India is a digital market with huge potential and influence. India is actively building a data governance system; Of all the digital policies currently in place or being established in India, about 25% (53 policies) are related to data governance. Against this backgroud, we study the data governance policies and regulations in India, as well as the cooperation between India and major countries, and cases of companies.

Chapter 2 analyses India’s top-level data policy framework that forms the foundation of the data economy and the data regulations that govern its implementation. India is considering a long-term, comprehensive data governance framework such as the ‘National Data Governance Policy (draft)’. It is also building a government-led data accumulation and utilisation system, India Stack. The establishment of a government-led data ecosystem is a key feature of India's digital transformation policy and has the potential to spread as an alternative to other latecomers to digital transformation.

India's data regulations are in line with global standards while seeking its own path. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 is business-friendly and avoids excessive restrictions. It is characterised by the introduction of a negative approach that allows cross-border data transfer in principle. However, sector-specific data localisation regulations are applied, and there are some parts that need to be specified in application. The Non-Personal Data Governance Framework (draft) announced in 2020 expresses the government's intention to create data platforms and data marketplaces, but further discussions are needed regarding the possibility of excessive restrictions. The Digital India Act (draft, 2023) is a comprehensive legal framework that responds to the rapid growth of new technologies and large technology companies represented by platforms. Through this, the regulatory environment for large technology companies in India will be newly established. It is likely that data regulations will be introduced for new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as transparency standards for data processing based on types of platforms.

In Chapter 3, we analysed the aspects of data governance in India expressed through digital trade policy. India has maintained a protectionist stance on data openness in WTO negotiations and bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and the EU. The US government has been raising the issue of data barriers with India, but given India's strategic importance, it is unlikely that the US government will exert bilateral trade pressure. However, it is likely that US companies will continue to raise issues and exert influence on India's data policy.

The EU and India are placing more emphasis on discussions about data governance in general rather than regulations, and it is expected that bilateral discussions will focus on areas where the interests of the two sides, such as artificial intelligence, coincide. It is noteworthy that the EU is responding to India's initiative to spread digital public infrastructure(DPI).

It is unlikely that Australia will be able to implement the liberalisation of cross-border data transfer and the restriction of data localisation measures in the CECA negotiations with India. However, Australia has been able to induce India to open up in the AI-ECTA service trade and financial services negotiations. Australia seeks to expand digital trade and data trasnfer with India and pursue institutional compatibility under the framework of strategic cooperation such as the QUAD.

Despite India's high economic dependence on China, it is likely to remain wary of China in the digital sector. In particular, Chinese companies’ investments in areas directly related to data security are expected to be treated with great sensitivity.

India is presenting Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a key agenda at major international forums such as the G20 and the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly (WTSA-24), as well as multilateral forums such as QUAD, and is stepping up its efforts to make its DPI model an international standard. This is believed to be an attempt to expand India’s influence in the process of building digital infrastructure, especially in global south.

Chapter 4 synthesises the above research and presents policy implications. First, it is necessary to respond to the issues that may arise in the process of introducing data norms in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) provides separate regulatory grounds for large-scale data processing companies and does not clearly state the legal basis for data processing, which may cause uncertainty in corporate activities. The Korean government needs to pay attention to the list of countries that the Indian government plans to announce as data transfer restriction countries. The Digital India Act (draft) currently under discussion is expected to have a major impact on corporate activities by strengthening the transparency of data processing, with platform companies as the main target.

Second, we can consider indirect measures to make the activities of data-related companies freer through negotiations with India. Like AI-ECTA, efforts should be made to increase the level of openness of computer and related services, engineering and integrated engineering services, provision and transfer of financial information, and software provided by financial data processing. If the data related articles are included, it is possible to include a temporary clause as an intermediate step in the liberalisation of data transfer and data localisation, and to review it after the establishment of the India’s data system. Meanwhile, Korea needs to pay attention to strengthening cooperation between like-minded countries. Korea is already participating in the Korea-US- India iCET, and it is necessary to actively respond to the QUAD countries’ agenda for cybersecurity and DPI cooperation.

Third, digital cooperation with India requires the building of trust capital, and key area is DPI. India's DPI is a government-led model with no precedent, and is likely to attract the attention of developing countries. It is necessary for Korea to consider responding to the DPI cooperation agenda in the G20, ITU, UNDP, and QUAD. Korea should also pay attention to cooperation for the development, interoperability, and inclusiveness of DPI in developing countries. It would also be possible for Korea to cooperate with India in projects such as capacity building and expert exchanges for developing countries.

Fourth, Korea should seek cooperation in the digitalisation of the public sector in India using ODA. It is believed that cooperation can be found in tasks such as standardising data management, data security, building data platforms, and expanding public data accessibility, etc. In particular, the digitalisation of government services in the process of urban development in India is a field with high potential for cooperation.

Fifth, it is necessary to establish continuous bilateral contact platforms so that Korean and Indian policy makers can share the changing aspects of data governance. It is necessary to set current issues such as data and DPI as an ongoing agenda in channels such as the ministerial-level industrial cooperation committee between the two countries, which is scheduled to be established, and the established Korea-India Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Council. Going further, the two countries could consider forming partnerships between relevant ministries and operating regular forums to exchange issues related to data governance. In addition, the difficulties faced by Korean companies entering India should be actively communicated through the Korea-India government-to-government dialogue channels, such as the Korea-India Fast Track Mechanism, Invest India, etc. Cooperation with a third country can also be promoted. Rather than the United States, which already has its own influence in India, cooperation with Japan may be more effective.

Executive Summary

Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Background
2. Objectives of the Study
3. Research Methodology
4. Chapter Composition
5. Research Limitation

Chapter 2. Overview of the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
1. History of Korea-Africa High-Level Forums
2. Government-Level Strategies for Economic Cooperation with Africa
3. Comparative Analysis of Previous Korea-Africa High-Level Forums and the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
4. Analysis of the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit Joint Declaration

Chapter 3. Korea’s ODA Strategies for Africa: Focus on the Key Agendas of 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
1. Rethinking the Underlying Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment
2. Agricultural Development
3. Environmental Sector: Climate Change, Desertification and Deforestation
4. Urban Transportation: Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
5. Supporting Industrialization through TVET Program
6. Healthcare
7. Digital Cooperation
8. Sharing Korea’s Development Experience with Africa

Chapter 4. Developing Government Support Strategy through SWOT Analysis for African Market Entry
1. SWOT Analysis for African Market Entry
2. Recommended Government Support Strategies Based on SWOT Analysis

Chapter 5. Securing Reliable Critical Minerals
1. Energy Transformation and Strategic Minerals
2. Supply Chain of Strategic Minerals
3. Strategic Minerals and Africa
4. Supporting Private Sector Mineral Development

Chapter 6. Leveraging International Development Financial Institutions
1. Constraints in Financial Support to Africa
2. Utilizing Development Financial Institutions (DFIs)
3. Examples of DFI Financial Support
4. Co-financing with Development Financial Institutions

Chapter 7. Conclusion

References

국문요약

Contributors

This report examines strategies for strengthening Korea’s economic and development cooperation with Africa, focusing on key agendas from the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit. The analysis covers critical areas, including agriculture, environmental issues, urban transportation, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), healthcare, digital cooperation, and the sharing of Korea’s development experience. Additionally, the report provides recommendations for securing reliable critical minerals and leveraging international development financial institutions to support cooperation efforts.
Africa faces significant agricultural challenges, including low productivity, limited use of modern inputs, poor infrastructure, and vulnerability to climate change. Customized smart farm solutions adapted to African contexts are necessary to support the establishment of agricultural processing facilities and cold chain systems. Korea can build partnerships to develop agricultural policies and regulatory frameworks, promote public-private partnerships in the agriculture sector, and support the development of agricultural research and extension services. This will improve irrigation and water management systems and promote the adoption of climate-resilient crop varieties and farming practices.
The Korea-Africa Partnership can address critical environmental challenges in Africa, including the impacts of climate change, desertification, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity. Various projects can be developed, such as reforestation, sustainable land management, and biodiversity conservation. Supporting early warning systems for climate-related disasters will benefit recipient countries. Training on environmental impact assessments and green growth strategies, promoting sustainable urban planning, and developing green infrastructure will also be beneficial. Korea can assist in implementing integrated water resource management approaches to promote circular economy initiatives and waste management solutions.
Rapid urbanization in Africa is creating significant challenges related to traffic congestion, road safety, and air pollution. Korea can develop pilot projects for intelligent transportation systems (ITS) in major African cities to support the development of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, provide technical assistance for transportation master planning, and promote electric mobility solutions adapted to African contexts. Additionally, Korea can help develop non-motorized transport infrastructure (e.g., bicycle lanes, pedestrian walkways) and support capacity building for urban transport authorities to promote transit-oriented development approaches.
TVET is a top priority area for Africa’s skills development. TVET projects focused on key industries (e.g., manufacturing, ICT, agriculture) should support the development of national qualification frameworks and promote industry-academia partnerships for TVET. Korea’s ODA projects can include quality assurance systems for TVET to support the modernization of TVET infrastructure and equipment and promote entrepreneurship education within TVET programs, including e-learning and blended learning approaches.
Africa’s healthcare challenges include a high burden of infectious diseases, rising non-communicable diseases, and weak health systems. Projects should aim to strengthen primary healthcare systems, support the development of telemedicine and e-health solutions, and establish centers of excellence for specific diseases. Promoting pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturing capabilities through capacity building for health policy and management, along with community health worker programs and health education initiatives, is essential.
Digital transformation is urgently needed in African countries. Korea has developed a well-designed e-government system that is envied by many. African countries need to improve customs, procurement, statistics, and more. Partnership projects can develop innovation hubs and tech parks to provide technical assistance for ICT policymaking and regulation, promote digital financial inclusion initiatives, and support the development of digital content in local languages. Digital literacy programs targeting underserved populations will be necessary to promote the adoption of emerging technologies (e.g., AI, IoT, blockchain) in key sectors.
Korea’s development experience can serve as a benchmarking model for African countries. Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) includes economic planning, industrial policy, export promotion strategies, human resource development, public sector reform, governance improvements, science, technology, and innovation policies, among others. Korea-Africa partnership projects that adapt Korean development models will provide policy advisory services tailored to specific African countries. This will support the development of think tanks and policy research institutes and organize study visits and exchange programs for African policymakers and experts to explore the adaptation of Korean development approaches.
There is a growing concern regarding the security of critical minerals for the clean energy transition, highlighting Africa’s significant mineral resources. Korea can strengthen partnerships with African countries rich in critical minerals to support sustainable and responsible mining practices and assist in developing mineral processing and value-addition capabilities. This can include technology transfer in the mining and mineral sectors, developing transparent and effective mineral governance frameworks, investing in geological surveys and resource mapping, and promoting local content development in the mining supply chain.
Development finance institutions (DFIs) will be crucial for the Korea- Africa partnership to support economic cooperation. Improving co-financing arrangements with multilateral and bilateral DFIs can strengthen cooperation with the African Development Bank. This will utilize innovative financing mechanisms like blended finance and enhance Korea’s capacity to structure and implement complex development projects. Strategic partnerships with European DFIs with extensive African experience can strengthen Korea’s development finance institutions to better support African projects. Additionally, it can promote private sector participation through public-private partnerships and risk mitigation instruments.
The 2024 Korea-Africa Summit provides a strong foundation for deepening this cooperation. Moving forward, it will be crucial to translate the summit’s commitments into concrete actions and sustainable long-term partnerships. This will require continued high-level engagement, regular policy dialogues, and the establishment of effective implementation mechanisms.

The Latin American region, while still abundant in fossil fuels, is also regarded as having significant potential in the renewable energy sector. The global transition to renewable energy presents an opportunity for industrial development in Latin American countries, which hold comparative advantages in this field. Many Latin American countries possess strong cost competitiveness in solar and wind energy. These global needs, coupled with the region's strengths, underline the necessity of fostering green energy. However, it is evaluated that the conditions required to realize these goals are not fully in place, necessitating responses through international cooperation. This study aims to analyze the current status and institutional foundations of the green energy industry in Latin American countries and, based on this analysis, propose directions for the advancement and cooperation of Korean companies.

This report seeks to understand the structure of the green energy industry in Latin America, focusing on solar, wind, and hydrogen energy, and to explore pathways for Korea's cooperation with the region. It especially highlights Chile, with its significant advantages across all renewable energy sectors and high political stability; Brazil, with the largest market in Latin America and strengths across almost all energy sources; Mexico, which ranks next in market size and holds great potential in solar energy; and Colombia, where energy accessibility is a major issue and official development assistance (ODA) could serve as a key cooperation channel.

Chapter 2 provides a macro-level discussion on the energy transition in Latin American countries. By examining shared and persistent characteristics, it identifies factors to consider for the development of the green energy sector and collaboration with Korea. It points out that underlying the region’s longstanding issues of low growth and inequality are problems in the corporate growth ecosystem, particularly institutional issues such as favoritism toward state-owned enterprises. Many Latin American countries find it difficult to meet energy transition demands on their own, requiring external investment. However, outdated institutional factors in Latin America are likely to continue to act as barriers to attracting investments for energy transition and green energy development.

This chapter also delves into the green energy potential of Latin America. According to IRENA (2023), countries like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have significant cost advantages in the solar and wind sectors. Northern Chile, Peru, and Mexico hold immense potential in solar energy, while the Patagonia region (southern Chile and Argentina), parts of Colombia, and eastern Brazil excel in wind energy. Additionally, Brazil and Argentina are well-suited for bioenergy production using agricultural resources. These diverse renewable energy resources contribute to the region being one of the largest renewable energy producers globally.

The study highlights the role of hydrogen as an energy source for achieving carbon neutrality, with particular attention to green hydrogen (produced using renewable energy), which is attracting the interest of many companies and nations. Latin America, with its abundant solar and wind resources, has the potential to supply electricity for hydrogen production at the lowest global cost and aspires to become a leading exporter of green hydrogen. Emerging international hydrogen industry platforms, including the Global Hydrogen Council, could facilitate Korea’s collaboration with Latin America in this field.

Lastly, the issue of a just and equitable transition is emphasized not merely as a social concern but as a practical challenge that significantly impacts the identification and execution of projects. International organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are focusing on technical cooperation to support a fair transition. While private companies may concentrate on business aspects, governments and public sectors need to take responsibility for related areas, such as community development, and actively consider relevant models.

Chapter 3 explores Korean companies’ perceptions of the renewable energy industry and Latin America’s potential, based on a survey of 100 professionals from diverse energy companies and institutions in Korea. While respondents generally recognize Latin America’s cost advantages, they do not view it as a critical strategic region. This is attributed to not only a lack of information but also challenges such as political instability, licensing issues, and land ownership disputes in the region, underscoring the need for policy responses.

The chapter also examines the technical advantages of Korean companies to identify comparative strengths. In solar energy, midstream and downstream capabilities stand out, while in wind energy, partnerships with European firms are suggested as a key strategy. In the hydrogen sector, Korean firms are recognized for their strengths in hydrogen-powered vehicles, tankers, and ammonia co-firing technologies.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia and proposes strategies for cooperation. Chile is identified as the most favorable country for entry due to its excellence in both solar and wind energy, clear hydrogen-focused policy direction, and proactive stance on foreign investment and collaboration. The report suggests positioning Chile as a hub country, offering an empirical model for other Latin American nations. It emphasizes establishing stable domestic and international demand plans, leveraging Chile’s interest in securing customers, and building long-term relationships through human exchanges and joint research.

For Brazil, while it is the largest economy in South America, significant challenges such as foreign exchange risks and a lack of information and relationships are noted. The report proposes a detour strategy through partnerships with European companies already established in Brazil and suggests targeting unique growth areas like biofuels and internal combustion engine components.

In Mexico, despite its technical potential, the report anticipates that regulatory practices favoring state-owned enterprises will remain entrenched. It recommends focusing on small-scale distributed energy markets and energy demand along the U.S. border. For Colombia, the report highlights the country’s market-friendly policies and status as a priority ODA partner. It advocates for continued ODA projects targeting regions excluded from the power grid and active involvement in Colombia’s hydrogen energy plans.

Chapter 5 synthesizes the findings to propose strategic cooperation directions for the four major countries and draws lessons from the collaboration approaches of other donor nations. A key feature of advanced donor nations’ energy policies is the integration of energy cooperation with other development projects. Many countries are implementing policy-oriented ODA projects to drive the entry of their domestic firms. Energy cooperation requires not only private investment but also government collaboration, necessitating comprehensive partnerships, including policy coordination. Korea’s experience with initiatives like the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and the Energy Industry Promotion Program (EIPP) offers advantages. However, Korea’s relatively short history of collaboration with Latin America suggests the need to focus on partnerships with willing countries in the region or to actively pursue collaborations with European nations or international organizations that have longstanding relationships with Latin America.

Lastly, the report highlights policy recommendations, including the identification of cooperative projects through international organizations like CABEI and IDB, strengthening intergovernmental cooperation through knowledge sharing and joint research, and improving internal feasibility studies for business development in Latin America.

This study is a research project that aims to more objectively and comprehensively understand Russia's new foreign policy direction, the Global South Strategy, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian War in February 2022. In particular, the main purpose of the study was to examine the structural changes and reorganization processes of the world order after the outbreak of the war, and to analyze the new foreign strategic direction of the Russian government in the midst of structural changes in the foreign strategic environment.

Chapter 2 examines the Russo-Ukrainian War and the rise of the Global South. The Russo-Ukrainian War has had a significant impact on the changes in the international order in terms of political diplomacy (deepening the process of fragmentation of international relations), security (creating a military confrontational structure between the West and Russia), and economic (damaging economic ties between Russia and the West). Meanwhile, the Global South is rising in the process of transforming international relations, symbolized by fragmentation. This is because, as the presence of the Global South (continuous economic growth and strengthening of political autonomy) has been highlighted since the war, its strategic value and importance in recent global international relations have increased even more. Ultimately, the Russo-Ukrainian War is creating a new phenomenon in international relations: the division of the world, changes in the international order, and the rise of the Global South.

Chapter 3 analyzes Russia’s Global South strategy concept, perception of the situation, goals, and tasks. Russia has recently preferred the term “World Majority” instead of the term “Global South.” According to Russia’s perception of the situation, the multipolarization of the world order, the growing interest in a new economic cooperation system, the emergence of comprehensive security threats and the risk of conflict between great powers, and the West’s all-out pressure on Russia are emphasized. The goals and tasks of Russia’s Global South strategy can be summarized in four points: promoting multipolarization of the world order through cooperation with Global South countries, intervention in the security of Global South countries, expanding economic cooperation with Global South countries, and spreading friendly perceptions of Russia in Global South countries.

Chapter 4 examines Russia’s Global South strategy in a multilateral context. In particular, it examines the launch and development process of BRICS, as well as Russia’s policy direction and economic relations toward BRICS. The recent expansion of BRICS has become a significant turning point and starting point in the history of BRICS, and a milestone in which BRICS has come to occupy the most important position in Russia’s “world majority” plan encompassing the global South.

Chapter 5 analyzes Russia’s Global South strategy in a regional context. In particular, it examines the nature and characteristics of the development of Russia’s relations with the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, given that Russia has strengthened its diplomatic activities in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America since the war in order to gather friendly forces to establish a multipolar order.

Chapter 6 presents policy implications for the research content and suggests policies that take into account the new external environment. First, policy implications are presented for each chapter: Chapter 2 (The Rise of the Global South and Pragmatic Balanced Diplomacy), Chapter 3 (Russia’s New Foreign Strategy and Seeking Changes in the World Order), Chapter 4 (The Means of BRICS Expansion and Potential Factors for Development), and Chapter 5 (Russia’s Means of Promoting Global Regional Strategy and Challenges). In addition, policy suggestions include strengthening and expanding middle-power diplomacy, establishing strategic cooperation plans for the Global South, establishing new perspectives and strategies for developing and fostering multilateral agendas at the global level, and establishing strategic management plans for Russia.

Both North and South Korea have long maintained the “One Korea Policy.” Under the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed in 1991, inter-Korean relations were defined as a “special interim relationship” tentatively formed during the process of unification, rather than state-to-state relations. North Korea appeared to show a stronger inclination for the “One Korea Policy” even with regard to its terminology, with its usage of phrases like “Pyongyang leaders’ reunion” and “North-South top leadership meeting” to refer to the Inter-Korean Summits.

However, in late 2023, North Korea began re-framing inter-Korean ties as relations between “two belligerent states.” The North went as far as declaring South Korea a “thoroughly foreign entity” and “primary foe,” even hinting at the possibility of nuclear war. It has prohibited the North Korean populace from using expressions like “unification” and “kinship” in their daily lives, even amending its Constitution to clearly designate the ROK as a “hostile state.”

The “two Koreas” rhetoric marks a profound shift from North Korea’s perception over the past eight decades and could fundamentally reshape the basis of inter-Korean relations. It is, therefore, essential to examine the key elements of the North’s “two Koreas” assertion, understand its underlying motives, and discuss the implications for Korean unification Equally important is the need to explore strategies to effectively promote a unification policy aligned with the perceptions of the four major powers involved in Korean Peninsula affairs.

In this study, Chapter II traces the evolution of the unification policy of the Republic of Korea, offering insights into the policies of the 1950s and 1960s spanning the Rhee Syngman, Chang Myon, and early years of the Park Chung-hee governments; as well as policies of the 1970s and 1980s, encompassing the latter years of the Park Chung-hee government and the Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo governments. It details the core philosophy, principles, and unification processes envisioned in the “National Community Unification Formula” announced in 1994 under then President Kim Young-sam’s leadership. The chapter then outlines the unification policies of the Kim Dae-jung government, which continued the tradition of the “National Community Unification Formula,” and each subsequent government up to the Yoon Suk-yeol government.

Chapter III provides a critical examination of North Korea’s approach to unification, beginning with the construction and development of a nationalist narrative and the symbolic emphasis on “kinship” and “nation.” This chapter reviews North Korea’s unification strategies, from the “democratic base theory” of the 1950s, which advocated for armed unification, to its later proposal of a “low stage federation” in the 2000s.

Chapter IV addresses North Korea’s recent adoption of the “two Koreas policy” and its consequences for Korean unification. North Korea had foreshadowed this shift even before explicitly asserting the “two Koreas policy” in late 2023. Signs included proposals for a “federal union system” (2014), the introduction of Pyongyang Standard Time (2015), the launch of the “Our State-First Principle” (2017-2021), revisions in the nationalistic phrase “Kim Il-sung’s nation, Kim Jong-il’s homeland” to “Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s homeland” (since 2019), the regime’s re-orientation toward a “two-state policy” during the 8th Party Congress (2021-2022), and the use of “Republic of Korea” in official statements from North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023). The study argues that North Korea’s push for the “two Koreas policy” reflects several key motivations: an ever deepening sense of siege mentality due to strengthened US, ROK, and Japan trilateral cooperation; disillusionment with the ROK government; resistance to unification through absorption; and concerns about internal stability. It also reflects a desire to reshape the North Korean national identity by eliminating notions of “kinship,” as well as the need to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s leadership. The chapter also discusses interpretations of this policy as either a tactical maneuver or a strategic shift and concludes that accepting the “two Koreas policy” is not only unnecessary, but that rejecting it would be significantly more advantageous.

Chapter V examines the perspectives and assessments of the four major powers—the US, Japan, China, and Russia—on the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, it analyzes official statements from the leaders of these countries, spanning from the Kim Young-sam to Moon Jae-in governments, evaluating each nation’s stance on unification.

Chapter VI re-evaluates the “National Community Unification Plan” and discusses strategies for garnering effective support from neighboring stakeholders. The “National Community Unification Plan” is significant for its vision of a gradual, phased unification process and for highlighting a “national community” based on national consensus. However, the plan faces limitations, such as difficulty adapting to the changing domestic and international situation, ambiguity in the stages it laid out, and a lack of concrete implementation strategies. The “August 15 Unification Doctrine” announced on August 15, 2024, marks a progressive advancement of the plan. It is commendable for its emphasis on universal values, focus on the North Korean populace over the regime, proactive international engagement, and specific action plans. Nonetheless, further refinement is needed, including steps to encourage North Korea’s engagement, assuage concerns over absorption-based unification, increase practical viability of implementation plans, and actively seek international solidarity. A review of past policy outreach revealed that promotional activities have largely been tied to the state of inter-Korean affairs, and have been generally one-dimensional, focusing on unidirectional information dissemination and targeting government authorities, experts, and overseas Koreans. To enhance support from neighboring stakeholders, it would be beneficial to conceptualize unification as a goal that transcends inter-Korean relations; transition from one-directional messaging to multidimensional, interactive approaches that promote active cooperation; and broaden the target audience from a select few to a more diverse and widespread audience.

The semiconductor industry is crucial not only for economic growth but also for leading future industries through innovation and technological development. Dominance in this sector is reflected through technological leadership, with leading nations at the forefront of scientific research and technological innovation, substantially contributing to global influence and economic competitiveness. Additionally, the semiconductor industry is vital for national security. Semiconductors are essential components in advanced weapons systems and are fundamental to nearly all modern military equipment and systems, including missiles, drones, radars, and communication devices. Consequently, controlling semiconductor supply chains and strategic technologies is critical for national security. Given the semiconductor industry’s importance, the battle for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China is central to their hegemonic rivalry. The United States has recognized that rapid advancements in China’s semiconductor technology could pose a significant risk to national security and has imposed various export controls, investment sanctions, and financial sanctions targeting China’s semiconductor industry. These U.S. measures impact not only China’s semiconductor industry but also significantly affect global semiconductor firms in Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and South Korea, leading to substantial changes in the global semiconductor supply chain. However, China already plays a significant role as a global hub in semiconductor manufacturing and supply, and there is keen interest in the outcomes of the U.S. sanctions.

This study addresses three critical questions to understand the core of this issue and provides an in-depth analysis:

1. Can China overcome U.S. sanctions and continue to develop its semiconductor industry?

2. What impact will U.S. sanctions on China’s semiconductor industry have on the global semiconductor industry and the current global semiconductor supply chain?

3. How will the U.S.-China semiconductor hegemony competition affect Korean semiconductor industry and economy, and howshould we prepare policy-wise?

The first question explores whether China’s semiconductor industry can overcome U.S. sanctions and enhance its position in the global semiconductor supply chain. This study answers by analyzing the competitiveness of the global semiconductor industry, including China, from 2000 to 2022, and comparing changes in competitiveness over the past two decades. The analysis uses UN Comtrade data to derive various competitiveness indices and also examines semiconductor technology competitiveness by analyzing patent registrations in the semiconductor field over the past 20 years for major countries and the top 10 global semiconductor companies.

The analysis of memory semiconductors showed that South Korea had the highest RSCA (Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage) and TSI (Trade Specialization Index) values, indicating strong competitiveness. In contrast, China showed a comparative advantage in production and export for most of the analysis period, asindicated by positive RSCA values, but its TSI values were negative throughout, indicating difficulties in achieving trade surpluses and overall lower competitiveness in the memory semiconductor industry. In the system semiconductor competitiveness analysis, Taiwan showed the highest competitiveness, followed by South Korea, which showed positive RSCA and TSI values. China, on the other hand, showed low competitiveness in the system semiconductor sector, with RSCA and TSI values between -0.5 and 0.

In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, Japan and the U.S. displayed high RSCA and TSI values, indicating strong competitiveness, while China showed very low competitiveness, with both indices close to -0.5 during the analysis period.

The technological competitiveness analysis based on patent registration data for memory semiconductors, system semiconductors, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment calculated indices such as RTA (Revealed Technological Advantage), TS (Technology Strength), CPP (Cites per Patent), and PII (Patent Impact Index). The results for China were similar to the trade data-based competitivenessanalysis, indicating a challenging situation for China to overcome U.S. sanctions in the short term. U.S. sanctions are expected to strictly limit China’s advanced chip production capabilities for the foreseeable future. Especially, the analysis based on semiconductor patent technology showed that global semiconductor manufacturers heavily rely on core technologies from the U.S., making it difficult for these companies to circumvent U.S. sanctions. However, the biggest problem the U.S. faces is securing active cooperation from global semiconductor companies and allies. There are significant conflicts between the U.S. and European countries over specific policies like the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and related subsidies. Global semiconductor companies are also likely to face substantial losses due to the sanctions, and there is considerable resistance to the U.S. administration’s policies, especially from EU countries, regarding how actively they will cooperate with U.S. policies against China. Additionally, active support from the Chinese government could greatly aid in enhancing the competitiveness of its semiconductor industry. Ironically, U.S. sanctions might actually accelerate innovation and self-reliance in China’s semiconductor sector, posing a short-term obstacle but unlikely to hinder the industry’s long-term development.

To answer the second question, this study analyzed the roles and positions of the countries in the global semiconductor supply chain through network analysis using trade data and firm-level supply-demand relations, focusing on global rankings and market shares in various semiconductor sectors. The analysis showed that China is already playing a significant role as a global hub in the semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment sectors, making it very difficult to quickly exclude or significantly reduce China’s role in the global semiconductor supply chain. In particular, the analysis of inter-firm cooperation and technology transfer relationships using Factset data showed that U.S. companies are major suppliers across the semiconductor industry, and applying a 0% de minimis rule would have a significant impact on the global semiconductor supply chain, making it impossible for most companies to evade these sanctions.

Despite these sanctions, it has been revealed that Chinese tech companies are importing and using advanced chips banned for export by the U.S. administration, and U.S. companies like NVIDIA are also circumventing sanctions by exporting modified semiconductor stargeted at the Chinese market. These incidents are occurring frequently, and the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions against China’s semiconductor industry depends on how much support the U.S. can secure from its allies. The U.S. is expected to transition to a multilateral export control system like the ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’ to fill the gaps in these sanctions.

Regarding the restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain, it is expected to bifurcate due to U.S. sanctions. Advanced semiconductor production is likely to shift to a supply chain system centered around the U.S. and its allies, while the supply chain system for general-purpose semiconductors is expected to strengthen around China. In particular, no country can produce general-purpose semiconductors as cheaply and competitively as China, which is expected to increase its global market share in this sector. Additionally, developing countries like India, Vietnam, and Thailand import the most semiconductor manufacturing equipment from China, and the establishment of a supply chain system for low-cost general-purpose semiconductor production between China and these countries is also an issue worth watching.

In addressing the third question, the study examined the impact of U.S. semiconductor sanctions on the Korean semiconductor industry through three scenarios: the control of exports for semiconductor manufacturing equipment, the control of exports for AI semiconductors, and the imposition of increased tariffs on China.

The first scenario involves export control of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, where South Korea experienced a significant decline in semiconductor equipment exports compared to other countries following the U.S. semiconductor equipment sanctions in October 2022. China’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment sharply decreased from October 2022, when U.S. sanctions began, to February 2023, but increased significantly from August 2023, eight months after the sanctions started. The U.S. initially saw a decrease in exports to China, but these later increased, and the Netherlands was not affected by the sanctions, with exports to China increasing. Even after controlling for variables such as the recent semiconductor business climate, South Korea’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment have significantly decreased, and this trend does not appear to be following any particular trend. Also, South Korean manufacturing equipment is almost not included in the U.S. sanction items, while the U.S., the Netherlands, and Japan have many items essential in the semiconductor manufacturing process, which Chinese companies would likely prioritize purchasing with their current capital.

The second scenario involves AI semiconductor export control, which assumes the worst-case scenario affecting DRAM production. In this scenario, the supply of DRAM for AI semiconductors is assumed to be delivered by TSMC after final assembly through Taiwan’s export of HBM. This scenario also showed a significant negative impact on the Korean economy.

The third scenario involves an increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese semiconductors under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, which imposes high tariffs. In this scenario, exports of semiconductors produced in China to the U.S. decreased, while South Korea’s exports to the U.S. increased long-term due to trade diversion effects.

In conclusion, only the increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese semiconductors is expected to have a positive impact on us due to trade diversion effects, while the export reduction of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI semiconductors such as HBM chips due to U.S. sanctions is expected to negatively affect us.

The U.S.-China semiconductor hegemony competition is already significantly limiting the business activities of our companies, and the negative impacts are likely to grow in the future. The U.S. is already responding to the potential impacts of this hegemony competition. The U.S. is relying on advanced semiconductor manufacturing by companies like Samsung and TSMC while fostering its domestic semiconductor companies like Intel and enhancing the backend chip post-processing capability through government subsidies to increase the resilience of the semiconductor supply chain.

In contrast, China, as previously discussed, is increasing its global market share centered on current legacy chips. In particular, the backend chip post-processing sector, which is technically less demanding and has a lower barrier to entry, could become an area where China can intentionally control the global supply chain based on its manufacturing capability and high market share. Therefore, such hegemonic disputes using this leverage are likely to continue between the U.S. and China, and the Korean government and companies need to prepare for this.

Korean companies have limitations in upgrading semiconductor manufacturing processes invested in China due to current U.S. sanctions on China. Therefore, in the medium to long term, advanced semiconductors are likely to be produced only in domestic or allied countries including the U.S. Ultimately, although production in China has been an optimal strategy for companies in terms of cost and market aspects, the U.S.-China hegemony competition makes it inevitable to relocate production bases for advanced semiconductor production. However, our current domestic semiconductor ecosystem is not more competitive than the ecosystem established in China.

This study recommends a series of policy measures aimed at bolstering the domestic semiconductor industry. These include strengthening the semiconductor manufacturing base and ecosystem, enhancing the added value of the industry, ensuring supply chain stability, and managing semiconductor operations in China effectively. It also suggests fortifying supply chain cooperation within the Korea-U.S.-Japan economic security alliance, controlling technology leaks, preventing talent outflow, and fostering a competitive innovation ecosystem. Additionally, the study advises managing supply chain risks, developing both short- and long-term production strategies, and promoting open trade policies and international cooperation.

This report identifies the opportunities and challenges present in post-war reconstruction programs of Ukraine, and provides implications for the participation of Korean companies. The study comprehensively analyzes past post-war reconstruction cases and recent international community discussion trends through review of literature on the subject, statistical analysis, expert interviews, and attendance at international conferences. While there is great interest in post-war recovery in Ukraine throughout the international community and Korea, it is difficult for governments and businesses to expand their participation due to the continuing uncertainty surrounding war conditions, and the lack of specific information on funding methods or investment profitability. As large-scale investments will certainly be made for Ukraine’s recovery after the end of the war, it is necessary to carefully design the government’s participation in international community discussions and the direction of corporate investment, considering the current war situation and overall conditions.

Chapters 2–4 of this report conducted research on three major topics to provide reference materials for the participation of the Korean government and businesses in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction programs.

In Chapter 2 we conduct an analysis of major past post-war recovery cases to present the main principles and precautions for participating in reconstruction projects. More than simple restoration of destroyed infrastructure, post-war reconstruction should be seen as an opportunity for a comprehensive overhaul of economic and social systems. This was evidently observed in cases such as the Marshall Plan after World War II, U.S. aid after the Korean War, and the reconstruction of the West Balkans in the 1990s. The Marshall Plan contributed to European economic recovery and the establishment of a market economy system, while in Korea’s case, U.S. aid laid the foundation for a liberal system. The Balkans are still undergoing reconstruction with EU-centered support, but challenges remain. Lessons learned from these cases are as follows: First, economic aid is effective when linked to improvements in the recipient country’s political and economic structure. Second, support tailored to the recipient country’s situation is necessary. Third, support that benefits both donor and recipient countries is important. Fourth, international cooperation enables the mobilization of funds to meet reconstruction needs and build international order. Korea’s participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction should also consider these points and participate not only in facility restoration but also in institutional improvement and international peacekeeping efforts.

Chapter 3 examined the current status of international community discussions on Ukraine’s reconstruction, the costs and direction of Ukraine’s reconstruction projects, governance, and key contents of core projects. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, discussions on Ukraine’s reconstruction projects have been active in the West. Major Western countries and international organizations intend to modernize social infrastructure and integrate Ukraine into the EU economy. This will be enabled through attracting large-scale investments, EU integration, and application of digital and net-zero technologies, which are the main topics discussed in a series of international conferences on Ukraine’s recovery. As of the end of December 2023, the total amount of damages sustained by Ukraine and its needs are estimated at $486 billion, about 2.8 times Ukraine’s nominal GDP in 2023. The reconstruction costs are expected to increase as infrastructure continues to be destructed due to the war. Energy, transportation, housing construction, and health are the key areas that should be most urgently recovered. We summarized major projects and implementation plans for each area at the end of this chapter.

In Chapter 4, we examine the magnitude of support toward Ukraine’s reconstruction by international organizations and major countries, and discussed how to mobilize public and private funding considering sustainability and risk management. As Ukraine’s fiscal instability deepens due to uncertainties from the prolonged war, it heavily depends on support from international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and major countries including the EU, G7, and Poland. To this end, the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP) was launched in January 2023 to coordinate short- and mid- to long-term Ukraine support directions and mechanisms among various donors. This reflects the international community’s common understanding that international support alone is clearly limited for Ukraine’s stable recovery and reconstruction, and that attracting private capital is essential. The international community now discusses ways to utilize frozen Russian sovereign assets as reconstruction funds within legally possible limits, and an agreement has been reached at the G7 level on how to use the annual interest income from frozen Russian assets. In addition, discussions on practical risk management measures such as strengthening public-private partnerships (PPP), compensation for losses due to political and commercial risks, and customized policy support are deepening to activate private funding.

Based on these research results, Chapter 5 presents the current status of Korean companies’ participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction projects and future support measures. Korea is paving the way for its companies to participate based on the EDCF basic agreement with the Ukrainian government and six leading projects. The One Team Korea Ukraine Reconstruction Cooperation Delegation includes not only government ministries such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, but also public enterprises such as Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH), Korea Water Resources Corporation, and Korea Overseas Infrastructure & Urban Development Corporation (KIND), as well as some private companies exploring the possibilities of reconstruction projects. To facilitate their smooth participation in reconstruction projects, this report proposes six support measures: first, establishing a pan-ministerial support organization under the Prime Minister for formulating reconstruction participation strategies and overseeing related ministries; second, supporting the development of integrated public-private partnership (PPP) projects throughout the project lifecycle; third, providing investment information in six key areas: energy, transportation, housing, infrastructure, industry, and complex fields; fourth, mitigating investment risks through the development of insurance products, participation in consortiums with major donor country companies, and utilization of MDCP; fifth, joint entry into reconstruction projects using Poland as a base; and sixth, strengthening bilateral cooperation with Ukraine, including KSP projects, and joint participation in multilateral cooperation.

The war will end someday, and regardless of how it ends, massive resources will certainly be poured into post-war recovery. Korea needs to set the right direction and prepare now so that it can contribute to this historic post-war reconstruction. The economic benefits gained by participating companies will be given as a bonus.

This research studies the role of international trade in the economic growth paths of five Southeast Asian nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam). We evaluate the export-led growth strategies of the five nations and derive policy implications for Korea.

Chapter 2 elaborates on the economic growth paths of the five nations from the perspective of economic growth convergence. Introducing the comparative approach with growth convergence analysis allows the authors to delineate how the economic growth paths of these five Southeast Asian nations should be understood in terms of the speed and magnitude of the convergence. We find that the speed and magnitude of growth convergence in the five Southeast Asian nations are faster and more prominent compared to the world average. Country-specific estimations confirm that economic convergence is significantly explicit in Malaysia and Thailand, resonating with “middle-income trap” diagnoses on both nations.

We extend discussions by comparing growth convergence in these five Southeast Asian nations to that in the three East Asian nations of China, Japan, and Korea. Growth convergence is significantly identified in four nations: Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. These four nations have already experienced rapid economic growth. Malaysia and Thailand followed convergent growth paths before joining the high-income group, and this is marked as a big difference compared to Japan and Korea, where growth convergence started after they had become high-income nations.

In nations currently undergoing accelerated economic growth, such as China and Vietnam, economic growth convergence is not statistically significant. We also could not find evidence of growth convergence in Indonesia and the Philippines. As growth convergence cannot be directly linked to growth slowdown, we analyzed the dynamics of structural change in four nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) that have accessible sectoral data. We ascertained whether a sector with higher productivity attracts more labor share within a national economy. If this productive labor reallocation is shown to occur, we can say that a country is going through growth-enhancing structural change, which is a critical factor for long-run rapid growth. According to our estimations, neither of these four nations is going through growth-enhancing structural change.

Chapter 3 clarifies how exports in the five nations are related to their economic growth. We obtain country-level export productivity measures following existing literature and estimate how export productivity can explain the economic growth of each nation. In Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, export productivity has contributed to economic growth. However, in Malaysia and the Philippines, export productivity has not contributed to economic growth. The five nations are actively implementing export-led growth strategies to overcome the “middle-income trap” and accelerate their entry into a high-income economy. Chapter 4 comprehensively reviews and evaluates the history of export-led growth strategies in the five nations.

Chapter 5 extends the discussions in Chapter 4 by focusing on recent export-led growth strategies in the 2020s. Indonesia’s Making Indonesia 4.0 project and National RPJMN five-year plan, Malaysia’s New Industrial Master Plan 2030, National Trade Blueprint 2021-2025, the Philippines’ Philippine Development Plan 2023-2028 and Philippine Export Development Plan 2023-2028, Thailand’s 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), Thailand 4.0 Strategy and MoC Action Plan, and Vietnam’s Strategy on Exports and Imports and expansion of its trade promotion agency (VIETRADE) are introducing export-led growth strategies under the goals and constraints that these five nations are facing. All strategies target the maximized utilization of their respective comparative advantages to promote export growth and job creation.

Based on the recent export-led growth strategies of the five nations outlined in Chapter 5, we derive implications for Korean trade and investment in the areas of ① country-specific optimized cooperation, ② critical minerals/food supply chain cooperation, and ③ cooperation in future strategic industries. First, in the first area, country-specific optimized cooperation, some of the flagship projects in Chapter 5 could provide mutually beneficial business opportunities with Korea. For example, Malaysia clarifies its goals in aerospace industries in its New Industrial Master Plan 2030. Korea established the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) in 2024, which is poised to expand its activities in international cooperation. The Philippine Export Development Plan 2023-2028 suggests how the Philippines can utilize comparative advantages in labor-intensive sectors to attract investment. This can provide incentives for Korean businesses concerned about labor costs in Korea and its low fertility rate issues.

In the second area, critical minerals/food supply chain cooperation, we focus on national strategies provided by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. As a net importer of critical minerals and food, Korea can proactively suggest cooperation packages through which it can contribute to the economic security of Korea and export promotion of the five Southeast Asian nations. For the third area, cooperation in future strategic industries, Korea can collaborate with all five nations in green transition, digital transformation, and semiconductor industries, which are commonly mentioned in each nation’s national strategies in Chapter 5. Working with Korean businesses allows these nations to avoid a dichotomous choice issue between the US and China. Also, as Korean businesses have already attained considerable local networks in ASEAN economies, they can serve as key contributors in constructing an ASEAN-friendly global value chain in future strategic industries.

This paper delves into the perceptions of urban residents in developing countries on climate change, underscoring the importance of these insights in formulating effective climate policies. As urban areas in these regions experience rapid growth and heightened vulnerability due to climate impacts, understanding local perspectives becomes crucial for both mitigating and adapting to climate change effectively.

The study contributes to the body of knowledge on public perceptions of climate change, focusing particularly on the urban populations of developing countries. Despite existing literature on the subject, there remains a scarcity of research concerning cross-national variations in climate change perception within this demographic, which this paper seeks to address. To gather detailed empirical evidence, we conducted an online survey with participants from eight major cities in countries across Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. The survey primarily assessed climate change awareness, the perceived personal impact of climate changes, and evaluations of governmental and international responses.

The findings reveal that awareness and concerns about climate change significantly differ among urban populations, influenced by educational level, economic status, and direct climate impact experiences. Furthermore, the study explores the heterogeneity in perceptions, which is shaped by a complex interplay of demographic and socio-economic factors. This diversity in perceptions impacts the public's willingness to engage in climate change adaptation measures and supports varied policy preferences at the domestic and international levels.

Also, the findings emphasize the necessity for policymakers to consider the diverse perceptions of urban residents when implementing climate policies. Engaging these communities in developing countries is crucial for achieving widespread support and effective climate action. This approach aligns with the broader goals of sustainable development and international cooperation on climate challenges. By gaining a deeper understanding of varied urban perceptions, policymakers can more effectively prioritize actions and allocate resources in areas where the impact of climate change is most severe and the potential for meaningful change is significant.

In the context of the prolonged and structured U.S.-China strategic competition, the three countries which we examine - the United States, China, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) - must find ways to maximize their respective national interests and value. Nevertheless, due to a lack of mutual understanding between the three countries, they are focusing on attacking each other’s vulnerabilities rather than on long-term strategies for cooperation and competition, thus maximizing their costs. This study is motivated by the need to discuss an approach that conceptualizes the U.S.-China-ROK triangle as a multi-dimensional matrix to address these issues.

This study aims to examine points of conflict and interdependence within the trilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea, the United States, and China. As the dynamics in the trilateral relationship become more complex, progress can be limited and strategic planning becomes more challenging. Thus, this study begins with the premise that it is difficult to perform three-dimensional analysis by examining only the interaction of the three bilateral relationships that form a triangle. In addition to demonstrating the demand for each other, as well as conflicts that may result from consideration of core interests in the interaction of bilateral relations, this study seeks to explore the possibility of stereoscopic and three-dimensional analysis of trilateral relations as a whole.

Building upon this study, the United States and Republic of Korea should work in the direction of expanding their intersecting areas while reducing areas of divergence. The ROK’s strategy should be to increase convergence with the United States and decrease divergence with China. By doing so, it can expand the space for coexistence with China and strengthen its trust relationship with the United States. With the intersection of the U.S.-Korea relationship expanding, it is natural for crises in the Sino-Korea relationship to arise, but there are gaps and places of coexistence within the U.S.-China strategic competition if the parties understand each other’s priorities and red lines and expand the intersections within Korea-China relations.