The study examines methodologies for quantitatively analyzing the impact of global supply chain fragmentation and applies these approaches to scenarios involving critical minerals. It identifies two primary analytical approaches: microeconomic and macroeconomic.

Microeconomic methods provide detailed insights at the item or firm level but face challenges due to limited access to specific supply chain data. Macroeconomic methods, while suitable for industry- or national-level analysis, often rely on unrealistic assumptions when applied to item-level fragmentation. Despite the significant macroeconomic effects of disruptions in critical supply chains, existing item-level analysis techniques struggle to capture these impacts accurately. For instance, efforts to link item-level analysis with GDP using linear programming or inoperability input-output analysis often encounter limitations due to rigid assumptions about input-output structures. High-tech items, in particular, pose challenges due to their complex supply chain interdependencies and their significant influence on final production.

To address these issues, the study proposes an integrated methodology combining machine learning techniques for microeconomic analysis with the OECD METRO model for macroeconomic evaluation. This approach considers key issues and transmission channels identified in previous research. The study also reviews critical mineral management policies in major economies such as the United States, European Union, China, and Korea. The United States identifies critical minerals essential for economic and national security through legislative measures like the 2020 Energy Act and has implemented strategies to strengthen North American supply chain resilience. The European Union has updated its critical raw materials list every three years since 2008 and enacted the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024 to expand production capacity and enhance international cooperation. China, despite lacking a clear legal definition of critical minerals, strengthens its resource management through export controls and cooperation with resource-rich countries. Korea designated 33 minerals as critical through its 2023 Critical Minerals Securing Strategy, prioritizing 10 strategic minerals essential for industries like electric vehicles and semiconductors. However, Korea’s reliance on imports for most critical minerals highlights its vulnerability.

The study conducts a vulnerability analysis of Korea’s critical mineral supply chains using indicators such as the Trade Specialization Index (TSI) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). It identifies high global supply chain concentration in minerals like cobalt, lithium, and neodymium, which are crucial for secondary batteries and electric vehicles. To assess geopolitical risks, it examines import trends from China across seven countries from 2017 to 2023. Sharp declines in imports of gallium, graphite, and rare earth elements suggest potential disruptions due to trade conflicts or export controls.

The study employs a Dual-Stage Attention-Based Recurrent Neural Network (DA-RNN) model to predict the impact of critical mineral fragmentation on Korea’s exports of key items like batteries and semiconductors under three scenarios involving germanium, graphite, and rare earth elements. The results show significant decreases in export values across all scenarios. For example, restrictions on germanium imports led to a 3.9% decline in battery exports, while rare earth element shortages caused a 10.8% drop.

Using the OECD METRO model, the study evaluates the macroeconomic impact of critical mineral fragmentation under two approaches: direct analysis of import disruptions (Approach 1) and integration of microeconomic results into macroeconomic simulations (Approach 2). The findings indicate that germanium fragmentation could reduce Korea’s real GDP by 0.15%, while graphite and rare earth element disruptions could lead to decreases of 0.14% and 0.89%, respectively.

Based on these findings, the study recommends strengthening supply chain monitoring systems by integrating fragmented platforms across government agencies and establishing a centralized control tower. It also suggests diversifying procurement strategies, promoting R&D for substitute materials, and supporting SMEs through digital-based supply chain management platforms. Additionally, it emphasizes harmonizing policies with major economies to prevent over-securitization and redundant investments while expanding international cooperation for joint mineral exploration and development projects.

Since the onset of the U.S.-China trade dispute, economic tensions between the two countries have persisted, with the Biden administration maintaining a hardline stance on China. With the recent return of the Trump administration, a large-scale tariff war is once again anticipated, making thorough analysis and policy responses increasingly critical. This study examines the impact of the tariff war triggered by the U.S.-China trade dispute on the Korean economy, and derives policy implications based on the findings.

First, the U.S. tariff increases on Chinese goods have led to a decline in Korea’s exports to the U.S. and a reduction in imports from China, thereby reshaping trade flows. However, the strengthening of U.S. non-tariff barriers has increased Korea’s exports to the U.S., particularly in consumer goods, suggesting that Korea can play a crucial role as an alternative supplier. Consequently, the Korean government and businesses must diversify their markets beyond key trading partners by expanding into emerging markets such as Southeast Asia and Latin America to mitigate trade risks. To achieve this, the government and research institutions should systematically collect and analyze data on the economic, political, legal, and consumer trends of these emerging markets and provide relevant insights to businesses.

Furthermore, to diversify its export industries, Korea must enhance its manufacturing competitiveness and foster high-value-added industries. Given the complementary nature of Korea’s exports of industrial goods to the U.S. with those of China, an increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods could potentially lead to a decline in Korea’s exports to the U.S. Therefore, Korea should diversify its export portfolio to include not only industrial goods such as semiconductors and machinery but also consumer goods, thereby mitigating the negative impact of trade disputes. To achieve this, Korea should continuously invest in research and development (R&D) to advance products and services while enhancing industrial processes through expanded investments in Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and R&D. Additionally, policies should be implemented to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by promoting technological innovation and providing tax incentives to strengthen overall industrial competitiveness.

Additionally, a systematic response to non-tariff barriers is required. Amid ongoing trade disputes and rising protectionism, non-tariff barriers have been reinforced alongside tariffs, often offsetting the effects of tariff policies. Thus, focusing solely on countering the negative effects of tariff measures may introduce unnecessary uncertainty, underscoring the need for a comprehensive response that also addresses non-tariff barriers. Accordingly, response strategies should take into account the simultaneous impact of systematic trade policies, including tariff and non-tariff measures. Moreover, a preemptive monitoring and early warning system should be established to continuously track trends in non-tariff barriers and enable swift policy responses.

Next, adjustments to foreign direct investment (FDI) strategies are necessary. Following U.S. tariff increases on Chinese goods, Korean multinational corporations (MNCs) have shown a tendency to increase their FDI in the U.S., a trend particularly evident among large enterprises. Meanwhile, although the number of subsidiaries of Korean MNCs operating in China has been declining—particularly among firms with higher import shares and heavily dependent on the global value chain—, the overall scale of FDI to China has not significantly decreased. This suggests that firms are reallocating their investments in China more efficiently. In particular, U.S. tariff measures on Chinese goods have created opportunities for Korean firms to expand their investments into third countries such as ASEAN, leading to increased FDI in this region. This trend reflects ASEAN’s advantages, including low production costs and strengthened connectivity with both the U.S. and Chinese markets, positioning it as an attractive alternative investment destination for Korean firms. Therefore, the Korean government should formulate policies to support the FDI strategies of Korean businesses while also considering measures to prevent the hollowing out of domestic industries.

Finally, ensuring flexible macroeconomic stability policies, including foreign exchange market and monetary policies, is crucial. Analyzing past U.S. trade policy shifts reveals that as U.S.-China trade conflicts intensified, trade policy uncertainty increased before tariff adjustments. This led to a depreciation of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar and heightened exchange rate volatility. The impact of trade policy uncertainty did not have a statistically significant effect on Korea’s key macroeconomic variables, as its influence on exports and imports was offset by the depreciation of the Korean won. However, U.S. tariff increases negatively affected Korea’s total production and dollar-denominated exports, partially explained by changes in the won-dollar exchange rate and price levels. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that Korea’s macroeconomic policies can respond more swiftly and flexibly. Coordination between monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies should be strengthened to maintain economic stability.

In summary, changes in U.S.-China trade policy have significantly increased trade costs between the two countries, leading to reduced trade volumes and rising import costs, with substantial structural impacts on third-country economies, including Korea. Consequently, the Korean government and businesses must develop strategies to adapt flexibly to the evolving trade environment, followed by further research and policy discussions should continue. In particular, to minimize the negative impact of the prolonged U.S.-China trade dispute on Korea’s trade environment, more sophisticated trade policies should be formulated, and measures should be implemented to support Korean firms’ FDI strategies amid growing protectionist trends.

Additionally, policy support should be strengthened to enable Korean firms to respond flexibly to the restructuring of global value chains. Furthermore, institutional improvements are needed to enhance the speed and flexibility of macroeconomic policies, allowing for effective responses to exchange rate volatility amid increasing uncertainty in U.S. trade policy. Through these measures, Korea must establish a comprehensive strategy to ensure continued economic growth and competitiveness despite the U.S.-China trade conflict and shifts in U.S. trade policy with other countries.

Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, the country has rapidly expanded its international development cooperation efforts. Today, Korea ranks 15th among the 31 DAC member countries in terms of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on evaluating the outcomes of these aid initiatives and identifying ways to enhance their effectiveness. The government is actively exploring strategies to improve ODA performance, with a particular focus on project packaging, large- scale project development, and branding.

In parallel with this budgetary expansion and the drive for increased effectiveness, building a knowledge ecosystem for international development cooperation has become a central priority for all stakeholders involved. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), development consulting firms, academic associations, and research institutes all play vital roles in this process to ensure greater impact. Facilitating smooth interaction between these stakeholders is crucial for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international development cooperation efforts. Furthermore, managing the supply and demand for professional human resources is key to strengthening the knowledge ecosystem. Policymakers should focus on how to train and effectively deploy entry-level professionals in this field.

The primary aim of this study is to identify the policy measures needed to train and utilize entry-level professionals, a critical factor for more efficient and effective implementation of international development cooperation in Korea, where the knowledge ecosystem is still in its early stages. In addition to a comprehensive literature review, the study employs two other research methodologies. First, a survey was conducted among graduates and current students of graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) at selected universities. The aim was to gather practical insights into the current state of education and training for entry-level professionals, thus yielding policy recommendations. Second, case studies were carried out in Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom to identify lessons that could be applied to Korea’s context.

The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the research identified several key challenges in the operation of the knowledge ecosystem, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of professional human resources. On the supply side, three primary obstacles were identified: (ⅰ) the lack of an integrated curriculum that balances both field knowledge and practical experience; (ⅱ) insufficient synergy between regional expertise education and courses related to international development cooperation; and (ⅲ) the underperformance of the qualification system for professionals in this field. On the demand side, two factors hinder the effective functioning of the ecosystem: (ⅰ) the lack of competitiveness among private consulting firms capable of executing ODA projects efficiently and effectively; and (ⅱ) the absence of a robust support system for job placement and career development for professionals.

Based on these findings, the study offers three key policy recommendations. First, it is recommended that the government reorganize the national education system for training professional human resources and play a more active role in this process. While the government has concentrated on quantitative expansion of the ODA budget since joining the OECD DAC, it is now essential to prioritize quality assurance by assessing how effectively and efficiently the budget is being utilized. A critical aspect of this process is improving the quality of professionals involved in international development cooperation, which aligns with the main objective of this study. To achieve this, we recommend that the government review existing human resource training programs, with a focus on supporting select graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) that provide foundational education for professionals. By enhancing the quality of their programs and expanding their reach, the government can significantly improve overall training standards. Additionally, programs run by public institutions like KOICA should be expanded and strengthened through increased budgets and synergies with GSIS programs. In the medium to long term, the study suggests considering the establishment of a “National Graduate School for International Development Cooperation” (tentative name), where the government would take a more direct role in training professional human resources.

Second, to ensure more efficient and effective use of the national budget, we recommend the creation of a demand base for professional human resources by increasing the participation of private consulting firms. Although this sector is still in its infancy, involving more private consulting firms is essential for expanding the demand for qualified professionals. Development consulting is a high-value knowledge industry, and greater participation from private firms will facilitate the accumulation of valuable knowledge and experience. This, in turn, can benefit Korea’s international development cooperation efforts and foster opportunities for collaboration on larger-scale ODA projects led by international organizations such as the World Bank and ADB.

Third, while the first two recommendations focus on the supply and demand sides of professional human resources, it is equally important to ensure smooth matching between the two to maximize the efficiency of job support and employment services. Our recommendation is to establish an integrated platform to manage professional human resources in international development cooperation. This platform should act as a two-way mechanism, facilitating job matching and capacity building for both early-career and mid-level professionals, ensuring more efficient alignment between the supply of trained professionals and the demand for their skills.

This study investigates the consideration of unintended effects within South Korea’s burgeoning Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs. Despite Korea’s growing role as an emerging donor, research on the unintended consequences of its aid interventions remains limited. This analysis addresses this gap by examining how key Korean ODA implementing agencies, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) and the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH), address unintended consequences in their evaluation reports.

Employing a mixed-methods approach – literature review, text analysis, and qualitative content analysis – the study explores the extent to which these agencies analyze and report on unintended effects in evaluations conducted over the past decade. Text analysis of agency reports (extracted from KOICA, KEXIM and KOFIH websites) identifies the frequency and nature of unintended effects discussed, utilizing software (CAQDAS) and keyword searches (“unintended,” “unplanned,” etc.). Thematic analysis then categorizes identified effects based on established typologies(Koch 2024; Jabeen 2018).

Findings reveal that Korea’s major aid agencies analyzed unintended effects in approximately 8% of evaluations, with KOICA featuring a balanced view of both positive and negative effects, while KEXIM and KOFIH focused predominantly on positive effects. The most frequently observed positive unintended effect was the spill-over effects, spread of benefits to non-beneficiary groups and area, fostering community solidarity, economic gains, and empowerment for women. A microcredit program targeting women for increased household income inadvertently led to partners’ awareness of women’s economic and social capacity, leading to enhanced understanding of human rights. Additionally, a cross-sectoral effect was observed in a school feeding program, where children’s educational outcomes improved as a result of better nutrition.

In contrast, negative unintended effects, such as elite capture and regressive targeting—wherein benefits unintentionally excluded vulnerable populations—highlighted gaps in project design and stakeholder engagement. Notably, rural development programs like the Samaeul initiative were found to unintentionally benefit wealthier farmers, excluding poorer ones (regressive targeting, Koch, 2024). Similarly, vocational training for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-conflict settings risked unintended discrimination within IDP communities, potentially undermining social cohesion. In microcredit program targeting former refugee villagers provided loans for agricultural activity, unintentionally marginalizing female-led/elderly-led household as they tend to have insufficient labor to increase agricultural productivity.

Conversely, macro-level effects like anti-aid sentiments, governance issues, and environmental impacts were rarely mentioned. These findings may be attributed to factors like East Asian cultural tendencies that discourage open discussions about failure, the relatively recent and smaller scale of Korean interventions, and the absence of a colonial past unlike traditional donors.

Additional semi-structured interviews with domestic and international evaluation experts, reaffirmed the study’s conclusions and contributed to refining its recommendations. The analysis underscores the importance of developing more complexity theory and systems thinking based Theory of Changes that could help predict and indentify not only intended but also potential unintended consequences of the evaluated intervention. Strategies include assessing risks and designing safeguards for negative unintended effects during project planning, fostering mechanisms to enhance positive spillover, and strengthening human rights and gender considerations. In performance management, recommendations emphasize monitoring not only outputs and outcomes but also underlying assumptions and risks, and refining ToRs to mandate or recommend UIE evaluation where relevant. Additionally, evaluators could adopt open-ended, exploratory interview technique and evaluation methods like outcome harvesting, and participatory narrative inquiry (PNI) which are arguably better suited to identify the unintended effects in development interventions.

The study suggests institutional measures to conduct more strategic evaluations with long-term perspectives. Establishing a culture that distinguishes evaluation from auditing is also recommended as a precondition for further discussion and evaluation of unintended effects of international development cooperation as donor agencies are reluctant to openly discuss the unintended effects of their intervention, which are often perceived as negative results of mismanagement of taxpayer’s money.

This study marks the first in-depth examination of unintended effects in Korean ODA evaluations. By comparing practices across donor countries and defining unintended effects in the Korean context, the study provides critical insights for enhancing developmental effectiveness, helping policymakers, evaluation managers, and researchers consider new, often-overlooked aspects of development cooperation. Importantly, this research underlines the need to address both planned and unintended effects in Korea’s ODA, setting a foundation for resilient, inclusive, and sustainable aid interventions.

To address the complex challenges in international development, the role of social enterprises, particularly social ventures, is increasingly vital. These enterprises employ innovative and sustainable approaches to tackle multifaceted issues, by blending social objectives with economic gain and bridging corporate structures and nonprofit organizations. They offer effective solutions to development challenges through innovative approaches and technological integration, fostering a close collaboration with marginalized communities and local groups in developing countries. Nevertheless, activities and studies on the role of social enterprises in international development, especially in terms of individual corporate activities, remain limited due to institutional constraints and scarcity of information available. This study focuses on the features of social enterprises to illustrate their roles and contributions within the context of international development cooperation. By focusing on social ventures as the main form of social enterprise in international development, this study attempts to move beyond previous limitations and yield practical insights on facilitating the participation of social enterprises in international development, and to increase their impact.

Following an introduction of the study, Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for understanding some essential characteristics of social enterprises. Our research highlights the lack of a universal definition for social enterprises and the varying scope of these organizations across different countries. In Chapter 2, we examine discussions at the OECD and UN, along with the background and status of social enterprises in major countries.

Our review found that the countries have formed distinctive social enterprise institutions according to their macro policy background. We also discovered that they apply flexibility on the definition and scope over time. Notably, the UK, France, and Denmark, which saw the development of social enterprise institutions starting in the late 1990s, promoted social enterprise as a means to complement government welfare. Therefore, these nations emphasize the main feature of social enterprises as businesses that prioritize social value. In contrast, the development of social enterprises came into prominence in the Netherlands during the 2000s. In the Netherlands, social enterprises flourished as skilled personnel from civil society organizations entered the private sector. Unlike other countries, the Netherlands maintains a flexible perspective on determining social enterprises, foregoing any legal limitations on the forms of social enterprises. Well-known for its vibrant tradition in civil society engagement, the United States recognizes social enterprises through various legal frameworks. Flexibility is allowed in the social values pursued by each enterprise. Likewise, international organizations such as the OECD and the UN also provide flexible definitions of social enterprises. The organizations position social enterprises as key players in addressing evolving and intricate development issues.

In South Korea, institutions for social enterprises were developed during the 1990s with a strong focus on job creation. As a result, a narrower official stance toward “social enterprises” was formed, compared to the other countries discussed in this chapter. In a broader perspective, other forms of social enterprises also exist in Korea, such as self-supporting enterprises, cooperatives, village enterprises, and social ventures. This study focuses particularly on social ventures, which are defined most inclusively and have the institutional capacity to engage in international activities.

Chapter 3 compares and analyzes approaches and support programs in the UK, Netherlands, and the United States. These countries actively promote private sector participation in international development. For example, the UK has been supporting social enterprises since the 2000s, mainly through capacity-building. Since 2015, there is a shift towards indirect impact investment – through development finance institution, from direct capacity support.

The Netherlands has traditionally underscored the pursuit of national interests by encouraging private sector participation in international development. It is currently pursuing social value by requiring corporate social responsibility in all business-engaged international development activities. In addition to technical support (consulting, networking), the Netherlands also provides financial support, often employing indirect support for local companies in developing countries through development finance institutions.

The United States maintains robust private sector involvement in international development. The U.S. promotes the participation of socially innovative enterprises in line with USAID’s Private Sector Engagement (PSE) policy. Enterprises are supported through financial aid, advisory support, networking, and research collaboration. The U.S. distinguishes itself from other donors by providing direct funding to social ventures through development finance institutions (DFIs), therefore, leveraging additional private investment.

In contrast, Korea ‘s support programs for social ventures remain at a nascent stage. KOICA’s Creative Technology Solution (CTS) supports the initial business development of startups and ventures with innovative technology. Under the KOICA Innovative Business Solutions (IBS) project, there have been co-financing with domestic social impact investors to discover, nurture, and support local startups in developing countries.

The following chapter provides a review of Korean social ventures, including those participating in KOICA’s CTS program, as well as case studies of companies active in international development cooperation. Findings indicate that most KOICA CTS participants are registered as ventures, not as social ventures or (preliminary) social enterprises. They are predominantly classified as impact ventures or conventional ventures with some commitment to social value. On the other hand, companies interviewed for the case study identified themselves as social ventures, highlighting a gap between institutional classification and self-perception.

Examples of social ventures engaged in international development cooperation include Enuma Korea (education), Vuno (healthcare), Wiplet (water), Cornerstone T&M, Greengoods (rural development), Verywords, Envelops, and Pharos Marine (technology, environment, energy). These enterprises were initiated or adapted their business goals to prioritize social value creation in developing countries. Many leverage innovative technologies or mature business models to establish profitable structures, while utilizing public support to enhance their business model and to secure investments. In addition, many of them work closely with local stakeholders, ranging from the government to NGOs and community residents.

Lastly, Chapter 5 analyzes and presents the findings to identify key constraints in stimulating social venture participation in international development cooperation: (1) the gap between institutional frameworks and on-the-ground realities, (2) the lack of opportunities, and (3) the scarcity of entrepreneurs in development cooperation. To address these challenges we suggest a revision of policies related to social enterprises. In Korea, the Social Enterprise Promotion Act, enacted in 2007, has remained largely unchanged, failing to adequately reflect today’s social challenges and corporate realities. Drawing on the UN’s experience of amending social enterprise roles to address evolving demands, as well as OECD Guidelines on social enterprise institutions, adjustments to the social enterprise framework are essential. This should include revisions in the certification system and an expanded scope for social enterprises to reflect contemporary challenges, such as aging population, inequality, and environmental issues. Furthermore, it is imperative to enhance the efficacy of the institutional framework by providing tangible benefits to businesses. Many companies participating in the KOICA CTS are registered under the venture enterprise system, which offers substantial benefits such as tax exemption, low interest rate loans, R&D support, and so on. This stems from how registration as social or social venture enterprises provides no tangible benefits to these businesses, which in turn highlights the need for incentives within the social enterprise framework, as seen in the U.S., which provides practical incentives to enterprises with social missions.

Secondly, there is a need to expand programs that potential entrepreneurs can access. This will lead to fostering social enterprises involved in international development cooperation as well as revitalizing the private sector ecosystem in international development. Taking on from the lessons learned, current programs such as the KOICA CTS and IBS can play an even more pivotal role in attracting and fostering potential entrepreneurs in international development. In the long-term, it would be beneficial to explore impact investment for enterprises tackling development issues through development finance institutions, as in the cases of the UK, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Lastly, there is a need to cultivate entrepreneurs who possess a strong understanding of and interest in international development. The social ventures reviewed in this study can be broadly categorized into two types: those that focus on developing innovative solutions aimed primarily at developing countries ("social purpose-driven" ventures) and those that aim to apply innovative solutions to the local challenges in developing countries through entrepreneurial spirit (“innovation-driven" ventures). Strengthening the developmental impact of innovation-driven enterprises while enhancing the business models of social purpose-driven enterprises will improve the sustainability of their solutions and operations. The Dutch example could serve as a useful reference in reinforcing development objectives within existing programs. At the same time, it is also crucial to identify and nurture potential entrepreneurs who are willing to modify their business activities to fit developing countries.

This study aimed to gain comprehensive understanding of the form and characteristics of social enterprises in Korea to increase their participation in international development. The study seeks to assess the effectiveness of support programs and identify challenges from the perspective of the businesses. Furthermore, as a policy study, it compares Korea’s social enterprise systems and programs with those in other countries to identify areas for improvement. This research provides an overview of social enterprise development in international organizations, various countries, and Korea. It also documents the experiences of companies involved in these activities. Subsequent policy researches are expected to bridge the gap between policy and business activities. We also hope that the business cases analyzed in the report will serve as valuable references for increased participation of social entrepreneurs in international development cooperation.

India is a digital market with huge potential and influence. India is actively building a data governance system; Of all the digital policies currently in place or being established in India, about 25% (53 policies) are related to data governance. Against this backgroud, we study the data governance policies and regulations in India, as well as the cooperation between India and major countries, and cases of companies.

Chapter 2 analyses India’s top-level data policy framework that forms the foundation of the data economy and the data regulations that govern its implementation. India is considering a long-term, comprehensive data governance framework such as the ‘National Data Governance Policy (draft)’. It is also building a government-led data accumulation and utilisation system, India Stack. The establishment of a government-led data ecosystem is a key feature of India's digital transformation policy and has the potential to spread as an alternative to other latecomers to digital transformation.

India's data regulations are in line with global standards while seeking its own path. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 is business-friendly and avoids excessive restrictions. It is characterised by the introduction of a negative approach that allows cross-border data transfer in principle. However, sector-specific data localisation regulations are applied, and there are some parts that need to be specified in application. The Non-Personal Data Governance Framework (draft) announced in 2020 expresses the government's intention to create data platforms and data marketplaces, but further discussions are needed regarding the possibility of excessive restrictions. The Digital India Act (draft, 2023) is a comprehensive legal framework that responds to the rapid growth of new technologies and large technology companies represented by platforms. Through this, the regulatory environment for large technology companies in India will be newly established. It is likely that data regulations will be introduced for new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as transparency standards for data processing based on types of platforms.

In Chapter 3, we analysed the aspects of data governance in India expressed through digital trade policy. India has maintained a protectionist stance on data openness in WTO negotiations and bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and the EU. The US government has been raising the issue of data barriers with India, but given India's strategic importance, it is unlikely that the US government will exert bilateral trade pressure. However, it is likely that US companies will continue to raise issues and exert influence on India's data policy.

The EU and India are placing more emphasis on discussions about data governance in general rather than regulations, and it is expected that bilateral discussions will focus on areas where the interests of the two sides, such as artificial intelligence, coincide. It is noteworthy that the EU is responding to India's initiative to spread digital public infrastructure(DPI).

It is unlikely that Australia will be able to implement the liberalisation of cross-border data transfer and the restriction of data localisation measures in the CECA negotiations with India. However, Australia has been able to induce India to open up in the AI-ECTA service trade and financial services negotiations. Australia seeks to expand digital trade and data trasnfer with India and pursue institutional compatibility under the framework of strategic cooperation such as the QUAD.

Despite India's high economic dependence on China, it is likely to remain wary of China in the digital sector. In particular, Chinese companies’ investments in areas directly related to data security are expected to be treated with great sensitivity.

India is presenting Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a key agenda at major international forums such as the G20 and the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly (WTSA-24), as well as multilateral forums such as QUAD, and is stepping up its efforts to make its DPI model an international standard. This is believed to be an attempt to expand India’s influence in the process of building digital infrastructure, especially in global south.

Chapter 4 synthesises the above research and presents policy implications. First, it is necessary to respond to the issues that may arise in the process of introducing data norms in India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) provides separate regulatory grounds for large-scale data processing companies and does not clearly state the legal basis for data processing, which may cause uncertainty in corporate activities. The Korean government needs to pay attention to the list of countries that the Indian government plans to announce as data transfer restriction countries. The Digital India Act (draft) currently under discussion is expected to have a major impact on corporate activities by strengthening the transparency of data processing, with platform companies as the main target.

Second, we can consider indirect measures to make the activities of data-related companies freer through negotiations with India. Like AI-ECTA, efforts should be made to increase the level of openness of computer and related services, engineering and integrated engineering services, provision and transfer of financial information, and software provided by financial data processing. If the data related articles are included, it is possible to include a temporary clause as an intermediate step in the liberalisation of data transfer and data localisation, and to review it after the establishment of the India’s data system. Meanwhile, Korea needs to pay attention to strengthening cooperation between like-minded countries. Korea is already participating in the Korea-US- India iCET, and it is necessary to actively respond to the QUAD countries’ agenda for cybersecurity and DPI cooperation.

Third, digital cooperation with India requires the building of trust capital, and key area is DPI. India's DPI is a government-led model with no precedent, and is likely to attract the attention of developing countries. It is necessary for Korea to consider responding to the DPI cooperation agenda in the G20, ITU, UNDP, and QUAD. Korea should also pay attention to cooperation for the development, interoperability, and inclusiveness of DPI in developing countries. It would also be possible for Korea to cooperate with India in projects such as capacity building and expert exchanges for developing countries.

Fourth, Korea should seek cooperation in the digitalisation of the public sector in India using ODA. It is believed that cooperation can be found in tasks such as standardising data management, data security, building data platforms, and expanding public data accessibility, etc. In particular, the digitalisation of government services in the process of urban development in India is a field with high potential for cooperation.

Fifth, it is necessary to establish continuous bilateral contact platforms so that Korean and Indian policy makers can share the changing aspects of data governance. It is necessary to set current issues such as data and DPI as an ongoing agenda in channels such as the ministerial-level industrial cooperation committee between the two countries, which is scheduled to be established, and the established Korea-India Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Policy Council. Going further, the two countries could consider forming partnerships between relevant ministries and operating regular forums to exchange issues related to data governance. In addition, the difficulties faced by Korean companies entering India should be actively communicated through the Korea-India government-to-government dialogue channels, such as the Korea-India Fast Track Mechanism, Invest India, etc. Cooperation with a third country can also be promoted. Rather than the United States, which already has its own influence in India, cooperation with Japan may be more effective.

This study is a research project that aims to more objectively and comprehensively understand Russia's new foreign policy direction, the Global South Strategy, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian War in February 2022. In particular, the main purpose of the study was to examine the structural changes and reorganization processes of the world order after the outbreak of the war, and to analyze the new foreign strategic direction of the Russian government in the midst of structural changes in the foreign strategic environment.

Chapter 2 examines the Russo-Ukrainian War and the rise of the Global South. The Russo-Ukrainian War has had a significant impact on the changes in the international order in terms of political diplomacy (deepening the process of fragmentation of international relations), security (creating a military confrontational structure between the West and Russia), and economic (damaging economic ties between Russia and the West). Meanwhile, the Global South is rising in the process of transforming international relations, symbolized by fragmentation. This is because, as the presence of the Global South (continuous economic growth and strengthening of political autonomy) has been highlighted since the war, its strategic value and importance in recent global international relations have increased even more. Ultimately, the Russo-Ukrainian War is creating a new phenomenon in international relations: the division of the world, changes in the international order, and the rise of the Global South.

Chapter 3 analyzes Russia’s Global South strategy concept, perception of the situation, goals, and tasks. Russia has recently preferred the term “World Majority” instead of the term “Global South.” According to Russia’s perception of the situation, the multipolarization of the world order, the growing interest in a new economic cooperation system, the emergence of comprehensive security threats and the risk of conflict between great powers, and the West’s all-out pressure on Russia are emphasized. The goals and tasks of Russia’s Global South strategy can be summarized in four points: promoting multipolarization of the world order through cooperation with Global South countries, intervention in the security of Global South countries, expanding economic cooperation with Global South countries, and spreading friendly perceptions of Russia in Global South countries.

Chapter 4 examines Russia’s Global South strategy in a multilateral context. In particular, it examines the launch and development process of BRICS, as well as Russia’s policy direction and economic relations toward BRICS. The recent expansion of BRICS has become a significant turning point and starting point in the history of BRICS, and a milestone in which BRICS has come to occupy the most important position in Russia’s “world majority” plan encompassing the global South.

Chapter 5 analyzes Russia’s Global South strategy in a regional context. In particular, it examines the nature and characteristics of the development of Russia’s relations with the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, given that Russia has strengthened its diplomatic activities in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America since the war in order to gather friendly forces to establish a multipolar order.

Chapter 6 presents policy implications for the research content and suggests policies that take into account the new external environment. First, policy implications are presented for each chapter: Chapter 2 (The Rise of the Global South and Pragmatic Balanced Diplomacy), Chapter 3 (Russia’s New Foreign Strategy and Seeking Changes in the World Order), Chapter 4 (The Means of BRICS Expansion and Potential Factors for Development), and Chapter 5 (Russia’s Means of Promoting Global Regional Strategy and Challenges). In addition, policy suggestions include strengthening and expanding middle-power diplomacy, establishing strategic cooperation plans for the Global South, establishing new perspectives and strategies for developing and fostering multilateral agendas at the global level, and establishing strategic management plans for Russia.

Both North and South Korea have long maintained the “One Korea Policy.” Under the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed in 1991, inter-Korean relations were defined as a “special interim relationship” tentatively formed during the process of unification, rather than state-to-state relations. North Korea appeared to show a stronger inclination for the “One Korea Policy” even with regard to its terminology, with its usage of phrases like “Pyongyang leaders’ reunion” and “North-South top leadership meeting” to refer to the Inter-Korean Summits.

However, in late 2023, North Korea began re-framing inter-Korean ties as relations between “two belligerent states.” The North went as far as declaring South Korea a “thoroughly foreign entity” and “primary foe,” even hinting at the possibility of nuclear war. It has prohibited the North Korean populace from using expressions like “unification” and “kinship” in their daily lives, even amending its Constitution to clearly designate the ROK as a “hostile state.”

The “two Koreas” rhetoric marks a profound shift from North Korea’s perception over the past eight decades and could fundamentally reshape the basis of inter-Korean relations. It is, therefore, essential to examine the key elements of the North’s “two Koreas” assertion, understand its underlying motives, and discuss the implications for Korean unification Equally important is the need to explore strategies to effectively promote a unification policy aligned with the perceptions of the four major powers involved in Korean Peninsula affairs.

In this study, Chapter II traces the evolution of the unification policy of the Republic of Korea, offering insights into the policies of the 1950s and 1960s spanning the Rhee Syngman, Chang Myon, and early years of the Park Chung-hee governments; as well as policies of the 1970s and 1980s, encompassing the latter years of the Park Chung-hee government and the Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo governments. It details the core philosophy, principles, and unification processes envisioned in the “National Community Unification Formula” announced in 1994 under then President Kim Young-sam’s leadership. The chapter then outlines the unification policies of the Kim Dae-jung government, which continued the tradition of the “National Community Unification Formula,” and each subsequent government up to the Yoon Suk-yeol government.

Chapter III provides a critical examination of North Korea’s approach to unification, beginning with the construction and development of a nationalist narrative and the symbolic emphasis on “kinship” and “nation.” This chapter reviews North Korea’s unification strategies, from the “democratic base theory” of the 1950s, which advocated for armed unification, to its later proposal of a “low stage federation” in the 2000s.

Chapter IV addresses North Korea’s recent adoption of the “two Koreas policy” and its consequences for Korean unification. North Korea had foreshadowed this shift even before explicitly asserting the “two Koreas policy” in late 2023. Signs included proposals for a “federal union system” (2014), the introduction of Pyongyang Standard Time (2015), the launch of the “Our State-First Principle” (2017-2021), revisions in the nationalistic phrase “Kim Il-sung’s nation, Kim Jong-il’s homeland” to “Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s homeland” (since 2019), the regime’s re-orientation toward a “two-state policy” during the 8th Party Congress (2021-2022), and the use of “Republic of Korea” in official statements from North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023). The study argues that North Korea’s push for the “two Koreas policy” reflects several key motivations: an ever deepening sense of siege mentality due to strengthened US, ROK, and Japan trilateral cooperation; disillusionment with the ROK government; resistance to unification through absorption; and concerns about internal stability. It also reflects a desire to reshape the North Korean national identity by eliminating notions of “kinship,” as well as the need to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s leadership. The chapter also discusses interpretations of this policy as either a tactical maneuver or a strategic shift and concludes that accepting the “two Koreas policy” is not only unnecessary, but that rejecting it would be significantly more advantageous.

Chapter V examines the perspectives and assessments of the four major powers—the US, Japan, China, and Russia—on the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, it analyzes official statements from the leaders of these countries, spanning from the Kim Young-sam to Moon Jae-in governments, evaluating each nation’s stance on unification.

Chapter VI re-evaluates the “National Community Unification Plan” and discusses strategies for garnering effective support from neighboring stakeholders. The “National Community Unification Plan” is significant for its vision of a gradual, phased unification process and for highlighting a “national community” based on national consensus. However, the plan faces limitations, such as difficulty adapting to the changing domestic and international situation, ambiguity in the stages it laid out, and a lack of concrete implementation strategies. The “August 15 Unification Doctrine” announced on August 15, 2024, marks a progressive advancement of the plan. It is commendable for its emphasis on universal values, focus on the North Korean populace over the regime, proactive international engagement, and specific action plans. Nonetheless, further refinement is needed, including steps to encourage North Korea’s engagement, assuage concerns over absorption-based unification, increase practical viability of implementation plans, and actively seek international solidarity. A review of past policy outreach revealed that promotional activities have largely been tied to the state of inter-Korean affairs, and have been generally one-dimensional, focusing on unidirectional information dissemination and targeting government authorities, experts, and overseas Koreans. To enhance support from neighboring stakeholders, it would be beneficial to conceptualize unification as a goal that transcends inter-Korean relations; transition from one-directional messaging to multidimensional, interactive approaches that promote active cooperation; and broaden the target audience from a select few to a more diverse and widespread audience.

The semiconductor industry is crucial not only for economic growth but also for leading future industries through innovation and technological development. Dominance in this sector is reflected through technological leadership, with leading nations at the forefront of scientific research and technological innovation, substantially contributing to global influence and economic competitiveness. Additionally, the semiconductor industry is vital for national security. Semiconductors are essential components in advanced weapons systems and are fundamental to nearly all modern military equipment and systems, including missiles, drones, radars, and communication devices. Consequently, controlling semiconductor supply chains and strategic technologies is critical for national security. Given the semiconductor industry’s importance, the battle for technological supremacy between the U.S. and China is central to their hegemonic rivalry. The United States has recognized that rapid advancements in China’s semiconductor technology could pose a significant risk to national security and has imposed various export controls, investment sanctions, and financial sanctions targeting China’s semiconductor industry. These U.S. measures impact not only China’s semiconductor industry but also significantly affect global semiconductor firms in Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and South Korea, leading to substantial changes in the global semiconductor supply chain. However, China already plays a significant role as a global hub in semiconductor manufacturing and supply, and there is keen interest in the outcomes of the U.S. sanctions.

This study addresses three critical questions to understand the core of this issue and provides an in-depth analysis:

1. Can China overcome U.S. sanctions and continue to develop its semiconductor industry?

2. What impact will U.S. sanctions on China’s semiconductor industry have on the global semiconductor industry and the current global semiconductor supply chain?

3. How will the U.S.-China semiconductor hegemony competition affect Korean semiconductor industry and economy, and howshould we prepare policy-wise?

The first question explores whether China’s semiconductor industry can overcome U.S. sanctions and enhance its position in the global semiconductor supply chain. This study answers by analyzing the competitiveness of the global semiconductor industry, including China, from 2000 to 2022, and comparing changes in competitiveness over the past two decades. The analysis uses UN Comtrade data to derive various competitiveness indices and also examines semiconductor technology competitiveness by analyzing patent registrations in the semiconductor field over the past 20 years for major countries and the top 10 global semiconductor companies.

The analysis of memory semiconductors showed that South Korea had the highest RSCA (Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage) and TSI (Trade Specialization Index) values, indicating strong competitiveness. In contrast, China showed a comparative advantage in production and export for most of the analysis period, asindicated by positive RSCA values, but its TSI values were negative throughout, indicating difficulties in achieving trade surpluses and overall lower competitiveness in the memory semiconductor industry. In the system semiconductor competitiveness analysis, Taiwan showed the highest competitiveness, followed by South Korea, which showed positive RSCA and TSI values. China, on the other hand, showed low competitiveness in the system semiconductor sector, with RSCA and TSI values between -0.5 and 0.

In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, Japan and the U.S. displayed high RSCA and TSI values, indicating strong competitiveness, while China showed very low competitiveness, with both indices close to -0.5 during the analysis period.

The technological competitiveness analysis based on patent registration data for memory semiconductors, system semiconductors, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment calculated indices such as RTA (Revealed Technological Advantage), TS (Technology Strength), CPP (Cites per Patent), and PII (Patent Impact Index). The results for China were similar to the trade data-based competitivenessanalysis, indicating a challenging situation for China to overcome U.S. sanctions in the short term. U.S. sanctions are expected to strictly limit China’s advanced chip production capabilities for the foreseeable future. Especially, the analysis based on semiconductor patent technology showed that global semiconductor manufacturers heavily rely on core technologies from the U.S., making it difficult for these companies to circumvent U.S. sanctions. However, the biggest problem the U.S. faces is securing active cooperation from global semiconductor companies and allies. There are significant conflicts between the U.S. and European countries over specific policies like the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and related subsidies. Global semiconductor companies are also likely to face substantial losses due to the sanctions, and there is considerable resistance to the U.S. administration’s policies, especially from EU countries, regarding how actively they will cooperate with U.S. policies against China. Additionally, active support from the Chinese government could greatly aid in enhancing the competitiveness of its semiconductor industry. Ironically, U.S. sanctions might actually accelerate innovation and self-reliance in China’s semiconductor sector, posing a short-term obstacle but unlikely to hinder the industry’s long-term development.

To answer the second question, this study analyzed the roles and positions of the countries in the global semiconductor supply chain through network analysis using trade data and firm-level supply-demand relations, focusing on global rankings and market shares in various semiconductor sectors. The analysis showed that China is already playing a significant role as a global hub in the semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment sectors, making it very difficult to quickly exclude or significantly reduce China’s role in the global semiconductor supply chain. In particular, the analysis of inter-firm cooperation and technology transfer relationships using Factset data showed that U.S. companies are major suppliers across the semiconductor industry, and applying a 0% de minimis rule would have a significant impact on the global semiconductor supply chain, making it impossible for most companies to evade these sanctions.

Despite these sanctions, it has been revealed that Chinese tech companies are importing and using advanced chips banned for export by the U.S. administration, and U.S. companies like NVIDIA are also circumventing sanctions by exporting modified semiconductor stargeted at the Chinese market. These incidents are occurring frequently, and the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions against China’s semiconductor industry depends on how much support the U.S. can secure from its allies. The U.S. is expected to transition to a multilateral export control system like the ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’ to fill the gaps in these sanctions.

Regarding the restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain, it is expected to bifurcate due to U.S. sanctions. Advanced semiconductor production is likely to shift to a supply chain system centered around the U.S. and its allies, while the supply chain system for general-purpose semiconductors is expected to strengthen around China. In particular, no country can produce general-purpose semiconductors as cheaply and competitively as China, which is expected to increase its global market share in this sector. Additionally, developing countries like India, Vietnam, and Thailand import the most semiconductor manufacturing equipment from China, and the establishment of a supply chain system for low-cost general-purpose semiconductor production between China and these countries is also an issue worth watching.

In addressing the third question, the study examined the impact of U.S. semiconductor sanctions on the Korean semiconductor industry through three scenarios: the control of exports for semiconductor manufacturing equipment, the control of exports for AI semiconductors, and the imposition of increased tariffs on China.

The first scenario involves export control of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, where South Korea experienced a significant decline in semiconductor equipment exports compared to other countries following the U.S. semiconductor equipment sanctions in October 2022. China’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment sharply decreased from October 2022, when U.S. sanctions began, to February 2023, but increased significantly from August 2023, eight months after the sanctions started. The U.S. initially saw a decrease in exports to China, but these later increased, and the Netherlands was not affected by the sanctions, with exports to China increasing. Even after controlling for variables such as the recent semiconductor business climate, South Korea’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment have significantly decreased, and this trend does not appear to be following any particular trend. Also, South Korean manufacturing equipment is almost not included in the U.S. sanction items, while the U.S., the Netherlands, and Japan have many items essential in the semiconductor manufacturing process, which Chinese companies would likely prioritize purchasing with their current capital.

The second scenario involves AI semiconductor export control, which assumes the worst-case scenario affecting DRAM production. In this scenario, the supply of DRAM for AI semiconductors is assumed to be delivered by TSMC after final assembly through Taiwan’s export of HBM. This scenario also showed a significant negative impact on the Korean economy.

The third scenario involves an increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese semiconductors under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, which imposes high tariffs. In this scenario, exports of semiconductors produced in China to the U.S. decreased, while South Korea’s exports to the U.S. increased long-term due to trade diversion effects.

In conclusion, only the increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese semiconductors is expected to have a positive impact on us due to trade diversion effects, while the export reduction of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI semiconductors such as HBM chips due to U.S. sanctions is expected to negatively affect us.

The U.S.-China semiconductor hegemony competition is already significantly limiting the business activities of our companies, and the negative impacts are likely to grow in the future. The U.S. is already responding to the potential impacts of this hegemony competition. The U.S. is relying on advanced semiconductor manufacturing by companies like Samsung and TSMC while fostering its domestic semiconductor companies like Intel and enhancing the backend chip post-processing capability through government subsidies to increase the resilience of the semiconductor supply chain.

In contrast, China, as previously discussed, is increasing its global market share centered on current legacy chips. In particular, the backend chip post-processing sector, which is technically less demanding and has a lower barrier to entry, could become an area where China can intentionally control the global supply chain based on its manufacturing capability and high market share. Therefore, such hegemonic disputes using this leverage are likely to continue between the U.S. and China, and the Korean government and companies need to prepare for this.

Korean companies have limitations in upgrading semiconductor manufacturing processes invested in China due to current U.S. sanctions on China. Therefore, in the medium to long term, advanced semiconductors are likely to be produced only in domestic or allied countries including the U.S. Ultimately, although production in China has been an optimal strategy for companies in terms of cost and market aspects, the U.S.-China hegemony competition makes it inevitable to relocate production bases for advanced semiconductor production. However, our current domestic semiconductor ecosystem is not more competitive than the ecosystem established in China.

This study recommends a series of policy measures aimed at bolstering the domestic semiconductor industry. These include strengthening the semiconductor manufacturing base and ecosystem, enhancing the added value of the industry, ensuring supply chain stability, and managing semiconductor operations in China effectively. It also suggests fortifying supply chain cooperation within the Korea-U.S.-Japan economic security alliance, controlling technology leaks, preventing talent outflow, and fostering a competitive innovation ecosystem. Additionally, the study advises managing supply chain risks, developing both short- and long-term production strategies, and promoting open trade policies and international cooperation.

This report identifies the opportunities and challenges present in post-war reconstruction programs of Ukraine, and provides implications for the participation of Korean companies. The study comprehensively analyzes past post-war reconstruction cases and recent international community discussion trends through review of literature on the subject, statistical analysis, expert interviews, and attendance at international conferences. While there is great interest in post-war recovery in Ukraine throughout the international community and Korea, it is difficult for governments and businesses to expand their participation due to the continuing uncertainty surrounding war conditions, and the lack of specific information on funding methods or investment profitability. As large-scale investments will certainly be made for Ukraine’s recovery after the end of the war, it is necessary to carefully design the government’s participation in international community discussions and the direction of corporate investment, considering the current war situation and overall conditions.

Chapters 2–4 of this report conducted research on three major topics to provide reference materials for the participation of the Korean government and businesses in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction programs.

In Chapter 2 we conduct an analysis of major past post-war recovery cases to present the main principles and precautions for participating in reconstruction projects. More than simple restoration of destroyed infrastructure, post-war reconstruction should be seen as an opportunity for a comprehensive overhaul of economic and social systems. This was evidently observed in cases such as the Marshall Plan after World War II, U.S. aid after the Korean War, and the reconstruction of the West Balkans in the 1990s. The Marshall Plan contributed to European economic recovery and the establishment of a market economy system, while in Korea’s case, U.S. aid laid the foundation for a liberal system. The Balkans are still undergoing reconstruction with EU-centered support, but challenges remain. Lessons learned from these cases are as follows: First, economic aid is effective when linked to improvements in the recipient country’s political and economic structure. Second, support tailored to the recipient country’s situation is necessary. Third, support that benefits both donor and recipient countries is important. Fourth, international cooperation enables the mobilization of funds to meet reconstruction needs and build international order. Korea’s participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction should also consider these points and participate not only in facility restoration but also in institutional improvement and international peacekeeping efforts.

Chapter 3 examined the current status of international community discussions on Ukraine’s reconstruction, the costs and direction of Ukraine’s reconstruction projects, governance, and key contents of core projects. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, discussions on Ukraine’s reconstruction projects have been active in the West. Major Western countries and international organizations intend to modernize social infrastructure and integrate Ukraine into the EU economy. This will be enabled through attracting large-scale investments, EU integration, and application of digital and net-zero technologies, which are the main topics discussed in a series of international conferences on Ukraine’s recovery. As of the end of December 2023, the total amount of damages sustained by Ukraine and its needs are estimated at $486 billion, about 2.8 times Ukraine’s nominal GDP in 2023. The reconstruction costs are expected to increase as infrastructure continues to be destructed due to the war. Energy, transportation, housing construction, and health are the key areas that should be most urgently recovered. We summarized major projects and implementation plans for each area at the end of this chapter.

In Chapter 4, we examine the magnitude of support toward Ukraine’s reconstruction by international organizations and major countries, and discussed how to mobilize public and private funding considering sustainability and risk management. As Ukraine’s fiscal instability deepens due to uncertainties from the prolonged war, it heavily depends on support from international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and major countries including the EU, G7, and Poland. To this end, the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP) was launched in January 2023 to coordinate short- and mid- to long-term Ukraine support directions and mechanisms among various donors. This reflects the international community’s common understanding that international support alone is clearly limited for Ukraine’s stable recovery and reconstruction, and that attracting private capital is essential. The international community now discusses ways to utilize frozen Russian sovereign assets as reconstruction funds within legally possible limits, and an agreement has been reached at the G7 level on how to use the annual interest income from frozen Russian assets. In addition, discussions on practical risk management measures such as strengthening public-private partnerships (PPP), compensation for losses due to political and commercial risks, and customized policy support are deepening to activate private funding.

Based on these research results, Chapter 5 presents the current status of Korean companies’ participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction projects and future support measures. Korea is paving the way for its companies to participate based on the EDCF basic agreement with the Ukrainian government and six leading projects. The One Team Korea Ukraine Reconstruction Cooperation Delegation includes not only government ministries such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, but also public enterprises such as Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH), Korea Water Resources Corporation, and Korea Overseas Infrastructure & Urban Development Corporation (KIND), as well as some private companies exploring the possibilities of reconstruction projects. To facilitate their smooth participation in reconstruction projects, this report proposes six support measures: first, establishing a pan-ministerial support organization under the Prime Minister for formulating reconstruction participation strategies and overseeing related ministries; second, supporting the development of integrated public-private partnership (PPP) projects throughout the project lifecycle; third, providing investment information in six key areas: energy, transportation, housing, infrastructure, industry, and complex fields; fourth, mitigating investment risks through the development of insurance products, participation in consortiums with major donor country companies, and utilization of MDCP; fifth, joint entry into reconstruction projects using Poland as a base; and sixth, strengthening bilateral cooperation with Ukraine, including KSP projects, and joint participation in multilateral cooperation.

The war will end someday, and regardless of how it ends, massive resources will certainly be poured into post-war recovery. Korea needs to set the right direction and prepare now so that it can contribute to this historic post-war reconstruction. The economic benefits gained by participating companies will be given as a bonus.