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  • 한-중앙아 수교 30주년: 경제협력 평가와 4대 협력 과제
    30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and Central Asia: The Evaluation of Economic Cooperation and Four Major Cooperation Tasks

       Central Asia refers to five countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, which became independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Region, located in the heart of ..

    Young Jin Kim et al. Date 2021.12.27

    Economic development, Financial cooperation Russia Eurasia
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       Central Asia refers to five countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, which became independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Region, located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, is attracting attention as a key promising participant for regional integration projects of major powers, and is the site of fierce geopolitical competition between Russia, China and the United States. Central Asian economies which are dependent on the export of energy resources such as oil and natural gas, are diversifying their industrial structure through policies to encourage manufacturing industry in line with the transition to a global carbon-neutral era, and are implementing policies to expand the development of new and renewable energy. In addition, as non-face-to-face activities have become normal due to the COVID-19 crisis, digital transformation including ICT industry is accelerating in Central Asia, where population density is low.
       2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and the five Central Asian countries. Korea has grown into an important import partner in Central Asia over the past 30 years. According to the official statistics of each country in 2020, Korea is the third largest importer of Kazakhstan, the fourth largest importer of Uzbekistan, and the seventh and ninth largest importer of remaining three Central Asian countries. On the other hand, Central Asia is not a major trading partner for Korea, as it accounts for less than 1% of Korea’s total exports and imports. Trade items between Korea and Central Asia are also limited to some items due to differences in economic structure and economic development. However, the possibility of cooperation between Korea and Central Asia is increasing as the 4th Industrial Revolution and economic modernization policies of Central Asian countries have led to major changes in economic and social structures of Central Asian countries.
       Central Asian countries are striving to modernize their economies and diversify their industrial structures for sustainable economic development, and are pushing for modernization of the domestic financial sector to expand domestic investment and successfully attract overseas investment.
       In addition, with the advent of the carbon-neutral era, the development of new and renewable energy is being promoted, and the digitalization of the economy is being pursued in accordance with the global trend of the 4th industrial revolution. At the same time, governments in each country are implementing improvement policies to strengthen their capabilities in health care sector as they face medical and health crises such as the shortage of medical supplies due to the COVID-19 outbreak. In other words, important tasks emerging in Central Asian countries is to successfully overcome the health crisis and promote stable economic development. For this purpose, important future cooperation tasks between Korea and Central Asian countries is to break away from the existing cooperation limited to some items and to discover areas of cooperation for building mid- to long-term cooperative relationship.
       In celebration of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and Central Asia, this study used the following research methods to evaluate the achievements of cooperation in the fields of diplomacy and economy, and to analyze the four major cooperation areas in depth.
       First, the contents of the research topic of this report were analyzed and organized using various primary and secondary literature and statistical data. These literature and statistical data were actively used to analyze the current status and characteristics of politics, diplomacy, and economy in Korea and Central Asia, and to analyze the cooperation status and performance of four major cooperation areas: digital cooperation, renewable energy cooperation, financial cooperation, and health care cooperation.
       Second, in order to improve the quality of this study by obtaining the opinions and advice of experts, a number of experts related to each subject were invited and expert meetings were held. In particular, the objectivity and validity of directions and policy proposals of this study were enhanced by listening to the opinions of experts focusing on the four major cooperative areas.
       Third, due to the COVID-19, field research and interviews with local experts were practically difficult, so written interviews were conducted with experts from Central Asia working in government, academia, and private sector living in Korea and Central Asia. This study was intended to provide vivid information and conduct realistic research by reflecting the results of these written interviews In commemoration of the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Central Asia, this study comprehensively evaluates the economic and diplomatic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia over the past 30 years. Furthermore, this study explored areas with high potential for cooperation between Korea and Central Asia by reflecting the rapidly changing global political, economic, social and cultural environment. The contents of this study can be summarized as follows.
       First, diplomatic and security cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. Central Asia is a region in which Russia, China, and the United States are in geopolitical competition due to high potential for oil and natural gas energy resource development, bordering with unstable Afghanistan, and high importance as a key point for regional integration projects. Russia is trying to maintain military influence in Central Asia based on historical ties, and China is seeking to expand its economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States, which advanced into Central Asia to attack Afghanistan shortly after 9/11, is preparing a new strategy in Central Asia to check Russia and China.
       Marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Central Asia, the achievements in terms of diplomacy and security between Korea and the five Central Asian countries are as follows. The first is the expansion of the horizon of Korean diplomacy. The past governments of Korea have made efforts to expand their diplomatic ties to Eurasia, and within that, policies of cooperation with Central Asian countries have been steadily strengthened. Second, sharing experiences with Kazakhstan, which voluntarily promoted denuclearization and non-proliferation. Korea is one of the few countries that has a multilateral consultative body with five Central Asian countries, and the two sides are cooperating based on multilateralism.
       Second, in terms of economic cooperation, Central Asia is not pertaining to Korea’s major trading partners, accounting for less than 1% of Korea’s total exports and imports, but Korea is an important trading partner for Central Asia. Among the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have relatively large trade volume with Korea, but the trade volumes between Korea and the other three countries are insignificant. Over the past 30 years, Korea’s total investment in Central Asia has reached $3.596 billion, of which Kazakhstan’s share was $2.661.2 million, accounting for 74% of the total investment in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan accounted for 21.52% with $774 million. The proportion of the remaining three Central Asian countries was insignificant at 2.78% in Kyrgyzstan, 1.66% in Tajikistan, and 0.13% in Turkmenistan. Therefore, in terms of foreign direct investment, investment relations between Korea and Central Asia have been concentrated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the 1990s, Korea invested the most in Uzbekistan among Central Asian countries, but since the 2000s, Kazakhstan has maintained the status of Korea’s largest investment destination in Central Asia. Uzbekistan was selected as a major ODA priority partner in 2010 and 2015, making it a major beneficiary among the five Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan was re-selected as an ODA priority partner country in 2021, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were newly selected as priority partners. Accordingly, Korea’s ODA to Uzbekistan is expected to continue its high performance as it is today, and the ODA to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is now equipped with conditions to expand further.
       Third, the transition to the digital era presented an important task of ICT cooperation between Korea and Central Asian countries. All five Central Asian countries have established and implemented mid- to long-term strategies for the digital economy. Uzbekistan’s strategy is “Digital Uzbekistan 2030”, Kazakhstan’s is “Digital Kazakhstan 2018 to 2022”, and the Kyrgyz government is pursuing “Digital Kyrgyzstan (2019-2023)”, Tajikistan is seeking “The Concept of the Digital Economy of the Republic of Tajikistan”, Turkmenistan has announced the resolution of “The Digital Economy Development Concept 2019-2025”.
       The strategies of Central Asian countries commonly set priority areas such as strengthening broadband networks, digital transformation of the economy, formation of a sustainable innovative ecosystem, formation of human capital, expansion of e-commerce, and formation of e-government. Korea-Central Asian digital cooperation is largely divided into ODA projects and private cooperation. Korea has been continuously expanding its ODA projects with Central Asian countries, mainly cooperating in the fields such as e-government, geographic information system, and educational digitalization. The cooperation of the private sector related to the digital economy largely consists of the export of ICT devices such as mobile phones and the advancement of service companies such as KT and LG CNS, and the export of ICT devices has been led by Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics. While Korea’s cooperation with Uzbekistan, which has been Korea’s ODA priority partner, is high, while ODA projects and private entry to other Central Asian countries were still on the low side. However, as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are selected as priority partners for ODA in 2021, cooperation with these countries is expected to expand further in the future.
       Fourth, the possibility and policy tasks for new and renewable energy cooperation between Korea and Central Asia were analyzed. Among the Central Asian regions, especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have the greatest potential for solar power generation, and Kazakhstan has a high potential for wind power generation as it can generate wind power in about 50% of the total land area. These industries are very useful in terms of economic and energy security in Central Asia. Central Asian countries have established national strategies for the construction of new and renewable energy facilities. However, only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have prepared concrete plans for the implementation stage of renewable energy strategy. The governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have announced plans to generate more than 10% of electricity generation from solar and wind power by 2030, and significant investments are expected to be made to achieve this goal. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in the stage of developing new and renewable energy industries in earnest according to their national development strategies, and many wind power and solar power projects are being promoted. As a result, opportunities for foreign companies to participate in local businesses are increasing significantly, and competition for bidding orders from each country is fierce. Korea needs a national strategy and support to advance into Central Asia in consideration of new and renewable energy cooperation by breaking away from the existing Korea-Central Asian energy cooperation limited to oil and natural gas cooperation.
       Fifth, the current status of the financial industry in Central Asian countries and the tasks of financial cooperation between Korea and Central Asia were analyzed. Financial cooperation between Korea and Central Asia is also a promising field for cooperation in that Central Asian countries are promoting industrial diversification and modernization through foreign capital attraction. Central Asian countries have low competitiveness in financial markets, and financial companies in each country are not able to expand their participation in the global financial market. Therefore, the development of a balanced financial industry is pointed out as one of the urgent national tasks of the five Central Asian countries. In banking sector, Kazakhstan is the most connected to the global financial system among the five countries, Turkmenistan is the most isolated market, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are heavily dependent on the government, and Kyrgyzstan has restrictions depending on the size of the domestic market. Looking back on the details of Korea-Central Asian financial cooperation over the past 30 years, Korean financial companies and financial infrastructure have advanced into Central Asia, centered on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which have the highest demand for development cooperation among the five Central Asian countries. In the development aid cooperation sector, credit extensions such as development loans and overseas investment loans were concentrated in Uzbekistan, while official development aid was concentrated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the form of sharing development experience, technical support, and training. However, the need to expand the scope of financial cooperation between Korea and Central Asia is growing as the joint financial market of the European Economic Union is formed and Fintech and ICT emerge.
       Lastly, health and medical cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. Korean medical institutions have been promoting health and medical cooperation mainly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which have high demand and purchasing power for medical tourism. In fact, for 10
    years from 2009, when foreign patients were legally allowed, the rate of increase of inbound patients from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Korea was 67.1% and 48.3%, respectively, higher than the average annual growth rate of attracting foreign patient’s inflows in Korea (22.7%). As such, Korea and Central Asia are complementary to each other in terms of medical supply and demand, thus expectations for medical cooperation between the two countries were high. However, various legal regulations in Central Asian countries, the reluctance of locals who are accustomed to public health to use private medical institutions, and the high current costs of hiring Korean doctors have been obstacles for Korean institutions to advance into Central Asia. However, through President Moon Jae-in’s 2019 visit to Central Asia, regulations that have been pointed out as problems in health and medical cooperation between Korea and Central Asia are being discussed again at the government level, raising expectations for revitalizing health and medical cooperation. In addition, as non-face-to-face contact becoming commonplace due to the COVID-19, various pilot projects are being operated to make telemedicine a reality in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Accordingly, the possibility of local advancement through telemedicine, which Korean medical institutions have tried and hoped for from the beginning of their entry into Central Asia, is increasing.
       As described above, this study has analyzed the cooperation achievements and tasks in the fields of diplomacy and security, economy, digital, renewable energy, finance, and health care between Korea and Central Asia over the past 30 years. Based on this, this study presents policy implications and tasks as follows in order to enhance mid- to long-term cooperation between Korea and Central Asia.
       First, it is the field of diplomatic and security cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. Korea should form solidarity with middle powers such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan so that peace and neutrality, negotiation and dialogue can function in the great power politics. Most of the agendas in which middle powers can intervene or exercise initiative in the global order centered on great powers are directly related to human security, such as human rights, humanitarian aid, sustainable development, response to climate change, natural disasters, infectious diseases, and nuclear proliferation prevention. Thus, solidarity with middle powers is also related to human security. Therefore, Korea should strengthen diplomatic cooperation with Central Asian countries in terms of solidarity with middle powers. In the post-coronavirus era, cooperation between Korea and Central Asia leads to solidarity of middle powers for human security, and mutual understanding should be enhanced by strengthening public diplomacy in line with the era of the 4th industrial revolution.
       Next, the key cooperation areas were selected based on the evaluation of economic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. Despite the disproportionate trade relationship between Korea and Central Asia over the past 30 years, in order to develop a mutually beneficial and future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two sides, Korea needs to select areas of cooperation that can support the sustained economic growth of Central Asian countries and lead the cooperation. These cooperative areas should share Korea’s advanced technological level and development experience and meet the policy demands and needs of each country in Central Asia. In addition, for future-oriented and sustainable cooperation with Central Asian countries, it is necessary to prepare a new framework for economic cooperation. In order to prepare such a new framework for economic cooperation, it is desirable to set the direction of cooperation between the two sides and select the areas of cooperation in consideration of the economic development strategies and economic policy directions and policy demands of each country in Central Asia. Accordingly, in this study, four promising areas of cooperation; 1) digital cooperation, 2) new and renewable energy cooperation, 3) financial cooperation, and 4) health and medical cooperation, between Korea and Central Asian countries were selected, and in-depth analysis and policy measures were presented for each field.
       First, it is a policy plan for ICT cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. As Korean government promotes online/non-face-to-face economic cooperation and the digital economy of partner countries using ICT technologies such as AI due to the COVID-19, digital cooperation with Central Asian countries that are promoting the transition to a digital economy is emerging as a promising business.
       Promising fields of digital cooperation between Korea and Central Asia include: a) Broadband network sector, including ICT policy exchange for network construction (frequency management policy and network joint construction, etc.), and cooperation in 5G and advanced technologies /future technologies using 5G such as the Internet of Things, big data, and artificial intelligence. b) It is promising to export Korea’s e-Government model in a package type that includes e-Government promotion and online participation or usage ability directly related to practical use, which is needed by the people of Central Asian countries. c) It is possible to export new services, business models, and security technologies of Korea to the e-commerce market in Central Asia, which is in its infancy, and it is possible to enter various application fields such as fintech, payment-related applications, and edtech, where demand is expected to increase with the growth of e-commerce in Central Asia. d) As agriculture is a major key industry in Central Asian countries and can receive budget support from international organizations, smart farming-related services, such as seed testing, human resources and management-related training, data management/precision system, etc., are promising. e) Smart city business sector, which includes multiple layers of solutions (smart transportation, smart building, smart water supply, smart energy, smart waste management, smart safety/disaster prevention solutions, etc.). f) It is necessary to establish a startup ecosystem that can create various innovations using ICT technology.
       Considering that Central Asian countries lack the financial capacity to pursue digital projects, Korea should actively seek cooperation by winning bids for digital transformation projects from Central Asian countries and participating in several international development bank projects. It will also be necessary to consider how to leverage the EAEU and Russian/overseas channels in digital cooperation with Central Asia to enter the market. At the same time, Korea should focus on cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan so that this cooperation can be expanded to the other countries step by step.
       Second, in accordance with the transition to a carbon-neutral era, cooperation in renewable energy between Korea and Central Asia should be promoted. In Central Asia, local business risks are too high for private companies to carry out alone, and there is insufficient information for domestic companies to enter the renewable energy field. There are many problems in local businesses that are difficult to solve with the efforts of private companies alone. Therefore, in order for Korean companies to enter the new and renewable energy business in Central Asia, which has great potential, institutional support at the government level is necessary.
       The governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have clearly stated their intention to develop new and renewable energy with private capital rather than government funds in their national development strategies.
       Considering that the private sector in both countries has limited funds to invest in this field, the new and renewable energy project will be carried out with the financial support of foreign governments or multilateral development banks in the PPP method. As it is true that Korea lacks in price competitiveness and financial support compared to its competitors, it will be important to actively cooperate with the local government from the initial stage of the project to be selected as the preferred bidder.
       Energy projects are mostly large-scale projects that require a long-term investment of a large amount of investment. However, various reasons, such as changes in local laws/systems and bureaucracy in Central Asia, are hindering entry into the local market, and private companies are experiencing difficulties in investing. There is a need for institutional measures to protect investors through consultations between the Korean government and the Central Asian government. In addition, in order to receive payment guarantees from local governments for the amount of PPP investment, an agreement between countries is required. Currently, the public-private network with the local country is well formed, so using it to discover and participate in new projects is an effective strategy to increase the penetration power of Korean companies. Considering that Central Asian private and governmental funds are insufficient, it is necessary to efficiently utilize Korean ODA funds to advance into new and renewable energy projects in Central Asia. In addition, it is necessary to actively participate in projects funded by multilateral development banks.
       Third, it is the field of financial cooperation with Central Asian countries that are actively promoting foreign capital attraction. The following long-proposed existing agendas such as capital market cooperation, SME financing for Koryoin(Korean diaspora) companies in Central Asia, public finance and resource development through international financial institutions, plant project funding support, and transfer and provision of basic knowledge and technology necessary for nurturing manufacturing for industrial diversification and advancement in Central Asian countries, regular advice on credit guarantees necessary for fostering special economic zones and SMEs, etc. are still considered necessary to build long-term and sustainable financial cooperation.
       However, considering the rapidly changing circumstances surrounding the financial industry, it is necessary to approach the existing agenda in a new way or to readjust the agenda. In relation to the integration efforts of Eurasian countries, including Central Asia, important areas in which Korea can contribute or cooperate in the future financial sector of Central Asia are as follows. Integration of Central Asian financial infrastructure, implementation of a multilateral payment and settlement system using local currency or single currency in the region, stock market development and revitalization of investment in CIS countries, support for overcoming financial crisis, etc. In order to induce active investment in raising funds for regional development, it is necessary to establish a guarantee fund that mitigates investment risk through multilateral cooperation or to actively participate in financing and financial support projects of international financial institutions. In addition, it is important to expand mutual cooperation through active participation of Korean public financial institutions related to the improvement of financial market infrastructure such as payment and settlement infrastructure, fintech, and credit rating systems, which are becoming increasingly important with the spread of digital finance. Regular multilateral or bilateral meetings with financial regulatory supervisors in Central Asian countries are important in order to politicize these diverse financial cooperation-related agendas, share experiences, and discover and continuously promote mutually beneficial cooperation tasks.
       Lastly, health and medical cooperation between Korea and Central Asia, where the possibility of cooperation has increased more than ever due to the COVID-19 crisis. Due to the global pandemic of COVID-19, our daily life is changing in a non-face-to-face manner based on digital technology. Digital-based non-face-to-face activities increase convenience and reduce costs as there are no time and space restrictions.
       Digital technologies also have the advantage of being scalable through networks. Korean medical institutions with strengths in IT sector will be able to quickly adapt and apply these changes to advance into Central Asia in the form of non-face-to-face treatment and medical platforms. In particular, the medical platform business model that reflects the local people’s demand for high-quality medical services following the introduction of the health insurance system can be expanded and exported to Russia and other Russian-speaking CIS countries. At the same time, by conducting non-face-to-face education to strengthen the capabilities of local medical staff, Korean medical institutions will be able to secure manpower to assist with remote medical treatment and contribute to the improvement of health care in Central Asian countries.
       For such non-face-to-face treatment and digital platform business between the two sides, the policy support of Korean government should be made in order to alleviate institutional regulations, as well as the efforts of Korean medical institutions. 
  • 한ㆍ러 경협 활성화를 위한 중소기업의 역할과 과제
    Study on Economic Cooperation between Korea and Russia in Aspect of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises

       This research was inspired by the 30th anniversary of Korea-Russia diplomatic ties and the COVID-19 pandemic. Seeking solutions to enhance economic cooperation between Korea and Russia in the aspect of small and mediu..

    Dong-Yul Kim et al. Date 2021.12.24

    Economic development, Economic cooperation Russia Eurasia
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       This research was inspired by the 30th anniversary of Korea-Russia diplomatic ties and the COVID-19 pandemic. Seeking solutions to enhance economic cooperation between Korea and Russia in the aspect of small and medium sized enterprises differentiates this research from previous researches. The current status and characteristics of Russia’s small and medium enterprises were examined first. Currently the Russian government’s policy on small and medium enterprises is changing drastically. Analyzing recent changes and economic cooperation of the Russian government with China and Germany provided implications for economic cooperation between Korea and Russia. Lastly, the study investigates collaboration projects between Korean and Russian small and medium companies. Based on these findings, the study evaluates the achievements and limitations of economic cooperation between Korea and Russia.
       While Russian small and medium-sized businesses are constantly developing, their performance remains lacking compared to developed countries in terms of contribution to GDP, sales and employment. The productivity of small and medium-sized companies is significantly lower than that of large enterprises. With development of the Russian economy largely relying on government-run firms, economic growth is led by companies related to the energy and mining industry, thus requiring huge investment from the government. This leads to governmental support measures within the financial and tax system concentrating on major government-run companies.
       Innovation is urgently needed on the energy-focused industrial structure. Along with this innovation, the worldwide trend of the 4th industrial revolution is expected to trigger growth of Russian small and medium businesses on a constant basis. The growth is anticipated to accelerate due to Russian government’s policy to promote growth in innovative industries such as ICT. In addition, policy programs such as the Skolkovo Foundation have helped non-governmental and innovative small and medium businesses to emerge.
       In July of 2007, the Russian authorities adopted federal laws “on the development of small and medium-sized businesses in the Russian Federation” (О развитии малого и среднего предпринимательства в Российской Федерации) to institutionalize support for small and medium sized companies. Also, the Russian government approved “Initiative support for small and medium sized business and independent companies” in December of 2018. This program stipulates five different support methods (innovation of business environment, financial aid, aid to accelerate companies’ development, establishment of system to support agricultural corporation and farmers and promoting to found venture companies) for small and medium companies.
       Collaboration with foreign high-tech companies of countries such as Germany and China as well as the Russian government’s supporting policies play a significant role on development of innovative small and medium-sized companies. The Korean government also needs to engage in cooperation with Russian small and medium-sized businesses, for instance through government-hosted forums and funds launched by bilateral cooperation. Cooperation between small and medium sized companies through bilateral governments or government-run firms is also necessary.
       The economic cooperation of Korea and Russia was originally built around large-scale infrastructure and energy development projects by major companies. Recently this aspect is turning into industrial and technological cooperation between small and medium-sized companies and startups.
       Despite the attempts to change the structure of bilateral economic cooperation through a Korean and Russian innovation platform, the size and range of bilateral companies’ cooperation are limited in the aspect of trade, investment and technology. Global startups less than 7 years old have difficulties with expansion and consistency in Russia. As a result, milestones from the domestic market to global prospective companies in Russia are insufficient when considering exports of all Korean small and mid-sized companies. Exports are still highly concentrated in goods such as vehicles and parts, and cosmetics, while exports in promising fields such as next-generation semiconductors and displays, robots, bioindustry and heath industry remain in gridlock. The level of participation in the global value chain is also estimated to be low. Small and medium sized companies’ imports are small compared to major corporations, highly relying on specific products such as marine products and lumber. Also the majority of imports are conducted on a small scale.
       The scale of technical transfer between both countries is trivial considering the level of original technology and commercial technology they represent. Most technical transfers are conducted by major companies, bringing the percentage of small and medium sized companies in technical transfers down to merely 10 percent. Investment of small and medium sized companies on Russia is lower than that of developing countries such as Vietnam and India, not to mention investment in the U.S. and China. In addition, those investments are mostly focused in the service industry, wholesale and retail sales industry and agricultural fishing industry.
       Overall economic cooperation between the two countries goes far beyond expectation. This fact, however, implies the potential and chance of bilateral cooperation are significantly high. If small and medium sized companies’ lack in information and funding capacities are supplemented through an innovative platform, the level of trade, investment and technological transfer of bilateral participants is expected to rise higher.
       Sluggish cooperation of bilateral small and medium-sized enterprises can be overcome through improvement in institutional support. Economical cooperation between Korea and Russia has continued since 1997. The economic cooperation platform must be reinforced to catch up with the innovations made since then. The current innovation platform is insufficient from the perspectives of trade, investment and finance.
       The study goes on to consider several steps to boost expansion of Korean small and medium sized companies. First of all, supporting plans need to be subdivided according to a company’s characteristics. Secondly, more support should be provided in the area of five promising consumer goods, which as of yet show poor performance. Thirdly, the government needs to help investment toward Russia result in higher value creation. Lastly, the GVC between Korea and Russia needs to be expanded into a broader form.
       Cooperation tasks from the perspective of small and medium sized corporations can be summarized in nine points. First, it will be necessary to take a long-term approach. The most important condition learned from cooperation between Russia-Germany and Russia-China is consistency. The second point to consider is technical cooperation based on public nature and reliability. Third, stable technical cooperation could be made possible through joint expansion of major companies and small and medium sized companies. Fourth, technical cooperation can be pursued by utilizing Russian exclusive industrial zone and techno parks. For instance Korean technical venture companies can establish joint ventures with Russian companies. Fifth, technical cooperation can be settled through the 2035 National Technology Initiative Policy, strongly supported by the Russian government. Sixth, the stability of technical cooperation could be improved by utilizing Russia’s import substitution policy. The seventh direction to consider would be constructing a new type of model such as technical cooperation through exporting Korea’s commercialization technology to Russia. Eighth is technical cooperation between small and medium sized companies in the agrifood field. Lastly, the role of the Innoviz Association and Korean Federation of Small and Medium Businesses should be reinforced, especially in technical cooperation for smart factory.
       In conclusion, more attention and investment on the part of the Korean government is necessary when considering Russia’s abundant natural resources and its geopolitical importance, which are receiving attention from North Asian countries. The importance of the Eastern Economic Forum, held since 2015 annually in Vladivostok, is growing higher. The Korean government’s strategic support for corporations is urgently needed. Korea and Russia are planning to construct an industrial complex in the Littoral Province. The industrial complex will be distributed in 2022 and its completion is planned in 2024. The Korean government should actively utilize the industrial complex as a representative example of successful cooperation between Korean and Russian small and medium sized companies.
  • 만화로 보는 세계경제 2021
    만화로 보는 세계경제 2021

    KIEP Date 2021.12.23

    United States of America Latin America China Japan Europe Russia Eurasia Southeast Asia Ocean India and South Asia Africa Middle East
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  • 디지털플랫폼에 관한 최근 EU의 규제개편 및 우리나라의 통상친화적 제도 개선 방향
    The Keynote of Korea’s Trade-friendly Digital Platform Regulation at the Outset of EU’s New Legislation

       This study aims to present policy suggestions for Korea’s digital platform regulation with particular focus on the EU’s recent drafts of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Market Act (DMA). The former is a s..

    Han-Young Lie et al. Date 2021.12.20

    ICT economy, Electronic commerce
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       This study aims to present policy suggestions for Korea’s digital platform regulation with particular focus on the EU’s recent drafts of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Market Act (DMA). The former is a social regulation to promote a transparent and safe online environment, while the latter is an economic regulation to prevent potential anticompetitive conducts by so-called “gatekeepers.”
       Chapter II of the study examines the distinctive characteristics of digital platforms from an economic standpoint. Chapter III analyzes the details of the DSA and DMA, including their compatibility with GATS. Chapter IV looks over the main contents, characteristics and structure of Korea’s laws and regulations on digital platforms, including those under parliamentary discussion. Chapter V and VI seek to put forward takeaways for Korea’s digital platform regulation, evaluating its policy space vis-a-vis trade obligations.
       Key policy suggestions are as follows. First, careful consideration must be taken of the pros, cons, and probable consequences involved when switching from ex-post regulation to an ex-ante regime. Seldom advisable is to rely heavily on ex-ante regulation. Second, benchmarking foreign law or legislation drafts should answer the respective regulatory purpose. For instance, it is not appropriate to refer to the DSA instead of the DMA when dealing with anticompetitive conducts of digital platform. Third, the definition of “gatekeeper” within the DMA is conceptually no better than a market-dominant digital platform equipped with quasi-essential facilities. This kind of approach could entail quite a trade risk, since it lacks international consensus building at the moment. Finally, Korea should be ready for potential trade conflicts in the near future over its digital platform regulation. A highly possible case would be de facto breach of national treatment obligation. In this respect, there is an urgent need to address how to harness exceptional rights of defense embedded in trade agreements such as GATS.
  • 4차 산업혁명 시대 무역원활화 제고를 위한 싱글윈도우 개선방안 및 시사점
    Single Window for the Trade Facilitation in the Era of the 4th Industrial Revolution

       The 4th Industrial Revolution, characterized by convergence of technologies, blurs the boundaries of the product classification by which import and export regulations are applied. This imposes more burden on firms’ c..

    Eun-Jae Lee and Jisoo Yi Date 2021.11.25

    ICT economy, Trade policy
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    Summary
       The 4th Industrial Revolution, characterized by convergence of technologies, blurs the boundaries of the product classification by which import and export regulations are applied. This imposes more burden on firms’ compliance with the import and export customs procedures. In customs procedures, the product classification is a key criterion for determining whether they are subject to import/export regulations or customs tariffs. Still, there are often differences of opinion on item classification among related government agencies. Efforts at home and abroad to harmonize product classification are continuing, but not fast enough to keep up with the pace of the 4th Industrial Revolution.
       For this reason, the applicable regulations for import and export products are rarely predictable for companies. Companies often get lost about which government agency they should contact, when, and what kind of work they should complete. Customs clearance is being delayed, and costs are increasing. In the 4th Industrial Revolution era, the cost of customs procedures for import and export companies is soaring as such.
       This study explores ways to rationalize firms’ compliance costs with a single window for customs procedures. Single Window is a system that simplifies the processes of completing all trade-related legal requirements in one submission. The Korea Customs Service (KCS) also introduced a “Customs Clearance Single Window” in 2006 to unify the requirement verification procedure to check firms’ compliance with import and export regulations and the import and export declaration procedure of customs. This study aims to analyze the status of efforts to simplify customs procedures with the Customs Clearance Single Window (CCSW), and seek improvement measures and implications for Single Window in the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution.
       This research consists of five chapters. The background, purpose, methods, and construction of the study are explained in the first chapter. In the second chapter a literature review is conducted on inter-government information sharing, the concept of Single Window, and the status of international Single Window implementations. The third chapter includes analyzing the current procedure unification under CCSW from technological, organizational, and institutional perspectives. The fourth chapter states why the convergence of the customs procedures is necessary for the 4th Industrial Revolution era and presents a U.S. Customs Border Protection (CBP) Single Window model. The fifth chapter is for the research results summary, and also elaborates the implications for the improvement of CCSW. Further issues dealt with within the research are explained in more detail in the following sections.
       Chapter 2 summarizes previous studies on inter-government agencies’ information sharing. The reasons and solutions for the failure in introducing e-Government in the 1990s are summarized. Based on the review, this study emphasizes the need for government organizations to fulfill their role as a “steward” rather than owners of public information, promote institutional and organizational coercion, and activate sub-networks to build trust. In addition, this chapter examines the global adoption status of single windows based on the survey results of 58 World Customs Organization (WCO) member states in 2010. It also introduces the U.S. government’s efforts over the past 26 years to build a legal and organizational framework for Single Window implementation.
       Chapter 3 summarizes the analysis results on the status of integration and unification of import and export customs clearance procedures at CCSW in terms of technology, organization, and institution. From a technical point of view, the merger between the import/export declaration and the requirements verification process was insignificant. About 95% of the verification requests, 63 related standard forms from 31 agencies, are processed using CCSW. Still, as most import and export companies utilize user programs for export and import declarations, the two procedures are performed separately.
       The legal framework for CCSW is also vulnerable. The establishment and operation of a single window, the scope of integration and simplification of business procedures, the purpose of the system and evaluation of operational performance, and the roles and responsibilities of the operating and participating organizations are not stipulated in the Customs Act. In addition, there is no memorandum of understanding or service contract defining operating services and methods of cooperation with the operating organization. There is also no provision for granting access rights that guarantee access to the data log the other party maintains, even when necessary for risk management or litigation.
       This study concludes that the CCSW corresponds to stage two of the five stages of single window evolution of UN/ECE and is close to a “single submission portal” by UN/CEFACT standards. The CCSW was highly valued compared to countries where customs modernization or computerization was backward, and there was a misunderstanding in the evaluation in international reports. However, the CCSW, without adequate legal authority, leadership or cooperation, and agreement on the usage of the legacy programs, is not regarded as a valid single window.
       Chapter 4 explains the need to integrate import/export declaration and requirement verification procedures to relieve firms’ compliance burden amid the 4th Industrial Revolution. This chapter also introduces the U.S. CBP’s case of procedure integration for establishing a single window. Separate systems used by U.S. government agencies were integrated into a single window, and a data model was developed to send and receive data to and from this integrated system. The private program developers can freely design user programs for import and export companies. Developed programs that have passed the customs test are released to the public, and companies can choose the programs according to their needs. The U.S. government has released a wide range of technical documentation required to develop user programs, giving companies greater autonomy in compliance with the law and expanding options to choose the appropriate program minimizing the overall compliance costs.
       Chapter 5 summarizes the previous discussion and outlines implications for building a valid single window that reduces firms’ compliance in the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution. First, government agencies should integrate information to increase data value and faithfully fulfill their “stewardship” responsible for the accuracy, integrity, and security of data. The development of user programs should be left to the market. The Korea Customs Service and the participating government agencies should direct their administrative resources toward integrating inter-agency systems and developing data models. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen capacities in customs systems to build data models that process import/export customs information. For the “datafication” of technical information related to import and export customs procedures, a systematic human resource program should be launched to discover, nurture, evaluate, and reward talents in each ministry.
       There should also be support for establishing governance based on the autonomy of import and export enterprises. The customs clearance program market in Korea is not active, and it is difficult for new developers to access. Government support should back up start-up companies collaborating with customs brokers to revitalize the market. A system to test the quality of the developed program should also be established. 
       In addition, it is necessary to create a legal framework for a single window to clarify the purpose of a single window for customs, the scope of simplification, and the role and responsibility of the operating organization. The roles and responsibilities under the cooperation should be clarified in a memorandum of understanding or agreement between the operating organization and participating organizations. Access rights for mutual risk management and dispute resolution should also be stipulated. 
       In this process, the operating institution must have strong leadership and policy driving force and activate the arena of cooperation, communication, and network activities. Lastly, an education system with which all participating institutions can continuously develop the required capacity and a robust feedback system through which all the interest parties can continually provide their opinion at the policy level should be established.

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Income Inequality: Evidence from APEC Member Ec..
    The Effects of Climate Change on Income Inequality: Evidence from APEC Member Economies

    This study empirically investigates the dynamic effects of climate change on within-country income inequality. Using panel data of 17 APEC member economies, I estimate impulse responses via the local projection method. Temperature..

    Wongi Kim Date 2021.11.15

    APEC, Environmental policy
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    Content
    Executive Summary

    I. Introduction

    II. Related Literature

    III. Econometrics and Data
    1. Local Projections
    2. Identification Strategy
    3. Data

    IV. Empirical Results
    1. Results in the Linear Model
    2. Results in the Non-linear Model
    3. The Role of Redistribution Policy

    V. Discussion and Policy Implications
    VI. Concluding Remarks

    References

    Summary
    This study empirically investigates the dynamic effects of climate change on within-country income inequality. Using panel data of 17 APEC member economies, I estimate impulse responses via the local projection method. Temperature and precipitation shocks, defined as deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms, are also exploited to measure country-specific climate change. The empirical results reveal the following. First, temperature and precipitation shocks deteriorate income inequality measured by the Gini index; these effects are long-lasting. Moreover, asymmetric effects exist: heatwaves and droughts more significantly increase income inequality than coldwaves and floods. Lastly, current redistribution policies do not seem to effectively mitigate those adverse effects. I also discuss implications of carbon pricing/tax and environmental taxes related to income inequality.

  • 미국의 스위스 환율조작국 지정 원인 분석 및 평가
    On the U.S. 2020 Designation of Switzerland a Currency Manipulator

       In December 2020, the U.S. Treasury designated Switzerland, together with Vietnam, currency manipulators in its biannual report Macroeconomic Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States to..

    Dong-Hee Joe et al. Date 2021.11.12

    Economic relations, Exchange rate United States of America Europe
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    Content
    Summary
       In December 2020, the U.S. Treasury designated Switzerland, together with Vietnam, currency manipulators in its biannual report Macroeconomic Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States to the congress. The report conducts an enhanced analysis on each country exceeding certain thresholds in three criteria: trade surplus with the U.S., current account surplus and foreign exchange market intervention. Based on this analysis, the Treasury can designate the country a currency manipulator. Switzerland met the three criterion during the period of the analysis of the December 2020 report, from the third quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2020, and the Treasury’s decision was the result of an enhanced analysis.
       During the period of the analysis, Switzerland had negative interest rates and deflation; and the Swiss Franc (CHF), considered to be a safe asset in the international financial market, severely appreciated following the outbreak of COVID-19. The report acknowledged the need for foreign exchange market intervention in such a situation to counter the pressure on CHF. However, it claimed that the magnitude of the intervention was excessive; that is, at least some of it was to improve the competitiveness of Swiss products.
    This study aims at evaluating the U.S. Treasury’s decision to designate Switzerland a currency manipulator, by surveying related empirical evidences. To evaluate the claim that Swiss intervention in the foreign exchange market was to improve the country’s price competitiveness, we survey the empirical evidences on the sensitivity of Swiss exports to the exchange rate of CHF. To evaluate the legitimacy of Swiss intervention in the foreign exchange market, we survey the empirical evidences on the impact of sudden exogenous appreciation of CHF on the country’s domestic economy.
       Swiss export is characterized by high technological intensity and value-added. At the HS 4-digit level, for instance, exports are highly concentrated in high value-added and technology-intensive products such as medicine, medical products, chemicals and luxury watches. This concentration is known to be a result of the country’s strategic choice during the first era globalization, from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. Thanks to this export structure, the CHF exchange rate has little impact on Swiss exports, especially of medicine, medical products and luxury watches, which take up more than forty percentage of the country’s total exports.
       Sudden appreciation of CHF due to exogenous causes leads to a reduction in import prices, which in turn puts a downward pressure on domestically produced goods, resulting in deflation and distortion in the economic agents’ decision between imported goods and domestically produced goods in Switzerland. Intervention by the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the country’s central bank, is known to be effective in reducing exogenous appreciation pressure on CHF.
       Considering the characteristics of the Swiss economy, the SNB’s intervention in the foreign exchange market appears to be for countering the effect of CHF’s sudden appreciations on the country’s domestic economy, rather than for improving the country’s price competitiveness. Deflation had been happening for some time in Switzerland, to which the SNB’s mandate of price stability urged it to react; and as it kept its policy rate negative since late 2014, reducing it further would have been ineffective and inefficient.
       When the Treasury published its December 2020 report, the SNB immediately reacted by announcing its expectation that it could persuade the then-forthcoming Biden administration that its foreign exchange market intervention is solely a reaction to the exogenous appreciation pressure on CHF, not an effort to improve the country’s price competitiveness. Indeed, the April 2021 report, the first one in the Biden administration, did not designate Switzerland a currency manipulator, even though it conducted an enhanced analysis on Switzerland, as well as on Taiwan and Vietnam. This observation supports the suspicion that the conclusion of the December 2020 report was politically motivated. The Biden administration, which was about to take office at the time of the publication of the December 2020 report, was largely expected to change the Trump administration’s policies towards foreign countries, including the designation of currency manipulators. It appears plausible that the outgoing administration tried to constrain the incoming administration’s policies.
       This observation suggests that the Biden administration is unlikely to designate Switzerland a currency manipulator in the future. There is a high chance that Switzerland, due to the characteristics of its economy, will again meet the three criterion for an enhanced analysis. However, the Swiss government and central bank have consistently reacted to such criticisms, and the April 2021 report’s evaluation agrees with their reactions. Therefore, the conclusions of the enhanced analyses conducted in the Biden administration are likely to be in line with that of the April 2021 report.
  • Does digitalization help employment stability during the COVID-19 pandemic?: Evi..
    Does digitalization help employment stability during the COVID-19 pandemic?: Evidence from Korean survey data

    This paper investigates if workers’ ICT use intensity helps to improve their labor market outcomes in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic using real-time survey data produced in Korea. We first find that the impacts of the p..

    Seongman Moon Date 2021.10.20

    APEC, ICT economy
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    Content
    Executive Summary

    I. Introduction

    Ⅱ. Related Literature

    Ⅲ. Real-Time Survey Data
    3.1. Survey Design
    3.2. Summary Statistics

    Ⅳ. Empirical Models
    4.1. A Model for Different Impacts of COVID-19
    4.2. Models for the Role of Digitalization

    V. Heterogeneous Impacts of COVID-19

    VI. Workers’ ICT Use and Impacts of COVID-19
    6.1. ICT Use Intensity
    6.2. ICT Skills
    6.3. Internet Activities

    VII. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks

    References

    Summary
    This paper investigates if workers’ ICT use intensity helps to improve their labor market outcomes in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic using real-time survey data produced in Korea. We first find that the impacts of the pandemic on labor market outcomes are different across workers’ socio-economic characteristics and industries where they are employed: workers in service or construction industries, temporary workers, and workers who had experienced unemployment before the pandemic are more likely to be unemployed, be furloughed, work less hours, and have earnings reduced in the early stage of the pandemic. We measure workers’ ICT use intensity by weekly computer, mobile, and internet usage hours and find that workers who belong to a group with high ICT use intensity tend to mitigate the adverse effects of the pandemic on their labor market outcomes, while controlling for skill-fixed, industry-fixed, and region-fixed effects as well as for individual characteristics.
  • FTA가 중소기업의 고용과 혁신에 미치는 영향
    The Effects of Free Trade Agreements on SMEs’ Employment and Innovation

    Beginning with the Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2004, Korea has continued to actively implement FTA policies, and as of June 2020 a total of 16 FTAs ​​with 56 countries are in effect. As a result, Korea's trade volume..

    Kyong Hyun Koo et al. Date 2021.09.02

    Labor market, Trade policy
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    Content
    Summary
    Beginning with the Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2004, Korea has continued to actively implement FTA policies, and as of June 2020 a total of 16 FTAs ​​with 56 countries are in effect. As a result, Korea's trade volume has grown rapidly since the 2000s, providing an important driving force for Korea's economic growth.
      A number of studies have reviewed the positive impacts of the FTA policy on the overall economic growth of Korea from various aspects. However, there have been few attempts to explore whether the positive results of FTAs have been shared evenly between large and small/ medium enterprises, or if most of the benefits have been enjoyed mainly by large enterprises. Addressing this research gap, this study examines the effects of Korea's FTA policies on employment and innovation activities of SMEs and analyzes how each effect varies depending on firm characteristics to draw policy implications.
      According to the empirical results, the employment and real wages of SMEs significantly increased mainly in industries where the effect of export expansion due to FTAs was higher, with innovation activities also taking place more actively in such industries. On the other hand, although the SMEs in industries with high import competition due to FTAs showed a relatively low increase in the real wage, no negative effect was found on the employment or innovation activities of SMEs. Taken together, Korea's FTA policies seem to have played a positive role in boosting overall employment and innovation of SMEs in the manufacturing sector.
      However, when re-identifying the FTA effects by firm size of SMEs, most of the positive effects of FTAs ​​were mainly centered on medium- sized enterprises, and relatively small enterprises tended to be alienated from such positive effects or conversely exposed to the negative effects of FTAs. For example, the effect of reducing the real wage growth rate due to FTA-induced import competition effect mainly occurred in small enterprises, and the effect of FTAs toward increasing the innovation activities of small enterprises was not found. On the other hand, medium-sized firms led the increase in employment and innovation activities of SMEs due to the FTA export effect, and although they experienced a decrease in employment due to the FTA import competition effect, there was no significant decrease in real wages. This suggests that unlike small-sized firms, medium-sized ones have leveraged the import competition pressure from FTAs as an opportunity for efficient resource allocation and productivity improvement through restructuring.
      Based on the results of the empirical analysis above, we discuss some policy implications for improving FTAs’ benefits for SMEs’ employment and innovation.
  • ODA 시행기관의 성과관리체계 개선방안 연구
    Study on Results-Based Management System in Korea’s Aid Agencies

       Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2010, there has been a continuous rise in Korea’s aid budget as well as the number of government ministries and public agencies engaging in the..

    Yul Kwon et al. Date 2021.08.31

    Economic development, Economic cooperation
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    Content

    Summary
       Since Korea’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2010, there has been a continuous rise in Korea’s aid budget as well as the number of government ministries and public agencies engaging in the aid industry. The proliferation of new actors has led to growing concerns on the organizational capacity to ensure aid effectiveness of new aid-spending ministries and agencies. Aside from the main aid agencies such as the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) under the Export-Import Bank of Korea, the number of government ministries and public agencies (hereafter referred to as non-aid agencies) that spend aid budget is up to forty-one as of the financial year 2021. In terms of budget composition, the non-aid agencies account for approximately half of Korea’s grant aid budget.
       In this context, this paper reviews aid management schemes at Korea’s aid agencies as well as non-aid agencies with special attention on their organizational capacity to ensure aid effectiveness and results-based management. Chapter two starts by reviewing the aid management schemes of Korea’s aid agencies and non-aid agencies in terms of their aid strategy and programs, key channels and modalities, budget allocation and result-management system. In addition, the paper moves on to analyze the aid portfolio and governance mechanism of the fourteen top aid-spending agencies, examining whether and to what extent there exists a strategic coordination system among multiple executing agencies to ensure internal coherence of their projects and programs. Based on a case-study approach, chapter three explores the cases of three agencies that have different cooperation schemes for results management and evaluation. The first model is the case of the main grant aid agency, namely KOICA, which has an independent evaluation unit within the agency. The second model is the case of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and its executing agency, the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH), which incorporates an evaluation function within the agency. The organizational structure for evaluation at the KOFIH is somehow similar to that of the KOICA, albeit with much smaller budget. The third model is the case of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs and its main executing agency, the Korea Rural Community Corporation, which delegates the evaluation function to the state-led think tank, the Korea Rural Economic Institute. Having evaluation functions within or outside the agency, the experience of these three agencies provides valuable lessons for other agencies with relatively limited budget, human resources and expertise. It was found that in order to strengthen evidence-based policy and implementation and ensure aid effectiveness, Korea’s aid agencies need to invest more on building evaluation expertise, addressing resource constraints and make more efforts to use and learn from the evaluation results and recommendations. 
       Based on the analysis, the paper concludes with suggestions for future policy direction. Amid the growing demand for evidence-based decision-making and value for money, it is recommended that the Korean government introduce periodical assessment of results management systems at Korea’s aid agencies and strengthen strategic evaluation and learning systems for increasingly diverse actors in aid industries. The paper also suggests that the newly established Office for International Development Cooperation under the Office for Government Policy Coordination of Korea exercise enhanced leadership to provide policy directions and guidelines in the realm of results-based management and evaluation systems for Korea’s aid and non-aid agencies. 

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