital technology, and health services could be areas of potential cooperation between the two countries. It may also be possible to encourage the private sector to participate and cooperate between two countries by holding regular high-level meetings.

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  • CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY AS A DEVELOPED COUN..
    CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY AS A DEVELOPED COUNTRY

    Despite the fact that China and the United States represent the G2 in terms of economic size, the RMB’s international significance in the existing international financial system is limited. China has made significant progress in ..

    Alexander Downer et al. Date 2022.09.30

    International politics

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    Despite the fact that China and the United States represent the G2 in terms of economic size, the RMB’s international significance in the existing international financial system is limited. China has made significant progress in encouraging RMB internationalization. It has the ability to disrupt the global financial system, dominated by the US dollar. In order to seize chances under such circumstance, Korea must find a new direction for the internationalization of Korean Won.

    This collective volume has seven independent papers that investigate the current and future status of the RMB internationalization and its impacts and implications on Korean economy. The summarizations of each paper are as follows: Chapter One explains the background and motivation of this collective volume. Also, it describes the current status of the Korean Won Internationalization. Chapter Two provides detailed descriptions of the current status of RMB internationalization and its future prospects. Chapter Three examines the performance of Shanghai and Seoul RMB-KRW direct foreign exchange markets and figures that such direct FX markets have not been fully developed yet. However, such markets are expected to become more efficient gradually. Chapter Four finds that in the gradual evolution of the RMB internationalization, the KRW is becoming more synchronized with the Chinese yuan. Chapter Five explores the factors for coupling between the RMB and the KRW. Not only trade and finance channels but also policy implementations are important. Chapter Six develops the index for the KRW internationalization in light of the RMB internationalization. This chapter finds that the RMB internationalization may hinder the KRW internationalization. If the Korean government continues to delay the KRW internationalization, the benefit from the currency internationalization will become smaller. In that regard, Chapter Seven emphasizes that at this moment, it is very meaningful to re-examine the long-term strategy for Korea’s won internationalization. 

    The internationalization of the Korean won provides a new opportunity for the country’s financial development, rather than a disruption to the current global financial system. In the process of the internationalization of RMB and KRW, China and Korea should further strengthen bilateral financial and economic cooperation to push forward the process of RMB and KRW internationalization. Because the RMB or the KRW each have such a small proportion of the global monetary system, it is premature to be concerned about competition. Cooperation should take priority. The key policy suggestions for cooperation between these two currency internationalizations could at the very least include: (1) increasing the bilateral currency swap lines (BSLs) and making them more effective; (2) encouraging more usage of RMB and KRW in bilateral trade and direct investment; (3) encouraging more Chinese investors to hold KRW denominated assets and so does the other party; (4) accelerating the development of offshore RMB market in Seoul while having increasingly important offshore KRW market in China; (5) strengthening the coordination and cooperation in exchange rate policies.
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  • 글로벌 기후금융의 현황과 발전방향: 녹색채권을 중심으로
    Current Development and the Future of Global Climate Finance: Focusing on Green Bonds

    The mitigation and adaptation of climate change require large-scale investment in green projects. Green bonds, which are liquid financial instruments used to finance climate mitigation, adaptation, and green projects, have shown r..

    Jiyoun An et al. Date 2022.06.30

    Capital market, Environmental policy

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    The mitigation and adaptation of climate change require large-scale investment in green projects. Green bonds, which are liquid financial instruments used to finance climate mitigation, adaptation, and green projects, have shown rapid growth in issuance in recent years. Besides financing for climate change, green bonds help ESG management by enhancing the issuer’s reputation for eco-friendly activities. Further, they may create, namely, greenium to reduce the cost of financing.

    In 2007, green bonds were first issued by multilateral development banks such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank. The global issuance volume of green bonds soared from about $800 million in 2007 to $320 billion in 2020, and the total cumulative volume reached $1.5 trillion by October 2021. In 70 countries, sovereign institutions and private companies issued green bonds. The issuance by private companies accounted for 77.9% of the total number of issuance and 63.9% of the total amount. Financial companies accounted for 46.0% of private issuances, higher than non-financial companies, 31.9%. In 40 countries, the public sector, such as the central and local governments, public corporations, and public institutions, issued green bonds, accounting for 25.6% of the total issuance volume. Although developed regions such as Europe and the United States and international organizations have been leading their issuance, it is notable that emerging countries such as China are fast increasing the issuance recently. Since a Korean institution first issued green bonds overseas in 2013, by October 2021, the total stock of green bonds issued at home and abroad by Korea’s public institutions or private companies reached 43.5 billion dollars. In particular, the issuance of green bonds in 2021 increased explosively, approximately ten times more than in the previous year.

    Green bonds need a regulatory system defined as the institutional framework regarding the requirements for being a green bond and the means of verifying the requirements and of penalizing for their violation. The International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) and the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) presented the Green Bond Principles as the basis for the green bond regulatory framework. These principles aim to strengthen the credibility of green bonds, expand financial support for carbon reduction and responses to climate change, reduce the risk of greenwashing, and set up standards for certification of climate bonds. The Green Bond Principles outline the four core components of green bonds: use of proceeds, the process for evaluation and selection for projects, management of proceeds, and ex-post reporting. Countries specify their green bond guidelines based on these principles, and issuers of green bonds introduce a green bond management regime consistent with these principles.

    As a result of statistical analysis on the determinants of the issuance size of green bonds in a country, it is found that the higher the readiness for climate change and the higher the vulnerability to climate change, the greater the issuance of green bonds. However, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between the size of greenhouse gas emissions and the issuance of green bonds. Among macroeconomic variables, the income level, the sovereign credit rating, and the level of financial market development are positively associated with the size of green bonds issuance at a significant level.

    Based on the considerations of the recent green bond issuance trend, the development of the regulatory system, and the determinants of the growth of the green bond market, this study suggests policies to nurture the green bond market in Korea: 

    First, upgrading the domestic regulatory system for green bonds is necessary. The regulatory system in first-mover countries is changing its emphasis from self-regulation and ex-ante procedure-centered regulation to binding legal regulation and ex-post performance and impact regulation. While updating the green bond regulatory system, Korea needs to closely analyze the EU regulatory system and make its system closer to the EU one. Second, it is necessary to induce the growth of credible and competent external review institutions, which are crucial to the credibility of green bonds and the market’s growth. To this end, the government can consider introducing a certification system of external review institutions until the market’s self-regulation works effectively. Third, the government needs to issue sovereign green bonds, which may help build best practices for issuing and managing green bonds in Korea. Finally, it is necessary to expand the base of green bond issuers by inducing more companies, such as mid-sized companies, to issue green bonds. To this end, the government needs to consider temporarily subsidizing the incidental costs associated with the issuance of green bonds, such as external review costs.
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  • 인도의 對아프리카 협력 현황 및 정책적 시사점
    Implications of India’s Africa Policy for Korea

       As Africa rises in both economic and demographic terms, India, as the largest country of import after China, is becoming one of Africa’s core partner countries. The size and share of Africa’s import from India has g..

    Hyoungmin Han and Yejin Kim Date 2022.05.27

    Economic development, Economic cooperation India and South Asia

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       As Africa rises in both economic and demographic terms, India, as the largest country of import after China, is becoming one of Africa’s core partner countries. The size and share of Africa’s import from India has grown from $18.7 billion (3.7%) in 2010 to $30.2 billion (5.4%) in 2019. While Korea is also regarded as Africa’s emerging partner, import from Korea has dwindled during the same period, from 8th largest to 17th. In terms of export value, it has decreased from $16.8 billion to $10 billion. This book examines India’s strategy and policy towards Africa with regards to the deepening cooperation between India and Africa. It seeks to derive policy implications for future cooperation between Korea and Africa by analyzing India’s current trade with Africa and her strategies through quantitative tools and case studies. 
       While the Asia-Pacific, Europe, North America and the Middle East are the largest regions of import for Africa, India is the largest country, accounting for 9.2% of Africa’s total import in 2019. India's exports to Africa have traditionally headed towards Southeast African countries, where many countries belong to the Commonwealth, and to the islands located in the Indian Ocean. However, export trends have recently skewed towards northwestern Africa, especially Nigeria and Egypt, whereas exports to South Africa, with whom India has had strong economic relations, have decreased, resulting in the diversification of Indian exports to Africa. The composition of export items is mixed and includes high value-added products such as chemicals, machinery, and electronics as well as low value-added products such as shoes, stone materials and glass. 
       In terms of investment, India is a major investor in Africa, following that of Europe and South Asia. India’s investment value in 2020 totaled $3.57 billion. At the country level, most of India’s investment is in Mauritius while investment in Mozambique has gradually increased. Investments in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa have also expanded. Areas of investments have seen change from manufacturing to service in Mauritius, and from manufacturing to construction in Nigeria. On the other hand, India’s investment in South Africa is relatively small compared to its export value, and is rather focused on the manufacturing sector compared to the service sector. India’s investment in Kenya has increased significantly under the Modi administration. Manufacturing and services account for the largest portion in Kenya. 
       In the area of development cooperation, India’s annual aid to Africa averaged $800 million over the past 10 years. Although development aid to Asia has greatly increased since the Modi administration, India’s aid has largely been directed towards Africa throughout the years, covering 34 African countries. India’s development loans have been utilized for infrastructure development and also for projects specifically intended to strengthen security ties. Also, through its partnership with the private sector, the Indian government has strengthened cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, health and IT. India also deploys trilateral partnerships with advanced economies such as the US and UK in its cooperation with Africa. 
       One characteristic of India’s cooperation with Africa is that India emphasizes commonalities with Africa, such as its colonial history, alliance to the “Third World” or their emphasis on market diversification, to build ideological and economic consensus on which they have strengthened their partnership. The numerous presence of overseas Indians in Africa also factor into India’s interest in Africa. The overseas Indian population in Africa grew with the expansion of the British empire during imperialism, reaching the current total of 2.85 million. Countries with the largest Indian population are South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania, which are also India’s main trade and investment destinations. 
       India’s cooperation strategy for Africa materialized in the Singh administration. Noticeable state level cooperation began with the India-Africa Summit in 2008, whereas cooperation within the private sector channels was launched in 2005 through the CII-EXIM Bank Conclave on India-Africa Project Partnership. 
       India’s Africa strategy can be divided into financial support and capacity building. On the financial side, India introduced the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) in 2005 to provide development loans to developing countries, with India’s development loans estimated to reach $12.5 billion in 2019. Although the conditions of India’s loans are unfavorable compared to that of Korea’s in terms of interest rates and repayment periods, they are actively sought by African countries because of the wide range of products and services covered by the loan. India’s support includes infrastructure development, capacity building, as well as military supplies and training, particularly because India stresses a demand-based partnership.
       On capacity building, India’s support has channeled mainly through the Indian Technology and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and Pan-Africa e-Network (PAEN) platforms. ITEC focuses on the capacity building of civil servants in partnering countries and has operated in 160 countries since 1964. African participants compose 40% of ITEC graduates. Participants of ITEC are funded by the Indian government. ITEC provides more than 300 programs a year covering a diverse range of studies including finance, IT, and environmental studies. Since 2018, it also provides cultural training programs for yoga and meditation. India seeks to strengthen security partnerships with its neighboring countries through ITEC by providing special military training programs as it holds concerns for the security of the Indian Ocean against the growing Chinese influence in the region, and with the launch of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. 
       Meanwhile, the Pan-African e-Network (PAEN), which was launched in cooperation with the African Union (AU), sought to strengthen the connectivity of the African continent and provide universal online education. Through PAEN, the Indian government established wireless networks in selected African countries, through which online medical and academic teaching was provided by higher education institutions and medical institutions based in India. 
       In summary, India’s Africa cooperation policy shows four characteristics: 1) it is demand-driven; 2) presents a “South-South” cooperation model, different from that of developed countries or China; 3) utilizes India’s developmental experience in institutional and capacity building; and 4) is supported by the Indian overseas residents in Africa. 
       Based on the analysis above, this study proposes the following policy directions to strengthen Korea’s cooperation with Africa. First, Korea’s cooperation strategy with Africa should be segmentalized to reflect the different demands of Africa’s sub-regions and fields (topics) of cooperation. India has recently increased its level of cooperation with Western and North Africa, along with the southeastern African region where the Indian diaspora are most populated. India also tailors its strategy to respond to the demands of Africa. For example, PAEN supports the AU’s mission to strengthen connectivity within Africa. The Indian government also uses the CII-EXIM Bank Conclave as a platform to gather information on Africa’s market demands and engage the Indian private sector in meeting Africa’s needs. In terms of identifying competitive fields of cooperation, India actively emphasizes its strength as an IT powerhouse in forming cooperation platforms with Africa. Although the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy each hold high-level forums with Africa, a coordinated and specific strategy and actionable programs have not fully materialized. With different market characteristics and cultural norms, different strategies should be articulated for the different sub-regions and economic communities such as COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS. Moreover, many of Korea’s cooperation programs share and build on lessons from Korea’s past development experience. However, Korea should also be able to create programs in areas that it has strengths in such as mobile and online finance, entertainment, and ICT. 
       In addition, Korea should also create and strengthen a chain for cooperation with Africa. Currently, much of Korea’s cooperation with Africa is development-oriented. However, in consideration of Africa’s resources and its market potential, Korea should engage in strengthening trade and investment, and also enhance partnerships with the private sector. India’s cooperation model exemplifies how the government can efficiently support market demands identified by the private sector. Areas of cooperation identified at the CII-EXIM Bank Conclave are linked and supported by the government through public initiatives such as the IDEAS and ITEC. Creating a chain of partnership between the private sector and the government as such, could increase policy effectiveness. Strengthening and coordinating the activities of KOICA, KOTRA and KITA would be a step in building this chain of cooperation. 
       Finally, the study proposes triangular cooperation between Korea, India and Africa. India is emerging as a global production hub and is increasing its influence in the global supply chain. India’s market value and the government’s policies supporting the nurturing of the manufacturing sector have enhanced the linkage between Korean-Indian production networks, while an increasing number of Korean firms are entering India for both production and export purposes. India is a key partner of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and vigorously supports systems such as the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme that encourage domestic production and export expansion, enabling the formation of a Korea-India-Africa value chain. In order to do so, increasing the production link between Korea and India is required through negotiations on improving the Korea-India CEPA and the Korea-India Joint Initiative, as well as increasing trade links by supporting cooperation on the automation of customs.
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  • 코로나19의 인도 사회·경제에 대한 영향과 시사점
    The Social and Economic Impact of Covid-19 in India

    The Covid-19 pandemic led to significant reductions in economic activity across the world. In India, the Covid-19 pandemic has also created unprecedented disruptions in the labor market including employment loss and a decline in i..

    Yoon Jae Ro and Seung Jin Cho Date 2022.05.27

    Economic cooperation, Labor market India and South Asia

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    The Covid-19 pandemic led to significant reductions in economic activity across the world. In India, the Covid-19 pandemic has also created unprecedented disruptions in the labor market including employment loss and a decline in incomes. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic is having unequal impacts on the consumption of Indian households. 
    In this paper, we investigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Indian households. We examine the impact of lockdown measures that India imposed during the first and second years of the pandemic. The first lockdown in India was from March 25th, 2020, to May 31st, 2020, which was considered the longest lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic. The second lockdown was from April to June 2021. We focus on the differential impact of these shocks on employment, income, and consumption, using data from a large household panel survey. 
    Firstly, we observe large and heterogeneous reductions in employment and income in formal and informal segments of the labor market in India. Informal wage workers were significantly more vulnerable to the loss of employment than formal workers during the lockdown. Furthermore, income declined significantly more for the households of the informal wage worker. There was a differential impact of the shocks on labor market outcomes for male and female workers. We find that women were more likely to lose employment during the lockdown, and more likely to not return to work subsequently post the lockdown relative to men.
    Second, we document the impacts of the lockdown on household consumption. We find that consumption decreased the most for the households with initially higher pre-pandemic income. Also, this group has the slowest recovery rate to the pre-pandemic consumption level. For all households, the consumption of food and fuel dropped less than the consumption of durables. 
    When the labor market fluctuates rapidly due to the economic downturn, the harm is relatively concentrated on the low-income and vulnerable groups. This study shows the Covid-19 pandemic caused great economic damage to women and informal workers, who are the most vulnerable groups in India. 
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  • 미중 경쟁에 대한 호주의 전략적 대응과 시사점: 호주의 대중정책 변화를 중심으로
    Australia’s Strategic Responses to the US-China Rivalry and Implications for Korea

       As former Prime Minister Tony Abbott once admitted, Australia’s China policy has been driven by “fear and greed,” implying that China is a source of both economic prosperity and security discomfort. As in other Asi..

    Ina Choi et al. Date 2022.05.20

    Economic cooperation, International politics

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       As former Prime Minister Tony Abbott once admitted, Australia’s China policy has been driven by “fear and greed,” implying that China is a source of both economic prosperity and security discomfort. As in other Asia-Pacific countries, facilitating trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Up until the mid-2010s, despite concerns over security threats posed by China’s military expansion, hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia’s recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia’s China policy is an interesting case to study how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia’s recent foreign policy is also relevant to South Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea’s relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study aims to unravel Australia’s strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea’s foreign policy.
       Chapter 2 examines Australia’s strategic interests in the evolving regional architecture and how these interests have influenced Australia’s China policy recently. China’s retaliatory measures in response to Australia’s calls for inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 fueled the conflict between the two sides, but Australia-China tensions have loomed large over the past five years. Beijing’s responses to the PCA ruling on the South China Sea and persistent gray zone activities have alarmed Canberra to advocate for rules-based order and closely align with the United States in countering China’s hegemonic power. Most notably, high-profile scandals over China’s interference in Australia’s politics in 2017 led to a series of measures to counter Chinese influence in the country. In August 2018, Australia took the initiative in banning Chinese vendors including Huawei from its 5G network over national security concerns. China’s economic sanctions against Australia in 2020 reinforced anti-Chinese public sentiment, fostering an environment where the concerns of policymakers in the security sector are well-received. In particular, the Defense Strategic Update 2020 suggests that China’s military expansion poses a direct threat to Australia’s national security, calling for an increase of military capabilities. Along with an unprecedented large-scale investment in military forces, Canberra took a step further to initiate the launch of the AUKUS pact in September 2021, thus allowing Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines. In the past Australia used to be cautious about ruffling the feathers of its largest trading partner, but a series of recent moves against Beijing make it clear that security concerns have overridden economic considerations in Canberra.
       Chapter 3 analyzes the economic effects of China’s import restrictions on Australian exports. Our findings suggest that the import restrictions did not have a significant impact on the overall volume of Australian exports to China. The total export volumes of iron ore (not included in the restriction list) have actually increased, which counteracted the decrease in total exports of restricted products, such as beef, wine, and lumber. Hence, China’s import restrictions were not an effective tool for altering Canberra’s stance towards Beijing. Chinese policymakers could not expect the offsetting effects of Australian iron ore, which accounts for over 60% of China’s total iron ore imports. Nonetheless, this recent economic dispute caused Australia to revisit the potential consequences of overreliance on China as the major trading partner. Given the volatility of commodity prices, Canberra is also aware of the limits of relying on natural resources as the main safeguard against Beijing’s retaliatory actions. Consequently, the Australian government and businesses are exploring ways to reduce economic reliance on China, mostly via trade and investment diversification. 
       Chapter 4 assesses how Australia is responding to China’s growing influence on global economic and political environments. First, in response to the growing economic threat from the overreliance on China, Australia is experimenting with government policies related to trade and investment diversification. Recommendations from the Joint Standing Committee on Trade and Investment Growth of Australia include 1) a “China Plus” or “China And” type approach to open new export markets; 2) market liberalization via bilateral or multilateral FTAs; 3) upgrading manufacturing processes; 4) prioritizing national security in trade policies; and 5) strengthen support for export industries and their associated businesses. As evidence of these trade diversification efforts, Australian barley exporters found a new destination in Saudi Arabia, away from massive Chinese tariffs. Moreover, Australian policymakers are being cautious with the large influx of Chinese investment into their mining and real estate industries. Recommendations from the parliament include 1) establishing national security guidelines, 2) increasing the number of foreign investments subject to a review for national interests (i.e., Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Amendment Regulations 2020), 3) providing incentives for domestic investment, and 4) supporting domestic manufacturing industries. Similarly, Australia’s Modern Manufacturing Strategy intends to create competitive and resilient domestic industries. Bilateral and multilateral FTAs are at the forefront of achieving the aforementioned initiatives to diversify trade and investment, away from China’s influence. Australia aims to conduct over 80% of global trade via FTAs, while actively participating in Indo-Pacific centric multilateral FTAs. Furthermore, Australia is heavily involved with setting a global technology standard in an era of the U.S.-China Technology Competition, reflecting its interests in national security and the Indo-Pacific region.
       Second, in response to the growing regional security threat from China, Australia has embarked on its largest military build-up for decades. Based on a new defense strategy outlined in the “2020 Defense Strategy Update,” the Australian government resolved to accelerate military transformation to enhance its self-defense capability. Australia has also strengthened defense ties with US allies and strategic partners, playing a part in consolidating the US-led security cooperation network. Apart from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), Canberra managed to conclude the AUKUS agreement, which allows it to acquire a variety of advanced weapon technologies including nuclear-powered submarines. The AUKUS partnership has also enhanced security commitments by the US and the UK to the Indo-Pacific region, which suits the interest of Australia. Third, sharing concerns about China’s hegemonic role in the region, Australia is actively participating in regional efforts to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Australia is particularly wary of China‘s growing influence in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, where Australia’s most direct strategic interests lie. Accordingly, in close cooperation with the US and Japan, Australia has sought to support infrastructure development in the Pacific Islands and enhanced its bilateral engagement with Pacific states through the “Pacific Step Up” initiative. In regard to ASEAN, Australia newly launched the ASEAN Future Initiative in 2021 with an emphasis on maritime security, connectivity, SDGs and economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. In consideration of the strategic value of the Mekong region, Canberra has also launched a new partnership with the Mekong region called the ASEAN-Mekong Program (MAP).
       Based on the analyses above, Chapter 5 discusses the implications for Korea. First, Korea needs a preemptive strategy to ease the negative effects of China’s potential economic sanctions. Australia could fight through the negative effects via its irreplaceable commodities and trade diversification efforts for replaceable products. Analogous to Australia, Korea needs to secure leverage over critical products and technologies and explore alternative export markets, all along with the support of the government. Faced with China’s heavy tariffs, Australian barley farmers found new export destinations, then the Australian government followed through with additional support. This example showcases how the Korean government can also support businesses to expand export networks. Second, as Australia searches for new economic partners, Korea should renew economic relationships with Australia. Namely, the most workable area for the Korea-Australia cooperation is the supply of rare earth minerals. For instance, Korean companies can increase investment in Australia’s natural resources sector, while Australian companies can build an integrated rare earths refinery in Korea. As Australia develops future battery and critical minerals industries strategies, the Korea-Australia cooperation can extend to operations in the downstream sector, which would contribute to diversification of value chains for critical technologies.     
       Third, given Australia’s commitments to regional development in the Indo-Pacific, Korea needs to enhance its partnership with Australia for the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in Southeast Asia, where the two countries’ strategic needs converge. At the country level, Indonesia can be prioritized in pursuing bilateral partnership since both countries have enjoyed deep bilateral cooperation with Indonesia. At the ASEAN level, Seoul and Canberra need to jointly support the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC 2025) and strengthen cooperation on cyber, digital and technology standards in which both countries have a competitive edge. In addition, as both countries closely work together with the US in promoting peace and prosperity of the region, more active trilateral dialogue between Korea, Australia and the US should be carried out on a regular basis to enable effective collaboration.
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  • INTERNATIONALIZATION OF  THE KOREAN WON IN THE LIGHT OF  THE RMB INTERNATIONALIZ..
    Internationalization Of The Korean Won In The Light Of The Rmb Internationalization

    Despite the fact that China and the United States represent the G2 in terms of economic size, the RMB’s international significance in the existing international financial system is limited. China has made significant progress in ..

    Hyo Sang Kim et al. Date 2022.02.25

    Financial liberalization, Exchange Rate China

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    Content
    Preface

    Forward

    Contents

    Executive Summary

    Contributors

    Chapter 1. Introduction
    1. Background and Motivation
    2. The Current Status of the Korean Won Internationalization
    3. Contributions

    Chapter 2. RMB Internationalization: Development Status, Evolution Logic and Prospect
    1. Development Status of RMB Internationalization
    2. Evolution Logic of RMB Internationalization
    3. Prospect of RMB Internationalization
    Chapter 3. Performance of the Shanghai and Seoul Direct RMB-Korean Won Exchange Market
    1. Introduction
    2. Direct KRW-RMB Exchange Markets in Seoul and Shanghai
    3. Empirical Model and Results
    4. Conclusion and Policy Implications

    Chapter 4. Synchronization of East Asian Currencies: RMB or USD?
    1. Introduction
    2. Exchange Rate Regime in China
    3. Empirical Estimation
    4. Conclusion

    Chapter 5. Analysis of Factor Determining the Synchronization of RMB and Korean Won
    1. Introduction
    2. The Currency Co-movements with the RMB
    3. Factor Determinants on the RMB Weights
    4. Empirical Results
    5. Conclusion
    Appendix

    Chapter 6. Effects of RMB Internationalization on Korean Won 
    Internationalization
    1. Introduction
    2. Constructing the Korean Won Internationalization Index
    3. Empirical Analysis
    4. Conclusion
    Appendix

    Chapter 7. 
    Policy Proposals and Conclusion
    1. A Policy Framework for Currency Internationalization
    2. Review of the Experiences of the Currency Internationalization
    3. A Proposal for the KRW Internationalization
    4. Agenda for RMB and KRW Cooperation
    5. Conclusion

    References
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    Summary
    Despite the fact that China and the United States represent the G2 in terms of economic size, the RMB’s international significance in the existing international financial system is limited. China has made significant progress in encouraging RMB internationalization. It has the ability to disrupt the global financial system, dominated by the US dollar. In order to seize chances under such circumstance, Korea must find a new direction for the internationalization of Korean Won.

    This collective volume has seven independent papers that investigate the current and future status of the RMB internationalization and its impacts and implications on Korean economy. The summarizations of each paper are as follows: Chapter One explains the background and motivation of this collective volume. Also, it describes the current status of the Korean Won Internationalization. Chapter Two provides detailed descriptions of the current status of RMB internationalization and its future prospects. Chapter Three examines the performance of Shanghai and Seoul RMB-KRW direct foreign exchange markets and figures that such direct FX markets have not been fully developed yet. However, such markets are expected to become more efficient gradually. Chapter Four finds that in the gradual evolution of the RMB internationalization, the KRW is becoming more synchronized with the Chinese yuan. Chapter Five explores the factors for coupling between the RMB and the KRW. Not only trade and finance channels but also policy implementations are important. Chapter Six develops the index for the KRW internationalization in light of the RMB internationalization. This chapter finds that the RMB internationalization may hinder the KRW internationalization. If the Korean government continues to delay the KRW internationalization, the benefit from the currency internationalization will become smaller. In that regard, Chapter Seven emphasizes that at this moment, it is very meaningful to re-examine the long-term strategy for Korea’s won internationalization. 

    The internationalization of the Korean won provides a new opportunity for the country’s financial development, rather than a disruption to the current global financial system. In the process of the internationalization of RMB and KRW, China and Korea should further strengthen bilateral financial and economic cooperation to push forward the process of RMB and KRW internationalization. Because the RMB or the KRW each have such a small proportion of the global monetary system, it is premature to be concerned about competition. Cooperation should take priority. The key policy suggestions for cooperation between these two currency internationalizations could at the very least include: (1) increasing the bilateral currency swap lines (BSLs) and making them more effective; (2) encouraging more usage of RMB and KRW in bilateral trade and direct investment; (3) encouraging more Chinese investors to hold KRW denominated assets and so does the other party; (4) accelerating the development of offshore RMB market in Seoul while having increasingly important offshore KRW market in China; (5) strengthening the coordination and cooperation in exchange rate policies.
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  • 디지털 부문 혁신과 신북방 주요국의 구조 전환: 신북방 중진국과의 IT 협력을 중심으..
    Development of the IT Industry and Structural Transformation: Focused on IT Cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

    This study is designed as a primary study to objectively analyze the economic meaning and potential of digital sector cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to derive implications for presenting new directions for prom..

    Minhyeon Jeong et al. Date 2022.02.21

    ICT economy, Economic cooperation

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    Summary
    This study is designed as a primary study to objectively analyze the economic meaning and potential of digital sector cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to derive implications for presenting new directions for promising cooperation. With the advent of the so-called “fourth industrial revolution era” just around the corner, the goal of the study is to discuss what the development of the digital industry means to the economies of the three countries, examine the characteristics of individual countries, and get policy clues on how cooperation with Korea should proceed in the future. To this end, this study performs the following four main analyses. First, the economic meaning of IT technology cooperation with three countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, is viewed from the perspective of industrial transformation. Second, the effect of IT technology cooperation between Korea and Russia on the Russian economy is quantitatively estimated through the analytical framework of the structural transformation. Third, to supplement the limitations of theoretical discussions and derive customized cooperation directions for each country, we examine the current status and policies of the IT industry in the three new northern countries in detail. Fourth, we identify as objectively as possible which IT technology will have a high cooperation effect between Korea and Russia.

    Chapter 2 is the first chapter of the main topic and was conducted to achieve the first and second research objectives. Section 1 briefly discusses the traditional characteristics of the structural transformation based on the experience of high-income countries. Section 2 discusses why the traditional structural transformation is not well represented and often delayed, centering on the recent middle-income countries’ experiences. Section 3 examines the structural transformation of the three countries in the New Northern Region. Section 4 examines how IT technology innovation can play a role in solving the delay in the structural transformation. In order to analyze this economically, a theoretical model is constructed based on the intuition that IT technology innovation has a positive effect on improving productivity in the service sector. Furthermore, by numerically approximating the theoretical model for Russia with available data, we quantitatively estimate how helpful IT technology innovation can be to the problem of delay in the structural transformation that Russia has to solve.

    The conclusion of the analysis is positive. This is because the economy can naturally move from the “bad equilibrium” to the “good equilibrium” through technological innovations in the IT sector. According to the new structural transformation model considered in this paper, we can theoretically prove that the proportion of production in general manufacturing, including the IT sector, increases when IT technology innovation helps improve service industry productivity. Here, the increase in productivity of the service industry with advances in IT technology is based on the intuition that IT technology innovation can alleviate search and matching friction existing in the service industry. The quantitative analysis of how positive IT technology cooperation with Korea affects the long-term growth rate of resource-dependent middle-sized countries showed that if the positive effect of current productivity improvement in the Russian manufacturing sector rises by 173%, Russia’s long-standing delay in industrial structure can be resolved. 

    Chapter 3 is the second chapter of the main topic and was prepared to achieve the third purpose of this study. In other words, it is a chapter prepared to compensate for the limitations of generality and universality of the theory. The individual characteristics of the three New Northern countries dealt with in this paper are analyzed in-depth. In the last section, by briefly comparing and analyzing the status of IT industry development and the governments’ development strategies, we derive the individual characteristics of these countries in the IT industry and development strategies as much as possible.

    As a result of comparing and reviewing the current status of the IT industry in the three countries using the best data available, we conclude that the level of development in the IT industry is similar to that of Russia and Kazakhstan, while  Uzbekistan is relatively lagging. These differences in industrial development are reflected in differences in transition strategies to the digital economy and IT industry development strategies of the three countries. In particular, Russia and Kazakhstan, which are highly dependent on natural resources, are considered to be more interested in transforming the economic structure through the development of the IT industry. Specifically, Russia’s policy focus is on improving existing IT infrastructure and related systems and enhancing the practical competitiveness of the Russian IT industry in the global market. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has a policy focus on improving existing IT infrastructure and related systems, but no specific policy has been prepared to develop the IT industry. Finally, in Uzbekistan, the establishment of IT infrastructure should be prioritized, and accordingly, this becomes the most important policy goal. There is still no national policy for developing the IT industry like Kazakhstan. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have yet to have IT companies to secure competitiveness in the global market, so national strategies and policies for developing the IT industry are expected to differ from Russia’s.

    In Chapter 4 we objectively identify which IT technology field can maximize the effectiveness of cooperation between Korea and Russia. We statistically analyzes technology patent data registered by Korea and Russia over the past five years. Chapter 4 examines which technological cooperation has a strong synergy effect and a positive propagation effect, and infers the immediate “need for technological cooperation” based on this. As a result of patent citation analysis, we find that the cooperative synergy between Korea’s semiconductor-related technologies and Russia’s digital computing or data processing will be prominent, reflecting each country’s technological comparative advantage. In addition, when using the network analysis method, we find that such technological cooperation has a high scope of the propagation effect and immediate influence of cooperation as well as synergy effect of cooperation.
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  • 지역별 중장기 통상전략 및 대외경제 협력 방안
    Korea’s Medium- and Long-Term Trade Strategies by Region and International Economic Cooperation Plans

       This study seeks to identify Korea’s cooperation directions with major regions and present action plans to implement them in five medium-to long-term trade issues: global supply chains, digital trade, climate change,..

    June Dong Kim et al. Date 2021.12.31

    Economic cooperation, Trade policy

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    Summary
       This study seeks to identify Korea’s cooperation directions with major regions and present action plans to implement them in five medium-to long-term trade issues: global supply chains, digital trade, climate change, health, and development cooperation.
       In the area of global supply chains, Korea and the U.S. could promote predictability and sustainability through periodic exchanges of information between the respective control towers of supply chains in the two countries, and the utilization of various consultative bodies composed of diverse agents related to supply chains. In the long-term perspective, we need to implement exchange programs of personnel and joint R&D programs in the areas of advanced technologies of the two countries in order to cultivate talented persons in the key industries.
       The EU and Korea could reinforce the connectivity of their supply chains through cooperation in the areas of technology and production in such strategic industries as telecommunication infrastructure. In addition, when considering the global expansion of low-carbon economy initiatives, Korea needs to closely cooperate with the EU, which is preemptively adjusting its supply chains under a green economy concept.
       With regard to China, it is anticipated that Korea will have no choice but to cooperate in areas where China and the U.S. share values, or in areas where the U.S. does not show interest in, for a considerable period of time. More specifically, cooperation can be possible in the areas of green industries, the health sector, and those with matured technology. Regionally, Korea needs to pursue cooperation with China in supply chains in third countries, rather than within China.
       In the New Southern Region, above all, Korea should pursue diversification of supply chains within the ASEAN region by utilizing changes in the trade and investment environment due to the RCEP, the CPTPP, and the ASEAN Economic Community. Korea also needs to upgrade its CEPA with India to secure smooth movement of intermediate goods between Korea and India. Additionally, Korea needs to expand cooperation with India utilizing the EDCF, particularly in light of the demand within India to establish various infrastructure such as renewable energy and roads.
       In the area of digital trade, two directions of cooperation with key countries and regions can be outlined as follows. First, Korea should strengthen medium-to long-term cooperation with leading economies such as the U.S. and the EU in digital infrastructure, digital technology, digital technological standards, and data regulation. Second, in places where need for digital infrastructure is increasing, such as China, the New Southern Region, and Africa, unique and specialized digital trade policies should be established.
       To be more specific, in order to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in digital technology, Korea needs to encourage its domestic firms to join in the O-RAN Alliance. Furthermore, in order to foster technological cooperation in the field of AI, Korea should facilitate discussions about the development of international AI standards through the already existing Joint Committee on Science and Technology Cooperation between Korea and the U.S. Korea also needs to begin discussions to maintain technical standards cooperation by forming a Korea-EU Committee on digital technology like Trade and Technology Council between the U.S. and the EU. In terms of data regulation, Korea must take a proactive role together with the U.S. in WTO e-commerce talks. This study also suggests that the e-commerce chapter that was not addressed during the negotiation of the KORUS FTA amendment should be upgraded in the near future. Efforts will also be vital to keep complying with the EU’s GDPR requirements.
       Regarding digital infrastructure cooperation with major countries and regions such as China, the New Southern Region, and Africa, Korea should undertake action plans in conjunction with domestic policies such as K-semiconductor strategies and materials, components, and equipment strategies. Meanwhile, it is critical to develop a venue to discuss digital technology and data regulatory cooperation with China and the New Southern Region. Korea could benchmark the cooperation in the area of standards between Japan and China in 2019. This platform can help to improve the compatibility of digital technology and goods in key areas specified by the Northeast Asia Standards Cooperation Forum.
       Aside from digital infrastructure, digital technology, digital technological standards, and data regulation, Korea must seek specific cooperation plans for major countries and regions. For example, Korea can develop policies to increase intellectual property protection in relation to China. Furthermore, it can assist domestic digital trade firms in entering the Comprehensive Testing Region for Cross-Border E-commerce designated by the Chinese government. Korea also needs to conduct discussions with China to facilitate customs issues in e-commerce. In the New Northern Region, Korea should maintain cooperation with Russia in the field of digital services and software, with both countries developing research initiatives and expanding training programs for young researchers. In the New Southern Region, Korea can concentrate its capabilities for cooperation on SMEs and workers to strengthen the digital infrastructure. Establishing preemptive collaboration channels for digital trade between Korea and India would benefit both countries. In Africa, Korea should pursue digital trade policies targeted to the growing need for digital infrastructure, digital technology, public services, and labor force development.
       In regard to climate change, Korea should promote cooperation in such industries as energy transformation and transportation, areas where the EU is also focusing on within its carbon neutrality policy, as well as facilitate the dialogue channel of cooperation with the EU to back up this promotion. Korea also needs to maintain its position in the follow-up discussions to implement the Paris Climate Agreement while communicating closely with the EU.
       In the area of low carbon technology cooperation with the U.S., technological cooperation related to clean energy initiatives, energy efficiency, and carbon removal – which both countries share common interests and are competitive in – could be promoted first. In addition, Korea can also suggest cooperation in areas where the U.S. has global competitiveness, such as adaptation to climate change.
       In order to identify cooperation areas and facilitate multilateral cooperation with the New Southern Region, Korea needs to identify the policy interests and current status of dialogue channels in this area. With ASEAN, Korea needs to continue utilizing dialogue channels such as the Korea-ASEAN Dialogue on Environment and Climate Change. With respect to India, Korea needs to establish a regular high-level dialogue channel and identify specific cooperation demands.
       In the area of health cooperation, Korea needs to overcome the limits of existing international cooperation systems by establishing new international organizations such as an international pandemic treaty. This new organization will have the function of assisting production of vaccines, therapeutics, and equipment for diagnosis and personal protection as well as establishing more effective distribution systems for medicine and medical supplies.
       In order to respond more effectively to the crisis of infectious diseases in the future, it will be necessary to amend the related provisions within WTO agreements, since the production and distribution of medical supplies lies also in the area of international trade. More specifically, particular situations or conditions will have to be defined when the relevant TRIPS clauses can be exempted.
       The fundamental solution to the pandemic is technological innovations in the area of medicine manufacturing and increase of production amounts. In this context, Korea should place more of an emphasis on its current project to establish a global vaccine hub. A cooperation system must be established to co-utilize personnel and facilities through a consortium with companies in the U.S. and Europe.  
       With regard to development cooperation in Asia, the need to differentiate cooperation types, methods and areas has already been pointed out. As a specific action plan, for example, Korea can cooperate with assisting ICT-based hybrid infrastructure projects such as smart city and smart water control to medium-income countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Philippines. Meanwhile, to low-income countries such as Laos and Myanmar, assistance should be provided to establish basic social infrastructure mainly in the form of ODA.
       For development cooperation with the African region, systematic cooperation among the ODA-implementing entities is crucial. A good example is the Muhimbili University Hospital project in Tanzania. Korea could also consider promoting utilization of development finance, for the purpose of supporting private sector development in the region.
       In the Latin American region, Korea should explore plans to participate in large-sized energy projects by co-financing with the MDBs, since such countries as Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia are currently pursuing energy transformation initiatives.
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  • 포스트 코로나 시대 해외 주요국의 경제체제 중요 요소 변화: 기후위기, 디지털플랫폼..
    Major changes in economic system in the post-corona era: Focusing on climate crisis, digital platform, human resources and fiscal sustainability

    This study reviewed what kind of institutional improvements are needed in the following four areas amid the changes in economic conditions that are accelerating due to the COVID-19 crisis.First, theoretical analysis was carreid ou..

    Deokhyeon Ryu et al. Date 2021.12.30

    Economic reform, Economic development

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    Summary
    This study reviewed what kind of institutional improvements are needed in the following four areas amid the changes in economic conditions that are accelerating due to the COVID-19 crisis.

    First, theoretical analysis was carreid out to reflect the principle of equal rights and historical responsibility in the allocation of obligations between countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which is likely to become a fundamental constraint on future economic activities. Specifically, four apporached were reviewed and compared with the Kyoto Protocol: equal distribution per capita (EPC), historical equal distribution per capita (HEPC), proportional distribution (EPE), and proportional distribution (HEPE) per capita. As a result, a large gap between Kyoto Protocol and the HEPC principle, which is satisfies the principle of minimum equality (‘if historical and BAU responsibilities are the same, everyone should be guaranteed equal rights to common resources regardless of their country of origin’) and historical responsibility (‘standard that all countries are free from historical responsibility’). Existing international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol were found to be most similar to the EPE, which respects vested interests and does not consider historical responsibility. Korea, which achieved rapid growth in a short period of time, has a very low historical responsibility compared to other advanced countries. Therefore, it is between the position of a developing country that demands historical responsibility and the position of a developed country that demands vested interests, and there is an advantage of being able to adopt a flexible strategy between the two sides in the climate agreement.

    Second, we reviewed how to establish competition rules in the field of online platforms, whose importance in economic activities has dramatically increased during the COVID-19 crisis. It was concluded that ex post regulation on a case-by-case is desirable considering and that ex-ante and non-discriminatory regulation can hinder competition and innovation activities. Online platforms have the characteristics of a multi-faceted market that can lead to a winner-takes-it-all market, but in reality there are factors that can offset such a tendency. In order to effectively implement such regulations on a case-by-case basis, it is necessary to revise the review guidelines reflecting the characteristics of the online platform and to upgrade the economic analysis method. To this end, it is necessary to actively refer to the economic analysis methodologies developed for online platforms, in particular, academic studies and judgment cases on market definition methods, and the price increase pressure analysis method, which is measures competition restrictions in business combinations. In addition, measures such as disclosure of data for pre-monitoring or shifting the burden of proof may be considered in order to perform monitoring and regulation more effectively.

    Third, taking into account the accelerated spread of new technologies due to Corona 19 crisis, the necessary policy tasks were reviewed to respond to the advancement and fluctuations in skills required in the labor market due to the progress of the 4th industrial revolution. The conclusion of a comparative review of the current system of Korea and major foreign countries is as follows. ① Administrative, financial, and integration of the higher education and lifelong education functions of the Ministry of Education and the vocational training functions of the Ministry of Employment need to be integrated. Also in major foreign countries, government agencies in charge of adult competency development are dispersed among the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Employment and the local government. However, it is observed that there is a key institution that plays the role of a control tower for adult competency development policies. ② The academic system should become more permeable so that universities can play a key role in the lifelong competency development system. Currently, the university’s undergraduate system is mainly designed for full-time students in their mid-20s. It is necessary to reorganize the university’s academic system so that universities can expand from educational institutions for full-time students in their 20s to lifelong educational institutions that cover the needs of adults for lifelong ability development. ③ A personal learning account system that financially supports people’s lifelong ability development should be introduced. Personal support for skill improvement has been focused on low-skilled workers so far, but in the era of the 4th industrial revolution, the need for skill development will expand to middle-skilled workers and above. Therefore, it is necessary to devise a personal learning account that accumulates a certain amount of support for individuals to use for skill development throughout their lifetime. ④ Labor reform that strengthens the upward mobility of the labor market is necessary. 

    Fourth, an international comparison was made on the ability to bear national debt and its implications were drawn. It is important to check whether the debt is repayable with revenue, that is, the condition that it is sufficiently possible to repay interest through revenue so that it is not necessary to cover it with another debt to pay interest. Considering this, the credit default swap spread (CDS) was selected and analyzed as an indicator of fiscal sustainability. The estimation of regression models to explain CDS as a function of various variables showed that, in addition to the ratio of national debt to GDP, the maturity structure of government bonds, the ratio of short-term government bonds, and the ratio of foreign government bonds were important factors. The result implies that the national debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the important indicators to be considered in fiscal management, but it is not appropriate to overly emphasize the ratio or insist on a specific level of it.

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