The global economy is currently undergoing unprecedented uncertainty due to a series of complex and diverse external shocks and risk factors. The COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2019 caused the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, leading to a sharp contraction in global economic activity. In response to this crisis, governments around the world implemented fiscal and monetary policies on an unprecedented scale. While these measures helped stabilize markets in the short term, they also triggered side effects such as soaring asset prices and rising levels of public and private debt.

The war between Russia and Ukraine, which broke out in 2022, dealt a major blow to the global supply of energy and raw materials, further intensifying inflationary pressures worldwide. In response, central banks shifted from accommodative to tightening monetary stances, which in turn contributed to a slowdown in global growth. The Israel–Hamas conflict in 2023 deepened instability in the Middle East, adding yet another layer of uncertainty. Although inflation has begun to stabilize since mid-2024, geopolitical risks and asset price volatility remain key threats to global economic stability. At the same time, the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China is accelerating the fragmentation of the global economy. Their competition for technological dominance is reinforcing protectionist measures in advanced sectors and triggering a restructuring of global supply chains.

This study seeks to analyze the relationships between economic fragmentation, global business cycles, and key macroeconomic flows such as trade and foreign direct investment, with particular attention to the evolving dynamics shaped by recent global disruptions. Excluding the introduction and conclusion, the study is composed of four main chapters. Chapter 2 examines the degree of real GDP synchronization among 45 major economies using a Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model. The findings show that global factors had a significant influence on national economies prior to the pandemic, but their importance diminished in the post-pandemic period, with regional factors playing a more prominent role. Differences in recovery speeds and synchronization patterns became more pronounced across regions—namely Europe, North America, and Asia. Europe experienced a slower recovery due to overlapping pressures from the energy crisis and inflation. North America, by contrast, achieved a rapid recovery through aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus but faced mounting inflationary burdens. In Asia, recovery speeds varied widely across countries, influenced by China’s growth slowdown and divergent policy responses. These differences are interpreted as being driven by variations in national economic structures and policy choices, indicating a strengthening of country-specific dynamics. In particular, factors such as fiscal capacity, industrial structure, and labor market flexibility played critical roles in shaping each country’s crisis response and recovery path.

Chapter 3 assesses the impact of energy price shocks on the Korean economy using a small open-economy New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. This model is distinguished by incorporating features such as household heterogeneity, capital-investment decision-making, climate-related economic structure, energy consumption as part of household utility, and the role of fiscal authorities. The analysis finds that rising energy prices significantly increase consumer inflation and reduce real household income, leading to contractions in both consumption and investment, and ultimately weakening production and employment. These effects are especially severe among low-income households, given their higher share of energy expenditures. In terms of monetary policy response, interest rate hikes based on the Taylor rule are effective in curbing inflation but risk further suppressing aggregate demand and overall economic activity. By contrast, the Ramsey optimal monetary policy supports economic activity by stimulating consumption and investment through interest rate reductions. Additionally, reductions in fuel taxes help to ease inflation, alleviate consumption declines among constrained households, and reduce the upward pressure on interest rates, thereby helping to prevent a broader economic contraction.

In Chapter 4, the study evaluates the impact of the U.S.–China trade conflict using a general equilibrium model that includes multiple industrial sectors. The analysis assesses the effects of increased U.S. tariffs on imports from China and explores the resulting changes in trade balances under a comprehensive trade war scenario. The findings indicate that U.S. tariff hikes meaningfully altered Korea’s trade patterns with both China and the United States. Based on the assumption of balanced trade, the U.S. attempt to restructure global supply chains resulted in welfare losses across many countries, including the U.S. itself. Korea’s welfare loss was relatively smaller than those of China and the U.S., but still significant. Moreover, the impacts of the tariff war varied across industries. While the petroleum sector was projected to contract, sectors such as machinery, medical and office equipment, electronics and telecommunications equipment, and automobiles were expected to demonstrate relative resilience. These outcomes are attributable to differences in global value chain integration, substitutability, and technological sophistication across sectors.

Chapter 5 analyzes trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the role of geopolitical distance from 2013 to 2023. The analysis shows that greater geopolitical distance—measured using ideal point distances from political science—was associated with reduced FDI flows, and that this negative relationship has grown stronger over time. Coefficients were estimated using the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method. The effect of geopolitical distance was found to be statistically significant for the U.S. and its Western allies. However, in the case of Korea, China, and Japan, the significance was lower, or even reversed in some cases. These results reflect the high degree of economic interdependence and the complex geopolitical relationships in East Asia, suggesting that the influence of geopolitical distance on FDI can vary significantly depending on the region or industry. Accordingly, there is a need to formulate FDI policies that take into account sector-specific characteristics.

Based on these findings, the study presents the following policy implications. First, with global factors weakening and regional influences strengthening, it is important to enhance economic cooperation within the Asia region and promote the stabilization of regional supply chains. At the same time, maintaining policy flexibility is crucial for rapid and effective responses to future economic crises. Second, in the face of rising energy prices, coordinated use of monetary policy to ensure price stability and fiscal policy to support economic activity is required. Special emphasis should be placed on supporting low-income households and advancing energy efficiency initiatives. Third, in response to U.S.–China tensions, it is necessary to adopt customized industrial strategies that reflect heterogeneous impacts across sectors, while strengthening competitiveness and technological protection in industries where comparative advantages exist. Lastly, regarding FDI, long-term strategies should include the management of geopolitical risks, diversification of investment destinations to emerging markets, and enhanced global cooperation in advanced technology sectors. In particular, it is urgent for Korea to establish an FDI strategy that reflects its unique geopolitical position and ensures competitiveness in strategic and high-tech industries.

Until the mid-20th century, tangible assets were the primary drivers of economic growth. However, with the rise of digital transformation and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the role of intangible assets has grown significantly in the 21st century. Traditional forms of intangible assets—such as software, R&D, branding, intellectual property rights, design, and organizational capital—have become central to enhancing firm-level and macroeconomic competitiveness. More recently, advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and cloud computing are emerging as new forms of intangible capital that contribute to innovation, productivity, and growth. Against this backdrop, this report analyzes the role of intangible asset investment in both major economies and Korea, and provides policy insights by examining its relationship with key economic indicators such as growth, productivity, and firm performance.

This study is composed of four chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between intangible asset investment and economic growth using EKIP data. The analysis confirms a positive correlation between intangible investment and productivity growth, although the strength of this relationship varies considerably across countries and industries. Growth accounting results show that while the contribution of tangible assets to growth is declining, the contribution of intangible assets is on the rise—particularly for those included in national accounts. A regression analysis further reveals that economies with higher concentration of intangible asset investment tend to experience stronger medium-term growth. Additionally, the impact of intangible investment appears to vary depending on the economic size of each country group.

Chapter 3 employs a macroeconomic model with optimal intangible asset investment by agents, calibrated separately to Korean and U.S. data. The results show that the distribution of intangible assets is less dispersed in Korea than in the U.S. Model simulations suggest that increasing intangible asset investment—driven by supportive policy—can lead Korea toward a pattern seen in the U.S., where larger firms expand employment and productivity rises. However, this transformation is also accompanied by a deterioration in income distribution, highlighting the trade-offs involved.

Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between intangible assets and firm performance using data from the Korean Survey of Business Activities between 2006 and 2021. While the proportion of firms holding intangible assets and their total value have increased steadily, the ratio of intangible to total assets has declined since the mid-2010s. Regression results show that greater intangible asset holdings are associated with improvements in sales, labor productivity, and export performance, both in the short term (1 year) and medium to long term (5 years). The positive effects on sales and productivity are particularly persistent. While the impact on export value weakens over time, intangible assets consistently enhance a firm's likelihood of participating in export activities.

Chapter 5 examines the short-term effects of AI exposure on industries in Korea and the U.S. based on data from 2019 to 2022—prior to the widespread adoption of generative AI. In Korea, AI exposure is positively correlated with some employment indicators, but these correlations are not statistically significant once labor productivity is controlled for. Moreover, AI exposure shows a negative relationship with per capita sales and labor share, indicating that technology adoption does not affect all outcomes equally. In contrast, in the U.S., AI exposure is significantly and positively associated with employment, hourly wages, and labor compensation, suggesting that AI adoption may enhance employment and earnings even in the absence of direct productivity gains.

Based on these findings, the report presents several policy implications. First, given the increasing economic contribution of intangible assets, governments should strengthen tax incentives and public support for R&D, software development, and organizational capital—especially in manufacturing and ICT industries—while promoting digitalization in the financial sector. Second, to address the gap in intangible asset accumulation between large firms and SMEs, policies such as easing credit constraints, expanding tax benefits, and providing innovation vouchers for SMEs are needed. At the same time, expanded investment in intangible assets calls for stronger policies on worker retraining to mitigate income polarization. Third, given the demonstrated benefits of intangible assets for firm performance, it is essential to improve access to finance for SMEs through the development of intangible asset–backed lending and to establish policy frameworks for valuing new types of assets such as AI- and big data–driven technologies. Lastly, since the employment and wage effects of AI adoption differ across countries, Korea should focus on strengthening AI-related job training for existing workers, supporting the adoption of AI by SMEs and traditional industries, and implementing labor protection policies for AI-affected sectors.

As Korea’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) continues to grow, so does the need for a more coherent research ecosystem to support effective policymaking. This reference study aims to inform policy discussions on the development of Korea’s international development research infrastructure by exploring the roles, functions, and contributions of leading research institutes in the field. Focusing on their institutional characteristics, operational models, and relevance to Korea’s policy environment, the study provides foundational insights for building a more strategic and integrated research system.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of research trends in Korea and abroad. In Korea, while academic research on development cooperation has declined over the past five years, policy- and project-oriented studies commissioned by ODA implementing agencies have increased significantly. This reflects growing policy demand, but also highlights several limitations: many of these studies are short-term, conducted on an ad hoc basis, narrowly focused on immediate issues, and often lack coherence, making it difficult to ensure continuity or generate long-term strategic value. The fragmented nature of Korea’s ODA system—where multiple ministries and agencies not only implement projects but also commission research independently—further hampers efforts to build a coherent knowledge base, foster collaboration, and strengthen long-term research capacity.

While Korea currently lacks a dedicated research institute for development cooperation, some leading international cases demonstrate more integrated and multifaceted approaches. Given the multidisciplinary and practice-oriented nature of development cooperation, specialized research institutions are expected to perform a range of functions that go beyond traditional knowledge production. These include policy advisory, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, knowledge dissemination, global networking, discourse shaping, and responsiveness to emerging global issues.

Chapter 3 examines ten major international research institutes engaged in development cooperation, focusing on their operational models, roles, and core functions. These institutes conduct both academic and policy-oriented research, respond to emerging and priority development issues, and actively contribute to global discourse. They also disseminate knowledge through a variety of platforms and channels.

Common thematic areas include sustainable economic and social development, climate change, peace, and governance—often approached from the perspective of global public goods. Many institutes also take the lead in advancing research on topics they have strategically prioritized, such as human security, social and economic justice, and digital transformation, while conducting country- and region-specific studies in parallel. Increasingly, they are placing emphasis on evidence-based evaluations of development effectiveness and impact.

These institutions play a key role in shaping international discourse by identifying timely research agendas and spotlighting emerging issues. Their ability to offer relevant, policy-oriented insights enhances both their strategic value and practical influence. In addition, they actively promote outreach, collaboration, and global partnerships, reflecting the inherently international and problem-solving nature of development cooperation.

From an institutional standpoint, many of these research institutes operate with flexible staffing structures and conduct multi-year research projects, often in collaboration with external experts and networks. Given the complexity and multidimensionality of development challenges, such long-term engagement—supported by sustained data collection and rigorous analysis—is essential for generating credible findings. In Korea, where government budget cycles tend to constrain multi-year research, establishing a dedicated research institute with a continuous mandate could help ensure coherence and overcome the inefficiencies of fragmented, one-off studies.

Based on this analysis, the study identifies key roles and functions for establishing a specialized research institute in Korea. These include conducting regular foundational and reference studies on critical development issues, building robust knowledge repositories, facilitating knowledge sharing and dissemination, and supporting timely policy responses to international development challenges. A dedicated institute could enhance the quality, continuity, and responsiveness of research efforts, while also strengthening Korea’s engagement in global development discourse.

In the short term, it is essential to articulate a clear vision and operational framework for such an institute, and to lay the groundwork—both in terms of institutional infrastructure and government support systems—for a continuous research ecosystem. Over the longer term, efforts should focus on building institutional capacity through stable staffing, sustainable funding, deepening expertise, and strong networks. Ultimately, the institute could serve as a national knowledge hub for development cooperation research.

Executive Summary

Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Literature Review
1.3 Data
1.4 Structure of the Report

Chapter II. Consumer Behavior in India
2.1 Consumption patterns in India
2.2 Household Financial Portfolio in India

Chapter III. Optimism and Consumer Behavior
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Estimation Strategy
3.3 Household Consumption and Saving in India in Relation to the Direction of Forecasting Error
3.4 Category 2 Consumption Expenditures Relative to Income
3.5 Food Subcategories
3.6 Saving Rate
3.7 Household Financial Portfolio
3.8 Conclusion of Chapter 3

Chapter IV. Conclusion
4.1 Summary of the Research
4.2 Discussion

References

Appendix Tables: Household consumption by region and gender

This study examines Indian household consumption and financial behaviors using data from the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS), focusing on how spending patterns and financial strategies evolve in response to economic conditions, demographic factors, and forecasting errors.

Chapter 2 analyzes household consumption patterns, revealing that food accounts for nearly half of total expenditures, emphasizing its critical role in household budgets and food security. Non-food consumption is more dynamic, with significant shifts during the COVID-19 pandemic. Spending on non-essential categories like entertainment and dining declined, while healthcare saw a modest increase. Education and healthcare remain smaller components of spending, reflecting budgetary constraints, particularly among lower-income households where post-pandemic financial pressures further limited these expenditures.

The chapter also highlights regional and demographic disparities. Rural households allocate a larger share of their budgets to food, reflecting subsistence needs, while urban households spend more on non-food items due to higher incomes and market access. Female-dominated households allocate slightly more to health and education, suggesting a prioritization of family welfare and human capital investment influenced by socio-cultural factors. These findings underscore the need for targeted policies to address disparities in essential spending areas like health and education.

Chapter 3 explores how forecasting errors—discrepancies between expected and actual financial outcomes—shape household financial decisions, including consumption, savings, and borrowing. Households with optimistic errors increase non-food consumption while reducing savings, particularly in liquid assets like fixed deposits, favoring immediate consumption. Conversely, pessimistic households reduce spending on non-essential services while increasing savings across all asset types as a precaution against economic uncertainty.

Urban households with optimistic errors show stronger tendencies to reduce formal savings and increase spending on food and services. Rural households with pessimistic errors prioritize informal savings mechanisms but reduce food expenditure more significantly. Post-COVID trends reveal that pessimistic households intensified precautionary savings across all asset types while reducing debt exposure, reflecting heightened economic caution.

Borrowing behavior also varies with forecasting errors. Optimistic households favor informal borrowing channels like shop-based credit, especially among low-income groups with limited access to formal financial institutions. Pessimistic households broadly reduce debt exposure across both formal and informal sources, with this effect being more pronounced in rural areas. Post-COVID analysis shows that the cautious approach tied to pessimistic errors has intensified, while the impact of optimistic errors on borrowing has diminished. Overall, this study highlights how Indian households adapt their financial strategies based on economic conditions and sentiment-driven forecasting errors. It underscores significant regional and demographic variations in these behaviors, emphasizing the need for targeted policy interventions to promote balanced growth in essential areas like health and education while enhancing financial resilience across household segments. These insights are critical for designing policies that address disparities and foster stability in the face of economic uncertainty.

This study aims to examine the importance of intellectual property rights(IPR) protection in digital content trade, particularly focusing on the economic impacts of the international diffusion of IPR protection. Additionally, it seeks to identify the appropriate roles and responsibilities that can be assigned to platforms, which play a significant role in the international distribution of digital content, in order to protect IPR in digital content trade. The study also explores the necessity of international cooperation to facilitate these efforts. In Chapter 2, we examine the trends in Korea’s digital content market and trade to understand the changing significance of digital content in the economy. The revenue of Korea’s digital content industry increased from 20.3 billion USD in 2013 to 45.8 billion USD in 2021, with an average annual growth rate of 10.7%. During the same period, revenue per business entity in the digital content industry grew by an average of 11.6% annually, and revenue per employee also increased by an average of 8.8% annually, indicating an overall improvement in business performance. Exports of Korea’s content industry rose from 9.62 billion USD in 2018 to 13.24 billion USD in 2022. The trade surplus in the content industry expanded significantly from 8.4 billion USD in 2018 to 12.09 billion USD in 2022, with substantial trade surpluses recorded in industries such as gaming, music, broadcasting, character, and content solutions.

Chapter 3 outlines the trends in discussions on IPR protection for digital content from a trade perspective. IPR protection issues for digital content have been heavily addressed through bilateral or other agreements. In order to track developments in IPR protection provisions in bilateral agreements, we create a database containing the level of IPR protection for digital content in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) globally. The digital content-related IPR provisions in FTAs were categorized into three areas: i) compliance with the WTO TRIPS Agreement and adherence to international IPR treaties under WIPO, ii) provisions on copyright and related rights, and iii) enforcement- related provisions. We find a steady increase in the FTAs which include digital content-related IPR provisions.

Additionally, we look into regulatory trends concerning global platforms that dominate the distribution of digital content and services but, due to their vast scale and influence, create challenges that existing regulations struggle to address. To this end, the main features and characteristics of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) were summarized. Previously, platforms were often granted exemptions from liability for copyright infringements occurring on their services. In contrast, the DSA emphasizes platforms' responsibility for copyright infringements. This reflects the growing significance of platforms in content distribution and copyright infringement cases.

Chapter 4 empirically analyzes the impact of IPR protection in FTAs on digital content trade. We explore the effects of FTAs with TRIPS-plus provisions for digital content (referred to as IPAs) identified in Chapter 3 on digital content trade. The analysis distinguishes between countries that signed IPAs between 2005 and 2019 and those that did not, comparing their global and bilateral trade patterns to derive the trade effects of IPAs. The study focuses on industries closely related to digital content such as telecommunications, computer and information services; royalties and license fees; and personal, cultural, and recreational services. In terms of total imports, countries with IPA experienced a relative increase in imports in the telecommunications, computer, and information services, and personal, cultural, and recreational services sectors compared to countries without IPA. On the export side, personal, cultural, and recreational services exports showed a positive relationship with IPA adoption. We also analyze by income level and find that the relative increase in imports of telecommunications, computer, and information services through IPAs was primarily led by lower-middle-income countries. In contrast, the relative increase in exports of telecommunications, computer, and information services was statistically significant in high-income countries, suggesting that IPA may have facilitated cross-border supply from high-income to lower-income countries in this sector. These results align with theoretical and intuitive predictions about how IPR protection could influence cross-border supply.

Chapter 5 looks into the necessity of imposing copyright protection liabilities on global platforms. Using a two-country theoretical model, we examine when it is necessary to impose copyright protection obligations on digital platforms from a global perspective that considers the total welfare of both countries. We also explore how the incentives to impose such obligations differ between countries when strengthening copyright protection liabilities from a total welfare perspective, and whether these countries can enhance such obligations through voluntary agreements, such as FTAs. From the perspective of total welfare, regulations that strengthen platforms’ copyright protection obligations positively impact innovation in both countries, thereby increasing producer surplus for content creators. However, consumer surplus may either increase due to the availability of more content or decrease due to reduced competition among creators resulting from monopolistic supply. In such circumstances, if regulations strengthening copyright protection obligations lead to a positive impact on consumer surplus compared to the monitoring level voluntarily chosen by platforms, the total welfare of the two countries is always positively affected. The analysis also examines whether each country independently has an incentive to impose stronger copyright protection obligations on platforms. It demonstrates that even if there is an incentive to enhance platforms’ copyright protection efforts from the perspective of total welfare, such regulations are unlikely to be implemented when each country makes decisions independently. In this situation, if the two countries are relatively symmetric in terms of the scale of content providers and consumers, we show that there is an incentive to strengthen copyright protection obligations through voluntary agreements such as FTAs.

Based on these findings, implications for Korea’s current EPA policy are presented. Countries with which Korea is pursuing EPAs can be broadly categorized into three groups based on the level of IPR protection in their existing FTAs and the current state of their domestic IPR legal frameworks. Countries in Group 1 have already signed FTAs with a relatively high level of IPR protection and established strong domestic legal frameworks to protect IPR. For Group 1, ensuring the effective enforcement of digital content copyright is critical. It is necessary to introduce provisions regulating IPR enforcement, particularly in digital environments. The enforcement clauses included in recent FTAs signed by the UK could serve as a useful reference. Countries in Group 2 have included comprehensive IPR protection provisions in their existing FTAs but whose domestic legal systems are insufficient to effectively protect digital content copyrights. For Group 2, it is worthwhile to include protection provisions not covered in their existing FTAs. Especially, many countries in this group are not parties to the WIPO Internet Treaties so their accession to these treaties should be a priority. Countries in Group 3 have not signed FTAs with significant IPR protection provisions and have domestic legal systems that make it challenging to efficiently protect digital content copyrights. For Group 3, it is more important to assist these countries in establishing and growing a foundation for the content market rather than immediately introducing high-level IPR protection provisions in the EPA. This can gradually increase the necessity of IPR protection. For instance, including agreements on joint content production or cultural cooperation protocols within the EPA can help create a foundation for the content industry by fostering skills and expertise through international joint production efforts. Additionally, sharing Korea’s experience in developing its content industry through strengthened IPR protection via initiatives like the Knowledge Sharing Program could further enhance the interest and participation of partner countries.

Since the establishment of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 and the launch of the World Trade Organization multilateral trading system in 1995, trade liberalization has led to an increase in global trade and the internationalization of production through the globalization of supply chains. More recently, however, as non-trade values such as national security, domestic industry development, labor rights, and environmental protection have become important considerations, supply chains have become an end in themselves rather than a means of pursuing efficiency, and are subject to regulation to achieve various policy goals pursued by governments. Major trading partners, including the United States, are moving away from supply chains based on efficiency and focusing on building supply chains that share values and ideologies, and as economics and security are closely linked, major countries are strengthening their national-level responses by announcing economic and security strategies and utilizing various policy measures, including subsidies, to build their own local production and supply chains.

The problem then lies in the fact that traditional WTO/FTA international trade rules do not adequately address the proliferation of such unilateral measures that regulate global supply chains linked to various non-trade issues, including national security, environment, labor, and human rights. Due to the legal limitations of international trade rules, affected companies are facing increased compliance costs from emerging supply chain regulations, despite their legitimate expectations of market access (previously) promised in trade agreements under existing bilateral agreements. In light of these issues, this study identifies and characterizes the phenomenon of global supply chain regulation, whether international (mainly bilateral) or unilateral, and identifies the status and limitations of current international trade rules in this regard, and draws policy implications for the future direction of our foreign trade policy and domestic legislation.

Chapter 2 identifies the various legal, institutional, and policy efforts aimed at regulating global supply chains and characterizes the emerging phenomenon of unilateral supply chain regulation. Given the current geopolitical and geoeconomic conflicts, nationalism, and the trend of strengthening domestic industry protection, most unilateral supply chain regulations are focused on supply chains such as key minerals and raw materials, industrial subsidies, and high-tech industries, as well as national security, labor rights, and environmental protection. In light of this, Chapter 2 examines the main areas of recent unilateral supply chain regulation, categorized by supply chain and security, environment, labor, and other issues, and provides a detailed review of the measures.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine unilateral supply chain regulation itself and the trade law issues that arise from its implementation. Chapter 3 discusses the current state of international trade rules governing supply chain regulation and their limitations, focusing on the WTO’s multilateral trade rules. It focuses on the role that international trade rules have played in the formation of unilateral supply chain regulation in terms of who, what, and how it is formulated and implemented, its categorization according to the legal nature of the measures, and its legitimacy, as well as the extent to which it is applicable and whether it is actually deterrent. It also looks at the possible evolution of the case law on the legality of trade measures based on non-product-related process or production methods or “NPR PPMs” and the future development of the national security exception.

Further this study reviews the current state of disciplines in bilateral and multilateral trade rules, including FTAs, on unilateral supply chain regulation, focusing on the chapters on trade in goods. Overall, FTAs’ chapters on trade in goods directly incorporate or contain similar provisions as the WTO’s multilateral trade rules, but in some cases provides for “WTO plus” provisions that go beyond the disciplines of the WTO agreements. This study assesses whether this bilateral and multilateral approach may have the effect of reducing incentives for unilateral supply chain regulation.

For more recent examples of sectoral agreements and memoranda of understanding that are specific to supply chain issues, this study reviews the critical minerals sector. Leading examples include the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement, the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA), the U.S.-EU CMA under negotiation, the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), and the EU’s Strategic Partnership. Characterize recent developments in the formation and discussion of supply chain-related international rules and draw implications for the development of new components of national trade agreements and new types of international (trade) agreements to promote security of critical minerals and related supply chain stability.

Chapter 4 discusses (i) trade secret protection issues in the course of unilateral supply chain regulations, and (ii) what should be prepared for in light of the increasing involvement and influence of private actors in supply chain regulatory regimes. As major supply chain regulation cases have demonstrated that regulators are leveraging their markets to demand information from regulated companies on a fairly comprehensive range of production and processing methods throughout their supply chains, this paper will examine the current state of trade secret issues in international law and in the national laws of major countries, and suggest responses at the international and national law levels. The phenomenon of private actors’ participation in supply chain regulation at the government level is not a case of unilateral supply chain regulation, but it is indirectly related. It focuses on the trend of public participation and emphasis on corporate responsibility that has been in full swing since the Facility-Specific Rapid-Response Labor Mechanism or “RRM” under the USMCA.

Chapter 5 provides the following policy implications for how to respond to each type of unilateral supply chain regulation, both as recipients and as designers and addressers of domestic policies that may affect global supply chains. Firstly, as an addressee of unilateral supply chain regulation, it is important to have sufficient information prior to the adoption of a particular country's policy that may affect our supply chain and to respond quickly at the pre-policy formulation stage to minimize concerns for our companies and industries. In order to reduce dependence on certain raw materials in the supply chain and to ensure stable supply and demand of key minerals important for clean technology and semiconductor production, it is necessary to diversify import lines, actively participate in international agreements and consultations on key minerals, and strengthen linkages and cooperation among similarly positioned countries. It is necessary to consider how to design and utilize bilateral and multilateral agreements as an international legal policy instrument that can effectively support Korea’s core mineral supply chain policy direction and cooperation among countries. Regarding supply chain regulations related to forced labor, companies may have limitations in assessing the actual presence of forced labor and monitoring various partners scattered within global supply chains, so the government should consider ways to support companies by proactively assessing the risk of forced labor in countries and providing the results to relevant companies. Given that minimizing the risk of forced labor in supply chains may be the duty of the state as well as companies in the context of sustainable development, it is also necessary to consider strengthening domestic legislation to meet global standards so that Korean companies do not face additional burdens in their overseas operations.

As for the exposure of corporate trade secrets to unilateralist supply chain regulation, Article 1.9 of the U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement signed in 2020 during the Trump administration can be referenced in multilateral and bilateral negotiations and discussions in which Korea participates. This agreement is the only example of a trade secret protection provision that includes a separate section on “trade secrets and confidential business information” and protects trade secrets from potential leakage in regulatory proceedings. Regarding the trend toward greater public participation and corporate responsibility for labor standards compliance, which is being led by some trading partners such as the United States through domestic legislation or multilateral agreements, efforts should be made through multilateral channels to secure a common understanding among countries on public participation in the international trading environment to ensure a common and uniform standard that is acceptable to all countries, and institutional improvements should be made to safeguards to prevent abuses, and transparency mechanisms to ensure the right of reply and access to information for companies under investigation.

Finally, as an addresser of domestic policies that may affect global supply chains, there is a need for strategic use of policy discretion to the extent permitted under current international trade rules and for institutional design to pursue multiple policy objectives, particularly within climate, labor, and supply chain policies. When pursuing multiple objectives, i.e., where industrial objectives and non- traditional value objectives coexist, careful consideration should be given to the design of measures to ensure that non-traditional value objectives are set as the primary objective. Korea also needs industrial support policies centered on core items and industries, but should be cautious about introducing laws and systems similar to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. This study stresses careful design of domestic industry support policies regarding the use of subsidies related to local parts usage requirements (LCRs) and encourages ‘commercial considerations’ in the design of domestic industrial support policies. Further it suggests that the Korean government make efforts to strengthen the external ‘durability’ of domestic legislation and policies in the face of various new trade issues, including new types of industrial support policies, including preparations for possible WTO complaints and consideration of countervailing duties that may be imposed by major trading partners.

Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, the country has rapidly expanded its international development cooperation efforts. Today, Korea ranks 15th among the 31 DAC member countries in terms of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on evaluating the outcomes of these aid initiatives and identifying ways to enhance their effectiveness. The government is actively exploring strategies to improve ODA performance, with a particular focus on project packaging, large- scale project development, and branding.

In parallel with this budgetary expansion and the drive for increased effectiveness, building a knowledge ecosystem for international development cooperation has become a central priority for all stakeholders involved. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), development consulting firms, academic associations, and research institutes all play vital roles in this process to ensure greater impact. Facilitating smooth interaction between these stakeholders is crucial for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international development cooperation efforts. Furthermore, managing the supply and demand for professional human resources is key to strengthening the knowledge ecosystem. Policymakers should focus on how to train and effectively deploy entry-level professionals in this field.

The primary aim of this study is to identify the policy measures needed to train and utilize entry-level professionals, a critical factor for more efficient and effective implementation of international development cooperation in Korea, where the knowledge ecosystem is still in its early stages. In addition to a comprehensive literature review, the study employs two other research methodologies. First, a survey was conducted among graduates and current students of graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) at selected universities. The aim was to gather practical insights into the current state of education and training for entry-level professionals, thus yielding policy recommendations. Second, case studies were carried out in Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom to identify lessons that could be applied to Korea’s context.

The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the research identified several key challenges in the operation of the knowledge ecosystem, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of professional human resources. On the supply side, three primary obstacles were identified: (ⅰ) the lack of an integrated curriculum that balances both field knowledge and practical experience; (ⅱ) insufficient synergy between regional expertise education and courses related to international development cooperation; and (ⅲ) the underperformance of the qualification system for professionals in this field. On the demand side, two factors hinder the effective functioning of the ecosystem: (ⅰ) the lack of competitiveness among private consulting firms capable of executing ODA projects efficiently and effectively; and (ⅱ) the absence of a robust support system for job placement and career development for professionals.

Based on these findings, the study offers three key policy recommendations. First, it is recommended that the government reorganize the national education system for training professional human resources and play a more active role in this process. While the government has concentrated on quantitative expansion of the ODA budget since joining the OECD DAC, it is now essential to prioritize quality assurance by assessing how effectively and efficiently the budget is being utilized. A critical aspect of this process is improving the quality of professionals involved in international development cooperation, which aligns with the main objective of this study. To achieve this, we recommend that the government review existing human resource training programs, with a focus on supporting select graduate schools of international studies (GSIS) that provide foundational education for professionals. By enhancing the quality of their programs and expanding their reach, the government can significantly improve overall training standards. Additionally, programs run by public institutions like KOICA should be expanded and strengthened through increased budgets and synergies with GSIS programs. In the medium to long term, the study suggests considering the establishment of a “National Graduate School for International Development Cooperation” (tentative name), where the government would take a more direct role in training professional human resources.

Second, to ensure more efficient and effective use of the national budget, we recommend the creation of a demand base for professional human resources by increasing the participation of private consulting firms. Although this sector is still in its infancy, involving more private consulting firms is essential for expanding the demand for qualified professionals. Development consulting is a high-value knowledge industry, and greater participation from private firms will facilitate the accumulation of valuable knowledge and experience. This, in turn, can benefit Korea’s international development cooperation efforts and foster opportunities for collaboration on larger-scale ODA projects led by international organizations such as the World Bank and ADB.

Third, while the first two recommendations focus on the supply and demand sides of professional human resources, it is equally important to ensure smooth matching between the two to maximize the efficiency of job support and employment services. Our recommendation is to establish an integrated platform to manage professional human resources in international development cooperation. This platform should act as a two-way mechanism, facilitating job matching and capacity building for both early-career and mid-level professionals, ensuring more efficient alignment between the supply of trained professionals and the demand for their skills.

China’s digital trade is developing at a rapid pace. Exports of digital service trade, categorized as “digital delivery trade,” grew to account for 56.7% of China’s total services exports in 2023. In cross-border e-commerce, also categorized as “digital order trade,” China became the world’s largest B2C trade market in 2022. Comprehensive policy support on the part of the Chinese government has been instrumental in promoting this development of China’s digital trade. The Chinese government has been supporting technology development and institutional opening-up measures in the digital domain for several years now, in order to promote the quantitative and qualitative development of digital trade. In addition, China’s digital platforms have been able to expand overseas rapidly because smartphone-based mobile cross-border payment platforms have enhanced the affordability and convenience of international payments. The development of China’s mobile cross-border payment platforms has been largely influenced by the government’s institutional support. In addition, it is noteworthy that the Chinese government has been increasingly developing policies related to the construction and management of data infrastructure systems over the past year or two, and since the announcement of the Regulations on Facilitating and Regulating the Cross-border Data Transfers in March 2024, it has been piloting the implementation of negative lists in free trade pilot zones. China’s main focus has been to ease “the measures affecting cross-border data flows,” which have been criticized as a major digital trade barrier in China. However, it is difficult to detect a change in China’s basic stance as the deregulation measures of the above Regulations have only made detailed adjustments through subordinate laws, such as sectoral bylaws, while maintaining the overall framework stipulated in China’s three data laws. At the same time, it is significant that the Chinese government is attempting to make institutional changes to support China’s rapid digital trade growth in preparation for joining the DEPA and expanding its voice in international digital norm-setting and Chinese digital standards.

Meanwhile, the digital platform industry, which plays a key role in China’s digital trade, is also developing rapidly, with e-commerce and social commerce platforms at its center. Major players such as Alibaba, Jingdong, Pinduoduo, and Kwaishou adopt short-form video-based sales methods having a significant impact on the market. This growth has been driven by policy support and regulation from the Chinese government, as well as a rapidly changing market environment. The government has enacted various legal norms and policies to ensure the safe and transparent operation of digital platforms, with a particular focus on ensuring consumer protection and market order.

China’s position in the cross-border e-commerce market is further strengthened by the increasing overseas expansion of Chinese digital platforms that are competitive in the Chinese e-commerce market. The United States has emerged as the largest market for Chinese cross-border e-commerce exports, and China has become the largest source of online shopping services in Europe. As Chinese platforms showed rapid growth after gaining entry into the Korean market, China has emerged as Korea’s largest overseas direct purchasing destination. Chinese platforms have targeted overseas consumers with aggressive strategies such as building efficient production and logistics networks and flexible supply chains, real-time data analysis, convergence strategies using shopping apps, large-scale advertising, targeting consumers (Generation Z), and price competitiveness. The biggest challenges for China’s digital trade policy in the future is how to balance domestic and foreign demand and integrate it with international digital trade rules to facilitate the overseas expansion of Chinese digital enterprises and enhance their international competitiveness. Meanwhile, as the global digital economy gradually expands in scale, the Chinese government is actively establishing a digital platform management system. In particular, the balance between “innovation incentives” and “regulatory fences” and the integration of domestic systems with international rules may expand the scope of the Chinese government’s influence in the digital realm. In response, companies conducting business with China need to pay close attention to the Chinese government’s data supervision practices and details, strengthen data and supply chain management across the company, and prepare in advance to comply with regulations.

This report makes several policy recommendations. First, China’s digital trade norms need to be taken into account in the follow-up negotiations of the Korea-China FTA. The digital trade norms in China’s regional trade agreements do not yet contain a full e-commerce chapter, and mainly focus on measures related to e-commerce facilitation. The privacy and e-commerce cooperation provisions in the e-commerce chapters of China’s pending FTAs are vaguely worded and lack specific implementation details, which may make it difficult to resolve disputes in the future. It is important to keep this in mind when negotiating a follow-up FTA with China, and ensure that the text of the agreement is detailed and precise from the outset. Another characteristic is that the content of the digital trade norms in the agreement differs depending on the target country and its interests with China. This suggests that when Korea negotiates a follow-up FTA with China in the future, it may be possible to revise the text of the agreement in accordance with circumstances in the two countries. China highly praises the Korea-China FTA, which was signed in June 2015 and entered into force in December 2015, as China’s first agreement to include an e-commerce chapter. However, the China-Australia FTA, which was signed and entered into force around the same time, includes provisions that are not included in its FTA agreement with South Korea, such as consumer protection and data protection. In addition, FTAs with other countries that were signed or revised after the Korea-China FTA include the same provisions as Australia. In addition to consumer protection, the China-Chile FTA, revised in September 2017, includes articles on cooperation in cross-border payment supervision and support for SMEs to overcome e-commerce barriers. As consumer complaints continue to rise about goods sold on large Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms that have recently entered Korea, it is necessary to explicitly include the phrase “consumer protection” in follow-up negotiations. In addition, when conducting follow-up negotiations with China, it is necessary to supplement the agreement to support the overseas expansion of SMEs, as both countries are facing a difficult situation due to sluggish domestic demand. Based on the examples of the China-Chile and China-New Zealand FTAs, it is worth considering adding phrases such as “opening up markets for SMEs through e-commerce” and “helping SMEs overcome barriers to e-commerce” to the e-commerce chapter. This could be an institutional and policy support measure to support the development of cross-border e-commerce platforms as a sales channel for products in which Korean and Chinese SMEs have a comparative advantage.

Second, Korea needs to take a more forward-looking stance on China’s participation in global digital norms. As industries move toward AI and data-driven forms in the future, if DEPA’s new technology governance specifications become a global consensus, the embedded intellectual property rights will determine the competitive space of our products in related markets, such as related smart devices or smart gadgets. China’s accession to DEPA will expand the scope of digital trade governance norms discussions, and proactively identifying relevant technological innovations and best practices will impact the long-term competitiveness of existing industries in the digital economy.

Third, we suggest that the government balance its regulatory and supportive policies for platform companies. As China’s digital economy grows in size, the country has been active in establishing institutions related to the digital economy. In the past, China has been wary of the monopolistic influence of large platform companies over entire industries. However, it now recognizes the role of large platform companies in the digital economy. As such, China’s future policies are likely to focus on building an orderly system while encouraging platform operators to operate in a compliant manner. China first announced a government-level policy to promote the digital economy in 2019, and has since announced more specific and proactive measures to foster related industry infrastructure, data resources, digitization of industry and government, digital industries, and international cooperation. This can be interpreted as an attempt to encourage China’s large platform companies to go abroad and expand the domestic economy. While this may have a negative impact on China’s domestic economy, the government hopes that large Internet companies can play a greater role as national growth engines, creating jobs, helping traditional manufacturing enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises develop, and increasing their international competitiveness. China’s regulatory measures for platform companies are not necessarily applicable to Korea’s situation. However, government policy should not be limited to regulating platform companies’ anti-competitive behavior or illegal activities in the six services of brokerage, search, video, SNS, operating system, and advertising. It is necessary to balance regulatory-oriented platform enterprise policies with supportive policies to encourage the development of derivative industries and create jobs, while allowing Korea’s globally competitive platform enterprises to expand overseas.

Fourth, we propose the following two measures as Korea’s response to the increasing overseas expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms. Firstly, we believe that it is time to thoroughly prepare for the rapid entry of Chinese platforms into the Korean market. It is necessary to review the cross-border e-commerce related systems, including domestic market protection, safe trade and consumer protection, privacy and cybersecurity, etc. Secondly, as concerns grow over the problems arising from the expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms overseas, regulations in major economies such as the U.S. and EU have been strengthened. As a result, Korean e-commerce platforms seeking to expand overseas should prepare for trade risks arising from the regulation of cross-border e-commerce platforms in major countries. The U.S. and the EU have abolished the tax exemption system for cross-border e-commerce platforms and are strengthening regulations on the import of goods related to environmental degradation and forced labor. As such, it is important to recognize that factors such as labor and environment may also be subject to trade regulations. Therefore, in order to expand cross-border e-commerce, Korean companies need to proactively prepare for new trade regulation risks by preparing overseas expansion strategies that consider ESG management in addition to enhancing their own competitiveness. In addition, as major economies including the U.S. and the EU are expected to expand cross-border e-commerce regulations, it is necessary to monitor new regulatory trends and proactively assess their potential impact on Korean companies.

This study investigates the consideration of unintended effects within South Korea’s burgeoning Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs. Despite Korea’s growing role as an emerging donor, research on the unintended consequences of its aid interventions remains limited. This analysis addresses this gap by examining how key Korean ODA implementing agencies, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) and the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH), address unintended consequences in their evaluation reports.

Employing a mixed-methods approach – literature review, text analysis, and qualitative content analysis – the study explores the extent to which these agencies analyze and report on unintended effects in evaluations conducted over the past decade. Text analysis of agency reports (extracted from KOICA, KEXIM and KOFIH websites) identifies the frequency and nature of unintended effects discussed, utilizing software (CAQDAS) and keyword searches (“unintended,” “unplanned,” etc.). Thematic analysis then categorizes identified effects based on established typologies(Koch 2024; Jabeen 2018).

Findings reveal that Korea’s major aid agencies analyzed unintended effects in approximately 8% of evaluations, with KOICA featuring a balanced view of both positive and negative effects, while KEXIM and KOFIH focused predominantly on positive effects. The most frequently observed positive unintended effect was the spill-over effects, spread of benefits to non-beneficiary groups and area, fostering community solidarity, economic gains, and empowerment for women. A microcredit program targeting women for increased household income inadvertently led to partners’ awareness of women’s economic and social capacity, leading to enhanced understanding of human rights. Additionally, a cross-sectoral effect was observed in a school feeding program, where children’s educational outcomes improved as a result of better nutrition.

In contrast, negative unintended effects, such as elite capture and regressive targeting—wherein benefits unintentionally excluded vulnerable populations—highlighted gaps in project design and stakeholder engagement. Notably, rural development programs like the Samaeul initiative were found to unintentionally benefit wealthier farmers, excluding poorer ones (regressive targeting, Koch, 2024). Similarly, vocational training for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-conflict settings risked unintended discrimination within IDP communities, potentially undermining social cohesion. In microcredit program targeting former refugee villagers provided loans for agricultural activity, unintentionally marginalizing female-led/elderly-led household as they tend to have insufficient labor to increase agricultural productivity.

Conversely, macro-level effects like anti-aid sentiments, governance issues, and environmental impacts were rarely mentioned. These findings may be attributed to factors like East Asian cultural tendencies that discourage open discussions about failure, the relatively recent and smaller scale of Korean interventions, and the absence of a colonial past unlike traditional donors.

Additional semi-structured interviews with domestic and international evaluation experts, reaffirmed the study’s conclusions and contributed to refining its recommendations. The analysis underscores the importance of developing more complexity theory and systems thinking based Theory of Changes that could help predict and indentify not only intended but also potential unintended consequences of the evaluated intervention. Strategies include assessing risks and designing safeguards for negative unintended effects during project planning, fostering mechanisms to enhance positive spillover, and strengthening human rights and gender considerations. In performance management, recommendations emphasize monitoring not only outputs and outcomes but also underlying assumptions and risks, and refining ToRs to mandate or recommend UIE evaluation where relevant. Additionally, evaluators could adopt open-ended, exploratory interview technique and evaluation methods like outcome harvesting, and participatory narrative inquiry (PNI) which are arguably better suited to identify the unintended effects in development interventions.

The study suggests institutional measures to conduct more strategic evaluations with long-term perspectives. Establishing a culture that distinguishes evaluation from auditing is also recommended as a precondition for further discussion and evaluation of unintended effects of international development cooperation as donor agencies are reluctant to openly discuss the unintended effects of their intervention, which are often perceived as negative results of mismanagement of taxpayer’s money.

This study marks the first in-depth examination of unintended effects in Korean ODA evaluations. By comparing practices across donor countries and defining unintended effects in the Korean context, the study provides critical insights for enhancing developmental effectiveness, helping policymakers, evaluation managers, and researchers consider new, often-overlooked aspects of development cooperation. Importantly, this research underlines the need to address both planned and unintended effects in Korea’s ODA, setting a foundation for resilient, inclusive, and sustainable aid interventions.

The evaluation of international development cooperation has become increasingly institutionalized as Korea’s ODA budget has grown, together with awareness regarding the importance of evaluations, accompanied by a surge in the number of evaluations. This study explores whether this expansion has been matched by a corresponding increase in their practical contribution, as originally intended. It aims to diagnose the current state of evaluation use in Korea’s development cooperation, analyze both the demand for and barriers to such use, and identify practical strategies to enhance evaluation utility. While acknowledging broader structural and institutional constraints that may influence overall evaluation use, the study focuses on “evaluation implementation factors” that can be reasonably adjusted or influenced by evaluators and commissioning bodies during the evaluation process, with a view to proposing realistic and actionable strategies to improve the usefulness of evaluations.

Chapter 2 builds a conceptual foundation for evaluation use and utility by synthesizing relevant theories and international practices. It reviews existing literature on the concepts, types, and influencing factors of evaluation use, and closely examines specific cases and strategic efforts undertaken by major international organizations and donor agencies to strengthen the use of evaluations. Drawing on previous research, this study defines “evaluation use” as the various ways in which evaluation can influence stakeholders through different pathways, and analyzes the characteristics of evaluations with high utility. Rather than focusing on structural constraints that are difficult to change in the short term, the study emphasizes barriers that can be addressed through improvements in evaluation practice. It highlights the importance of providing information that meets user needs and adopting flexible methodologies as key strategies for enhancing the utilization of evaluation results.

Chapter 3 analyzes the current state of evaluation use in Korea’s development cooperation and proposes directions for improving its utility. Despite the institutionalization of evaluations across implementing agencies, actual use remains limited in both scope and depth. Repeated evaluations with unclear objectives, resource constraints, and a focus on compliance-driven feedback mechanisms have contributed to low perceived utility. Survey findings reveal that evaluations are often used symbolically—for promotion or justification —rather than instrumentally or for learning. Stakeholders pointed to persistent mismatches between what the information evaluations provide and what users actually need—such as forward-looking insights for agenda-setting or practical solutions to implementation challenges—as well as limited accessibility and poor readability of evaluation reports. Moreover, evaluations are primarily used by internal managers, while higher-level decision-makers and local stakeholders remain under-engaged. These findings underscore the need to broaden the user base and diversify the forms of evaluation use so that evaluations can more effectively support learning and problem-solving throughout the program cycle. In particular, the results suggest the need for more diversity in methodologies to better accommodate varied information needs.

Chapter 4 highlights the importance of flexible and fit-for-purpose methodologies in enhancing evaluation utility. Building on the conceptual and empirical insights of the previous chapters, it examines five approaches—impact evaluation, economic analysis, outcome mapping, outcome harvesting, and real-time evaluation—and analyzes their characteristics from the perspective of utility. Among these, impact evaluation and economic analysis are suitable for verifying causal links and cost-effectiveness through quantitative methods. These approaches are particularly useful for instrumental use by policymakers and managers in strategic planning and resource allocation, while also enhancing the credibility of project results through rigorous evidence generation. Outcome mapping and outcome harvesting are participatory and qualitative approaches that help capture complex and non-linear changes in dynamic development contexts. Real-time evaluation (RTE), which allows for immediate feedback during implementation, is especially relevant for humanitarian assistance and other time-sensitive projects. Participatory approaches not only improve the responsiveness of evaluations but also strengthen learning and capacity among stakeholders by involving them directly in data collection and analysis—thereby supporting continuous improvement and more effective collaboration.

The analysis concludes that evaluation methods should be selected based on their alignment with the evaluation’s purpose, subject, stakeholder needs, timing, and available resources—and that mixed-method approaches are often necessary in practice. In the Korean context, the study emphasizes the need for more diverse and advanced training programs to strengthen methodological capacity, and recommends a gradual approach to piloting new evaluation methods to assess their feasibility and scalability under practical constraints such as limited time and budget.

The final chapter offers practical policy recommendations for enhancing evaluation utility at both the implementing agency and national coordination levels. For implementing agencies, a strategic approach is needed throughout the evaluation process. The study proposes core checkpoints for each of five key stages of the evaluation process—(1) selection and planning, (2) design and implementation, (3) quality assurance, (4) communication of findings, and (5) follow-up and knowledge management—to ensure that evaluations produce relevant and usable insights.

At the national level, institutional improvements are recommended to encourage demand-driven evaluations, promote diverse methodologies, and strengthen evaluation knowledge systems. These include enhancing evaluator capacity, offering flexibility in evaluation mandates, and ensuring that feedback processes lead to meaningful action rather than symbolic compliance. Ultimately, the study calls for a shift from a compliance-oriented approach to a more strategic, user-centered evaluation culture. By aligning evaluations with stakeholder needs, adopting flexible methodologies, and embedding findings into knowledge systems, evaluation can become a more meaningful driver of learning, accountability, and effectiveness in Korea’s development cooperation.